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Prices for Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd’s Water Supply Services

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Preliminary

1 Application of this determination

This determination sets a methodology for fixing the maximum prices that Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd (ACN 125 935 177) (SDP) may charge for the Water Supply Services.

2 Commencement and term of this determination

(a) This determination commences on the later of 1 July 2017 and the date that it is published in the NSW Government Gazette (Commencement Date).

(b) The maximum prices set out in, or calculated in accordance with, this determination apply from the Commencement Date to 30 June 2022 (Term). The maximum prices set out in, or calculated in accordance with, this determination prevailing at 30 June 2022 continue to apply beyond 30 June 2022 until this determination is replaced.

3 Declaration

(a) Section 51 of the WIC Act provides that the Minister administering Part 5 of the WIC Act (Minister) may declare that a specified licensed retail supplier or licensed network operator is a monopoly supplier in relation to:

(i) a specified water supply or sewerage service; and
(ii) a specified area; and
(iii) a specified class of customers.

(b) By order dated 2 May 2011, the Minister, under section 51 of the WIC Act, declared SDP to be a monopoly supplier in a network operator and retail supplier capacity:

(i) for the purposes specified in SDP’s Network Operator’s Licence and Retail Supplier’s Licence; and
(ii) for distribution within the area of operations as specified in SDP’s Network Operator’s Licence and Retail Supplier’s Licence; and
(iii) to specified persons or classes of persons as specified in SDP’s Retail Supplier’s Licence.

4 Referral to IPART

(a) Under section 52(1)(a) of the WIC Act, the Minister may refer to IPART, for investigation and report, the determination of the pricing for any service in respect of which a declaration is in force under section 51 of the WIC Act.
(b) Under a referral made on 2 May 2011 and amended on 16 February 2012 (Referral), the Minister required IPART to determine the pricing for the following services provided by SDP (Water Supply Services):
(i) the supply of non-rainfall dependent drinking water to purchasers; and
(ii) the making available of the desalination plant to supply non-rainfall dependent drinking water.

(c) Under section 52(2) of the WIC Act, the provisions of Part 3 of the IPART Act in relation to government monopoly services apply to and in respect of a matter referred to IPART under section 52 of the WIC Act, in the same way as they apply to and in respect of a matter referred to IPART under section 12 of the IPART Act.

(d) In investigating and reporting on the pricing of the Water Supply Services, IPART has had regard to matters including:
(i) the matters it is required to consider under the Referral in accordance with section 13(1)(c) of the IPART Act; and
(ii) the matters set out in section 15(1) of the IPART Act.

(e) This determination is made under section 52 of the WIC Act, pursuant to the Referral.

5 Schedules

Schedules 1-3 are pricing schedules

(a) Schedule 1 sets out the methodology to be applied to determine the maximum prices that SDP may charge for the Water Supply Services during a Plant Operation Period.

(b) Schedule 2 sets out the methodology to be applied to determine the maximum prices that SDP may charge for the Water Supply Services during a Shutdown Period.

(c) Schedule 3 sets out the methodology to be applied to determine the maximum prices that SDP may charge for the Water Supply Services during a Restart Period.

Schedule 4 makes provision for the abatement mechanism

(d) Schedule 4 makes provision for an abatement mechanism which modifies the Abatable Charges provided for in schedules 1-3.

Schedule 5 contains definitions and interpretation provisions

(e) Definitions and interpretation provisions used in this determination are set out in schedule 5.

Schedule 6 is a statement of reasons for using a methodology to fix maximum prices

(f) In accordance with section 13A of the IPART Act, IPART has set a methodology for fixing the maximum prices that SDP may charge for the Water Supply...
Services. As required by section 13A(3) of the IPART Act, a statement of the reasons why IPART has chosen to make a determination that involves setting the methodology for fixing maximum prices is set out in schedule 6.

6 Compliance with this determination

Section 52(3) of the WIC Act has the effect that it is a condition of SDP’s licences under the WIC Act that it must comply with this determination.

7 Monitoring

(a) Under section 85(1) of the WIC Act, IPART may monitor and report to the Minister on the extent to which SDP complies or fails to comply with the conditions of SDP’s licences under the WIC Act.

(b) Under section 87 of the WIC Act, IPART may require SDP to keep specified records and provide IPART with specified information for the purpose of IPART monitoring and reporting on SDP’s compliance with SDP’s licences under the WIC Act.

(c) Under clause 1(1) of schedules 1 and 2 to the Water Industry Competition (General) Regulation 2008, SDP must provide IPART with such information in relation to SDP’s activities under its Retail Supplier’s Licence and Network Operator’s Licence as IPART may direct within the time specified by IPART.

8 Simplified outline

The following is a simplified outline of this determination.

Broadly, the applicable charges in the different modes of operation consist of the following:

During a Plant Operation Period:

- a water usage charge (a volumetric charge, including a variable network costs component) ($/ML);
- a base service charge (a fixed daily charge, including variable and fixed network costs components) ($/day);
- an incremental service charge (a fixed daily charge, including a variable network costs component) ($/day);
- a pipeline charge (a fixed daily charge) ($/day); and
- a membrane service charge (a fixed daily charge) ($/day).
During a Shutdown Period:

- a water usage charge (a volumetric charge, which applies to Desalinated Water supplied from storage only, and includes a variable network costs component) ($/ML);
- a base service charge (a fixed daily charge, including variable and fixed network costs components) ($/day);
- a transition to shutdown charge (a one-off charge payable at the beginning of certain shutdown periods);
- a pipeline charge (a fixed daily charge) ($/day);
- a membrane service charge (a fixed daily charge) ($/day); and
- a residual membrane charge (a one-off charge payable in certain shutdown periods immediately following the first Plant Operation Period of the Term only).

During a Restart Period:

- a water usage charge (a volumetric charge, which applies to Desalinated Water supplied from storage only, and includes a variable network costs component) ($/ML);
- a base service charge (a fixed daily charge, including variable and fixed network costs components) ($/day);
- a transition to restart charge (a one-off charge payable at the beginning of certain restart periods);
- a pipeline charge (a fixed daily charge) ($/day); and
- a membrane service charge (a fixed daily charge) ($/day).
Schedule 1  Maximum prices for the Water Supply Services during a Plant Operation Period

1  Application
(a) This schedule specifies the methodology for determining the maximum prices that SDP may charge for the Water Supply Services provided during a Plant Operation Period.
(b) This schedule 1 does not apply to Water Supply Services provided during:
   (i) a Shutdown Period; or
   (ii) a Restart Period.

2  Maximum prices for the Water Supply Services during a Plant Operation Period
The maximum price that SDP may levy on a customer for the Water Supply Services during a Plant Operation Period is the sum of the following:
   (a) the water usage charge calculated in accordance with clause 3;
   (b) the base service charge calculated in accordance with clause 4;
   (c) the incremental service charge calculated in accordance with clause 5;
   (d) the pipeline charge calculated in accordance with clause 6; and
   (e) the membrane service charge calculated in accordance with clause 7.

3  Plant Operation Period water usage charge
(a) The water usage charge that SDP may levy on a customer for a day during a Plant Operation Period is to be calculated as follows:

\[
WUC + \frac{\$/MWh \times 320,835 MWh}{91,250 ML} \times AS
\]

where:
- WUC = the water usage charge for the applicable period, as set out in Table 1;
- $/MWh = the Variable Network Charge for the applicable period; and

[Note: 320,835MWh is the annual average amount of electricity consumption used to allocate variable network charges to SDP's water usage charge. 320,835MWh was determined by taking the annual average electricity consumption over the Term (328,500MWh p.a.) and subtracting the annual average amount of electricity consumption allocated to the fixed water service charge (5,000MWh) and incremental service charge (2,665MWh). 320,835MWh is divided by the approximate amount of Desalinated Water the Plant would produce if it were to run at full capacity.]
capacity for a year (91,250ML), to yield an approximation of the incremental amount of electricity required to produce each megalitre of Desalinated Water.

\[ \text{AS} = \text{the number of ML of Desalinated Water supplied by SDP from the Plant to that customer on the day.} \]

(b) Despite paragraph (a), the water usage charge that SDP may levy on Sydney Water Corporation for a day will be nil if:

(i) the day falls outside a Drought Response Period;

(ii) the Desalinated Water supplied to Sydney Water Corporation on the day is not supplied under an Emergency Response Notice; and

(iii) the day occurs more than 14 months after the most recent Drought Response Trigger Day.

4 **Plant Operation Period base service charge**

[Note: This is an Abatable Charge that is subject to the Abatement Factor set out in Schedule 4.]

The base service charge that SDP may levy on a customer for a day during a Plant Operation Period is to be calculated as follows:

\[
\left( BSC + FNC + (\$/MWh \times 13.70MWh) \right) \times \left( \frac{CI}{TI} \right)
\]

where:

- \( BSC \) = the base service charge for the applicable period, as set out in Table 2;
- \( FNC \) = the Fixed Network Charge for the day;
- \( \$/MWh \) = the Variable Network Charge for the applicable period;

[Note: 13.70MWh is the rounded, annual average electricity consumption, converted to a daily amount for allocating variable network charges to SDP’s base service charge. This value equates to 5,000MWh p.a. reflecting the fixed electricity consumption of the Plant regardless of its mode of operation.]

- \( CI \) = the customer’s Customer Impact for the day; and
- \( TI \) = the Total Impact for the day.

5 **Plant Operation Period incremental service charge**

[Note: This is an Abatable Charge that is subject to the Abatement Factor set out in Schedule 4.]

**Incremental service charge during a Drought Response Period or within 14 months after a Drought Response Trigger Day**

(a) The incremental service charge that SDP may levy on a customer for a day that falls within a Drought Response Period, or falls within 14 months after a Drought Response Trigger Day, or both, is to be calculated as follows:

\[
\left( ISC + (\$/MW \times 7.30MW) \right) \times \left( \frac{CI}{TI} \right)
\]

where:
**ISc** = the incremental service charge for the applicable period, as set out in Table 3;

$$$/MWh = the Variable Network Charge for the applicable period;

[Note: 7.30MWh is the rounded, annual average electricity consumption, converted to a daily amount for allocating variable network charges to SDP’s incremental service charge. This value equates to 2,665MWh p.a. reflecting the incremental fixed electricity consumption of the Plant during a Plant Operation Period.]

CI = the customer’s Customer Impact for the day; and

TI = the Total Impact for the day.

**Incremental service charge outside a Drought Response Period and not within 14 months after a Drought Response Trigger Day**

(b) Subject to paragraph (c), the incremental service charge that SDP may levy on a customer for a day that falls neither within a Drought Response Period nor within 14 months after a Drought Response Trigger Day is to be calculated as follows:

$$ISC + ($/MWh \times 7.30MWh)) \times \left(\frac{AS}{TS}\right)$$

where:

ISC = the incremental service charge for the applicable period, as set out in Table 3;

$$$/MWh = the Variable Network Charge for the applicable period;

[Note: 7.30MWh is the rounded, annual average electricity consumption, converted to a daily amount for allocating variable network charges to SDP’s incremental service charge. This value equates to 2,665MWh p.a. reflecting the incremental fixed electricity consumption of the Plant during a Plant Operation Period.]

AS = the number of ML of Desalinated Water supplied by SDP from the Plant to that customer on the day; and

TS = the number of ML of Desalinated Water supplied by SDP from the Plant to all customers on the day.

[Note: If SDP only supplies one customer, customer A, and assuming that SDP supplies 200ML to customer A, then AS and TS = 200ML.

If SDP supplies 3 customers and assuming that SDP supplies 20ML to customer A, 100ML to customer B and 50ML to customer C, then TS = 170ML and AS for customer A = 20ML, AS for customer B = 100ML and AS for customer C = 50ML.]

(c) If SDP does not supply any Desalinated Water from the Plant on a day (that is, if TS = 0), then:

(i) AS is the number of ML of Desalinated Water supplied by SDP from the Plant to that customer on the most recent day on which SDP supplied Desalinated Water; and

(ii) TS is the number of ML of Desalinated Water supplied by SDP from the Plant to all customers on the most recent day on which SDP supplied Desalinated Water.
6 Plant Operation Period pipeline charge

The pipeline charge that SDP may levy on a customer for a day during a Plant Operation Period is to be calculated as follows:

\[ PC \times \left( \frac{CI}{TI} \right) \]

where:
- \( PC \) = the pipeline charge for the applicable period, as set out in Table 4;
- \( CI \) = the customer’s Customer Impact for the day; and
- \( TI \) = the Total Impact for the day.

7 Plant Operation Period membrane service charge

[Note: This is an Abatable Charge that is subject to the Abatement Factor set out in Schedule 4.]

(a) If SDP has previously been entitled to levy a residual membrane charge during the Term under clause 8 of schedule 2, then SDP must not levy a membrane service charge under this clause 7.

Membrane service charge where a Drought Response Trigger Day has occurred

(b) Where a Drought Response Trigger Day has occurred during the Term, the membrane service charge that SDP may levy on a customer for a day is to be calculated as follows:

\[ MSC \times \left( \frac{CI}{TI} \right) \]

where:
- \( MSC \) = the membrane service charge for the applicable period, and the period when the first Non-Emergency Restart Period began, as set out in Table 5;
- \( CI \) = the customer’s Customer Impact for the day; and
- \( TI \) = the Total Impact for the day.

[Note: No charge will apply unless there have been one or more days of a Non-Emergency Restart Period.]

Membrane service charge where no Drought Response Trigger Day has occurred

(c) Subject to paragraph (d), where no Drought Response Trigger Day has occurred during the Term, the membrane service charge that SDP may levy on a customer for a day is to be calculated as follows:

\[ MSC \times \left( \frac{AS}{TS} \right) \]

where:
- \( MSC \) = the membrane service charge for the applicable period, and the period when the first Non-Emergency Restart Period began, as set out in Table 5;
AS = the number of ML of Desalinated Water supplied by SDP from the Plant to that customer on the day; and

TS = the number of ML of Desalinated Water supplied by SDP from the Plant to all customers on the day.

[Note: No charge will apply unless there have been one or more days of a Non-Emergency Restart Period.]

(d) If SDP does not supply any Desalinated Water from the Plant on a day (that is, if TS = 0), then:

(i) AS is the number of ML of Desalinated Water supplied by SDP from the Plant to that customer on the most recent day on which SDP supplied Desalinated Water; and

(ii) TS is the number of ML of Desalinated Water supplied by SDP from the Plant to all customers on the most recent day on which SDP supplied Desalinated Water.
### Tables 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5

#### Table 1  Water usage charge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Water usage charge ($/ML)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commencement Date to 30 June 2018</td>
<td>858.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019</td>
<td>729.99 x (1 + ΔCPI_t)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020</td>
<td>667.65 x (1 + ΔCPI_t)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021</td>
<td>638.33 x (1 + ΔCPI_t)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022</td>
<td>627.32 x (1 + ΔCPI_t)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 2  Base service charge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Base service charge ($/day)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commencement Date to 30 June 2018</td>
<td>373,429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019</td>
<td>369,667 x (1 + ΔCPI_t)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020</td>
<td>364,531 x (1 + ΔCPI_t)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021</td>
<td>360,317 x (1 + ΔCPI_t)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022</td>
<td>356,108 x (1 + ΔCPI_t)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 3  Incremental service charge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Incremental service charge ($/day)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commencement Date to 30 June 2018</td>
<td>21,388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019</td>
<td>21,832 x (1 + ΔCPI_t)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020</td>
<td>21,793 x (1 + ΔCPI_t)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021</td>
<td>21,524 x (1 + ΔCPI_t)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022</td>
<td>22,847 x (1 + ΔCPI_t)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 4  Pipeline charge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Pipeline charge ($/day)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commencement Date to 30 June 2018</td>
<td>101,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019</td>
<td>101,167 x (1 + ΔCPI_t)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020</td>
<td>100,867 x (1 + ΔCPI_t)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021</td>
<td>101,090 x (1 + ΔCPI_t)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022</td>
<td>100,976 x (1 + ΔCPI_t)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Table 5 Membrane service charge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period when first Non-Emergency Restart Period began</th>
<th>Commencement Date to 30 June 2018</th>
<th>1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019</th>
<th>1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020</th>
<th>1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021</th>
<th>1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commencement Date to 30 June 2018</td>
<td>14,106</td>
<td>13,624 x (1+ΔCPI₂)</td>
<td>13,107 x (1+ΔCPI₂)</td>
<td>12,661 x (1+ΔCPI₂)</td>
<td>12,179 x (1+ΔCPI₂)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>14,106 x (1+ΔCPI₂)</td>
<td>13,624 x (1+ΔCPI₂)</td>
<td>13,107 x (1+ΔCPI₂)</td>
<td>12,661 x (1+ΔCPI₂)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>14,106 x (1+ΔCPI₂)</td>
<td>13,624 x (1+ΔCPI₂)</td>
<td>13,107 x (1+ΔCPI₂)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>14,106 x (1+ΔCPI₂)</td>
<td>13,624 x (1+ΔCPI₂)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>14,106 x (1+ΔCPI₂)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If no Non-Emergency Restart Period</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Schedule 2 Maximum prices for the Water Supply Services during a Shutdown Period

1 Application
(a) This schedule specifies the methodology for determining the maximum prices that SDP may charge for the Water Supply Services provided during a Shutdown Period.
(b) This schedule 2 does not apply to Water Supply Services provided during:
(i) a Plant Operation Period; or
(ii) a Restart Period.

2 Maximum prices for the Water Supply Services during a Shutdown Period
The maximum price that SDP may levy on a customer for the Water Supply Services provided during a Shutdown Period is the sum of the following:
(a) the water usage charge calculated in accordance with clause 3;
(b) the base service charge calculated in accordance with clause 4;
(c) the transition to shutdown charge calculated in accordance with clause 5;
(d) the pipeline charge calculated in accordance with clause 6;
(e) the membrane service charge calculated in accordance with clause 7; and
(f) the residual membrane charge calculated in accordance with clause 8.

3 Shutdown Period water usage charge
(a) The water usage charge that SDP may levy on a customer for a day during a Shutdown Period is to be calculated as follows:
\[ WUC + \frac{\$/MWh \times 320,835MWh}{91,250ML} \times AS \]
where:
- \( WUC \) = the water usage charge for the applicable period, as set out in Table 6;
- \( \$/MWh \) = the Variable Network Charge for the applicable period; and

[Note: 320,835MWh is the annual average amount of electricity consumption used to allocate variable network charges to SDP’s water usage charge. 320,835MWh was determined by taking the annual average electricity consumption over the Term (328,500MWh p.a.) and subtracting the annual average amount of electricity consumption allocated to the fixed water service charge (5,000MWh) and incremental service charge (2,665MWh). 320,835MWh is divided by the]
approximate amount of Desalinated Water the Plant would produce if it were to run at full capacity for a year (91,250ML), to yield an approximation of the incremental amount of electricity required to produce each megalitre of Desalinated Water.

\[ AS = \text{the number of ML of Desalinated Water supplied by SDP from the Plant to that customer on the day.} \]

[Note: Although the Plant will not produce Desalinated Water during a Shutdown Period, SDP may continue to supply Desalinated Water out of storage after production has stopped.]

(b) Despite paragraph (a), the water usage charge that SDP may levy on Sydney Water Corporation for a day will be nil if:

(i) the day falls outside a Drought Response Period;

(ii) the Desalinated Water supplied to Sydney Water Corporation on the day is not supplied under an Emergency Response Notice; and

(iii) the day occurs more than 14 months after the most recent Drought Response Trigger Day.

4 Shutdown Period base service charge

[Note: This is an Abatable Charge that is subject to the Abatement Factor set out in Schedule 4.] The base service charge that SDP may levy on a customer for each day of the Shutdown Period is to be calculated as follows:

\[ (BSC + FNC + ($/MWh \times 13.70MWh)) \times \frac{(CI)}{TI} \]

where:

\( BSC \) = the base service charge for the applicable period, as set out in Table 7;

\( FNC \) = the Fixed Network Charge for the day;

\( $/MWh \) = the Variable Network Charge for the applicable period;

[Note: 13.70MWh is the rounded, annual average electricity consumption, converted to a daily amount for allocating variable network charges to SDP’s base service charge. This value equates to 5,000MWh p.a. reflecting the fixed electricity consumption of the Plant regardless of its mode of operation.]

\( CI \) = the customer’s Customer Impact for the day; and

\( TI \) = the Total Impact for the day.

5 Transition to shutdown charge

[Note: This clause sets out two circumstances in which SDP may levy a transition to shutdown charge:

\( \uparrow \) where the Shutdown Period is the first since a Drought Response Trigger Day (i.e., within drought); and

\( \uparrow \) where the Shutdown Period is triggered by a Cease Supply Notice or by the occurrence of an Emergency Response Cease Day (i.e., outside drought).]
First Shutdown Period since Drought Response Cease Day

(a) Subject to paragraph (c), SDP may levy a transition to shutdown charge in respect of a Shutdown Period if the Shutdown Period is the first since the most recent Drought Response Cease Day.

(b) Where paragraph (a) applies, the transition to shutdown charge that SDP may levy on a customer is to be calculated as follows:

\[ TTS \times \left( \frac{CI}{TI} \right) \]

where:
- \( TTS \) = the transition to shutdown charge for the applicable period (being the period that includes the first day of the Shutdown Period), as set out in Table 8;
- \( CI \) = the customer’s Customer Impact for the most recent Drought Response Period prior to the Shutdown Period; and
- \( TI \) = the Total Impact for the most recent Drought Response Period prior to the Shutdown Period.

(c) SDP must not levy a transition to shutdown charge under paragraph (a), if it is entitled to levy a transition to shutdown charge under paragraph (d).

Shutdown Period triggered by Cease Supply Notice or Emergency Response Cease Day

(d) SDP may levy a transition to shutdown charge in respect of a Shutdown Period if the Shutdown Period was triggered by a customer.

[Note: See clause 2.1(l) of schedule 5 as to when a customer triggers a Shutdown Period.]

(e) Where paragraph (d) applies, the transition to shutdown charge that SDP may levy on each customer who triggered the commencement of the Shutdown Period is to be calculated as follows:

\[ TTS \times \frac{1}{TNC} \]

where:
- \( TTS \) = the transition to shutdown charge for the applicable period (being the period that includes the first day of the Shutdown Period), as set out in Table 8; and
- \( TNC \) = the total number of customers who triggered the commencement of the Shutdown Period.

6 Shutdown Period pipeline charge

The pipeline charge that SDP may levy on a customer for each day of the Shutdown Period is to be calculated as follows:

\[ PC \times \left( \frac{CI}{TI} \right) \]

where:
$PC = \text{the pipeline charge for the applicable period, as set out in Table 9;}$

$CI = \text{the customer’s Customer Impact for the day; and}$

$TI = \text{the Total Impact for the day.}$

7 **Shutdown Period membrane service charge**

[Note: This is an Abatable Charge that is subject to the Abatement Factor set out in Schedule 4.]

(a) If SDP has previously been entitled to levy a residual membrane charge during the Term under clause 8 of this schedule 2, then SDP must not levy a membrane service charge under this clause 7.

**Membrane service charge where a Drought Response Trigger Day has occurred**

(b) Where a Drought Response Trigger Day has occurred during the Term, the membrane service charge that SDP may levy on a customer for a day is to be calculated as follows:

$$MSC \times \left(\frac{CI}{TI}\right)$$

where:

$MSC = \text{the membrane service charge for the applicable period, and the period when the first Non-Emergency Restart Period began, as set out in Table 10;}$

$CI = \text{the customer’s Customer Impact for the day; and}$

$TI = \text{the Total Impact for the day.}$

[Note: No charge will apply unless there have been one or more days of a Non-Emergency Restart Period.]

**Membrane service charge where no Drought Response Trigger Day has occurred**

(c) Where:

(i) at least one Restart Period has been triggered by a customer serving a Restart Plant Notice during the Term; and

(ii) no Drought Response Trigger Day has occurred during the Term,

the membrane service charge that SDP may levy on a customer for a day is to be calculated as follows:

$$MSC \times \left(\frac{AS}{TS}\right)$$

where:

$MSC = \text{the membrane service charge for the applicable period, and the period when the first Non-Emergency Restart Period began, as set out in Table 10;}$

$AS = \text{the number of ML of Desalinated Water supplied by SDP from the Plant to that customer on the most recent day on which SDP supplied Desalinated Water; and}$

...
TS = the number of ML of Desalinated Water supplied by SDP from the Plant to all customers on the most recent day on which SDP supplied Desalinated Water.

[Note: No charge will apply unless there have been one or more days of a Non-Emergency Restart Period.]

8 Shutdown Period residual membrane charge

(a) SDP may only levy a residual membrane charge for the first day of a Shutdown Period if:

(i) SDP has not previously been entitled to levy a residual membrane charge during the Term;

(ii) the Shutdown Period was triggered by a customer serving a Cease Supply Notice; and

(iii) as at the start of the Shutdown Period:

(A) no Drought Response Trigger Day has occurred during the Term; and

(B) at least one Restart Period has been triggered by a customer serving a Restart Plant Notice during the Term.

(b) Where SDP may levy a residual membrane charge, that charge may be levied on each customer who triggered the commencement of the Shutdown Period by serving a Cease Supply Notice and is to be calculated as follows:

\[ RMC \times \left( \frac{1}{TNC} \right) \]

where:

\( RMC \) = the residual membrane charge for the applicable period, and the year when the first Non-Emergency Restart Period began, as set out in Table 11; and

\( TNC \) = the total number of customers who triggered the commencement of the Shutdown Period by serving a Cease Supply Notice.

[Note: No charge will apply unless there have been one or more days of a Non-Emergency Restart Period.]
Tables 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11

Table 6  Water usage charge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Water usage charge ($/ML)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commencement Date to 30 June 2018</td>
<td>858.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019</td>
<td>729.99 (\times (1+\Delta CPI_t))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020</td>
<td>667.65 (\times (1+\Delta CPI_t))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021</td>
<td>638.23 (\times (1+\Delta CPI_t))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022</td>
<td>627.32 (\times (1+\Delta CPI_t))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7  Base service charge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Base service charge ($/day)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commencement Date to 30 June 2018</td>
<td>373,429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019</td>
<td>369,667 (\times (1+\Delta CPI_t))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020</td>
<td>364,531 (\times (1+\Delta CPI_t))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021</td>
<td>360,317 (\times (1+\Delta CPI_t))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022</td>
<td>356,108 (\times (1+\Delta CPI_t))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8  Transition to shutdown charge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Transition to shutdown charge ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commencement Date to 30 June 2018</td>
<td>1,721,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019</td>
<td>1,721,406 (\times (1+\Delta CPI_t))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020</td>
<td>1,721,406 (\times (1+\Delta CPI_t))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021</td>
<td>1,721,406 (\times (1+\Delta CPI_t))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022</td>
<td>1,721,406 (\times (1+\Delta CPI_t))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9  Pipeline charge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Pipeline charge ($/day)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commencement Date to 30 June 2018</td>
<td>101,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019</td>
<td>101,167 (\times (1+\Delta CPI_t))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020</td>
<td>100,867 (\times (1+\Delta CPI_t))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021</td>
<td>101,090 (\times (1+\Delta CPI_t))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022</td>
<td>100,976 (\times (1+\Delta CPI_t))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 10 Membrane service charge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period when first Non-Emergency Restart Period began</th>
<th>Membrane service charge ($/day)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Commencement Date to 30 June 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commencement Date to 30 June 2018</td>
<td>14,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If no Non-Emergency Restart Period</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 11 Residual membrane charge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period when first Non-Emergency Restart Period began</th>
<th>Residual membrane charge ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Commencement Date to 30 June 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commencement Date to 30 June 2018</td>
<td>26,801,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If no Non-Emergency Restart Period</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18  IPART Prices for Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd’s Water Supply Services
Schedule 3   Maximum prices for the Water Supply Services during a Restart Period

1  Application
(a) This schedule specifies the methodology for determining the maximum prices that SDP may charge for the Water Supply Services provided during a Restart Period.
(b) This schedule 3 does not apply to Water Supply Services provided during:
   (i) a Plant Operation Period; or
   (ii) a Shutdown Period.

2  Maximum prices for the Water Supply Services during a Restart Period
The maximum price that SDP may levy on a customer for the Water Supply Services provided during a Restart Period is the sum of the following:
(a) the water usage charge calculated in accordance with clause 3;
(b) the base service charge calculated in accordance with clause 4;
(c) the transition to restart charge calculated in accordance with clause 5;
(d) the pipeline charge calculated in accordance with clause 6; and
(e) the membrane service charge calculated in accordance with clause 7.

3  Restart Period water usage charge
(a) The water usage charge that SDP may levy on a customer for a day during a Restart Period is to be calculated as follows:

\[
WUC = WUC + \frac{\$/MWh \times 320,835 MWh}{91,250 ML} \times AS
\]

where:
WUC = the water usage charge for the applicable period, as set out in Table 12;
\$/MWh = the Variable Network Charge for the applicable period; and

[Note: 320,835 MWh is the annual average amount of electricity consumption used to allocate variable network charges to SDP’s water usage charge. 320,835 MWh was determined by taking the annual average electricity consumption over the Term (328,500 MWh p.a.) and subtracting the annual average amount of electricity consumption allocated to the fixed water service charge (5,000 MWh) and incremental service charge (2,665 MWh). 320,835 MWh is divided by the approximate amount of Desalinated Water the Plant would produce if it were to run at full production.]
capacity for a year (91,250ML), to yield an approximation of the incremental amount of electricity required to produce each megalitre of Desalinated Water.]

\[ AS = \text{the number of ML of Desalinated Water supplied by SDP from the Plant to that customer on the day.} \]

[Note: Desalinated Water will not ordinarily be supplied from the Plant during a Restart Period. However:
\[ \text{a Restart Period will be a single day in duration where Desalinated Water is first produced and supplied on the same day following a Shutdown Period.} \]
In these cases, the water usage charge will apply to Desalinated Water supplied during the Restart Period.]

(b) Despite paragraph (a), the water usage charge that SDP may levy on Sydney Water Corporation for a day will be nil if:
\[ \begin{align*}
\text{(i)} & \quad \text{the day falls outside a Drought Response Period;} \\
\text{(ii)} & \quad \text{the Desalinated Water supplied to Sydney Water Corporation on the day is not supplied under an Emergency Response Notice; and} \\
\text{(iii)} & \quad \text{the day occurs more than 14 months after the most recent Drought Response Trigger Day.}
\end{align*} \]

4 Restart Period base service charge

[Note: This is an Abatable Charge that is subject to the Abatement Factor set out in Schedule 4.]

The base service charge that SDP may levy on a customer for each day of the Restart Period is to be calculated as follows:

\[ (BSC + FNC + (\$/MWh × 13.70MW h)) × \left(\frac{CI}{TI}\right) \]

where:
\[ \begin{align*}
BSC &= \text{the base service charge for the applicable period, as set out in Table 13;} \\
FNC &= \text{the Fixed Network Charge for the day;} \\
\$/MWh &= \text{the Variable Network Charge for the applicable period;} \\
CI &= \text{the customer’s Customer Impact for the day; and} \\
TI &= \text{the Total Impact for the day.}
\end{align*} \]

5 Transition to restart charge

[Note: This clause sets out two circumstances in which SDP may levy a transition to restart charge:
\[ \text{a} \quad \text{where the Restart Period is the first since a Drought Response Trigger Day (ie, within drought);} \]
\[ \text{and} \]
\[ \text{b} \quad \text{where the Restart Period is triggered by a customer serving a Restart Plant Notice or an Emergency Response Notice (ie, outside drought).} \]
First Restart Period since Drought Response Trigger Day

(a) SDP may levy a transition to restart charge in respect of a Restart Period if the Restart Period is the first since a Drought Response Trigger Day.

(b) Where paragraph (a) applies, the transition to restart charge that SDP may levy is to be calculated as follows:

\[ (TTR + ($/MWh \times 35,840MWh)) \times \left( \frac{CI}{TI} \right) \]

where:

- \( TTR \) = the transition to restart charge for the applicable period (being the period that includes the first day of the Restart Period), as set out in Table 14;
- \$/MWh = the Variable Network Charge for the applicable period;

[Note: 35,840MWh is the rounded electricity consumption for allocating variable network charges to SDP’s transition to restart charge. This is the electricity consumption required during a Restart Period to recommence activities associated with preparing the Plant for the production of Desalinated Water and not for the supply of Desalinated Water.]

- \( CI \) = the customer’s Customer Impact for the 365 days immediately preceding the first day of the Restart Period; and
- \( TI \) = the Total Impact for the 365 days immediately preceding the first day of the Restart Period.

(c) If SDP is entitled to levy a transition to restart charge under paragraph (a), then it must not levy a transition to restart charge under paragraph (d).

Restart Period triggered by Restart Plant Notice or Emergency Response Notice

(d) Subject to paragraph (c), outside a Drought Response Period, SDP may levy a transition to restart charge in respect of a Restart Period if the Restart Period was triggered by a customer.

[Note: See clause 2.1(m) of schedule 5 as to when a customer triggers a Restart Period.]

(e) Where paragraph (d) applies, the transition to restart charge that SDP may levy on each customer who triggered the commencement of the Restart Period is to be calculated as follows:

\[ (TTR + ($/MWh \times 35,840MWh)) \times \frac{1}{TNC} \]

where:

- \( TTR \) = the transition to restart charge for the applicable period (being the period that includes the first day of the Restart Period), as set out in Table 14; and
- \$/MWh = the Variable Network Charge for the applicable period;

[Note: 35,840MWh is the rounded electricity consumption for allocating variable network charges to SDP’s transition to restart charge. This is the electricity consumption required during a Restart Period to recommence activities associated with preparing the Plant for the production of Desalinated Water and not for the supply of Desalinated Water.]
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Prices for Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd’s Water Supply Services

TNC = the total number of customers who triggered the commencement of the Restart Period.

6 Restart Period pipeline charge

The pipeline charge that SDP may levy on a customer for each day of the Restart Period is to be calculated as follows:

\[ PC \times \left( \frac{CI}{TI} \right) \]

where:

PC = the pipeline charge for the applicable period, as set out in Table 15;
CI = the customer’s Customer Impact for the day; and
TI = the Total Impact for the day.

7 Restart Period membrane service charge

[Note: This is an Abatable Charge that is subject to the Abatement Factor set out in Schedule 4.]

(a) If SDP has previously been entitled to levy a residual membrane charge during the Term under clause 8 of schedule 2, then SDP must not levy a membrane service charge under this clause 7.

Membrane service charge where a Drought Response Trigger Day has occurred

(b) Where a Drought Response Trigger Day has occurred during the Term, the membrane service charge that SDP may levy on a customer for a day is to be calculated as follows:

\[ MSC \times \left( \frac{CI}{TI} \right) \]

where:

MSC = the membrane service charge for the applicable period, and the period when the first Non-Emergency Restart Period began, as set out in Table 16;
CI = the customer’s Customer Impact for the day; and
TI = the Total Impact for the day.

[Note: No charge will apply unless there have been one or more days of a Non-Emergency Restart Period.]

Membrane service charge where no Drought Response Trigger Day has occurred

(c) Subject to paragraph (e), outside a Drought Response Period, SDP may levy a membrane service charge in respect of a Restart Period if a customer triggered the Restart Period by serving a Restart Plant Notice.

(d) Where paragraph (c) applies, the membrane service charge that SDP may levy on each customer who triggered the commencement of the Restart Period by serving a Restart Plant Notice for a day is to be calculated as follows:
where:

\[ MSC \times \frac{1}{TNC} \]

MSC = the membrane service charge for the applicable period, and the period when the first Non-Emergency Restart Period began, as set out in Table 16; and

TNC = the total number of customers who triggered the commencement of the Restart Period by serving a Restart Plant Notice.

[Note: No charge will apply unless there have been one or more days of a Non-Emergency Restart Period.]

(e) If SDP is entitled to levy a membrane service charge under paragraph (b), then it must not levy a membrane service charge under paragraph (c).
### Tables 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16

#### Table 12  Water usage charge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Water usage charge ($/ML)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commencement Date to 30 June 2018</td>
<td>858.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019</td>
<td>729.99 x (1+ΔCPI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020</td>
<td>667.65 x (1+ΔCPI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021</td>
<td>638.23 x (1+ΔCPI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022</td>
<td>627.32 x (1+ΔCPI)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 13  Base service charge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Base service charge ($/day)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commencement Date to 30 June 2018</td>
<td>373,429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019</td>
<td>369,667 x (1+ΔCPI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020</td>
<td>364,531 x (1+ΔCPI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021</td>
<td>360,317 x (1+ΔCPI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022</td>
<td>356,108 x (1+ΔCPI)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 14  Transition to restart charge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Transition to restart charge ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commencement Date to 30 June 2018</td>
<td>14,225,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019</td>
<td>12,917,850 x (1+ΔCPI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020</td>
<td>12,283,623 x (1+ΔCPI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021</td>
<td>11,981,446 x (1+ΔCPI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022</td>
<td>11,865,587 x (1+ΔCPI)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 15  Pipeline charge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Pipeline charge ($/day)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commencement Date to 30 June 2018</td>
<td>101,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019</td>
<td>101,167 x (1+ΔCPI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020</td>
<td>100,867 x (1+ΔCPI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021</td>
<td>101,090 x (1+ΔCPI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022</td>
<td>100,976 x (1+ΔCPI)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Table 16  Membrane service charge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period when first Non-Emergency Restart Period began</th>
<th>Membrane service charge ($/day)</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Commencement Date to 30 June 2018</th>
<th>1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019</th>
<th>1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020</th>
<th>1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021</th>
<th>1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commencement Date to 30 June 2018</td>
<td>14,106</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13,624 &amp; 14,106 x (1+ΔCPI₁)</td>
<td>13,107 &amp; 13,624 x (1+ΔCPI₂)</td>
<td>12,661 &amp; 13,107 x (1+ΔCPI₃)</td>
<td>12,179 &amp; 12,661 x (1+ΔCPI₄)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>14,106 x (1+ΔCPI₁)</td>
<td>13,624 x (1+ΔCPI₂)</td>
<td>13,107 x (1+ΔCPI₃)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>14,106 x (1+ΔCPI₁)</td>
<td>13,624 x (1+ΔCPI₂)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>14,106 x (1+ΔCPI₁)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If no Non-Emergency Restart Period</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
- Commencement Date to 30 June 2018: The commencement date for the membrane service charge.
- Periods: The time frames for different service charge calculations.
- Membrane service charge ($/day): The daily charge for membrane services during different periods.
- ΔCPI: Percentage change in consumer price index.
Schedule 4  The abatement mechanism

1  The Abatement Factor
   (a) For any day which is an Abatement Application Day, any Abatable Charge that
       SDP may levy for Water Supply Services provided on that day is to be multiplied
       by the Abatement Factor calculated for that day under paragraph (b).
   (b) The Abatement Factor for a day is to be calculated as follows:
       \[
       \frac{AC}{TC}
       \]
       where:
       \( AC \) = the Available Capacity for the day in ML; and
       \( TC \) = the Total Capacity for the day in ML.

2  Reset of Daily Volumes on Drought Response Cease Day or Emergency Response Cease Day
   (a) A Cease Day is a Reset Day if the average of the Daily Volumes for the
       immediately preceding 365 Availability Days (the Preceding Days) exceeds the
       Total Capacity.
   (b) For the purposes of calculating the Abatement Factor on or after a Reset Day, the
       Daily Volume for each of the Preceding Days is deemed to be equal to the Total
       Capacity.
   (c) Where this clause 2 applies, it applies notwithstanding any other provision of
       this determination.

3  Refund at the end of a Drought Response Period or Emergency Response Period
   (a) A Cease Day is a Refund Day if the Total Refund Amount for the Cease Day,
       calculated in accordance with paragraph (d), is positive.
   (b) A customer is eligible for a refund on a Refund Day if the Customer Abatement
       Net Overpayment for that customer and that Refund Day, calculated in
       accordance with paragraph (e), is positive.
   (c) Where a customer is eligible for a refund on a Refund Day:
       (i) the amount of that refund is to be calculated in accordance with
           paragraph (f) (where the Refund Day is a Drought Response Cease Day) or
           paragraph (g) (where the Refund Day is an Emergency Response Cease Day); and
(ii) SDP must pay that refund to the customer within one month after the Refund Day.

(d) The **Total Refund Amount** for a Cease Day is the sum of the following for each Abatement Application Day \( i \) within the Preceding Period:

\[
(\text{\( AF_i \)} - 1) \times \text{TAC}_i \times (1 + \text{WACC}_d)^{\text{cease} - \text{day} - i}
\]

where:

- \( \text{AF}_i \) = the Abatement Factor for Abatement Application Day \( i \);
- \( \text{TAC}_i \) = the sum of all of the Abatable Charges SDP may levy on its customers for Abatement Application Day \( i \);
- \( \text{WACC}_d \) = the daily weighted average cost of capital calculated in accordance with paragraph (i); and
- \( \text{cease} - \text{day} - i \) = the number of days from Abatement Application Day \( i \) (inclusive) to the Cease Day (exclusive).

(e) The **Customer Abatement Net Overpayment** for a customer in relation to a Refund Day is the sum of the following for each Abatement Application Day \( i \) within the Preceding Period:

\[
(\text{\( AF_i \)} - 1) \times \text{CTAC}_i \times (1 + \text{WACC}_d)^{\text{cease} - \text{day} - i}
\]

where:

- \( \text{AF}_i \) = the Abatement Factor for Abatement Application Day \( i \);
- \( \text{CTAC}_i \) = the sum of all Abatable Charges SDP levied on that customer for Abatement Application Day \( i \);
- \( \text{WACC}_d \) = the daily weighted average cost of capital calculated in accordance with paragraph (i); and
- \( \text{cease} - \text{day} - i \) = the number of days from Abatement Application Day \( i \) (inclusive) to the Cease Day (exclusive).

(f) Where a customer is eligible for a refund on a Refund Day, and the Refund Day is a Drought Response Cease Day, that refund is to be calculated as follows:

\[
\text{TRA} \times \frac{\text{CCI} \_\text{overs}}{\text{TCl} \_\text{overs}}
\]

where:

- \( \text{TRA} \) = the Total Refund Amount for the Refund Day calculated in accordance with paragraph (d);
- \( \text{CCI} \_\text{overs} \) = the sum of that customer’s Customer Impacts for the Abatement Application Days:
  - (i) within the Preceding Period; and
  - (ii) for which the Abatement Factor exceeded 1; and
- \( \text{TCl} \_\text{overs} \) = the sum of all Eligible Customers’ Customer Impacts for the Abatement Application Days:
  - (i) within the Preceding Period; and
  - (ii) for which the Abatement Factor exceeded 1; or
(g) Where a customer is eligible for a refund on a Refund Day, and the Refund Day is an Emergency Response Cease Day, that refund is:

(i) the amount calculated as follows, unless the customer is Sydney Water Corporation:

\[
TIRA \times \frac{CCI_{overs}}{TCI_{overs}}
\]

where:

TIRA = the Total Impactor Refund Amount for the Refund Day calculated in accordance with paragraph (h);

CCI_{overs} = the sum of that customer’s Customer Impacts for the Abatement Application Days:
(A) within the Preceding Period; and
(B) for which the Abatement Factor exceeded 1; and

TCI_{overs} = the sum of all Eligible Customers’ Customer Impacts for the Abatement Application Days:
(A) within the Preceding Period; and
(B) for which the Abatement Factor exceeded 1; and

(ii) if the customer is Sydney Water Corporation, the amount calculated in accordance with paragraph (g)(i) plus the difference between the Total Refund Amount for the Refund Day and Total Impactor Refund Amount, if that difference is positive.

(h) The Total Impactor Refund Amount for a Refund Day which is an Emergency Response Cease Day is the sum of the following for each Abatement Application Day \(i\) within the Preceding Period:

\[
(AF_i - 1) \times ITAC_i \times (1 + WACC_a)^{cease\_day-i}
\]

where:

AF_i = the Abatement Factor for Abatement Application Day \(i\);

ITAC_i = the sum of the following Abatable Charges SDP may levy on its customers for Abatement Application Day \(i\):
(i) the sum of all base service charges that SDP may levy on its customers for Abatement Application Day \(i\); and
(ii) where a Drought Response Trigger Day has occurred during the Term prior to Abatement Application Day \(i\), the sum of all membrane service charges that SDP may levy on its customers for Abatement Application Day \(i\);

WACC_a = the daily weighted average cost of capital calculated in accordance with paragraph (i); and

\(cease\_day-i\) = the number of days from Abatement Application Day \(i\) (inclusive) to the Emergency Response Cease Day (exclusive).

(i) The daily weighted average cost of capital is to be calculated as follows:

\[
WACC_a = (1 + WACC)^\frac{1}{365} - 1
\]

where:
WACC = the nominal pre-tax weighted average cost of capital of 8.2% per year (which corresponds to the real post-tax weighted average cost of capital of 4.7% per year used to set prices in this determination).
Schedule 5  Definitions and interpretation

1  Definitions

1.1  General definitions

Where they appear in title case in this determination, the terms in bold below have
the corresponding meanings.

**Abatable Charge** means any of the following:
(a)  the base service charge under clause 4 of schedule 1;
(b)  the incremental service charge under clause 5 of schedule 1;
(c)  the membrane service charge under clause 7 of schedule 1;
(d)  the base service charge under clause 4 of schedule 2;
(e)  the membrane service charge under clause 7 of schedule 2;
(f)  the base service charge under clause 4 of schedule 3; and
(g)  the membrane service charge under clause 7 of schedule 3.

**Abatement Application Day** means:
(a)  a day during a Plant Operation Period; or
(b)  a day that satisfies the following three criteria:
   (i)  it occurs during a Shutdown Period or a Restart Period;
   (ii) it occurs during a Drought Response Period or an Emergency Response
        Period; and
   (iii) it occurs on or after 13 December 2018,

and which is not an Abatement Non-Application Day.

**Abatement Factor** means the multiplier calculated in accordance with clause 1(b) of
schedule 4.

**Abatement Non-Application Day** means a day upon which the supply capability of
the Plant is reduced as a result of the consequences of a Force Majeure Event, provided
that SDP would not have been able to obtain insurance, on reasonable commercial terms, against those consequences reducing the supply capability of the
Plant on that day.

**Agreed Volume** means the volume of Desalinated Water, in ML, agreed by Sydney Water
Corporation and SDP to be supplied by SDP from the Plant in respect of a day, as specified in an Emergency Response Notice.

**Availability Day** means any day:
(a)  which is either:
(i) a day during a Drought Response Period; or
(ii) a day in respect of which SDP has agreed to supply Desalinated Water from the Plant under an Emergency Response Notice; but

(b) which is none of the following:
   (i) a Drought Response Trigger Day;
   (ii) a day during a Grace Period;
   (iii) a day during a Shutdown Period or a Restart Period before 13 December 2018;
   (iv) a day on which SDP is required to reduce production below Total Capacity in order to comply with a law or a binding direction, order or similar, made under a law; or
   (v) an Abatement Non-Application Day.

**Available Capacity** means, for a day, either:
(a) the average of the Daily Volumes for the most recent 365 Availability Days (including that day if it is an Availability Day); or
(b) if fewer than 365 Availability Days have occurred up to and including that day, an amount calculated as follows:

\[
\frac{(365-n) \times TC + TDV}{365}
\]

where:

- \( n \) = the number of Availability Days that have ever occurred, up to and including that day;
- \( TC \) = Total Capacity; and
- \( TDV \) = the sum of the Daily Volumes for the Availability Days that have occurred up to and including that day.

**Available Storage** means the available storage in Sydney’s water supply reservoirs as published on a weekly basis on the website of Water NSW. If for any reason Water NSW does not calculate or publish the Available Storage, the Available Storage is the amount of water as calculated and notified from time to time by such other authority as is nominated by the Minister responsible for Part 2 of the WIC Act.

**Cease Day** means a day which is a Drought Response Cease Day or an Emergency Response Cease Day.

**Cease Supply Notice** means a notice:
(a) in writing;
(b) served on SDP by a customer of SDP for the supply of Desalinated Water;
(c) copied to IPART; and
(d) which requires SDP to cease the supply of Desalinated Water to the customer.
Commencement Date means the Commencement Date defined in clause 2(a) of the Preliminary section of this determination.

Customer Abatement Net Overpayment means, for a customer and a Refund Day, the amount calculated for that customer and that Refund Day in accordance with clause 3(e) of schedule 4.

Customer Impact means, for a period, the total volume of water supplied during that period by Water NSW and/or SDP to an Impactor, for use within Sydney Water Corporation’s area of operations.

Daily Volume, subject to clause 2 of schedule 4, means either:

(a) for a day during an Emergency Response Period, the lesser of:
   (i) the volume, in ML, calculated as follows:
       \[ VP \times \frac{TC}{AV} \]
       where:
       \( VP \) = the volume of Desalinated Water supplied by the Plant on that day, in ML;
       \( TC \) = Total Capacity; and
       \( AV \) = the Agreed Volume in respect of that day; or
       [Note: For example, if the Agreed Volume for a day was 100ML and 100ML was produced
       by the Plant on the day, the Daily Volume would be calculated as follows: Daily Volume =
       \( \frac{100ML \times 250ML}{250ML} = 250ML \) ]
   (ii) 110% of Total Capacity; or

(b) for any other day, either:
   (i) the volume of Desalinated Water supplied by the Plant on that day; or
   (ii) where the nameplate capacity of the Plant has been expanded since that day,
       the volume of Desalinated Water referred to in paragraph (b)(i) multiplied
       by the proportion that the expanded nameplate capacity of the Plant bears to
       the nameplate capacity of the Plant as at that day.
       [Note: For example, if the nameplate capacity of the Plant was expanded to 500ML per day
       and the volume of Desalinated Water produced by the Plant on an earlier day was 100ML,
       the Daily Volume would be calculated as follows: Daily Volume = \( \frac{100ML \times 500}{250} = 200ML \).]

Desalinated Water means desalinated water produced at the Plant which is suitable
for the purposes specified in SDP’s Network Operator's Licence and Retail Supplier’s Licence.

Distribution Network Service Provider has the meaning given in the National
Electricity Rules.

Drought Response Cease Day means a day on which Available Storage equals or
exceeds the Drought Response Cease Level for the first time since Available Storage
was last less than the Drought Response Trigger Level.
Drought Response Cease Level means either:

(a) 80%; or

(b) if the reference to 80% in SDP’s Network Operator’s Licence is replaced with a reference to a different percentage, that percentage.

Drought Response Period means a period:

(a) beginning on, and including, a Drought Response Trigger Day; and

(b) ending on, and including, the day immediately before the following Drought Response Cease Day.

Drought Response Trigger Day means a day on which Available Storage falls below the Drought Response Trigger Level for the first time since Available Storage last equalled or exceeded the Drought Response Cease Level.

Drought Response Trigger Level means either:

(a) 70%; or

(b) if the reference to 70% in SDP’s Network Operator’s Licence is replaced with a reference to a different percentage, that percentage.

Eligible Customer means, in relation to a Refund Day, a customer eligible for a refund on that Refund Day under clause 3 of schedule 4.

Emergency Response Cease Day means the day specified in an Emergency Response Notice as the day on which Sydney Water Corporation and SDP have agreed that SDP is to cease to supply Sydney Water Corporation with Desalinated Water under that Emergency Response Notice.

Emergency Response Commencement Day means the day specified in an Emergency Response Notice as the day on which Sydney Water Corporation and SDP have agreed that SDP is to begin to supply Sydney Water Corporation with Desalinated Water under that Emergency Response Notice.

Emergency Response Notice means a notice from Sydney Water Corporation and SDP jointly which:

(a) is delivered by post or in person to IPART’s address;

(b) is addressed to IPART’s chair;

(c) is in writing;

(d) states that Sydney Water Corporation has requested SDP to supply Sydney Water Corporation with Desalinated Water during a specified period to mitigate the effect of a public health incident or to ensure security of supply or network stability during periods of outages, unavailability or maintenance on any water industry infrastructure within Sydney Water Corporation’s area of operations;

(e) specifies the Agreed Volume in respect of each day during the specified period;
(f) specifies an Emergency Response Commencement Day;
(g) specifies an Emergency Response Cease Day; and
(h) may be replaced from time to time by another Emergency Response Notice.

Emergency Response Period means a period of time:
(a) beginning, and including, on the Emergency Response Commencement Day specified in an Emergency Response Notice; and
(b) ending on, and including, the Emergency Response Cease Day specified in the Emergency Response Notice.

Fixed Network Charge, for a day, means either:
(a) if one or more days of a Restart Period have occurred during the Term, the fixed charges, fees and tariffs payable by SDP in respect of Use of System Services provided on the relevant day by a Distribution Network Service Provider (including access charges and capacity charges) which are applied to the NMI (or NMIs) at which SDP's electricity usage at the Plant is measured; or
(b) if no day of a Restart Period has occurred during the Term, the lesser of the following:
   (i) the fixed charges, fees and tariffs payable by SDP in respect of Use of System Services provided on the relevant day by a Distribution Network Service Provider (including access charges and capacity charges) which are applied to the NMI (or NMIs) at which SDP's electricity usage at the Plant is measured; and
   (ii) the fixed charges, fees and tariffs referred to in sub-paragraph (i) above that would have applied, had the maximum demand used to calculate each relevant capacity charge been 1,090kVA.

Force Majeure Event means any event or circumstance which:
(a) reduces the amount of Desalinated Water the Plant is capable of supplying to SDP's customers, including by means of the Pipeline;
(b) is outside the reasonable control of SDP (including its contractors); and
(c) could not have been prevented, avoided or overcome by SDP and its contractors acting in accordance with Good Industry Practice.

Good Industry Practice has the meaning given in SDP's Network Operator's Licence.

Grace Period means a period of time:
(a) beginning on a Drought Response Trigger Day or an Emergency Response Commencement Day; and
(b) ending on the earlier of:
(i) the day 8 months after it began; or

(ii) a Grace Period Opt Out Day.

**Grace Period Opt Out Day** means a day specified in a Grace Period Opt Out Notice as the day that SDP elects to bring a Grace Period to an end, and must be a day at least 7 days after the date on which the Grace Period Opt Out Notice is served on all of SDP’s customers for the supply of Desalinated Water.

**Grace Period Opt Out Notice** means a notice which:

(a) is in writing;

(b) is served by SDP on all of its customers for the supply of Desalinated Water;

(c) is copied to IPART;

(d) is irrevocable, except by further notice served by SDP on all of its customers for the supply of Desalinated Water prior to the Grace Period Opt Out Day specified in the first notice; and

(e) informs SDP’s customers for the supply of Desalinated Water that SDP elects to bring a Grace Period to an end, with effect from a Grace Period Opt Out Day specified in the notice.

**GST** has the meaning given under the *A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999* (Cth).

**Impactor** means:

(a) Sydney Water Corporation; and

(b) any holder of a Retail Supplier’s Licence:

(i) who is supplied water by Water NSW or SDP; and

(ii) whose Retail Supplier’s Licence is subject to a condition requiring its holder to contribute to the costs of the Plant.

[Note: In certain circumstances, section 13(2)(c)(ii) of the WIC Act permits the Minister administering Part 2 of the WIC Act to impose a condition on a Retail Supplier’s Licence requiring the licensee to contribute to the costs of specified infrastructure.]

**IPART** means the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of New South Wales established by section 5(1) the IPART Act.


**IPART’s Address** means either:

(a) Level 15, 2-24 Rawson Place, Sydney NSW 2000; or

(b) a different address advised or published by IPART from time to time.

**kVA** means kilovolt-amps.
Minister has the meaning given in clause 3(a) of the Preliminary section of this determination.

ML means megalitres.

MWh means megawatt hours.

National Electricity Law means the National Electricity Law set out in the Schedule to the National Electricity (South Australia) Act 1996 (SA).

National Electricity Rules means the National Electricity Rules made under the National Electricity Law.

Network Operator's Licence has the meaning given in the WIC Act.

NMI means a meter allocated a National Metering Identifier as defined in the National Electricity Rules.

Non-Emergency Restart Period means any Restart Period during the Term, other than a Restart Period which immediately precedes an Emergency Response Commencement Day.

Pipeline means the pipeline system running from Lot 2 in Deposited Plan 1077972 in the suburb of Kurnell up to, but not including, the connection valve at Shaft 11C on the City Tunnel at Bridge Street in Lot A in Deposited Plan 365407 in the suburb of Erskineville and consisting of the following infrastructure:

(a) an overland pipeline running from the drinking water pumping station at the Plant to Silver Beach;
(b) a marine pipeline running from Silver Beach to a point 800 metres offshore from Silver Beach;
(c) twin marine pipelines running from 800 metres offshore of Silver Beach to Cook Park, Kyeemagh; and
(d) an overland pipeline running from Cook Park, Kyeemagh to the connection valve at Shaft 11C on the City Tunnel at Bridge Street, Erskineville.

Plant means the infrastructure covered by the Network Operator's Licence held by SDP according to the definition of water industry infrastructure in that licence (excluding the Pipeline).

Plant Operation Period means a period:

(a) beginning on the day immediately after the last day of a Restart Period; and
(b) ending on the day immediately preceding the eleventh consecutive day on which the Plant is Shutdown.

For the avoidance of any doubt, a Plant Operation Period can include a period of Shutdown of ten days or fewer in duration.

Preceding Day has the meaning given in clause 2(a) of schedule 4.
Preceding Period means:

(a) in respect of a Drought Response Cease Day, the Drought Response Period which ended with that Drought Response Cease Day; and

(b) in respect of an Emergency Response Cease Day, the Emergency Response Period which ended with that Emergency Response Cease Day.

Referral means the referral referred to in clause 4(b) of the Preliminary section of this determination.

Refund Day has the meaning given in clause 3(a) of schedule 4.

Reset Day has the meaning given in clause 2(a) of schedule 4.

Restart Period means a period:

(a) beginning on the day of recommencement of activities associated with preparing the Plant for the production of Desalinated Water (other than production of the kind referred to in paragraph (b) of the definition of “Shutdown” below) following a Shutdown Period; and

(b) ending on the later of:
   (i) the day referred to in paragraph (a); or
   (ii) the day before the first day that Desalinated Water is produced by the Plant and supplied by SDP from the Plant to a customer after that Shutdown Period.

Restart Plant Notice means a notice:

(a) in writing;

(b) served on SDP by a customer of SDP for the supply of Desalinated Water;

(c) is copied to IPART; and

(d) which requires SDP to initiate a Restart Period.

[Note: For the avoidance of any doubt, an Emergency Response Notice is not a Restart Plant Notice.]

Retail Supplier’s Licence has the meaning given in the WIC Act.

SDP has the meaning set out in clause 1 of the Preliminary section of this determination.

Shutdown means when the Plant:

(a) is not producing Desalinated Water; or

(b) is producing minimal quantities of Desalinated Water for the sole purpose of maintaining the Plant (including Plant membranes).

Shutdown Period means a period:

(a) beginning on the eleventh consecutive day (outside of a Restart Period) for which the Plant is Shutdown; and
(b) ending on the day immediately preceding the first day of a Restart Period.

**Sydney Water Corporation** means the corporation of that name constituted by section 4(1) of the *Sydney Water Act 1994* (NSW).

**Term** means the Term defined in clause 2(b) of the Preliminary section of this determination.

**Total Capacity** means either:

(a) 250ML per day; or

(b) if the Plant is expanded, the nameplate capacity per day of the expanded Plant in ML.

**Total Impact** means, for a period, the sum of all Customer Impacts for the period.

**Total Impactor Refund Amount** means an amount calculated in accordance with clause 3(h) of schedule 4.

**Total Refund Amount** means an amount calculated in accordance with clause 3(d) of schedule 4.

**Use of System Services** has the meaning given in the National Electricity Rules.

**Variable Network Charge** means the variable charge, fee or tariff per megawatt hour payable by SDP in respect of Use of System Services provided by a Distribution Network Service Provider in respect of electricity supplied to the NMI (or NMIs) at which SDP’s electricity usage at the Plant is measured for the applicable period.

**Water NSW** means the corporation of that name constituted by the *Water NSW Act 2014*.

**Water Supply Services** has the meaning set out in clause 4(b) of the Preliminary section of this determination.

**WIC Act** means the *Water Industry Competition Act 2006* (NSW).

### 1.2 Consumer Price Index

(a) \[ \Delta CPI_1 = \frac{CPI_{March 2018}}{CPI_{March 2017}} - 1 \]

(b) \[ \Delta CPI_2 = \frac{CPI_{March 2019}}{CPI_{March 2017}} - 1 \]

(c) \[ \Delta CPI_3 = \frac{CPI_{March 2020}}{CPI_{March 2017}} - 1 \]

(d) \[ \Delta CPI_4 = \frac{CPI_{March 2021}}{CPI_{March 2017}} - 1 \]

each as calculated and notified by IPART, where **CPI** means:
(i) the consumer price index, All Groups index number for the weighted average of eight capital cities as published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics; or
(ii) if the Australian Bureau of Statistics does not or ceases to publish the index, then CPI will mean an index determined by IPART.

(b) The subtext (for example March 2018) when used in relation to the CPI in paragraph (a) above refers to the CPI for the quarter and year indicated (in the example, the March quarter for 2018).

2 Interpretation

2.1 General provisions

In this determination:

(a) headings are for convenience only and do not affect the interpretation of this determination;

(b) a reference to a schedule, clause or table is a reference to a schedule to, clause of, or table in, this determination unless otherwise indicated;

(c) a construction that would promote a purpose or object expressly or impliedly underlying the IPART Act or the WIC Act is to be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object;

(d) words importing the singular include the plural and vice versa;

(e) a reference to a law or statute includes regulations, rules, codes and other instruments (including licences) under it and consolidations, amendments, reenactments or replacements of them or of the law or statute itself;

(f) where a word is defined, other grammatical forms of that word have a corresponding meaning;

(g) a reference to a day is to a calendar day;

(h) a reference to a month is to a calendar month;

(i) a reference to a person includes a reference to the person’s executors, administrators, successors, substitutes (including, but not limited to, persons taking by novation), replacements and assigns;

(j) a reference to an officer includes a reference to the officer which replaces it or which substantially succeeds to its powers or functions;

(k) a reference to a body, whether statutory or not:

(i) which ceases to exist; or

(ii) whose powers or functions are transferred to another body,

is a reference to the body which replaces it or which substantially succeeds to its powers or functions;

(l) a customer is taken to have triggered a Shutdown Period if:
(i) the customer served a Cease Supply Notice and was the last customer SDP supplied prior to the Shutdown Period;
(ii) the customer served a Cease Supply Notice within 14 days before the Cease Supply Notice referred to in paragraph (l)(i); or
(iii) the customer is Sydney Water Corporation and the Shutdown Period begins within 30 days after an Emergency Response Cease Day.

(m) a customer is taken to have triggered a Restart Period if:
(i) the customer served a Restart Plant Notice and was the first customer SDP supplied after a Shutdown Period;
(ii) the customer served a Restart Plant Notice within 14 days after the Restart Plant Notice referred to in paragraph (m)(i); or
(iii) the customer is Sydney Water Corporation and the Restart Period immediately precedes an Emergency Response Commencement Day.

2.2 Explanatory notes and clarification notice
(a) Explanatory notes do not form part of this determination, but in the case of uncertainty may be relied on for interpretation purposes.
(b) In the event of any inconsistency between clause 8 of the Preliminary section of this determination ("Simplified outline") and the balance of this determination, the balance of this determination is to prevail over clause 8 of the Preliminary section of this determination to the extent of the inconsistency.
(c) IPART may publish a clarification notice in the NSW Government Gazette to correct any manifest error in this determination. Such a clarification notice is taken to form part of this determination.

2.3 Prices exclusive of GST
Prices or charges specified in this determination do not include GST.

2.4 SDP’s billing cycle
For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this determination affects when SDP may issue a bill to a customer for prices or charges under this determination.

2.5 Rounding rule
(a) Any price or charge calculated in accordance with this determination is to be rounded to the nearest whole cent.
(b) In applying paragraph (a), any amount that is a multiple of 0.5 cents (but not a multiple of 1 cent), is to be rounded up to the nearest whole cent.

2.6 Notices
(a) Any notice served under this determination:
(i) must be in writing addressed to either:

(A) the intended recipient at the physical, postal, facsimile or email address last advised by the intended recipient to the sender; or
(B) in the case of a notice to IPART, IPART’s chair at IPART’s Address;

(ii) must be signed by an authorised officer of the sender (or, where the notice is to be issued jointly, signed by an authorised officer of each sender); and

(iii) will be taken to have been delivered:

(A) in the case of delivery in person – when delivered to the recipient’s address for service and a signature is received as evidence of delivery;
(B) in the case of delivery by post – within three business days of posting;
(C) in the case of delivery by facsimile – at the time of dispatch if the sender receives a transmission report which confirms that the facsimile was sent in its entirety to the facsimile number of the recipient; and
(D) in the case of delivery by email – on receipt of confirmation by the sender (either by automatic receipt request or otherwise) that the recipient has received the email.

(b) If delivery or receipt of a notice under this determination occurs on a day on which business is not generally carried on in the place to which the notice is sent, or occurs later than 4.00pm (local time in that place) on any day, it will be deemed to have occurred at 9.00am (local time in that place) on the next business day in that place.
Schedule 6  Statement of reasons why IPART has chosen to set a methodology for fixing a maximum price

Under section 13A of the IPART Act, in determining prices for the Water Supply Services, IPART may either fix maximum prices or set a methodology for fixing maximum prices. However, IPART may not set a methodology for fixing maximum prices unless it is of the opinion that it is impractical to make a determination directly fixing the maximum price.

In this determination, IPART has set a methodology for fixing the maximum prices that SDP may charge for the Water Supply Services. IPART’s reasons for setting a methodology for that purpose, rather than directly fixing maximum prices, are set out in this schedule.

The methodology in this determination allows for:

- different prices to be charged depending on the operating mode of the Plant;
- different prices to apply to different types of customers under different circumstances;
- abating components of maximum prices if SDP does not produce to a certain level;
- recovery of the costs of replacing membranes; and
- a pass through of actual electricity network costs incurred by SDP in providing the Water Supply Services.

SDP’s costs vary greatly depending on the operating mode of the Plant. As an example, the Plant tends to consume much more electricity when it is operating than when it is in shutdown. Having a pricing methodology that varies based on the operating mode of the Plant allows prices to better reflect the different costs of each mode.

IPART considers that, in some circumstances, it is necessary for different prices to apply to different types of customers. As an example, IPART considers that Impactors should ordinarily pay SDP’s incremental service charge, essentially because those who draw on Sydney’s water supply should pay to supplement it with Desalinated Water during drought. However, in a scenario where a particular customer calls SDP into operation outside of drought, IPART considers that that customer should pay SDP’s incremental service charge. It is necessary for IPART to use a methodology, rather than directly fixing maximum prices, to allocate charges to different types of customer in different scenarios.

IPART considers that abating components of maximum prices if SDP does not produce to a certain level provides an important incentive for SDP to supply Desalinated Water when the community needs it. It is necessary to use a methodology to incorporate the abatement mechanism; it would not be possible for IPART to do so if it directly fixed maximum prices.

SDP may need to replace the membranes used in the Plant at some time after the date of this determination. The methodology allows SDP to levy charges that reflect the costs SDP is likely to incur in replacing the membranes if it is called into operation.
IPART considers it important that SDP is able to pass through electricity network costs through its water prices given that SDP will have little ability to control these costs. In addition, there is uncertainty about average changes in network prices into the future. Given these uncertainties, we have established a mechanistic cost pass through provision for network charges to ensure that SDP does not have to bear the risk associated with changes in network costs (unless the cap provided for in paragraph (b)(ii) of the definition of Fixed Network Charge applies). This in turn ensures that the charges paid by water customers ultimately reflect the actual network costs.
Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd

Review of prices from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2022

Final Report

Water

June 2017
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IPART Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd
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### Glossary

Glossary: 191
1 Executive Summary

The Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) has determined the maximum prices charged by the Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd (SDP) for the supply of non-rainfall dependent drinking water to purchasers and the making available of the desalination plant to supply non-rainfall dependent drinking water.¹

This Final Report sets out our decisions on SDP’s maximum prices over the 5-year period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2022 (the 2017 determination period). It also:

- discusses the impact of our decisions on SDP’s customers and other stakeholders
- explains how we reached these decisions, and
- outlines how our prices compare to the 2012 Determination (which set maximum prices from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2017) and SDP’s proposed prices.

All dollar figures in this Final Report are in $2016-17, unless stated otherwise.

1.1 Our prices for SDP result in bill decreases for customers

The desalination plant is part of Greater Sydney’s water security plan. It was built to ensure a secure water supply for the Greater Sydney region, both in the long term and in response to drought events, as part of the NSW Government’s Metropolitan Water Plan.²

Under the Metropolitan Water Plan, SDP is required to operate with the objective of maximising production and supplying Sydney Water Corporation’s (Sydney Water) area of operations when dam levels fall below a specified point (currently 60%) and continue to do so until dam levels rise to a certain point (currently 70%). Throughout this Final Report, for simplicity, we refer to this range of dam levels in which SDP must operate as ‘drought’, consistent with SDP’s drought response role.

Currently, Sydney Water is SDP’s only customer and pays all of SDP’s fixed costs, when the plant is either shutdown or operating. SDP’s costs are passed on to end-use water customers through Sydney Water’s residential and non-residential prices (which are subject

¹ We determine SDP’s prices in accordance with a standing Ministerial reference under section 52 of the Water Industry Competition Act 2006 (WIC Act). We received the initial Terms of Reference on 6 May 2011. The initial Terms of Reference was replaced by the current Terms of Reference on 16 February 2012 (see Appendix A).

² In July 2007, Sydney Water was directed by the then Minister for Water Utilities, under section 20P of the State Owned Corporations Act 1989, to construct and operate the desalination plant and associated infrastructure. In 2007, IPART was subsequently directed, under section 16A of the IPART Act, to include in its 2008 determination of maximum prices for Sydney Water an amount representing the efficient costs of the requirements imposed on Sydney Water. The Metropolitan Water Plan was first developed in 2004 in response to indications a drought was taking hold. The Metropolitan Water Plan was updated in 2006 due to the deepening drought, where it identified a role for a desalination plant. See IPART, Review of prices for Sydney Water Corporation’s water, sewerage, stormwater and other services from 1 July 2008 – Determination and Final Report, June 2008, Appendix B, NSW Government, Metropolitan Water Directorate, Updating the Plan, at https://www.metrowater.nsw.gov.au/planning-sydney/updating-plan, accessed on 22 June 2017.
to a separate IPART price determination). The cost of SDP will go down in 2017-18 in a typical Sydney Water customer's annual bill:^3

- When the plant is shutdown, the yearly cost of SDP per customer (in shutdown mode) falls 12% from $96.78 in 2016-17 to $85.51 in 2017-18.

- When the plant operates, the yearly cost of SDP per customer (in operation mode) falls 3% from $134.75 in 2016-17 to $130.42 in 2017-18.

In operation mode, SDP's costs decrease on average by 1.4% each year over the determination period. This is because estimates of benchmark energy prices decrease over the period. If the plant remains shutdown it uses little energy. SDP's costs during shutdown would increase on average by 0.4% each year over the 5-year determination period, which is less than our 2.5% estimate of the rate of inflation.

In 2017-18, the plant is expected to be shutdown, given current dam storage levels of 94%.^4 SDP went into water security (shutdown) mode after its proving period in June 2012, as dam storage levels were 98%. It has remained in water security mode since.

The plant is currently in a state of care and maintenance following significant damage from a storm event that occurred on 16 December 2015. The damage to the desalination plant is fully covered by SDP's insurance and will not affect prices. We understand from SDP that the plant is expected to be reinstated and operable from 13 December 2018.

From 2018-19 onwards, if drought were to occur and the plant were called into operation, Sydney Water customers would pay, on average, an additional $37.49 in their annual water bill. This recovers SDP's costs of producing and supplying water, as well as the additional fixed operating costs needed to run the plant.

Figure 1.1 shows how the costs of SDP for a typical Sydney Water customer are expected to fall.

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^3 Customers would pay the 2017-18 costs of SDP in 2018-19, given the one year lag in the cost pass-through mechanism under the Sydney Water 2016 Determination. These costs are expressed in $2017-18 for simplicity.

We have set prices to allow SDP to recover its prudent and efficient costs of delivering its services based on its operating environment. We engaged expert consultants to assist us in reviewing SDP’s capital and operating expenditure proposals.

We have designed a regulatory framework and assessed SDP’s efficient costs through the lens of SDP’s primary role of drought response. Accordingly, when the plant is shutdown, SDP’s expenditure is limited to essential maintenance activities only. Any need to maintain a higher level of service is ancillary and so we have removed higher cost short-term shutdown modes. We have reinforced this by not including significant plant testing costs proposed by SDP in the upcoming price path. We have also reduced expenditure in shutdown by:

- deferring the cost of installing an additional pump until it is required
- applying efficiency targets to SDP’s corporate costs, and
- ensuring the cost of replacing membranes is paid for only when needed.

After allowing for movements in market interest rates, we have reduced SDP’s proposed revenue requirement over the 5-year determination period by $44.5 million (or 5.1%) – i.e., from $877.7 million to $833.2 million. These savings include our adjustments to SDP’s proposed operating and maintenance costs. SDP, in its submission to our Draft Report, accepted many of these adjustments.

SDP proposed a revenue requirement of $852.7 million over the 5-year determination period. This was based on a proposed Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) of around 4.5%, in line with our biannual WACC update from August 2016. Since then several key WACC parameters have increased to reflect current market conditions, resulting in a WACC of 4.7%. Controlling for movements in the WACC, SDP’s proposed revenue requirement would be about $877.7 million over the 5-year period (i.e., based on our WACC of 4.7%).
Should the plant be called into operation, SDP’s required revenue would be about $237.4 million per year. On average, it costs about $70.8 million more per year to operate the plant compared to when it is shutdown. This is due to the energy intensive nature of the desalination process, which explains about 70.5% of this increase (ie, $49.9 million). Benchmark energy costs have increased significantly since the 2012 Determination because of the increase in the ‘black’ energy component of the benchmark price. SDP is required to use 100% renewable energy as part of the planning approval for the plant. Consistent with the Terms of Reference for our price determination, we have also included an allowance in prices over the 2017 determination period for the losses made on the sale of SDP’s surplus energy while it was shutdown over the 2012 determination period.

SDP’s prices include all necessary costs to ensure that the plant can respond effectively to drought, if required to do so over the next five years. In line with our expenditure consultant’s recommendations, we have allowed for the costs of a full set of membranes on the first restart of the plant. This is because the plant has been in a prolonged period of shutdown (since July 2012) and the stock of membranes will be reaching the end of its asset life (8 years) during the 2017 determination period. We have also decided to capitalise the costs so that they are recovered gradually over the life of the membrane stock, rather than upfront as a one-off payment. This approach ensures these costs (should they occur) would be subject to a review of prudence and efficiency by our expenditure consultant at the next price review.

The 2017 Determination also strengthens financial incentives to ensure that SDP maximises its supply during drought. But we have been mindful of the difference between events that affect the plant’s capacity to supply during drought that are within SDP’s control and those that fall outside its control. Where SDP can insure, on reasonable commercial terms, against events that may impede its ability to maximise supply during drought, we have maintained provisions to reduce SDP’s fixed charges, as this provides the best value for water customers and allows SDP to recover its fixed costs through its insurance. This enhanced financial incentive would apply from 13 December 2018, when the plant is expected to be reinstated following the December 2015 storm event.

SDP’s drought response role is reflected in the Network Operator’s Licence it holds under the Water Industry Competition Act 2006 (WIC Act) and in the Metropolitan Water Plan. The Metropolitan Water Plan was updated on 19 March 2017. Under the new Plan, the ‘on’ and ‘off’ triggers for the desalination plant have been lowered to run the water supply system more cost effectively, taking account of changes in demand over the medium term.

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6 The benchmark energy price comprises mainly the wholesale market cost of energy (ie, ‘black’ component) and the cost of renewable energy certificates arising from the planning approval for the plant that required 100% renewable energy use (ie, ‘green’ component).

7 The project approval for SDP was granted under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979.


8 The 2012 Determination established an abatement mechanism that applies to SDP’s fixed charges when it produces volumes of water less than the plant’s full production capacity under the 70/80 rule – ie, when it is called into operation when dam storage levels fall to 70%, and until they rise to 80%. The objective of the abatement mechanism is to provide a financial incentive to SDP to respond fully to drought. But under the 2012 Determination, SDP’s fixed charges are not abated when it is shutdown, or restarting, even during drought.

9 The Hon Don Harwin MLC, Minister for Resources, Minister for Energy and Utilities, New Water Plan to save Greater Sydney, Media release Sunday 19 March 2017.


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to operate in drought response\textsuperscript{11} when the total dam storage level is below 60\% (previously 70\%) and continue to do so until the total dam storage level reaches 70\% (previously 80\%).\textsuperscript{12}

While our price review started under the previous operating rules, our final decisions take account of the new operating rules. However, the 2017 Determination will give effect to the new operating rules only when SDP’s Network Operator’s Licence is updated to reflect the 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan. Our expenditure consultant noted that any changes in the rules causing the plant to operate less frequently are not likely to impact on the findings on operating modes and efficient costs.\textsuperscript{13} In addition, we have accommodated new provisions under the Metropolitan Water Plan that allow SDP the option of running the plant for a minimum period of 14 months even if storage levels return to above the designated ‘off’ point for the plant.\textsuperscript{14}

While SDP’s emergency response role is ancillary to its primary purpose of responding to drought, we have also made changes to the regulatory framework to better accommodate this function. We have introduced financial incentives similar to those that apply in drought to incentivise SDP to respond to an emergency, if required to do so. These incentives are, however, subject to SDP agreeing levels of supply with Sydney Water. SDP is available to supply water to Sydney Water if required for public health, network stability, unavailability or maintenance in Sydney Water’s area of operations.\textsuperscript{15} The 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan has also made this role explicit.\textsuperscript{16}

Finally, we have decided to use a principles based approach to share SDP’s costs in line with those who create a need for the plant to exist and the purpose for which the plant is called into operation.

Impactors that directly affect Greater Sydney’s water storage levels will now pay a proportionate share of the base costs of maintaining the plant as a form of drought insurance premium or water security payment.\textsuperscript{17} Impactors are bulk water users drawing from WaterNSW’s dams serving Greater Sydney and SDP’s plant.

If SDP responds to drought, the additional fixed costs needed to operate the plant would also be paid for by impactors. However, outside of drought, these additional fixed costs would be paid for by direct users of SDP (or ‘beneficiaries’). This is because the supply of desalinated water under these circumstances is a discretionary service. The cost sharing rules result in an efficient outcome when allocating costs to impactors and beneficiaries in and out of drought.

\textsuperscript{11} The Metropolitan Water Plan does not define ‘drought’ according to the desalination plant’s trigger levels. However, the desalination plant, along with other water sources, is accessed as the water levels in dams reduce. Therefore, the plant is a drought response measure, aimed at securing supply of water. We refer to SDP’s operating rules to distinguish between when the plant is operating in its drought response role and when it is not.


\textsuperscript{13} Atkins Cardno, Expenditure Review – SDP, February 2017, p 7.

\textsuperscript{14} NSW Government, 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan, March 2017, p 38.

\textsuperscript{15} SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 117.


\textsuperscript{17} They would do so in proportion to their draw on the total water supply system. Total system draw is comprised of bulk water sourced from WaterNSW’s dams supplying Greater Sydney and SDP’s desalination plant (when in operation). This means SDP’s fixed charges could be paid by bulk water users that do not necessarily receive direct supply from SDP.
SDP’s prices are presented in Table 1.1 below. They are presented in ‘real’ $2016-17 – ie, they exclude the effects of inflation over 2017-18 to 2021-22. We note that prices in our Determination are in $2017-18 – ie, the prices outlined below adjusted for one year of inflation.18

Table 1.1  IPART’s prices for the 2017 determination period ($2016-17)

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<tr>
<td><strong>Plant service charges ($/day)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base service charge</td>
<td>391,257</td>
<td>365,748</td>
<td>362,064</td>
<td>357,033</td>
<td>352,906</td>
<td>348,783</td>
<td>-10.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incremental service charge</td>
<td>37,034</td>
<td>20,948</td>
<td>21,383</td>
<td>21,345</td>
<td>21,081</td>
<td>22,377</td>
<td>-39.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pipeline service charge ($/day)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membrane service charge ($/day)*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13,816</td>
<td>13,344</td>
<td>12,837</td>
<td>12,400</td>
<td>11,928</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition to restart ($’000 per event)</td>
<td>6,053</td>
<td>13,933</td>
<td>12,652</td>
<td>12,031</td>
<td>11,735</td>
<td>11,622</td>
<td>92.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition to shutdown ($’000 per event)</td>
<td>1,588</td>
<td>1,686</td>
<td>1,686</td>
<td>1,686</td>
<td>1,686</td>
<td>1,686</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
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<td><strong>Water usage charge ($/ML)</strong></td>
<td>687</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>-10.5%</td>
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* No membrane service charge applies if there is no restart in the 2017 determination period. The membrane service charge in this table assumes a first restart in 2017-18. Table 12.2 presents the complete schedule of membrane service charges by year of restart.

Note: The first year of the 2017 Determination is 2017-18. Results for 2016-17 are provided for comparative purposes.

1.2  Our review process

In making our pricing decisions, we have complied with our Terms of Reference (see Appendix A). These Terms of Reference require us to determine prices for two services:

a) the supply of non-rainfall dependent drinking water to purchasers, and

b) the making available of the desalination plant to supply non-rainfall dependent drinking water.

We have also taken into account a broad range of issues including the matters we must consider under the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal Act 1992 (the IPART Act) and the Water Industry Competition Regulation 2008 (see Appendix B).

SDP submitted its pricing proposal to IPART on 27 October 2016. SDP redacted certain information from the public version of its pricing proposal on the grounds of commercial confidentiality. At the Public Hearing, SDP disclosed some of the information that had been redacted from the public version of its pricing proposal. Accordingly, it resubmitted its pricing proposal to include some information that was originally redacted. No other changes have been made to SDP’s revised pricing proposal.

18 The Determination then allows prices in $2017-18 to be updated for inflation from 2018-19 onwards. We have applied 2.1% inflation to $2016-17 prices to determine prices in $2017-18 (in the Determination).
We have referred to SDP’s revised pricing proposal throughout this Final Report, which was made available on our website at the same time as we published our Draft Report. To avoid any confusion, we have marked SDP’s original pricing proposal on our website as ‘superseded’.

Also, available on our website is SDP’s public submission to our Draft Report, as well as non-confidential responses received from other stakeholders. We have considered all submissions made to this review in making our pricing decisions.

As part of our review process, we have undertaken an extensive investigation and public consultation, including:

- releasing an Issues Paper in August 2016 to assist stakeholders identify and understand the key issues for review
- inviting SDP to make a pricing proposal in October 2016 detailing its proposed prices and future capital and operating expenditure necessary to maintain service levels and respond to regulatory demands
- inviting stakeholders to make submissions on the Issues Paper and SDP’s pricing proposal by 11 November 2016\(^19\)
- holding a Public Hearing in December 2016 to discuss a wide range of issues raised by SDP and other stakeholders
- engaging independent consultants to review SDP’s:
  - capital expenditure, asset planning and operating expenditure proposals - WS Atkins International (Australia) Limited, in association with Cardno (Queensland) Pty (Atkins Cardno)\(^20\)
  - proposed allowances for energy costs and the energy adjustment mechanism – Marsden Jacob Associates Pty Limited (Marsden Jacob)\(^21\)
  - insurance coverage for material damage and business interruption - Atkins Cardno in association with Deloitte Consulting Pty Ltd (Deloitte) (confidential report),\(^22\) and
- releasing a Draft Report and Draft Determination in March 2017 and inviting stakeholders to make submissions in response to the drafts by 18 April 2017.

Our reports, stakeholder submissions, the transcript from the Public Hearing, and consultants’ reports are available on our website (www.ipart.nsw.gov.au).

\(^{19}\) A total of 6 written submissions were received from other interested parties.
\(^{20}\) Atkins Cardno’s final report was finalised in February 2017 and published on our website in March 2017. We reengaged Atkins Cardno to respond to SDP’s submission to our Draft Report and received a supplementary report in May 2017. This is also available on our website. Atkins Cardno in association with Deloitte Consulting Pty Ltd’s (Deloitte’s) final report was received in January 2017. Much of the supplementary information on costs used in its analysis was provided to us by Sydney Water on a commercial-in-confidence basis. Therefore, we have not published this report on our website.
\(^{21}\) Marsden Jacob’s final report was received in January 2017 and published on our website in March 2017. A supplementary report was received in May 2017 updating benchmark energy prices. This is also available on our website.
\(^{22}\) Atkins Cardno in association with Deloitte’s final report was received in January 2017. Much of the information on SDP’s insurance policies used in its analysis was provided to us by SDP on a commercial-in-confidence basis. Therefore, we have not published this report on our website.
Concurrent to this determination of SDP’s maximum prices, we also reviewed the Methodology Paper we published in 2012 setting out our approaches to provide SDP with:

- energy adjustment mechanism (EnAM), and
- efficiency adjustment mechanism (EfAM).

We have released a separate 2017 Methodology Paper, which is also available from our website (www.ipart.nsw.gov.au).

1.3 Structure of this Final Report

The rest of this Final Report provides more information about our decisions, and SDP’s pricing proposal:

- Chapter 2 discusses the regulatory framework within which we set maximum prices. Our main objective is to set prices to allow SDP to recover the efficient cost of providing its monopoly services over the life of its assets, as required by the Terms of Reference.
- Chapter 3 outlines the improvements we are making to SDP’s incentives to maximise its production and supply of water during drought.
- Chapter 4 outlines how we have accommodated SDP’s emergency response outside drought, including new incentives we have introduced to ensure that SDP is using its reasonable endeavours to respond to an emergency, if required to do so.
- Chapters 5 to 10 discuss the issues related to the steps in our approach for setting SDP’s maximum prices:
  - Chapter 5 covers SDP’s notional revenue requirement, which represents our view of the total efficient costs of providing SDP’s monopoly services in each year of the 2017 determination period.
  - Chapters 6 to 8 cover SDP’s efficient operating, capital and energy related expenditure.
  - Chapter 9 looks at how we calculated allowances for a return on assets and regulatory depreciation.
  - Chapter 10 discusses our decisions on price structures.
- Chapter 11 describes how the charges presented in Chapter 10 are to be shared in the event SDP serves multiple customers (ie, customers in addition to Sydney Water).
- Chapter 12 outlines how we have decided to capitalise the prudent and efficient cost of a full membrane replacement following the first restart of the plant.
- Chapter 13 presents price levels and assesses the implications of our pricing decisions on retail customers, SDP, general inflation, and the environment.

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1.4 List of decisions

Our decisions are outlined in the chapters of this Final Report. For convenience, they are also listed below.

We have made decisions to:

Length of determination [1]

1 Adopt a 5-year determination period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2022. 17

SDP’s operating modes [2]

2 Simplify SDP’s modes of operation for pricing purposes to the following - water security (shutdown), restart, and plant operation. In doing so, we have: 20
   - removed the intermediate shutdown modes in the 2012 Determination – ie, short-term, medium-term and long-term shutdown 21
   - redefined the shutdown period to begin from the 11th consecutive day of no production 21
   - redefined the restart period so that it marks the recommencement of activities associated with starting up the plant, and 21
   - retained the definition of plant operation period in the 2012 Determination (apart from consequential changes following amendments to the definition of “Shutdown Period”). 21

Abatable charges [3-4]

3 Continue to apply the abatement factor to daily fixed charges, which includes base, incremental and membrane service charges under our price structures. 26

4 Deem the Daily Volume on 364 Availability Days preceding the first Availability Day equal to 250 ML per day for the 2017 determination period where no prior history exists. 26

Regulating SDP’s prices [5]

5 Continue regulating SDP’s prices outside drought for all customers. 27

Cost pass-through mechanism [6]

6 Not include a general cost pass-through mechanism in the 2017 Determination. 28

Abatement mechanism during drought [7-11]

7 Broaden the abatement mechanism to apply uniformly during drought from 13 December 2018. This means: 33
   - SDP’s fixed charges would be fully abated for shutdown and restart days during drought resulting from: 33
8. Provide SDP with an option of a ‘grace’ period of up to eight months from full abatement when the plant first responds to drought. During the grace period partial abatement would apply, where:
   - The daily volumes of production will not be included in the abatement factor for the grace period. The grace period commences on the day when dam levels first fall into drought.
   - The abatement factor will, however, still apply to daily fixed charges during a plant operation period including for any plant operation period that falls within the grace period from abatement.
   - SDP would be able to opt out of the grace period at its discretion.

9. Align the abatement mechanism with the design parameters of the plant by:
   - Removing the 250 ML cap on daily volumes for calculation of the abatement factor applied to daily fixed charges.
   - Retaining the averaging period of 365 days for calculation of the abatement factor.
   - Introducing a true-up of fixed charges to claw back any over-recovery of revenue over a single episode of drought, which:
     - includes holding costs calculated using the relevant WACC, and
     - is payable at the end of a drought response period.
   - Resetting the abatement factor to one, if the plant exits drought with an abatement factor above one.
   - Retaining and using the abatement factor, if the plant exits drought with an abatement factor of one or lower.

10. Exempt SDP from full abatement on any day when it is required to reduce production below 250 ML per day in order to comply with a law or a binding direction, order or similar made under a law.

11. Not exempt SDP from abatement when Sydney Water is unable to accept water on a day.

**Abatement mechanism during minimum run time [12-13]**

12. Relax the nil price to Sydney Water when the plant operates within the 14-month minimum run time.

13. Apply partial abatement during the minimum run time.
Accommodating emergency response [14-18]

14 Relax the nil price outside drought to Sydney Water in the exceptional circumstances specified in the Water Supply Agreement, which are to:

- mitigate the effects of a public health incident, or
- ensure security of supply or network stability during periods of outages, unavailability or maintenance on any water industry infrastructure in Sydney Water’s area of operations.

15 Apply full abatement to SDP’s fixed charges when it is producing water in response to an Emergency Response Notice from Sydney Water. That is, the abatement factor:

- applies to SDP’s service charges and the volumes produced affect its calculation.

16 Provide SDP with an option of a ‘grace’ period of up to 8 months from abatement when it is producing water in response to an Emergency Response Notice from Sydney Water:

- The daily volumes of production will not be included in the abatement factor for the grace period.
- The abatement factor, however, will still apply during the grace period.
- SDP is able to opt out of the grace period at its discretion.

17 Allow the denominator for the abatement factor to be the amount agreed between SDP and Sydney Water following the issue of an Emergency Response Notice. However:

- A cap would apply to the numerator in the abatement factor so that it could not exceed 110% of the value of the denominator.
- SDP can manage fluctuations in output during an emergency response period within the 10% cap.
- Fixed charges would be trued-up to claw back any over-recovery of revenue over a single emergency response episode.

18 Retain and use the abatement factor if SDP exits an emergency response period with an abatement factor of less than one.

Notional revenue requirement [19]

19 Set SDP’s notional revenue requirement in each year of the 2017 determination period for:
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– the plant in operation and water security (shutdown) modes, as shown in Table 5.1, and
– the pipeline across all modes of operation, as shown in Table 5.2.

Application of Energy and Efficiency Adjustment Mechanisms [20-21]

20 Include an allowance in prices over the 2017 determination period for the losses made on the sale of SDP’s surplus energy while it was shutdown over the 2012 determination period of $28.8 million or $5.8 million per year (real $2016-17 and including financing costs). This is consistent with the Terms of Reference.

21 Include an efficiency carryover of $51,100 per annum for the first three years of the 2017 determination period based on applying the 2012 EfAM methodology.

Prudent and efficient past capital expenditure [22]

22 Include in the RAB over the 2012 determination period prudent and efficient capital expenditure for the plant and pipeline as set out in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2. Our decision accepts SDP’s proposed costs.

Expenditure on plant and pipeline over the 2017 determination period [23-28]

23 Set the efficient level of SDP’s operating expenditure (plant and corporate) in water security (shutdown) mode as outlined in Table 6.3. Our decision is $34.3 million (or 28%) lower than SDP’s proposed costs.

24 Set the efficient level of SDP’s operating expenditure (plant and corporate) in plant operation mode as outlined in Table 6.4. Our decision is $38.4 million (or 8%) lower than SDP’s proposed costs.

25 Include in the RAB the forecast capital expenditure for the plant as outlined in Table 6.5 over the 2017 determination period. Our allowance is $12 million (or 484%) higher than SDP’s total proposed costs.

26 Set forecast capital and operating expenditure over the 2017 determination period for the pipeline as outlined in Table 6.6. Our decision accepts SDP’s proposed costs.

27 Set the efficient level of SDP’s one-off operating expenditure (including energy) to transition to restart as outlined in Table 6.7. Our decision is on average $26.9 million (or 68%) lower than SDP’s average proposed costs.

28 Set the efficient level of SDP’s one-off operating expenditure (including energy) to transition to shutdown as outlined in Table 6.8. Our decision accepts SDP’s proposed costs.

Membrane replacement expenditure [29-30]

29 Set SDP’s prudent and efficient capital expenditure at $30 million for a full membrane replacement on the first restart in the 2017 determination period. These costs would be
payable at most once in the 2017 determination period. For clarity, this includes a restart:

- triggered by drought response, or
- discretionary use of the plant by third-party customers outside drought.

30 Not provide any further allowances for the ongoing replacement of membranes in the 2017 determination period.

Ex-post review of uncertain expenditure [31]

31 Not include in the RAB the prudent and efficient capital costs of an extra drinking water pump ($2.1 million) and a skid test unit ($1 million) given the uncertainty in timing of this expenditure. Rather, these costs would be re-assessed for efficiency and included (with holding costs at WACC) at the next review of SDP prices.

Energy costs [32-36]

32 Set energy cost allowances as outlined in Table 8.2.

33 Continue to set energy cost allowances based on benchmark estimates of efficient energy costs.

34 Set efficient benchmark energy unit prices as outlined in Table 8.3.

35 Set benchmark energy volumes as outlined in Table 8.6.

36 Maintain the cost pass-through mechanism used in the 2012 Determination for SDP’s energy network costs. However, we have:

- Updated the benchmark volumes used in the calculation of the Variable Network Charge.
- Capped the maximum demand used to calculate the capacity charge/s that feed into the Fixed Network Charge, from 1 July 2017 until SDP is first called into operation, to the lesser of:
  - actual maximum demand used to calculate SDP’s actual capacity charge/s, and
  - benchmark maximum demand of 1,090 kilovolt-amps (kVA).

Regulatory Asset Base [37-42]

37 Set the opening RAB at 1 July 2017 by rolling the historical RAB forward from 2011-12 to 2016-17 as outlined in Table 9.1.

38 Roll forward the RAB from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 by taking account of actual CPI, but not updating for actual capital expenditure.

39 Correct asset category values used in the 2012 Determination to roll the RAB forward from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2017.
40 Correct asset lives used in the 2012 Determination to roll the RAB forward from 1 July 2017. 120

41 Maintain our standard practice of using allowed depreciation to roll forward the historical RAB. 121

42 Adopt the value of the RAB in each year of the 2017 determination period as set out in Table 9.5. 121

Return on capital [43-44]

43 Apply a real post-tax WACC of 4.7% for the purposes of calculating an appropriate rate of return on SDP’s assets. 123

44 Set an allowance for return on capital as outlined in Table 9.7. 123

Return of capital [45]

45 Accept SDP’s infrastructure based asset categories, with minor adjustments, as set out in Table 9.8 and

– adjust SDP’s proposed new and existing asset lives as set out in Table 9.9, and 126

– set an allowance for regulatory depreciation as set out in Table 9.10. 126

Regulatory tax [46-48]

46 Adopt the regulatory tax allowance as set out in Table 9.11. 130

47 Maintain the current statutory corporate tax rate of 30% to calculate SDP’s taxation allowance for the purposes of setting prices over the 2017 determination period. 131

48 Adopt SDP’s proposed approach to the treatment of tax loss carryovers for the distribution pipeline. 132

Return on working capital [49]

49 Adopt 15 days for ‘receivable days’ to calculate SDP’s working capital allowance. 132

Price structures [50-54]

50 Split water service charges into:

– a base service charge ($/day), reflecting SDP’s efficient fixed costs when in water security (shutdown) mode, and 134

– an incremental service charge ($/day), reflecting the difference in SDP’s efficient fixed costs between water security (shutdown) and plant operation modes. 134

51 Retain a water usage charge ($/ML) for supplying non-rainfall dependent drinking water.136

52 Continue transition charges, which reflect the efficient one-off operating costs of moving from shutdown into plant operation mode and vice versa. 136
Ensure transition charges (for restart and shutdown) are payable only once. Either:
   - when triggered by dam storage levels when the plant is responding to drought, or
   - upon notice by a customer to start or cease supply outside drought.

Continue to set a mode-independent pipeline charge.

Cost sharing rules [55-59]

Change the cost sharing rules to reflect the desalination plant’s primary role as a drought response measure, such that:
   - Base service charges (and pipeline service charges) are always paid for by impactors
   - Water usage charges are always paid for by beneficiaries, and
   - Incremental service charges and transition charges are paid by impactors when the plant operates as a drought measure (including any portion of the minimum run time that falls outside drought) and beneficiaries when it operates outside of drought.

Define impactors so as to capture bulk water users who directly affect Greater Sydney’s water storage levels and cause the need for SDP to exist. Specifically, impactors source water from dams supplying Greater Sydney (WaterNSW) and from the desalination plant (SDP) when it operates.

Share base service (and pipeline service) charges between impactors based on their proportion of total system draw that day.

Share incremental service charges ‘on the day’ between:
   - impactors during drought based on their proportion of total system draw that day
   - impactors during any portion of the minimum run time that falls outside drought based on their proportion of total system draw that day, and
   - beneficiaries outside drought based on their proportion of desalinated water sold that day.

Share one-off transition charges (to restart and shutdown):
   - between existing impactors based on their total system draw over the 12 months prior to a restart for drought and the entire drought episode prior to the first shutdown after the end of drought, and
   - equally by the beneficiaries that request the restart or shutdown outside drought (ie, issue a notice for SDP to start or cease supply).

Establish a separate membrane asset base (membrane RAB) as set out in Table 12.1:
   - with an opening value of $30 million in the year of first restart
   - adopting an asset life for membranes of 8 years
– not adding any further capital expenditure for the ongoing replacement of membranes, and 151
– rolling forward the membrane RAB until the membranes fully depreciate. 151

61 Set separate charges to recover the capitalised costs of a full membrane replacement over the 2017 determination period, which includes the:

– schedule of membrane service charges as outlined in Table 12.2, and 152
– one-off charges for residual membrane costs as outlined in Table 12.3. 152

62 Apply the following charging rules for membrane costs:

– membranes paid for in full by impactors when the plant is triggered by drought 153
– membranes paid for in full by beneficiaries when the plant operates outside drought, and 153
– membrane costs revert to impactors if drought occurs before they are paid in full by beneficiaries. 153

63 Review the prudent and efficient capital costs of membranes associated with supply for emergency response to Sydney Water (ie, exceptional circumstances specified in the Water Supply Agreement) ex-post at the next determination period.

– Where appropriate, these costs would be rolled into the historical RAB, including holding costs using the relevant WACC. 156
– These membranes costs would be paid for in full by Sydney Water. 156

Prices [64]

64 Set prices for the 2017 determination period as outlined in Table 13.1. 158
2 Refining the regulatory framework

In this chapter, we discuss the regulatory framework within which we set prices. We set prices to allow SDP to recover the efficient costs of providing its monopoly services over the life of its assets, as required by the Terms of Reference.

SDP’s primary role is to respond to drought. Our expenditure consultant has thus set SDP’s efficient costs with reference to this purpose, rather than SDP’s ancillary emergency response role. Further, our expenditure consultant has simplified the plant’s shutdown modes by eliminating redundant and more costly intermediate shutdown modes.

In our 2017 Determination, we have also broadened and strengthened the abatement mechanism to incentivise performance when SDP is required to operate the plant in its drought and emergency response roles. This mechanism operates to reduce SDP’s fixed charges if it produces less than the specified volume of drinking water per day when the plant is required to operate.

Outside of drought and emergency response roles, we consider there are economic arguments in favour of allowing unregulated pricing agreements. But we are of the view that such agreements would contravene the financial indifference principle in the Terms of Reference. Prices must therefore be regulated.

In this chapter, we also discuss our decisions to not include a general cost pass-through mechanism and to set the determination period for a 5-year period.

2.1 Length of determination

We have made a decision to:

1 Adopt a 5-year determination period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2022.

We consider a 5-year determination period provides the most appropriate balance between certainty and flexibility for SDP. In forming our view, we have considered the following issues:

- The confidence we can place in the utility’s forecasts. We have sufficient confidence in our forecasts of capital and operating expenditure for the next five years. While five years is longer than the determination period for most utilities that we regulate, we consider this is still appropriate for SDP, which is a single asset business. Moreover, we note that membrane replacement costs, a potential source of forecast expenditure uncertainty, have been capitalised. This will enable us to review the prudence and efficiency of this expenditure at the next price review.
The risk of structural changes in the industry. We consider that significant structural change is unlikely in the next five years. We consider the changes to the SDP’s operating rules resulting from the 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan can be accommodated through SDP’s Network Operator’s Licence and references to this licence within the 2017 Determination.

The need for price flexibility and incentives to increase efficiency. We consider that a 5-year determination provides sufficient incentives to achieve efficiencies, while allowing for a timely reset of prices.

The need for regulatory certainty and financial stability. A 5-year determination generally provides sufficient regulatory certainty while balancing revenue stability.

Stakeholder views on the length of determination

In its original pricing proposal and submission to our Draft Report, SDP supported a 5-year determination period.24

In its submission to our Draft Report, Sydney Water also supported a 5-year determination period, noting that many of the uncertainties it raised in its submission to the Issues Paper have now been resolved.25

Sydney Water argued in its submission to the Issues Paper for a shorter determination period due to considerable uncertainty around SDP’s current operations. In particular, Sydney Water cited:

- the storm damage and repair to SDP’s plant and equipment, and
- the review of the current Metropolitan Water Plan and SDP’s operating rules.26

We have not included in prices costs associated with the damage to the desalination plant as a result of the storm event. SDP has indicated insurance will cover the repair and replacement of plant and equipment following the storm event.27 Thus, the rebuild does not affect the Regulatory Asset Base (RAB) nor is there any insurance ‘gap’ arising from the storm event.

The Metropolitan Water Plan was recently updated and released on 19 March 2017.28 The changes resulting to SDP’s operating rules (outlined below) will be reflected in SDP’s Network Operating Licence. Where relevant, the 2017 Determination has referred to the Network Operating Licence and therefore will incorporate these changes when they occur. The 2017 Determination also accommodates the discretionary minimum run time in the updated Metropolitan Water Plan.

Sydney Water also originally argued that a 2-year determination period may be needed for SDP to determine the costs of membrane replacement.29 We consider the capitalisation of

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24 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, pp 25-26; and SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 5.
membrane replacement costs adequately deals with this issue. Sydney Water has sought clarification of how any such replacements would change the membrane RAB.\footnote{Sydney Water submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p ii.}

We provide more detail on the membrane service charge in Chapter 12.

2.2 SDP’s primary role is to respond to drought

The desalination plant is a key element in Greater Sydney’s water security plan. It was constructed to ensure a secure water supply for the Greater Sydney region, both in the long-term and in response to drought events, as part of the NSW Government’s Metropolitan Water Plan.\footnote{Sydney Water was directed by the then Minister for Water Utilities, under section 20P of the State Owned Corporations Act 1989, to construct and operate the desalination plant and associated infrastructure. IPART was subsequently directed, under section 16A of the IPART Act, to include in its determination of maximum prices for Sydney Water an amount representing the efficient costs of the requirements imposed on Sydney Water. The Metropolitan Water Plan was first developed in 2004 in response to indications a drought was taking hold. The Metropolitan Water Plan was updated in 2006 due to the deepening drought, where it identified a role for a desalination plant. See IPART, \textit{Review of water prices for Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Limited from 1 July 2012 - Final Report}, December 2011, p 60; NSW Government, \textit{2010 Metropolitan Water Plan}, August 2010, p 11; IPART, \textit{Review of prices for Sydney Water Corporation’s water, sewerage, stormwater and other services from 1 July 2008 – Determination and Final Report}, June 2008, Appendix B. NSW Government, Metropolitan Water Directorate, \textit{Updating the Plan}, at \url{http://www.metrowater.nsw.gov.au/planning-sydney/updating-plan}, accessed on 22 June 2017.}

The 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan lowered the ‘on’ and ‘off’ triggers for the desalination plant to run the water supply system more cost effectively, taking account of changes in demand over the medium term. SDP is to operate the plant in response to drought:\footnote{The Metropolitan Water Plan does not define ‘drought’ according to the desalination plant’s trigger levels. However, the desalination plant, along with other water sources, is accessed as the water levels in dams reduce. Therefore, the plant is a drought response measure, aimed at securing supply of water. We refer to SDP’s operating rules to distinguish between when the plant is operating in its drought response role and when it is not.}

\begin{itemize}
    \item when the total dam storage level is below 60\% (previously 70\%), and
    \item continue to do so until the total dam storage level reaches 70\% (previously 80\%).\footnote{NSW Government, \textit{2017 Metropolitan Water Plan}, March 2017, pp 28-29; and NSW Government, \textit{2010 Metropolitan Water Plan}, August 2010, p 36.}
\end{itemize}

This ‘60/70 rule’ is designed to ensure SDP reduces the likelihood of end-use customers (ie, retail customers) facing water restrictions and to increase Greater Sydney’s water security during droughts.\footnote{We also note that Sydney Water is required to maintain and comply with an agreed roles and responsibility protocol regarding the development and implementation of the Metropolitan Water Plan under its Operating Licence. IPART, \textit{Sydney Water Corporation Operating Licence – Report to the Minister}, May 2015, pp 18-19.}

SDP’s drought response role is reflected in the Network Operator’s Licence it holds under the WIC Act. During drought, the licence requires SDP to operate and maintain the plant “with the objective of maximising the production of drinking water for the exclusive supply into Sydney Water Corporation’s area of operation”.\footnote{See condition A2(b) of SDP’s Network Operator’s Licence.}

The Network Operator’s Licence for SDP will need to be updated to give effect to the revised drought triggers in the 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan.\footnote{Throughout this report, we generally refer to the ‘60/70 rule’ as delimiting drought.} Until and unless the Network Operator’s Licence is
changed, our 2017 Determination will give effect to the previous operating rules (ie, 70/80 rule).

The desalination plant’s primary purpose is to provide water supply during drought conditions as defined in its Network Operator’s Licence. The overall objective of our expenditure review, therefore, was to establish and recommend the most efficient way to deliver SDP’s monopoly services, subject to SDP meeting its drought response role.

Atkins Cardno, our expenditure consultant, observed that the plant’s operating rules are fundamental in setting the mode of operation or shutdown, rather than any need to maintain a higher level of shutdown to respond to any emergencies as defined in the Water Supply Agreement with Sydney Water. In other words, our expenditure consultants examined the most efficient operation for SDP to fulfil its primary drought response, rather than its secondary emergency response role. In this latter case, SDP’s response is to use ‘reasonable endeavours’.

Accordingly, in water security (shutdown) mode, Atkins Cardno considered that the cost driver is the licence requirement to maintain the plant in accordance with Good Industry Practice. Expenditure, therefore, should be limited to essential maintenance activities and any periodic expenditure, such as membrane replacement and periodic maintenance, should be clearly justified in terms of scope, risk and time. This criterion also applies to significant plant testing costs proposed by SDP in the future price path.

In developing our decisions, we have designed a regulatory framework and assessed SDP’s efficient costs through the lens of SDP’s primary role of drought response. We agree with Atkins Cardno that any need to maintain a higher level of service is ancillary. In its submission to our Issues Paper, WaterNSW opposed SDP becoming a more broadly available supply source outside the operating rules, supporting the view of SDP’s primary role as a drought security measure and not a water supply measure.

Nonetheless, we also recognise that the licence does not require SDP to cease operating the plant outside drought. Nor does it restrict SDP supplying customers in addition to, or other than, Sydney Water (other than small retail customers).

While ancillary to SDP’s primary role as a drought response measure, our Determination accommodates these circumstances.

### 2.3 Strategic review of modes of operation

**We have made a decision to:**

1. Simplify SDP’s modes of operation for pricing purposes to the following - water security (shutdown), restart, and plant operation. In doing so, we have:

40 See condition A2(a)(i) of SDP’s Network Operator’s Licence.
42 WaterNSW submission to IPART Issues Paper, November 2016, p 1.
43 SDP is authorised by the Retail Supplier’s Licence granted to it under the WIC Act on 9 August 2010 to supply “any person other than a Small Retail Customer” within “Sydney Water Corporation’s area of operations (as defined in the Sydney Water Operating Licence)”. The term ‘small retail customer’ is defined under clause 5 of the WIC Regulation.

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IPART Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd
removed the intermediate shutdown modes in the 2012 Determination – ie, short-term, medium-term and long-term shutdown

– redefined the shutdown period to begin from the 11th consecutive day of no production

– redefined the restart period so that it marks the recommencement of activities associated with starting up the plant, and

– retained the definition of plant operation period in the 2012 Determination (apart from consequential changes following amendments to the definition of “Shutdown Period”).

Our expenditure consultant, Atkins Cardno, conducted a strategic review of SDP’s operating modes. It recommended that the defined modes of operation be simplified to:

▼ water security (shutdown) mode

▼ plant operational mode, and

▼ restart mode (distinguishing between first and subsequent restarts). 44

Atkins Cardno observed that there are no clear circumstances where short, medium and long-term shutdown modes under the 2012 Determination would apply. Atkins Cardno recommended the prudent approach to minimise costs when the plant is not operating is for SDP to move to a water security (shutdown) mode. 45

Atkins Cardno recommended water security (shutdown) mode as the base operating mode because it considers that SDP’s Network Operator’s Licence is clear in defining when the plant needs to be in operation or to be available – ie, in response to drought. Analysis of historical data shows that it is likely to take about one year for the dam levels to drop 10% in a drought; meaning that it would be a number of years following the break of a drought before the dam trigger level is likely to be reached again. 46 Atkins Cardno also noted that there are no clear protocols or definitions in place for determining any other mode of operation on an ex-ante basis - short, medium or long - and how any decision is made and agreed with all interested parties.

We support Atkins Cardno’s recommendation to simplify SDP’s operating modes. In particular, we agree that water security (shutdown) mode should be SDP’s default or base operating mode, and we have restructured SDP’s prices and set efficient costs to reflect this (see Chapter 5 to 8).

SDP’s revised proposal is consistent with Atkins Cardno’s recommendation. It agreed that simplifying the number of modes for pricing purposes to water security (shutdown), restart and plant operation reflects its proposed default position to transition to water security shutdown after a period of operation. 47 In its submission to our Issues Paper, SDP noted that:

In practice, it will generally make sense to always go into water security shutdown after a period of operation under the 70/80 rule. This is because the time it takes for the storages to drop below 70%, once they have reached 80%, is more likely to be greater than two years than less than two

47 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 7.
48 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, pp 115-116.
years (i.e. a long-term shutdown), given historical storage patterns...As a corollary, decisions about which modes to enter should be subject to an agreed protocol that the plant will always be placed into water security shutdown after a period of operation once the storages return to 80%, unless SWC (or another customer) requests otherwise.

However, SDP considered it would be beneficial to clarify the definition of a restart period to ensure there is no ambiguity.\(^{49}\) We agree with SDP and present definitions of our modes of operation in Box 2.1.

### Box 2.1 SDP’s modes of operations for the 2017 determination period

We have simplified SDP’s modes of operation to three periods:

1. shutdown
2. restart, and
3. plant operation.

We have made no changes to the definition of a plant operation period from that in the 2012 Determination (apart from consequential changes following amendments to the definition of “Shutdown Period”). SDP enters a plant operation period when the plant is producing and supplying desalinated water. Desalinated water is water suitable for purposes set out in SDP’s Network Operator’s Licence and Retail Supplier’s Licence.

However, we have refined the definition of a restart period so that it marks the recommencement of activities associated with preparing the plant for the production of desalinated water following a shutdown. We agree with SDP that the definition under the 2012 Determination conveys the impression that a restart period only commences when desalinated water is produced, rather than when the initial activities to restart the plant commence. As a result, we have adopted SDP’s proposed change to the definition of a restart period.

Given that we have eliminated the intermediate shutdown modes, we have defined a shutdown period to begin from the 11th consecutive day of no production. We refer to this as a ‘water security (shutdown)’ mode. It is therefore possible for a plant operation period to include up to 10 consecutive days of no production.

Our definition of a shutdown period complements refinements to the abatement mechanism we have also made to allow SDP to manage short-term fluctuations in output and period maintenance consistent with the plant’s design parameters (see Chapter 3).

We outline the rationale for removing the intermediate shutdown modes in further detail below. We also outline Atkins Cardno’s assessment of the length of time needed to restart from a prolonged water security shutdown.

#### 2.3.1 Removing the intermediate shutdown modes

The 2012 Determination covered a range of modes for shutdown, with varying levels of operating expenditure, including:

- Short-term shutdown for 2 to 10 days.

\(^{49}\) SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 8.
Medium-term shutdown for 11 to 90 days.

Long-term shutdown for 91 days to 2 years.

Water security shutdown for more than 2 years.

Atkins Cardno noted that many of these modes are not relevant to the plant’s primary objective to respond to drought or can be accommodated through appropriate changes to the regulatory framework. Atkins Cardno’s specific recommendations on each of the intermediate shutdown modes are:

- **Short-term shutdown (2 to 10 days).** Atkins Cardno formed the view that routine plant maintenance should be undertaken as part of normal operations and does not require a short-term shutdown mode. It noted that the plant can produce up to 266 ML per day, so a short-term outage could be managed through a modified abatement mechanism that accommodates the plant’s capacity to produce up to 266 ML per day.

- **Medium-term shutdown (11 to 90 days).** Atkins Cardno assessed that it would be highly unlikely that medium term shutdown would arise due to the dam levels falling below 70% within 3 months since last above 80%. Therefore, this mode of shutdown is not supported by SDP’s primary drought response role.

- **Long-term shutdown (91 days to 2 years).** While relevant to the plant’s drought response role, Atkins Cardno considers this mode does not provide any significant cost advantages compared to water security mode (ie, shutdown of more than 2 years). In the absence of any protocol to explain why a long-term shutdown mode should apply, Atkins Cardno recommended it prudent to minimise costs and move to the water security (shutdown) mode.

We have accepted Atkins Cardno’s recommendation to remove short, medium and long-term shutdown modes for pricing purposes. In doing so, we have refined the abatement calculation to align with the plant’s design parameters so that short-term outages can be managed by SDP without a net financial penalty through abatement. We also agree with Atkins Cardno that longer outages should be covered by SDP’s business interruption insurance for the loss of revenue through the abatement mechanism. Our changes to the abatement mechanism that complement the streamlining of SDP’s modes of operation are outlined in Chapter 3.

### 2.3.2 Endorsing an 8-month restart

SDP proposed an 8-month duration of restart from water security shutdown. Atkins Cardno reviewed SDP’s proposal and found it reasonable, given the scope of activities that have to be undertaken on restart.

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51 The 2012 Determination established an abatement mechanism that applies to SDP’s fixed charges when it produces volumes of water less than the plant’s full production capacity when required to fulfil its drought response role (ie, less than the annual average of 250 ML per day, when dam levels are between 70% and 80%).
53 Atkins Cardno, Expenditure Review – SDP, February 2017, pp 22, 24 and 25. We note that this finding applies equally to the lower trigger level of 60/70 under the 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan.
56 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 10.
In particular, Atkins Cardno noted that a long period of water security (shutdown) mode, which the plant is currently facing, places great importance on the restart. During restart, there is a need to procure membranes, carry out essential asset replacement, recruit and train additional operators and test the individual processes and the complete works. Atkins Cardno also considered that effective price regulation should allow SDP to make efficient use of water produced during restart.

We have designed our regulatory framework in accordance with Atkins Cardno’s recommendations on efficient modes of operation. Specifically, in restart we have:

- Introduced an 8-month grace from abatement when SDP responds to drought and an emergency or network outage. This would allow SDP to enter a plant operation period and supply drinking quality water without penalty (abatement of its service charge) when ramping-up supply over the 8-month restart period.
- Removed from restart charges energy costs related to the production and supply of drinking water during a restart phase, to ensure no double recovery of these costs (ie, SDP can recover these variable costs through the water usage charge).
- Allowed SDP to procure a full set of membranes upon the first restart over the 2017 determination period. This removes the need to test the plant in shutdown and limits expenditure to essential maintenance activities.

We comment on the detailed restart activities and costs recommended by Atkins Cardno in Chapters 6 to 8.

### 2.4 Abatement framework: incentivising SDP to operate when required

In the sections below we outline our abatement framework. At a high level, we discuss when and how abatement applies to SDP’s operations over the 2017 determination period. We also discuss which charges are subject to abatement, in the context of the changes we have made to SDP’s price structures.

#### 2.4.1 When and how abatement applies to SDP’s operations

In our 2012 Determination, we introduced an abatement mechanism to provide SDP with a strong incentive to maximise production of drinking water during drought. This mechanism operates to reduce SDP’s fixed charges if it produces less than the specified volume of drinking water per day when the plant is required to operate.

In our 2017 Determination, we have broadened and strengthened the abatement mechanism. In general, we have decided that abatement should apply across SDP’s differing operation periods. However, we have focused abatement to incentivise performance when SDP is required to operate the plant, and not to penalise performance when the plant operates on a discretionary basis.

There are two key dimensions to the abatement mechanism:

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Whether the abatement factor should be affected by SDP’s production levels.

When the prevailing abatement factor should apply to SDP’s fixed charges.

Under our 2017 Determination, we considered the application of three states of abatement outlined in Box 2.2.

**Box 2.2 Abatement options across SDP’s differing operation periods**

We considered the application of the following three states of abatement to ensure SDP operates as expected, when required:

1. Full abatement:
   - SDP’s level of production per day affects the abatement factor, and
   - the abatement factor is applied to SDP’s daily fixed charges.

2. Partial abatement:
   - SDP’s level of production per day does not affect the abatement factor, and
   - the abatement factor is applied to SDP’s daily fixed charges.

3. No abatement:
   - SDP’s level of production per day does not affect the abatement factor, and
   - the abatement factor is not applied to SDP’s daily fixed charges.

We have applied full abatement when SDP is required to produce – specifically, in its primary drought response role and its ancillary emergency response role. This means SDP’s performance at these times affects the abatement factor, which applies to SDP’s fixed charges. This strongly incentivises SDP to operate the plant and ensure that it can supply water when required to do so.

Outside its drought and emergency requirements, operation of the plant is at SDP’s discretion and we have decided that partial abatement applies. This includes supply to third parties outside drought and during the optional minimum run time provided to SDP under the 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan.

Under partial abatement, SDP’s performance does not affect the abatement factor. This recognises that production is discretionary and flexible. However, SDP’s fixed charges would continue to be affected by past performances when it was required to produce. That is, its prevailing abatement factor would be applied to its fixed charges. This provides a strong incentive for SDP to perform during drought and emergency response, so that it exits these periods having supplied volumes at required levels (drought) or agreed levels (emergency response).

In applying our framework, we have made some exceptions. For example, we do not consider it appropriate to abate SDP’s fixed charges for poor performance during drought or an emergency response as a result of uninsurable events outside SDP’s control. In these instances no abatement applies.

We also consider SDP should be provided grace from full abatement for up to 8 months to allow it sufficient time to ramp-up production to fulfil its drought and emergency response roles. In these instances partial abatement applies.
Our decisions on how abatement applies during drought and emergency response are outlined in detail in Chapter 3 and 4, respectively. Table 2.1 provides a high level summary of when and how abatement applies to SDP’s operations under the 2017 Determination.

### Table 2.1 When and how abatement applies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inside drought and inside emergency response</th>
<th>Outside drought and outside emergency response</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>During grace period</td>
<td>Minimum run time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After grace period</td>
<td>Supplying third party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Business as usual</td>
<td>Shutdown</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Partial</td>
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<td>Full</td>
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<td>Insurable force majeure</td>
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<td>Partial</td>
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<td>Uninsurable force majeure</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Data source: IPART analysis.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### 2.4.2 Abatement continues to apply to fixed charges

We have made a decision to:

3 Continue to apply the abatement factor to daily fixed charges, which includes base, incremental and membrane service charges under our price structures.

4 Deem the Daily Volume on 364 Availability Days preceding the first Availability Day equal to 250 ML per day for the 2017 determination period where no prior history exists.

We have refined SDP’s price structures (see Chapter 10), splitting its daily fixed charges for the plant into two components:

- **Base service charge** ($/day): reflecting the plant’s base fixed costs when shutdown and operating.
- **Incremental service charge** ($/day): reflecting the additional fixed costs incurred by SDP when the plant operates.

We have also introduced a **membrane service charge** ($/day) to recover the capitalised costs of a full set of membranes if the plant is called into operation over the 2017 determination period (see Chapter 12).

The abatement mechanism will continue to abate the above daily fixed charges related to the plant. Therefore, under our new price structures, it would apply to the base, incremental and membrane service charges when the plant is in operation mode.

Sydney Water considered this should also be extended to the pipeline service charge.\(^59\) We disagree. The pipeline service charge will not be subject to abatement under our 2017 Determination, as is currently the case. We consider the incentives in place to be sufficient under the application of the abatement mechanism to the existing charges. Moreover, SDP would likely require additional insurance coverage if the pipeline charge were to be abated.

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\(^59\) Sydney Water submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 5.
2.5 Prices remain regulated outside drought

We have made a decision to:

5 Continue regulating SDP’s prices outside drought for all customers.

As noted above, SDP is free to supply customers outside drought. In these instances, SDP might do so at volumes less than full production. This differs to SDP’s primary role, which is to maximise production during drought.

In our Issues Paper, we acknowledged the difficulty in determining bespoke or specific prices for all potential supply circumstances outside SDP’s prescribed drought response role. Thus we raised the possibility of introducing unregulated pricing agreements between SDP and its customers for supply outside drought. However, given the Terms of Reference under which we operate, we are unable to make this change to our regulatory framework.

2.5.1 Where SDP has limited monopoly power, economic arguments support unregulated pricing agreements

We consider that SDP and its customers should be able to make informed decisions in their own self-interest where SDP has limited monopoly power. Our view is that SDP has limited monopoly power when it operates outside drought because water is not scarce and there are other sources of water that are readily available. In addition, SDP’s customers are likely to be large sophisticated businesses with experience negotiating and assessing commercial agreements.

Given this, we consider that SDP, Sydney Water and third-party customers would only enter into unregulated pricing agreements when all parties benefit. The exception to this, however, is when SDP operates in an emergency response role outside drought. In these circumstances, it is reasonable to expect that SDP would have monopoly power, which could prevent ‘win-win’ agreements from occurring if prices were negotiated. We discuss SDP’s emergency response role in greater detail and how we have accommodated this role through our pricing framework in Chapter 4.

2.5.2 But unregulated pricing agreements are inconsistent with the financial indifference principle in the Terms of Reference

SDP sought unregulated pricing agreements when dam levels are high (ie, outside the 60/70 rule) with Sydney Water or other customers. To remain consistent with our Terms of Reference, however, we have decided that SDP’s prices outside drought will remain regulated to all customers.

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61 SDP is restricted from supplying small retail customers under its WICA licence.
62 We introduced this form of pricing flexibility in our recent determination of Sydney Water’s retail prices. We allowed Sydney Water and its large non-residential customers to enter into unregulated pricing agreements for water and wastewater services. See IPART, Review of prices for Sydney Water Corporation from 1 July 2016 to June 2020 – Final Report, June 2016.
63 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 31.
While, in principle, there is a strong economic argument for unregulated prices, we consider unregulated pricing agreements would be inconsistent with the financial indifference principle in the Terms of Reference. If SDP were to have the option to enter into unregulated pricing agreements, it would only be expected to do so at its benefit. Thus, it would no longer be financially indifferent as to whether or not it supplies water (see Appendix A).

SDP does not consider the financial indifference principle in the Terms of Reference prohibits unregulated pricing agreements. Rather, it considers that the financial indifference principle is directed only at SDP’s operation under its drought obligation. Nonetheless, in its revised proposal, SDP accepted our draft decision to regulate prices outside drought for all customers, given it is unlikely to be a material issue over the 2017 determination period. It considers that the scope of services subject to price regulation should be reconsidered in future periods.

In contrast, Sydney Water supported our draft decision to continue to regulate prices for all customers, both inside and outside drought, in line with the financial indifference principle in the Terms of Reference.

### 2.6 General cost-pass through mechanisms

We have made a decision to:

- Not include a general cost pass-through mechanism in the 2017 Determination.

In our Issues Paper, we noted that cost pass-throughs should only be used in exceptional circumstances and asked if there was a case to manage other SDP costs through a cost pass-through mechanism. SDP responded to this question by proposing a general cost pass-through mechanism to manage the risk of unforeseen and uncontrollable costs associated with extraordinary events (e.g., natural disasters), regulatory changes (e.g., Metropolitan Water Plan), and tax changes. It cited the following reasons in support of its proposal:

- **IPART’s strict cost pass-through criteria can lead to inefficient expenditure.** By limiting the scope of risks that can be passed through to customers, SDP has an incentive to make inefficient investments throughout the regulatory period (that are allowed in prices and paid for by customers) to insure itself against these risks.

- **Lack of control.** SDP has little if any control over these events occurring.

- **More cost reflective.** Allowing a general cost pass-through will allow SDP to avoid including speculative cost estimates in its expenditure forecasts for events that may or may not occur.

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64 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 31.
68 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 41.
More consistent with other regulatory frameworks. Other regulators, including the Essential Services Commission of South Australia (ESCOSA) and the Australian Energy Regulator (AER), provide general cost pass throughs. IPART provided cost pass through mechanisms in its 2010 and 2013 Electricity Retail Determinations.

In its submission to our Draft Report, SDP maintained the introduction of a cost pass-through mechanism to efficiently manage the risks associated with a number of unforeseen and uncontrollable events. SDP also welcomed IPART’s guidance on the event definitions and cost pass through processes to ensure they meet IPART’s cost pass-through criteria and the Terms of Reference.

SDP expressed disagreement with our draft decision and argued that:

- it is not efficient to partially expose SDP to risks that it has little influence over (such as changes to licence conditions)
- SDP’s proposed cost pass-through mechanism is not too general, given it is based on previous pass through mechanisms included in IPART determinations for electricity network and retail businesses
- the cost impacts associated with unforeseen and uncontrollable events are not symmetric (i.e., unexpected gains will not necessarily offset unexpected losses)
- uncertainty in SDP’s operating environment is not adequately addressed by references to the licence in SDP’s Determination, and
- re-opening the determination is not an efficient and cost-effective alternative to manage the risk of unforeseen and uncontrollable events.

Our final decision is to not provide a general cost pass through mechanism in SDP’s 2017 Determination. This decision is consistent with our cost pass-through criteria and with our recent 2015-16 decision for Sydney Water.

Our criteria for cost pass-through mechanisms reflect our views on the efficient allocation of risk between regulated businesses and customers and also reflect the requirement that our water pricing determinations are self-executing. Our cost pass-through criteria are outlined in Box 2.3 below.

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70 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 21.
71 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 12.
Box 2.3 Criteria for cost pass-through mechanisms

Cost pass-through mechanisms should only be applied in situations where:

- There is a trigger event (to activate the cost pass-through), which can be clearly defined and identified in the price determination.
- The resulting efficient cost associated with the trigger event can be fully assessed including whether there are other factors associated with the trigger event that fully or partially offset the direct cost of the event.
- The resulting cost is assessed to exceed a materiality threshold.
- The regulated business cannot influence the likelihood of the trigger event or the resulting cost.
- The mechanism is symmetric in that it applies equally to cost increases and cost decreases (in cases where the risk can result in both cost increases and cost decreases).
- It is clear the cost pass-through will result in prices that better reflect the efficient cost of service both before and after the trigger event occurs.

We do not consider SDP’s proposal for a cost pass-through mechanism for undefined extraordinary events, regulatory changes and tax changes, meets our criteria. Specifically:

- **Extraordinary events** (eg, natural disasters). While SDP cannot control if and when these events occur, it can decide whether or not to insure against these events (assuming they are insurable) and it can influence the costs resulting from these events. Therefore, it is efficient for SDP to be at least partially exposed to these risks.

- **Regulatory changes** (eg, Metropolitan Water Plan). SDP has an ability to influence the Metropolitan Water Directorate and it has some influence over the costs resulting from a change in the Metropolitan Water Plan. Therefore, it is efficient for SDP to be at least partially exposed to these risks.

- **Tax changes**. Although tax changes are generally considered suitable candidates for cost pass-throughs, SDP’s proposal is too general to meet our cost pass-through criteria. To meet our criteria, SDP would need to identify a potential tax change, identify the efficient cost, and show the efficient cost exceeds a materiality threshold. We note that tax changes are considered in more detail in Chapter 9.

We consider the current limited use of specific targeted cost pass-throughs is appropriate because it achieves an efficient balance of risk between SDP and customers.

- The risk of introducing a general cost pass-through for ‘unforeseen and uncontrollable events’ is that, in practice, it may be debatable what ‘uncontrollable’ means. There is a risk that unforeseen cost increases will tend to be presented as ‘uncontrollable’ and passed through to customers, while unforeseen cost decreases will be presented as ‘controllable’ and retained by the business.

- While SDP may have limited ability to influence processes like the development of the Metropolitan Water Plan, it does have some ability to influence these processes. Therefore, a cost pass-through that shifts 100% of these risks onto customers may remove SDP’s incentive to actively engage in these processes and may lead to less efficient outcomes.
Further, the risk around unforeseen events is already shared between the regulated business and its customers. Our 5-year determination period for SDP means that SDP is potentially exposed to up to 5-years of cost changes (positive or negative) resulting from an unforeseen event. At the next price review, cost changes are assessed and, if prudent to pass through to customers, these cost changes are factored into prices going forward.

We continue to be open to consider specific targeted cost-pass throughs where they can be assessed against our criteria at a price review. We consider our current approach to setting efficient cost allowances is working effectively. This approach includes:

- **Expenditure reviews** to assess expenditure forecasts and attempt to identify any inefficient expenditure that a business may have included for the purpose of limiting its exposure to specific risks (as indicated in SDP’s proposal).
- **Expenditure allowances** are assumed to be unbiased, so over the long-run unexpected cost increases are expected to offset unexpected cost decreases.
- Limited use of cost pass-throughs in circumstances that meet our criteria.
- The opportunity to re-open the determination if there is a significant change in costs.

SDP has requested further guidance on the types of costs that would qualify for a cost pass-through based on our cost pass-through criteria and the Terms of Reference. We offer guidance by way of a real life example. We continue to provide a cost pass-through for SDP’s network energy costs. SDP’s network energy costs clearly meet our cost pass-through criteria. That is:

- there is a trigger event (ie, AER issuing a new network price determination during the 2017 determination period)
- the cost being passed through can be assessed as being efficient and material
- SDP cannot influence the trigger event or the resulting cost
- the energy network cost pass-through is symmetric in that it passes through both increases and decreases in energy network costs, and
- the energy network cost pass-through is expected to result in prices that better reflect the efficient cost over time (ie, compared to us setting a fixed allowance for these costs).

This pass-through of SDP’s energy network costs is discussed in Chapter 8.

We note that Sydney Water supported our draft decision not to include a general cost pass-through mechanism in SDP’s 2017 Determination.\(^{73}\)

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\(^{73}\) Sydney Water submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 2.
3  Ensuring incentives are proportionate to SDP’s drought response role

This chapter outlines our changes to the abatement mechanism to ensure that SDP’s incentives reflect its drought response role. In particular, we have strengthened the abatement mechanism to apply more uniformly during drought. That is, full abatement has been extended to also apply in shutdown and restart periods when the plant is required to produce during drought.

We have been mindful of the difference between events that are within SDP’s control and those that fall outside its control. This is because SDP is less able to respond to the incentives created by abatement during events outside its control. In these circumstances, we have balanced providing value for SDP’s customers while ensuring SDP is not unduly exposed to risk. For situations where SDP could obtain insurance on commercially reasonable terms, we have continued to include provision for abatement of SDP’s fixed charges. Where events are uninsurable (eg, acts of war), rather than uninsured, we have decided not to include provision to abate SDP’s fixed charges.

In broadening the abatement mechanism, we have also decided to align the abatement mechanism with the design parameters of the plant by removing the 250 ML cap on daily volumes for calculation of the abatement factor applied to daily fixed charges. This would allow SDP to manage temporary fluctuations in output and short-term outages while responding to drought without a net financial penalty through abatement.

In this chapter, we have identified exemptions to the abatement mechanism to remove perverse incentives for SDP’s operations, including allowing a ‘grace period’ when moving from shutdown into plant operation mode in response to drought. We also considered circumstances in which SDP is directed to reduce supply under law, or Sydney Water is unable to receive the full production capacity of desalinated water during drought.

We have also decided that partial abatement should apply to the 14-month minimum run time provided to SDP under 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan. This was not included in our Draft Report, as the 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan was released shortly before the publication of our Draft Report. According to the 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan, the 14-month minimum run time operates in response to drought only and is at SDP’s discretion. It comprises an 8-month start-up period plus 6 months of production, even if dam levels rise above 70% during this period.74

3.1 SDP must maximise output during drought

We have made a decision to:

1. Broaden the abatement mechanism to apply uniformly during drought from 13 December 2018. This means:
   - SDP’s fixed charges would be fully abated for shutdown and restart days during drought resulting from:
     - events within SDP’s control, and
     - insurable events outside SDP’s control.
   - The daily volumes produced on these shutdown or restart days (ie, 0 ML) would be included in the abatement factor.
   - The abatement factor would apply to SDP’s fixed daily charges during these shutdown and restart days.

3.1.1 Abating inoperability during drought from 13 December 2018

The objective of the abatement mechanism is to provide a financial incentive to SDP to maximise its production and supply of water during drought.

SDP supports the retention of an abatement mechanism which appropriately incentivises it to maintain and operate the plant and ensure that it can supply water at full production levels when required to do so. So does Sydney Water.

We note the abatement mechanism in the 2012 Determination could mean that SDP’s fixed charges are not abated during drought even if the plant is not supplying water. This is because, under the 2012 Determination, abatement only applied when the plant was operating – hence, SDP’s fixed charges would not have been be abated when it was shutdown, or restarting, even during drought.

We support the continuation of the abatement mechanism. Where possible, we consider it should apply uniformly during drought. Thus, we have decided to broaden the abatement mechanism so that it applies during drought to:

1. Shutdown and restart days that result from events within SDP’s control.
2. Shutdown and restart days that result from insurable events outside SDP’s control.

In our Draft Report, we indicated our new abatement mechanism would operate from 1 July 2018. In response to our Draft Report, SDP proposed delaying the introduction of the abatement mechanism until 13 December 2018. This reflects the timeframe in the Agreed Reinstatement Plan for the December 2015 storm event. We accept this proposal. The abatement mechanism is discussed in more detail below.

75 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 35.
In its response to our Draft Report, Sydney Water argued that abatement should apply to both services provided by SDP:

a) the supply of non-rainfall dependent drinking water to purchasers, and
b) the making available of the desalination plant to supply non-rainfall dependent drinking water.78

Sydney Water asserted that abatement is a standard feature of modern service contracts. It is an important mitigation against the risk that a provider will not perform to the level expected by customers.79

Sydney Water strongly believes the abatement mechanism should be extended to cover periods when SDP is not providing its availability service outside drought (eg, the plant could not respond if a restart trigger were to occur on the day). If not, Sydney Water’s customers would be potentially exposed to ongoing payments even though a corresponding service had not been provided.80 To expand the abatement mechanism outside drought, Sydney Water suggested the abatement mechanism could reference the plant’s designed functions and purpose in water security mode, such as appropriate maintenance and testing (ie, rather than a measure linked to volumes of water supplied).81

We do not consider it practical to develop a new abatement mechanism to measure ‘unavailability’ when the plant is shutdown outside drought. We would not have had sufficient time to consult on this abatement mechanism between our Draft and Final Reports, nor to identify any unforeseen problems with its application. Sydney Water has recognised this, and has requested this option be considered at the next SDP price review.

More importantly, we have decided to limit full abatement to within drought episodes, because we consider this is a sufficiently strong incentive and proportionate to SDP’s drought role – ie, when the plant is required to operate. Sydney Water also noted that abatement could be extended outside drought to SDP’s emergency response role.82 We consider there to be merit in this approach, because this represents another circumstance when the plant is required to operate. Chapter 4 provides more detail on the policy rationale and approach we have taken to abating SDP’s emergency response role.

3.1.2 Shutdown and restart days within SDP’s control: an appropriate and manageable increase in SDP’s risk

We have decided to extend the abatement mechanism to shutdown and restart days during drought for events that are within SDP’s control. It is efficient for SDP to be at least partially exposed to risks that it has the ability to control or influence. This provides it with an incentive to minimise the likelihood and cost of downside risk and maximise the likelihood and benefits of upside risk.

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78 Sydney Water submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 15.
79 Sydney Water submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 15.
80 Sydney Water submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 16.
81 Sydney Water submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 16.
82 Sydney Water submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 5.
This approach also strengthens the incentive properties of our regulatory framework relative to SDP’s role in water security. Arguably, if SDP manages the plant prudently, as per the requirements of its Network Operator’s Licence, then its exposure to income loss through abatement should be limited.

**Routine maintenance can be managed through increased flexibility in the abatement mechanism**

Under our decision, SDP’s fixed charges would also be fully abated when it is shutdown for routine maintenance during drought. But, we consider our decision to increase flexibility in the abatement mechanism (explained further below) means that SDP could manage these routine reductions in output, without a net financial penalty through abatement.

Specifically, we have removed the 250 ML daily cap on the abatement factor to allow SDP to manage temporary fluctuations in output while responding to drought. Given the plant’s design parameters, this would provide SDP with up to 21 shutdown days a year and not be abated.\(^{83}\) If the plant were to undertake more than 21 days maintenance, it would be operating below its design parameters.

Our refinement to the abatement mechanism to allow SDP to manage temporary fluctuations in output while responding to drought is discussed in more detail below.

**3.1.3 Shutdown and restart days outside of SDP’s control: relying on SDP’s insurance provides better value for customers**

We have also decided to fully abate SDP’s fixed charges on shutdown and restart days during drought for events that are outside SDP’s control, but which are insurable on commercially reasonable terms. This includes force majeure events such as tsunamis, storms and fires. This would reduce (abate) the service charge payable by SDP’s customers (to the extent such events reduce SDP’s supply during drought, and abatement therefore applies). It should also enhance the likelihood of the plant being able to fulfil its drought response role, while allowing SDP to recover its fixed costs (through insurance, rather than its service charges).

Industrial and Special Risks insurance provides cover for physical loss or damage to SDP’s property as a result of, for example, fire, explosion, vandalism, weather perils, earthquake, or accidental damage. Typically, this policy covers the costs of replacement or reinstatement in the event of damage, and will also cover any resultant shortfall in revenue (ie, business interruption).

Where insurance is available on reasonable commercial terms, we consider it can be efficient for businesses to rely upon insurance to manage their risk. In the 2012 Determination, we included an allowance for SDP’s Industrial and Special Risks insurance premiums, which was then incorporated into SDP’s prices. Similarly, we have included an allowance in the 2017 Determination for SDP’s insurance premiums to ensure that its coverage is sufficient.

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\(^{83}\) A 94% availability of the plant at 266 ML per day is equivalent to plant producing 0 ML per day on 6% of the days in a year (that is, 0.06 x 365 = 21.9 days rounded downwards to 21 full days), and 266 ML per day on the remaining 365 – 21 = 344 days of the year. The average production (available capacity) calculated over the period of 365 days in the schedule above is (0 x 21 + 266 x 344)/365 = 250.7 ML per day, which means that SDP’s fixed charges are not abated.
given its operating environment (including our determination, and its abatement provisions).

Our decision should provide a financial incentive to SDP and its insurers to reinstate the plant as soon as possible following an insurable event that requires the plant to shutdown during drought. This is because SDP would be reliant upon its insurance payments during a period of inoperability to recover its fixed costs (rather than its service charges, which would be abated), and these payments would be limited in duration. Therefore, SDP would seek to have the plant in production as soon as possible. Similarly, the insurers would wish to minimise the business interruption payments under the policy and have the plant reinstated as quickly as possible.

**Events that are uninsurable will not be abated**

No abatement will apply to force majeure events for which insurance is not available on reasonable commercial terms (ie, that fall outside the scope of most insurance policies). We do not consider SDP should be exempt from abatement where it is insured or could be insured for a particular risk, or where an event is within its control. Rather, we are exempting SDP from abatement for uninsurable, not uninsured, events.

An example of this is following an earthquake:

- SDP is unable to supply drinking water for an entire 48 month drought episode.
- SDP could have insured on reasonable commercial terms against business interruption for the entire period, but instead chose to insure itself for a period of up to 36 months.
- SDP would be abated for the full 48 months, including 12 months for which SDP would not have insurance cover.

We consider that the risk of such events should remain with SDP. SDP, not its customers, is best placed to ensure that any recovery occurs in a timely fashion and to minimise any delays in plant repairs. If customers were to bear this risk, SDP would have little incentive to repair the plant as quickly as possible, as it could rely on its insurance or customers at all times.

We also consider this approach reflects what would occur in a competitive environment. An unregulated business (and not customers) is likely to bear the loss where it is affected by a force majeure event against which it could have insured itself, but did not.

We acknowledge that our approach does create some uncertainty for the parties. Determining what is uninsurable on reasonable commercial terms would be a question of fact and would likely require the assistance of an insurance expert. But we consider there is a trade-off between providing certainty for the parties and ensuring appropriate incentives in our Determination.

Sydney Water considered the Draft Determination may have inadvertently enabled SDP to avoid abatement for insurable and uninsurable force majeure events by referring to the Network Operator’s Licence. This is because the licence relaxes the obligation to maximise

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84 Sydney Water submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 17.
the production of drinking water in certain circumstances. We have addressed Sydney Water’s concerns in our drafting of the 2017 Determination.

3.1.4 Implications for the December 2015 storm event

We have decided that the changes to abatement should apply from 13 December 2018. This is the date from which we understand the plant will be reinstated, following the December 2015 storm event. The plant is currently being repaired because of this storm event.

We have decided to apply the above-mentioned changes to abatement from 13 December 2018, to ensure that SDP’s fixed charges are not abated when the plant is inoperable because of the December 2015 storm event. We do not think it appropriate to abate SDP’s fixed charges for an event that occurred in the 2012 determination period under which different abatement rules applied.

By applying abatement from 13 December 2018, we are also providing an incentive to SDP to ensure the plant is reinstated as soon as possible. From 13 December 2018, SDP would be penalised if the plant produced less than 250 ML per day if required to respond to drought (ie, under the 60/70 rule). This excludes the grace period from abatement when first moving from shutdown to plant operation in a drought episode, discussed in further detail below.

3.1.5 Stakeholder views on extending the abatement mechanism

SDP agreed with “the continuation of an abatement mechanism that provides SDP with strong financial incentives to operate at full capacity when called upon.”85 So too did Sydney Water.86

SDP further stated that strengthening the abatement mechanism, rather than introducing a new inoperable mode, is a better targeted and more proportionate way of ensuring that SDP’s incentives reflect its drought response role.87 It agreed that the abatement mechanism be broadened to apply to all days during a drought response period, regardless of the mode the plant is in.88 SDP accepted that it is reasonable during a drought period for insurance rather than customers to bear the risk of loss of revenue from an insurable force majeure event. It sought an additional $1.1 million in operating expenditure allowances over the 2017 regulatory period to reflect increased business interruption coverage for abatement during drought following an insurable force majeure event.89 SDP’s proposed insurance coverage and premiums are discussed in detail in Chapter 7.

Both SDP and Sydney Water provided specific commentary on our decision to exempt uninsurable force majeure events from abatement. This is discussed below.

85  SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 11.
86  Sydney Water submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p i.
87  SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 5.
88  SDP submission to IPART Draft Report - Appendices, April 2017, p 23.
89  SDP submission to IPART Draft Report - Appendices, April 2017, p 25.
SDP proposed linking uninsurable force majeure events to its Network Operator’s Licence

SDP noted that our approach to uninsurable force majeure events created risks distinguishing between those events that are insurable and those that are not. SDP considered that if assessments of ‘uninsurable force majeure events’ are left until the event has occurred (ie, an ex post assessment), then it is subject to significant regulatory risk, which translates into significant financial risk.

SDP submitted that the definition of uninsurable force majeure event should be linked to its requirement to obtain appropriate insurances under its Network Operator’s Licence.

- The WIC Act states that a licence may be not be granted unless the Minister is satisfied that (amongst other factors), “the applicant has made, and will continue to maintain, appropriate arrangements with respect to insurance”.

- As part of its licensing role, IPART (on behalf of the Minister) monitors SDP’s insurances. SDP considered that anything outside of these insurance policies should be deemed to be an ‘uninsurable force majeure event.’

- SDP should therefore not be abated for events that are not fully covered by SDP’s insurance (provided SDP is compliant with its Network Operator’s Licence). This includes events for which coverage limits are exceeded, but which fall within the scope of its insurance policy.

In effect, SDP is seeking to be exempt from abatement where it is uninsured, but compliant with its licence. This is broader than an exemption for uninsurable events only.

The advantage of this approach would be that SDP has certainty about how and when abatement should apply. Its current insurance policy has a list of exclusions as well as set coverage limits for its insured risks. The Network Operator’s Licence requires SDP to maintain ‘appropriate’ insurance. SDP argued that as its insurance is effectively deemed to be appropriate any force majeure event that falls outside these policies should not be abated.

However, we consider there to be difficulties with SDP’s proposed approach. In essence, it reduces the incentives created by abatement for SDP to operate, or be ready to operate, as soon as possible. This is because SDP would be covered for abatement at all times, either by its insurance (paid for by customers), or by customers (through unabated service charges).

Under SDP’s proposal, an incentive would exist for SDP to reduce its insurance coverage and increase the proportion of risk borne by customers. This could occur by excluding specific risks (eg, flood) or by reducing the coverage provided for risks (eg, 36 months of business interruption coverage versus 48 months of business interruption coverage). It

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90 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 11.
91 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report - Appendices, April 2017, p 27.
92 Section 10(4)(c) of the Water Industry Competition Act 2006 (the WIC Act).
94 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report - Appendices, April 2017, p 27.
96 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report - Appendices, April 2017, p 27.
could argue that what is required for ‘appropriate’ insurance coverage has decreased over time. This is because it would be exempt from any abatement outside of this insurance coverage. As such, SDP’s proposal may result in perverse incentives, where its insurance coverage is progressively reduced, providing less value for customers.

As noted above, the WIC Act requires SDP to maintain appropriate arrangements with respect to insurance. We apprehend this is to require regulated entities to maintain a minimum level of insurance to protect their customers from the impact of adverse events. In administering the WIC Act on behalf of the Minister, we have maintained a light-handed approach to regulation, enabling regulated entities to determine their appetite for risk and their level of insurance up to a point (although IPART can require SDP to procure an expert report certifying the appropriateness of SDP’s insurance).

The WIC Act licensing requirements address the need for a minimum level of insurance, ultimately in order to protect consumers. However, these requirements are not designed to determine how the risk should be shared between an entity and its customers beyond this minimum level of insurance.

In addition, should SDP’s proposal be accepted, it may lead to SDP seeking a cost pass-through for the material damage for an uninsured force majeure event. For example, a storm event might occur again where the damage to the plant exceeded its insurance sub-limits. SDP may argue that it should not be abated if it had exceeded its limits for business interruption. It may also argue that any damage to the plant that falls outside its coverage limits should be borne by customers. This is a logical extension to its argument that it should only be held accountable for events for which it is fully insured.

**Sydney Water also stated that further clarification is required for uninsurable force majeure events**

Sydney Water also stated that further clarification is required. It considered that there are practical difficulties in identifying ‘uninsurable force majeure events.’ For example, it submitted that it may be difficult for Sydney Water to identify an ‘uninsurable force majeure event’ given the confidentiality of insurance contracts. We think this submission is misinterprets our intention. While SDP’s insurance contracts would help in identifying what is insured, we do not agree that they would be of assistance in identifying what was insurable.

Sydney Water also submitted that markets for insurance may change over time. As a result Sydney Water was concerned that the scope of events captured by our definition of ‘uninsurable force majeure event’ may itself change. We think that this is an intended and desirable aspect of our definition.

Equally, Sydney Water was concerned that SDP could overstate the difficulty and/or cost of procuring insurance for certain types of events. If SDP does this, it will be open to Sydney Water to seek its own expert advice on insurance markets to contradict SDP.

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97 Sydney Water submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 17.
We consider our original policy position remains valid. We have amended the drafting in the 2017 Determination to provide further clarity to the parties on the policy intent. We consider that our changes to the definition improve clarity by expressly tying whether or not the abatement factor applies on a day to whether or not SDP could have insured against the consequences of a force majeure event for that day. That was implicit in the definition in the Draft Determination, but the proposed changes make it clearer.

### 3.2 Allowing SDP sufficient time to respond to drought

We have made a decision to:

8 Provide SDP with an option of a ‘grace’ period of up to eight months from full abatement when the plant first responds to drought. During the grace period partial abatement would apply, where:

- The daily volumes of production will not be included in the abatement factor for the grace period. The grace period commences on the day when dam levels first fall into drought.
- The abatement factor will, however, still apply to daily fixed charges during a plant operation period including for any plant operation period that falls within the grace period from abatement.
- SDP would be able to opt out of the grace period at its discretion.

We have decided to introduce a ‘grace’ period of up to eight months from abatement to enable SDP to supply water at less than full production levels without being penalised when it is moving from shutdown to plant operation mode. This grace period would start when dam levels fall to 60%.

The 8-month grace period aligns with our expenditure consultant’s views and those in the 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan on the time it takes the plant to reach maximum production following a restart.

If dam levels fall below 60%, SDP would issue instructions to its operating and maintenance (O&M) contractor to restart the plant. From restart, it takes up to eight months for the plant to become fully operational. During this period, the plant will progressively commence producing potable water that meets the standard required by Sydney Water.

SDP proposed introducing an 8-month ‘grace period’ so that it is not subject to abatement during the period between switching on and producing water at 100% of capacity. Under the definition of a restart period in the 2012 Determination, the period ends as soon as SDP produces and supplies water to a customer. As SDP would not yet be producing 250 ML per day, supplying water to Sydney Water as the plant is restarting would result in SDP’s fixed charges immediately being abated. This provides SDP with a perverse incentive to

100 In fact, until and unless the SDP’s Network Operator’s Licence is changed, our Determination will give effect to the 70/80 rule, despite what the 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan says.

101 Ideally, abatement should commence as soon as the plant reaches full production. However, it is impractical to be precise as to the period of time this would take. An 8-month restart period is consistent with SDP’s O&M contract, and our expenditure consultant’s views. It is also consistent with the Metropolitan Water Plan – see NSW Government, 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan, March 2017, p 38.

102 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 36.

103 IPART, Prices for Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Limited’s Water Supply Services - Determination No. 2, December 2011, p 60. This is apart from water that is supplied from storage.
withhold supply during the ramp-up period (eg, return it to the sea), in order to avoid being penalised through abatement.

We agree that the abatement mechanism should not penalise SDP when the plant is ramping up production to fulfil its drought response role. In our view, this penalty is unwarranted, as the plant’s production is limited by technical factors outside SDP’s control. In its response to our Draft Report, Sydney Water maintained its support for the 8-month grace period. 104

3.2.1 How the 8-month grace period would apply

The grace period starts on the date of dam levels first falling below 60% since they were last above 70%. It does not apply on subsequent ‘restarts’ during an unbroken drought episode.

For clarity, during the grace period partial abatement would apply. That is, daily volumes of water produced during the grace period would not influence the calculation of the abatement factor (ie, the averaging formula that is applied to fixed charges). But the abatement factor would still apply to daily fixed charges during this period.

In other words, past performance during drought (rather than performance during the grace period) could nonetheless impact the fixed charges that SDP would receive in the eight month grace period through the abatement factor.

Following the 8-month grace period, full abatement would apply. That is, the daily volumes of production would begin to influence the calculation of the abatement factor. This means that SDP has eight months from the date of dam levels first falling below 60% since they were last above 70% to ensure its production levels reach 250 ML per day. Beyond that time period, it would be penalised for production levels below 250 ML per day.

3.2.2 SDP may opt out of the 8-month grace period

Since our Draft Report, we have decided that SDP may opt out of the 8-month grace period. Opting out of the grace period means that SDP would elect to have its fixed charges fully abated.

This would encourage SDP to maximise its production prior to the expiry of the 8-month grace period. We consider this would be in the interests of SDP’s customers (through greater water supply at an earlier time) and SDP (by being able to manage future abatement at an earlier point in time).

3.2.3 Stakeholder views on the 8-month grace period

Sydney Water noted its support for the 8-month grace period. 105

In its response to our Draft Report, SDP argued that the abatement factor should not apply to its service charges during the grace period (ie, against partial abatement). 106 SDP asserted

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104 Sydney Water submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 3.
this was not consistent with SDP’s Network Operator’s Licence, which recognises SDP is not required to maximise production during restart.

According to SDP, the application of the abatement factor would be arbitrary and unduly punitive, as it effectively imposes penalties on SDP for failing to perform during the last year of one drought episode, which then continues into future drought episodes.\textsuperscript{107} This is particularly so given our decision to implement an asymmetric carryover of the abatement factor (ie, that the abatement factor is only carried over if it is less than one – this is discussed in more detail in Section 3.3 below).\textsuperscript{108} In other words, the application of the abatement factor means that SDP would at best recover its fixed charges in full and at worst recover only a proportion of those charges – it would never over-recover its fixed charges. As the volumes produced during the grace period are excluded, SDP would also not be able to influence the grace period in its favour.\textsuperscript{109}

Given the 365-day averaging period, SDP states the carryover of the abatement factor would reflect only the last year of a drought period and not the production in the preceding period. It would also unduly penalise SDP if it were to undertake maintenance at the end of a drought response period.\textsuperscript{110}

SDP states each drought response period should be considered a separate event, with the abatement factor reset to one at the conclusion of drought.\textsuperscript{111} This argument is expanded in our discussion in Section 3.3 below.

We maintain our view that partial abatement during the grace period strengthens the incentive properties of abatement. It ensures SDP maximises its production during drought to prevent the future application of an abatement factor of less than one to its service charges. Our changes to the abatement mechanism enable SDP to offset any periods of maintenance or lesser production. Below we discuss our removal of the 250 ML cap on daily volumes for calculation of the abatement factor applied to daily fixed charges. As SDP notes, it has technical capacity to produce 266 ML 94\% of the time, allowing approximately 21 days of maintenance a year. We also consider SDP would be able to monitor the dam levels sufficiently to plan when maintenance should best occur.

Our approach also ensures consistency across differing operation periods. The abatement factor is applied at all times of plant operation, including for third parties. In making our decision, we also considered a range of matters under section 15 of the IPART Act, including potential impacts on customers. We have consulted with SDP, Sydney Water and NSW Treasury on this issue and considered their responses.

\textsuperscript{106} SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, Appendices, April 2017, p 27.
\textsuperscript{107} SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, Appendices, April 2017, p 27-28.
\textsuperscript{108} SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, Appendices, April 2017, p 29.
\textsuperscript{109} SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, Appendices, April 2017, p 28.
\textsuperscript{110} SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, Appendices, April 2017, p 28. 
\textsuperscript{111} SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, Appendices, April 2017, p 30.
3.3 Managing fluctuations in output during drought

We have made a decision to:

- Align the abatement mechanism with the design parameters of the plant by:
  - Removing the 250 ML cap on daily volumes for calculation of the abatement factor applied to daily fixed charges.
  - Retaining the averaging period of 365 days for calculation of the abatement factor.
  - Introducing a true-up of fixed charges to claw back any over-recovery of revenue over a single episode of drought, which:
    - includes holding costs calculated using the relevant WACC, and
    - is payable at the end of a drought response period.
  - Resetting the abatement factor to one, if the plant exits drought with an abatement factor above one.
  - Retaining and using the abatement factor, if the plant exits drought with an abatement factor of one or lower.

The desalination plant has technical capacity to operate at 266 ML per day, with 94% availability. This is equivalent to an annual average of 250 ML per day (or 91.25 GL per year). To avoid abatement under the 2012 Determination, and operate within the design parameters of the plant, SDP would either need to:

- run the plant to produce at least 250 ML per day during drought, or
- cease production and enter into a short-term shutdown mode (up to 10 days).

We agree with SDP that this is contrary to the intent of the abatement mechanism. Therefore, we have removed the 250 ML daily cap on the abatement factor to allow SDP to manage temporary fluctuations in output while responding to drought. To avoid any over recovery of revenue, and remove the incentive for SDP to push production above the technically optimal limit, we have also introduced a true-up of fixed charges paid over the duration of a drought episode (ie, for the period of time when dam storages are below 60% or until levels rise again above 70%).

3.3.1 Under the 2012 Determination, SDP cannot recover temporary losses by exceeding the 250 ML average daily capacity of the plant

The abatement mechanism reduces the daily water service charge\textsuperscript{112} applicable on that day in plant operation mode if the average production of the preceding 365 days of production during drought is less than the plant’s optimal capacity (ie, 250 ML per day).

The abatement mechanism under the 2012 Determination, however, was not symmetrical. SDP was penalised for any days on which the plant’s output falls below optimal capacity (‘unders’) but not rewarded for any days on which production was above optimal capacity (‘overs’). This is because the average daily volume for the past 365 production days was capped at the plant’s optimal capacity.

\textsuperscript{112} Network charges are included in the fixed daily charge. The pipeline charge is not abated.
SDP noted in its pricing proposal that this is contrary to the intent of the abatement mechanism, which is to ensure that the plant runs at full capacity when needed. To illustrate how a disproportionate penalty could arise under the current formulation of the abatement mechanism, we have constructed a simple example in Table 3.1 below that assumes a daily fixed charge of $100.

Table 3.1  Simplified example of loss of revenue under the 2012 Determination abatement mechanism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Daily output, ML</th>
<th>Average output, ML</th>
<th>Abatement factor</th>
<th>(Loss)/gain of revenue, $</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>99.2%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This example uses 5-day rolling average. The production is 10 ML lower on Day 5, and 15 ML higher on Day 6. The abatement factor is applied on Day 5, leading to $0.8 loss of revenue. There is no offsetting gain in revenue on Day 6 as the abatement factor is capped at one.

Data source: IPART analysis.

SDP also provided an example in its pricing proposal showing how it would be penalised for a two-week engineering fault that limited plant production to 150 ML per day, despite maintaining an aggregate volume of 250 ML per day delivered. Specifically, SDP noted that the current abatement factor prevents it maximising production and results in a lost opportunity to build a production “bank” necessary to accommodate essential maintenance during prolonged periods of drought.

We agree with SDP that the current abatement mechanism is not aligned with the design parameters of the plant. It can apply disproportionate financial penalties on SDP relative to SDP’s performance during drought.

### 3.3.2 Removing the cap on the abatement factor allows SDP to manage temporary fluctuations

Removing the cap on the abatement mechanism would allow SDP to over-recover its fixed charges when production is above average output of 250 ML per day, so that it can offset times when production falls below 250 ML per day and fixed charges are abated.

This is illustrated in Table 3.2 below, again assuming a $100 daily fixed charge.

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113 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 35.
115 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 35.
116 Under the 2012 Determination, SDP could avoid abatement during drought by entering shutdown mode for a period of time. However, as outlined above, as part of the 2017 Determination we have decided to extend the abatement mechanism to shutdown during drought.
117 To allow the plant to smooth out temporary fluctuations in output while responding to drought, we propose to remove the cap on the abatement factor (AC/TC) under the 2012 Determination, allowing the ratio to exceed one.

44 IPART Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd
Table 3.2  Simplified example of removing the cap on the abatement factor for the 2017 Determination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Daily output, ML</th>
<th>Average output, ML</th>
<th>Abatement factor</th>
<th>(Loss)/gain of revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>99.2%</td>
<td>(0.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>100.4%</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>100.4%</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This example uses 5-day rolling average. The production is 10 ML lower on Day 5, and 15 ML higher on Day 6. The abatement factor is applied on Day 5, leading to $0.8 loss of revenue. There are offsetting gains in revenue on Days 6 as 7 as the abatement factor is not capped at one.

Data source: IPART analysis.

Modifying the abatement mechanism to allow SDP to manage short-term fluctuations in output also removes the need for shorter duration shutdowns. Within the 94% availability parameter, SDP would be able to recoup up to 21 days of lost production per year, and thus would manage its maintenance requirements without needing to enter the shutdown mode (i.e., it could operate for 344 days at 266 ML and 21 days at 0 ML and not have its fixed charges abated; or any other combination that results in average production of 250 ML per day over the year).

Our expenditure consultant, Atkins Cardno, recommended elimination of short duration shutdown modes based on the plant’s technical capacity to produce 266 ML per day at 94% reliability – i.e., an average of 250 ML day. Modifying the abatement mechanism to allow greater operating flexibility is consistent with Atkins Cardno’s recommendation.

The 365-day averaging period continues to be appropriate for calculation of the abatement ratio. This measure relates to the design specifications of the plant (i.e., that the plant produces an annual average of 250 ML per day).

3.3.3  A true-up is needed to manage potential over-recovery of fixed charges

Relaxing the cap on the abatement factor may result in over-recovery of fixed charges if the plant operates beyond its design parameters. That is, a period of prolonged production above the average daily output of 250 ML per day.

At most, SDP could over-recover 6.4% of its fixed revenue requirement. That is, 365 days of production at 266 ML (i.e., leading to an abatement factor of 266/250=1.064). But we note it is unlikely that the plant would be run at this intensity.

118 To ensure the ongoing reliability of supply including 94% availability, Atkins Cardno assessed that procuring an additional drinking water station pump would be prudent before the first restart in response to the drought. See Atkins Cardno, Expenditure Review – SDP, February 2017, p 59. This expenditure is addressed in Chapters 6 and 7, where we present our decisions on efficient operating and capital expenditure over the 2017 determination period.
To avoid over-compensation, and remove the incentive for SDP to push production above the technically optimal limit, we have introduced a true-up mechanism. This mechanism would claw back any over-recovery of revenue over the duration of a drought episode resulting from production above the average level of 250 ML per day (ie, for the period of time when dam storages are below 60% or until levels rise again above 70%). The true-up of fixed charges would also include holding costs, calculated using the relevant WACC and be payable at the same time as the transition to shutdown charge.

For clarity, the true-up mechanism is asymmetric. Any abatement penalties would not be refunded due to an abatement factor still below one by the end of drought. This would defeat the purpose and intent of the abatement mechanism.

Further, if the plant exits drought with an abatement factor less than one, it is retained and carries over into the next period when the plant is called into operation, consistent with the mechanism’s current design. This retains a strong financial incentive for SDP to operate as required during drought. If the plant exits drought with the abatement factor above one, it is reset to one so that SDP does not continue over-recovering revenue the next time the plant is called into operation.119

Box 3.1 explains how the true-up mechanism would work.

**Box 3.1 How the true-up mechanism would be implemented**

We decided to implement the ‘true-up’ mechanism in the following way:

**Step 1. Determine if the refund is payable, and if so, its total amount**

- On the day when drought ends, SDP evaluates whether it has over-recovered fixed charges during the drought response period. The balance includes holding costs. If over-recovery is positive, this is the total amount of refund that is due to customers.

**Step 2. Determine which customers are eligible to receive the refund**

- On the day when drought ends, for each customer who is an impactor, SDP evaluates whether it over-recovered fixed charges during the drought period from each customer. The balance includes holding costs. If over-recovery from a customer has occurred, this customer becomes eligible to receive refund.

**Step 3. Distribute the total refund among eligible customers**

- Allocate the total refund amount determined in Step 1 to eligible customers determined in Step 2, in proportion to the customer’s share of total impact on the days when over-recovery of charges occurred during the drought response period.

### 3.3.4 Stakeholder views on this issue

In its submission to our Draft Report, SDP reiterated its earlier support for the removal of the 250 ML cap on abatement volumes. It also continued to support the 365-day averaging period for the calculation of the abatement factor.120

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119 We note that from day one of a subsequent drought period (or emergency response) the preceding 365 days of daily volumes is deemed to equal total capacity.

120 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, Appendices, April 2017, p 23.
However, in SDP’s view there is a strong argument that each drought should be treated as a separate event and SDP’s performance reflected in financial incentives applying at the time of the event. This is particularly so, given the new operating rules in the 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan would effectively mean SDP operates less frequently than before, with greater time elapsing between drought response periods. As a result, it considers the abatement factor should be reset to one at the conclusion of each drought response period.\(^{121}\)

If this approach was not adopted, then SDP considered that the carryover of the abatement factor should be symmetric. In this scenario, the true-up mechanism would not be required.\(^{122}\) It does not view the application of an abatement factor above one to its service charges as an over-recovery of fixed charges.\(^{123}\) SDP stated:

> It is clearly unreasonable for SDP to be penalised for poor performance over multiple droughts but not given an opportunity to offset such penalties with good performance over the same timeframe.\(^{124}\)

We acknowledge the new operating rules in the 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan (ie, the 60/70 rule) would mean SDP operates less frequently than under the previous rules (ie, the 70/80 rule). But our view is that this does not alter the principled-approach we have taken to the abatement mechanism. Ensuring the abatement factor continues from one drought response period to another strengthens the incentives of our regulation. It ensures that SDP would produce sufficient water, even in periods of short duration, because of the potential for this to impact its service charges for future periods.

In making our decision, we also considered a range of matters under section 15 of the IPART Act, including potential impacts on customers. We have consulted with SDP, Sydney Water and NSW Treasury on this issue and considered their responses.

**Sydney Water proposed a monthly averaging period for the abatement mechanism**

Sydney Water supported the decision to remove the daily water volume cap for the calculation of the abatement factor.\(^{125}\) But it proposed a monthly averaging period for the abatement mechanism.\(^{126}\) In support of this approach, Sydney Water indicated redundancy in plant and equipment means that SDP can perform many maintenance activities (both planned and unplanned) without reducing drinking water production. According to Sydney Water, a 365-day averaging period for calculation of the abatement factor appears overly generous, and shorter averaging (eg, monthly) would provide a better incentive framework.\(^{127}\)

We still consider our decision to reconcile the abatement mechanism over the duration of a drought period aligns better with the plant’s design parameters. The desalination plant is not designed to operate in short monthly bursts, but rather produce an average output of 250 ML per day over a year. Our view is a monthly averaging period of abatement payments would not provide SDP with the flexibility it may require to manage the plant during

\(^{121}\) SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, Appendices, April 2017, p 29.
\(^{122}\) SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, Appendices, April 2017, p 29.
\(^{123}\) SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, Appendices, April 2017, p 29.
\(^{124}\) SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, Appendices, April 2017, p 30.
\(^{125}\) Sydney Water submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 4.
\(^{126}\) Sydney Water submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 18.
\(^{127}\) Sydney Water submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 4.
prolonged drought. We estimate that within a month SDP could at most offset 1.8 days of zero production without abatement.\textsuperscript{128} If the plant needed to address an engineering fault that required a longer period of shutdown, a monthly averaging period would unfairly reduce the abatement factor. Further, we consider maintaining the 365-day averaging period prudent given that to date the abatement mechanism remains untested.

3.4 Abatement does not apply when SDP reduces production in order to comply with a law, binding direction or an order

We have made a decision to:

10 Exempt SDP from full abatement on any day when it is required to reduce production below 250 ML per day in order to comply with a law or a binding direction, order or similar made under a law.

The 2012 Determination provides that SDP’s prices are not subject to abatement when it is “required to reduce production” other than because it is in breach of a contract pursuant to which it operates the desalination plant. In the 2017 Determination, we have clarified that this refers to a legal requirement to reduce production.

As noted earlier, we consider it would be unreasonable to penalise SDP for events outside its control. To be clear, partial abatement would still apply in these instances. SDP’s charges would still be multiplied by the existing abatement factor on a day when it is required to reduce production below 250 ML per day in order to comply with a law or a binding direction, order or similar made under a law; but its performance on that day would not affect the calculation of the abatement factor on future days.

SDP supported our decision in its submission to our Draft Report.\textsuperscript{129}

In its submission to our Draft Report, Sydney Water supported this exemption. But it noted that SDP may have discretion in how to comply with such a direction and this may require collaboration with other stakeholders in order to achieve the best response. It stated this aspect should be incorporated into the abatement mechanism.\textsuperscript{130}

We do not consider this to be easily achieved in practice through the abatement mechanism. We consider Sydney Water and SDP are best placed to negotiate such arrangements among themselves.

\textsuperscript{128} A 94\% availability of the plant at 266 ML per day is equivalent to plant producing 0 ML per day on 6\% of the days in a year (that is, 0.06 \times 365 = 21.9 days rounded downwards to a 21 full day), and 266 ML per day on the remaining 365 – 21 = 344 days of the year. The average production (available capacity) calculated over the period of 365 days in the schedule above is (0 \times 21 + 266 \times 344)/365 = 250.7 ML per day, which means that SDP’s fixed charges are not abated. On a monthly basis, 21 days of zero production per year translate to 21/12 = 1.8 days per month. Therefore, within a month SDP could on average offset 1.8 days of zero production without abatement. Actual outcome will depend on the starting level of abatement factor.

\textsuperscript{129} SDP submission to IPART Draft Report - Appendices, April 2017, p 23.

\textsuperscript{130} Sydney Water submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 4.
3.5 Abatement applies when Sydney Water is unable to accept desalinated water

We have made a decision to:

11 Not exempt SDP from abatement when Sydney Water is unable to accept water on a day.

We have decided to maintain our approach that the determination should not exempt SDP from abatement when Sydney Water is unable to accept water. Rather, under these circumstances, we consider the onus should be on Sydney Water to reimburse SDP for any under-recovery of costs – including any loss of revenue under the Determination caused by the application of the abatement mechanism – through payment outside of the determination.

This should help ensure that, in such instances, the financial penalty rests with Sydney Water, rather than being passed through to its end-use customers in the form of an unabated service charge (and the SDP pass through mechanism in the Sydney Water determination). In turn, this would create an appropriate incentive for Sydney Water to ensure that it is ready to receive the full supply of water from SDP during drought.

Both Sydney Water\textsuperscript{131} and SDP\textsuperscript{132} accepted our decision but provided commentary on its substance.

In its submission to our Draft Report, SDP implied that our decision was analogous to allowing unregulated pricing agreements.\textsuperscript{133} This is because our decision acknowledged that Sydney Water and SDP had entered into an agreement about what should happen when Sydney Water is unable to accept water on a day. We do not consider our decision to be analogous to allowing unregulated pricing agreements. We have continued to set the maximum prices that apply when SDP provides desalinated water or is making the plant available. SDP also considered it was not clear that our decision was consistent with the financial indifference principle under the Terms of Reference, but it did not elaborate on this point.\textsuperscript{134} We consider that our decision is consistent with the principle that our prices should encourage SDP to be indifferent as to whether or not it supplies water.

Similarly, Sydney Water considered that it was best to enshrine any agreement in our Determination.\textsuperscript{135} We disagree. As Sydney Water indicated, abatement is a feature of modern service contracts.\textsuperscript{136} We consider that Sydney Water and SDP are sophisticated entities with significant experience in negotiating contracts. As such, both parties would be able to protect their interests when negotiating service provision in these circumstances.

Sydney Water also stated it should not be held accountable where its inability to accept water may, in turn, be due to the actions of another party.\textsuperscript{137} If Sydney Water’s inability to accept water were caused by the actions of a third-party, then Sydney Water could pursue that third-party outside of our Determination.

\textsuperscript{131} Sydney Water submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 4.
\textsuperscript{132} SDP submission to IPART Draft Report - Appendices, April 2017, p 27.
\textsuperscript{133} SDP submission to IPART Draft Report - Appendices, April 2017, p 27.
\textsuperscript{134} SDP submission to IPART Draft Report - Appendices, April 2017, p 27.
\textsuperscript{135} Sydney Water submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 5.
\textsuperscript{136} Sydney Water submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 15.
\textsuperscript{137} Sydney Water submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 5.
3.6 Enabling SDP to have a 14-month minimum run time during drought

We have made a decision to:

12 Relax the nil price to Sydney Water when the plant operates within the 14-month minimum run time.

13 Apply partial abatement during the minimum run time.
   – The daily volumes of production will not be included in the abatement factor, but the abatement factor will still apply to daily fixed charges. Partial abatement will apply for that part of the 14 months that:
     o falls within the grace period, and
     o outside the grace period and outside drought.
   – For clarity, full abatement will apply for that part of the 14 months that falls outside the grace period, but within drought.

The 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan provides for a 14-month minimum run time during drought. This was not included in our Draft Report, as the 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan was released shortly before the publication of our Draft Report. The 2017 Metropolitan Water plan states the purpose of the 14-month minimum run time is to mitigate the risks associated with the restart of the plant and provide certainty to the operator in terms of staff recruitment.\(^\text{138}\)

According to the 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan, the 14-month minimum run time comprises six months of running the plant in addition to a maximum 8-month start-up:

… even if storage levels return to above the designated ‘off’ point for the plant. Outside the new minimum run time, the 70 per cent (of storage levels) ‘off’ trigger then applies.\(^\text{139}\)

This 14-month minimum run time applies at SDP’s discretion. It would apply from the first time dam levels reach 60% in a drought episode for a period of 14 months. Where dam levels reach 60% multiple times in a single drought episode, the minimum run time would only apply once.

Our view is SDP would need to notify Sydney Water of its intention to ‘opt-in’ to the minimum run time. Conversely, SDP would need to notify Sydney Water of its intention to ‘opt-out’ of the minimum run time.

We have relaxed the nil price to Sydney Water outside the 60/70 rule in order to accommodate the minimum run time. We have also considered if and how abatement should apply to the minimum run time.

3.6.1 Abatement factor applies to the 14-month minimum run time

In considering whether abatement should apply to the 14-month minimum run time, we have consulted with SDP, Sydney Water and NSW Treasury on this issue and considered their responses.


As noted in Chapter 2, we have applied full abatement when SDP is required to produce—specifically, in its primary drought response role and its ancillary emergency response role. Outside these requirements, operation of the plant is at SDP’s discretion and partial abatement applies.

The 14-month minimum run time is discretionary. In this sense, partial abatement would apply. That is, the abatement factor would be applied to the minimum run time but the volumes produced would not influence the calculation of the abatement factor. While this would enable SDP to retain discretion over the volume of water it produces as intended, this would not enable SDP to influence the abatement factor in its favour during the minimum run time.

An alternative argument may be made that fully exempting SDP from abatement better accords with this discretion (no abatement during a minimum run time). But we do not consider this retains a strong financial incentive for SDP to operate as required during drought. With partial abatement, past performance during drought (rather than performance during the minimum run time) could nonetheless impact the fixed charges that SDP would receive through the abatement factor.

Nor do we consider partial abatement to create a disincentive for SDP to exercise its minimum run time option. This because under our new abatement mechanism SDP has increased flexibility to manage the abatement factor that carries forward into future production periods, including a minimum run time. SDP can therefore prevent the future application of an abatement factor of less than one to its service charges.

Partial abatement is also consistent with the abatement regime applied during the grace period when SDP is ramping-up production in response to drought and, therefore, with the view that the minimum run time is simply the equivalent ramp-down period after drought.

### 3.6.2 How abatement would work during the 14-month minimum run time

As noted above, the 14-month minimum run time would comprise an 8-month start up period and a 6-month plant operation period. The 8-month start up or ‘grace’ period would be triggered by dam levels reaching 60%. This ‘grace’ period would then apply for eight months, regardless of dam levels. SDP would then have another 6 months of full production at its discretion.

During the ‘grace’ period, the abatement factor would apply to SDP’s fixed charges. But the volumes produced would not affect the abatement factor. During the plant operation period the volumes produced would also not affect the abatement factor once dam levels have reached 70%. That is, outside the drought period partial abatement applies, similar to the grace period.

For clarity, the volumes produced would affect the abatement factor as long as dam levels have not yet reached 70%. That is, the plant would be operating in a drought period and full abatement applies, as outlined earlier in the chapter.

SDP may choose to opt out of the minimum run time at any point (and therefore shutdown). If it does so, abatement would cease to apply. SDP would need to notify Sydney Water of its intention to both ‘opt-in’ and ‘opt-out’ of the minimum run time.
4 Accommodating emergency response outside drought

While SDP’s emergency response role is ancillary to its primary purpose of responding to drought, we have made changes to the regulatory framework to better accommodate this function. SDP is available to supply water to Sydney Water if required for public health, network stability, unavailability or maintenance in Sydney Water’s area of operations. The 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan has also made this role explicit.

We have relaxed the nil price to Sydney Water in circumstances where SDP is required to produce water as part of its emergency response role. However, prices for water supplied in an emergency response remain regulated. Our view is that SDP would likely have monopoly power in these circumstances, which could prevent ‘win-win’ agreements from occurring if prices were negotiated.

We have also extended abatement to SDP’s emergency response role. This acknowledges that abatement provides financial incentives for SDP’s performance if called upon in this role. In making our decision, we also considered a range of matters under section 15 of the IPART Act, including potential impacts on customers. We have consulted with SDP, Sydney Water and NSW Treasury on this issue and considered their responses.

4.1 Pricing SDP’s emergency response role

We have made a decision to:

- Relax the nil price outside drought to Sydney Water in the exceptional circumstances specified in the Water Supply Agreement, which are to:
  - mitigate the effects of a public health incident, or
  - ensure security of supply or network stability during periods of outages, unavailability or maintenance on any water industry infrastructure in Sydney Water’s area of operations.

In the 2012 Determination, we set a nil price for any water supplied to Sydney Water outside drought, effectively creating no financial incentive for SDP to supply Sydney Water outside drought, even where this could benefit both parties. In our Issues Paper, we questioned whether this pricing constraint should be relaxed. However, we noted that relaxing this pricing constraint would need to be contingent on Sydney Water not having to take water imprudently from SDP.

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140 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 9.

IPART Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd
4.1.1 Sydney Water objected to removing the nil charge except for the exceptional circumstances outlined in the Water Supply Agreement

Sydney Water considered the nil charge should remain in place, unless it has called for water under the specific circumstances outlined in the Water Supply Agreement and then only at regulated prices. It has argued that broader removal of the nil price outside drought conditions would require an amendment to the current Water Supply Agreement, because under that agreement Sydney Water must accept all water supplied from SDP, even if it is at a higher price than other water sources. In our Issues Paper, we noted this take arrangement as a potential impediment to SDP and Sydney Water operating flexibly outside the drought rule.

Sydney Water did not support changing the Water Supply Agreement because it may trigger a re-assessment of the accounting treatment of the SDP lease. This, in turn, could have significant implications for the financial position of Sydney Water, with negative impacts on its financeability. Changes to the Water Supply Agreement would also incur significant transaction costs for all parties.

Removing the nil charge for exceptional circumstances only

We consider relaxing the nil price in line with Sydney Water’s proposal better aligns our determination with the current Water Supply Agreement. It would also allow SDP to be paid when required under the Water Supply Agreement to operate the plant as an emergency response measure. As noted by SDP, the Water Supply Agreement requires Sydney Water to reimburse SDP the ‘reasonable costs’ for doing so, but the 2012 Determination prevents this.

We did not relax the nil price uniformly outside drought conditions because we recognise Sydney Water’s view that this would require changes to the Water Supply Agreement and in part have accounting implications. At the Public Hearing, SDP also agreed with Sydney Water that not changing the Water Supply Agreement is an important matter. Further, we note that removing the nil price to Sydney Water outside the drought rule would also weaken SDP’s incentives to seek third-party customers and increase SDP’s dependence on Sydney Water.

One exception, however, is that we have relaxed the nil price to accommodate the optional 14-month minimum run time provided to SDP in the 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan. This is discussed in Chapter 3.

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143 Sydney Water submission to IPART Issues Paper, November 2016, pp 34-35.
144 Sydney Water submission to IPART Issues Paper, November 2016, p 33.
146 Sydney Water submission to IPART Issues Paper, November 2016, p 34.
147 Sydney Water submission to IPART Issues Paper, November 2016, pp 34-35.
148 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 117.
149 IPART, SDP public hearing transcript, 8 December 2016, p 29.
Prices in an emergency response should be regulated

SDP proposed that the Determination allow SDP and Sydney Water to agree an appropriate charge if Sydney Water requests SDP to operate for emergencies.\textsuperscript{150} In seeking an unregulated pricing agreement, SDP stated that its intention was that the agreement would be consistent with the terms of the Water Supply Agreement.\textsuperscript{151}

We agree with Sydney Water that the supply of desalinated water under the specific circumstances outlined in the Water Supply Agreement should be regulated. In these circumstances, it is reasonable to expect that SDP would have monopoly power, which could prevent ‘win-win’ agreements from occurring if prices were negotiated.

SDP also supported the draft decision to remove the nil charge for supply of water in exceptional circumstances. However, it noted that the application of a regulated charge outside of drought will only allow SDP to recover the costs of the regulated services, namely an 8-month restart followed by full operation at design capacity. SDP argued that it would be unable to deliver alternative operational modes, such as a low flow mode, which incur different costs.\textsuperscript{152}

We consider our charges are cost reflective and are therefore in keeping with SDP using reasonable endeavours to supply any amount of desalinated water within the shortest period of time. Similarly, they are consistent with Sydney Water having to reimburse SDP the reasonable costs of doing so, as stipulated under the Water Supply Agreement.\textsuperscript{153} This is because the prices we have set reflect the efficient costs of service provision:

\begin{itemize}
  \item the base service charge reflects SDP’s efficient fixed costs when in water security (shutdown) mode
  \item the incremental service charges and one-off transition charges we set recover fixed costs incurred by SDP from operating the plant (regardless of volumes of water supplied), and
  \item the water usage charge we set reflects SDP’s incremental costs (variable operating costs) of supplying each ML of water.
\end{itemize}

Our decision to review membrane costs ex-post if the plant operates in an emergency response also ensures that only the membranes required to respond to the emergency are paid for. Our price structures and cost sharing rules are outlined in detail in Chapters 10 to 12.

\begin{thebibliography}{150}
\bibitem{150} IPART, SDP public hearing transcript, 8 December 2016, p 29.
\bibitem{151} IPART, SDP public hearing transcript, 8 December 2016, p 29.
\bibitem{152} SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 10.
\bibitem{153} SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 117.
\end{thebibliography}
4.2 Abatement also applies to water produced in an emergency response role

We have made a decision to:

15 Apply full abatement to SDP’s fixed charges when it is producing water in response to an Emergency Response Notice from Sydney Water. That is, the abatement factor:

– applies to SDP’s service charges and the volumes produced affect its calculation.

As noted in Chapter 2, SDP has an emergency response role under the 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan and the Water Supply Agreement. This requires SDP to make reasonable endeavours to supply Sydney Water with drinking water to mitigate the effect of a public health incident or to ensure security of supply or network stability in Sydney Water’s area of operations. In these circumstances, the plant does not necessarily need to supply water at full capacity.

While SDP’s emergency response role is ancillary to its primary purpose of responding to drought, we have made changes to the regulatory framework to better accommodate this function. We have introduced financial incentives similar to those that apply in drought to ensure that SDP responds to an emergency, if required to do so. These incentives are, however, subject to agreed levels of supply between SDP and Sydney Water.

In our Draft Report, we decided to exempt SDP’s fixed charges from abatement if it was producing water in an emergency response role.154 This is because the objectives of maximising production during drought do not apply to an emergency response role, where the plant may not need to supply desalinated water at full capacity.155

Since the release of our Draft Report, we have reconsidered if and how abatement should apply to SDP’s emergency response role, in response to Sydney Water’s submission that abatement should apply outside drought.156 Sydney Water asserted that abatement is a standard feature of modern service contracts. It is an important mitigation against the risk that a provider will not perform to the level expected by customers.157 In its submission to our Draft Report, SDP accepted our original decision not to abate its emergency response role.158

We consider there to be merit in Sydney Water’s view. While the emergency response role may not require SDP to produce water at full capacity, it is nonetheless a situation where the production of water is important. As such, it is also enshrined in the 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan.159 In an emergency response, Sydney Water, and its customers, would be relying upon the production of water by SDP.

We acknowledge that SDP is only required to use its reasonable endeavours to produce water in an emergency response role. But this does not mean that it should not be held...
accountable for the production of water, notwithstanding this lesser standard. Abatement may be an appropriate mechanism with which to provide incentives to SDP to produce the agreed amount of water in its emergency response role, in accordance with an Emergency Response Notice from Sydney Water.

In making our decision, we also considered a range of matters under section 15 of the IPART Act, including potential impacts on customers. We have consulted with SDP, Sydney Water and NSW Treasury on this issue and considered their responses.

We have thus decided to extend abatement to SDP’s emergency response role, subject to modifications that recognise production in these circumstances is more flexible than within drought.

4.3 Abatement in an emergency response role mirrors the abatement arrangements that exist in drought

We have made a decision to:

16 Provide SDP with an option of a ‘grace’ period of up to 8 months from abatement when it is producing water in response to an Emergency Response Notice from Sydney Water:
   – The daily volumes of production will not be included in the abatement factor for the grace period.
   – The abatement factor, however, will still apply during the grace period.
   – SDP is able to opt out of the grace period at its discretion.

17 Allow the denominator for the abatement factor to be the amount agreed between SDP and Sydney Water following the issue of an Emergency Response Notice. However:
   – A cap would apply to the numerator in the abatement factor so that it could not exceed 110% of the value of the denominator.
   – SDP can manage fluctuations in output during an emergency response period within the 10% cap.
   – Fixed charges would be trued-up to claw back any over-recovery of revenue over a single emergency response episode.

18 Retain and use the abatement factor if SDP exits an emergency response period with an abatement factor of less than one.

We consider the abatement regime in emergency response should reflect that which operates in drought, subject to minor modifications. Notably, SDP and Sydney Water would be able to agree on the volumes used to determine the abatement factor.

Our view is Sydney Water’s Emergency Response Notice (ie, its request for water) should embody the outcome of negotiations between the parties on how much water SDP should produce in such a situation. This is consistent with the intention of the Water Supply Agreement. It also reflects the approach we have taken to date, for example, by not including a membrane charge for emergency response.

Given that volumes produced during an emergency response need not be at full capacity and can vary, we have capped the numerator in the abatement factor so that it cannot not
exceed 110% of the value of the denominator. Much like the drought abatement mechanism, SDP can manage short-term fluctuations in output around the agreed volumes, but only up to the cap. A true-up will also apply to manage potential over-recovery of fixed charges (details of the true-up mechanism are outlined in detail in Chapter 3).  

We have also enabled SDP to respond to an emergency in a period up to eight months without penalty. This is consistent with Atkins Cardno’s view of the scope of activities that have to be undertaken on restart (as discussed in Chapter 2). In circumstances where an emergency response may continue for more than eight months (eg, a planned outage or maintenance), the abatement mechanism would provide an incentive to SDP to produce sufficient water for Sydney Water’s needs.

Last, we have maintained our decision to carry forward abatement factors into future periods of production if SDP exits an emergency response period with an abatement factor of less than one.

We note SDP opposed the carryover of the abatement factor from one drought response period to the next, and generally considered that whenever it is abated the factor should be reset to one at the conclusion of a production period. But we consider this to underpin the abatement mechanism and its incentives. It ensures that SDP would produce sufficient water, even in periods of short duration, because of the potential for this to impact its service charges for future periods.

Similar to the abatement mechanism that applies during drought, the new abatement regime for an emergency response would also only commence on 13 December 2018, once the plant has been reinstated.

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160 We note that the true-up mechanism applied to an emergency response period would need to distinguish between impactors that pay the base service charge (including Sydney Water) and the beneficiary that pays as the incremental service charge (only Sydney Water).
5 SDP’s revenue requirement

The notional revenue requirement (NRR) represents our view of the total efficient costs of providing SDP’s monopoly services in each year of the 2017 determination period. We set prices to recover this amount of revenue. In this chapter, we present an overview of SDP’s revenue requirement over the 2017 determination period when the plant is in water security (shutdown) and plant operation modes.

The revenue requirement we have set for SDP over the 2017 determination period reflects our decisions on:

- efficient operating and capital expenditure
- the value of the Regulatory Asset Base (RAB)
- the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) and allowance for return on capital
- regulatory depreciation, including asset lives, and
- taxation allowance for the plant and pipeline.

Our decisions on these cost items are covered in detail in Chapters 6 to 9.

Consistent with our Terms of Reference, SDP’s NRR includes additional allowances for an:

- energy adjustment mechanism (EnAM), and
- efficiency adjustment mechanism (EfAM).

The EnAM passes through to customers, outside a core band, the gains or losses SDP incurs on the sale of the surplus energy it has contracted. The EfAM is an efficiency carryover mechanism that allows SDP to retain efficiency savings for up to five years from when they are realised. In this chapter, we also outline our decisions on these allowances and their impact on SDP’s NRR.

5.1 Overview of SDP’s notional revenue requirement over the 2017 determination period

We have made a decision to:

19 Set SDP’s notional revenue requirement in each year of the 2017 determination period for:
   - the plant in operation and water security (shutdown) modes, as shown in Table 5.1, and
   - the pipeline across all modes of operation, as shown in Table 5.2.

As per the 2012 Determination, we use a building block method to calculate SDP’s revenue requirement (see Appendix C). Unlike other water utilities, SDP’s costs, and thus its prices, vary depending on what operating mode it is in.
We calculate SDP’s revenue requirements for:

1. water security (shutdown) mode, and
2. plant operation mode.

The key difference in the NRR between water security (shutdown) and plant operation modes relates to the additional operating expenditure required to produce desalinated water (primarily, energy and chemical costs). The return on capital (funding costs) and return of assets (depreciation) for SDP are identical under both water security (shutdown) mode and plant operation mode.

We also separately determine the building block costs for the distribution pipeline. The pipeline costs (and prices) do not vary by mode of operation. The annual building block components for the plant and pipeline in plant operation and water security modes are presented in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, respectively.\(^\text{161}\)

| Table 5.1 Plant – notional revenue requirement by building block ($million, $2016-17) |
|-------------------------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Water security (shutdown) mode                   | 2017-18  | 2018-19  | 2019-20  | 2020-21  | 2021-22  | Total          |
| Return on capital                                | 58.2    | 56.3    | 54.4    | 52.6    | 50.7    | 272.2          |
| Depreciation                                    | 43.0    | 43.1    | 43.1    | 43.2    | 43.3    | 215.6          |
| Operating costs                                 | 18.0    | 17.8    | 17.7    | 17.1    | 16.9    | 87.6           |
| Tax allowance                                   | 8.3     | 9.0     | 9.5     | 10.0    | 10.5    | 47.3           |
| Return on working capital                       | 0.2     | 0.2     | 0.2     | 0.2     | 0.2     | 0.8            |
| EnAM                                            | 5.8     | 5.8     | 5.8     | 5.8     | 5.8     | 28.8           |
| EfAM                                            | 0.1     | 0.1     | 0.1     | 0.0     | 0.0     | 0.2            |
| **Total NRR**                                   | 133.5   | 132.2   | 130.7   | 128.8   | 127.3   | 652.4          |

| Plant operation mode                            | 2017-18  | 2018-19  | 2019-20  | 2020-21  | 2021-22  | Total          |
| Return on capital                                | 58.2    | 56.3    | 54.4    | 52.6    | 50.7    | 272.2          |
| Depreciation                                    | 43.0    | 43.1    | 43.1    | 43.2    | 43.3    | 215.6          |
| Operating costs                                 | 102.6   | 91.0    | 85.5    | 82.0    | 81.3    | 442.3          |
| Tax allowance                                   | 8.3     | 9.0     | 9.5     | 10.0    | 10.5    | 47.3           |
| Return on working capital                       | 0.0     | 0.0     | 0.0     | 0.0     | 0.0     | 0.2            |
| EnAM                                            | 5.8     | 5.8     | 5.8     | 5.8     | 5.8     | 28.8           |
| EfAM                                            | 0.1     | 0.1     | 0.1     | 0.0     | 0.0     | 0.2            |
| **Total NRR**                                   | 217.9   | 205.2   | 198.3   | 193.5   | 191.5   | 1,006.5        |

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
Data source: IPART analysis.

\(^{161}\) We have set transition charges, which will reflect the efficient fixed one-off operating costs incurred when the plant moves from shutdown into operation mode and vice versa. These costs are not included in the NRR set out in this chapter.
Table 5.2  Pipeline - notional revenue requirement by building block ($million, $2016-17)

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<td>36.2</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>180.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Numbers may not add due to rounding.

**Data source:** IPART analysis.

The NRR over the five years of the 2017 determination period for the plant is:

- Water security (shutdown) mode: $652.4 million, which is $17.7 million, or around 2.6%, lower than SDP’s proposal.
- Plant operation mode: $1,006.5 million, which is $23.0 million, or around 2.2%, lower than SDP’s proposal.

The NRR for the pipeline is $180.7 million, which is $1.8 million (or 1.0%) lower than SDP’s proposal in both plant operation and water security (shutdown) modes.

Combined, EnAM and EfAM add to NRR for the plant and pipeline about 3.6% in water security (shutdown) mode and 2.5% in plant operation mode.

### 5.2 Notional revenue requirement (plant and pipeline) in water security (shutdown) mode

In water security (shutdown) mode, SDP proposed a total revenue requirement (for plant and pipeline) of $852.7 million over the 2017 determination period (on average, $170.5 million per year).\(^{162}\)

Our total plant and pipeline NRR in water security (shutdown) mode is $833.2 million, which is $19.5 million lower than SDP’s proposal over the 5-year period. This is due to a combination of factors offsetting each other including:

- a higher WACC of 4.7% compared to SDP’s proposed WACC of 4.5%\(^{163}\), due to updated market parameters
- transferring prudent and efficient periodic maintenance from operating costs to capital costs to allow a review of these costs at the next price review
- reduced operating costs mainly related to the disallowed partial plant test, and

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\(^{162}\) SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 55.

\(^{163}\) SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, pp 61-62.
correcting existing asset lives and the classification of certain asset categories, which in net terms has had a relatively minor impact.

Overall, the higher WACC and adjustments to asset lives have offset many of our downward adjustments to SDP’s proposed costs. SDP’s original WACC proposal of around 4.5% was based on IPART’s biannual WACC update from August 2016. Since then, several key WACC parameters have increased to reflect current market conditions.

Our NRR is shown in Figure 5.1, compared to SDP’s initial proposed NRR.

**Figure 5.1** Water security (shutdown) mode – IPART decision on notional revenue requirement (plant & pipeline) versus SDP proposed over the 5-year determination period ($million, 2016-17)

Note: The ‘other adjustments’ referred to in the figure relate to modelling related differences between SDP’s proposal and IPART’s analysis. The main components of this are: differences in the EnAM proposal and IPART’s decision, updating working capital parameters, updating historical inflation for 2011-12 from 2.5% to 2.3%, and modelling discrepancies of around $4 million over the 2017 determination period.

Data source: IPART analysis and SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 55.

In annual terms our NRR is higher in 2017-18 and lower in all other years of the determination period than SDP’s proposal. The profile of differences between SDP’s and

---

164 Note that changing the WACC also affects the return on working capital, and the tax allowance. The impact on the return on working capital varies between the two modes due to the alternative operating cost profiles, and therefore the WACC impact varies marginally between the two modes of operation. The tax calculation is consistent between the two modes as operating costs are netted out of the tax calculation.

165 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, pp 61-62.
our NRR estimates generally reflects lower efficient operating costs from 2018-19, and the removal of the partial plant test costs in 2020-21 and 2021-22.

On an NPV basis, our NRR of $708.4 million is $14.9 million lower than SDP’s proposal of $723.4 million (using a real pre-tax discount rate of 5.7%).

Table 5.3 provides a yearly comparison of our NRR to SDP’s proposed NRR.

Table 5.3 Water security (shutdown) mode – SDP proposed notional revenue requirement compared to IPART decision ($million, $2016-17)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IPART Decision</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant</td>
<td>143.4</td>
<td>133.5</td>
<td>132.2</td>
<td>130.7</td>
<td>128.8</td>
<td>127.3</td>
<td>652.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipeline</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>180.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>194.9</td>
<td>169.7</td>
<td>168.3</td>
<td>166.8</td>
<td>164.9</td>
<td>163.4</td>
<td>833.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP Proposed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant</td>
<td>130.6</td>
<td>132.1</td>
<td>131.1</td>
<td>139.4</td>
<td>137.0</td>
<td>670.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipeline</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>182.6</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>167.2</td>
<td>168.7</td>
<td>167.6</td>
<td>175.8</td>
<td>173.4</td>
<td>852.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-10.6</td>
<td>-9.7</td>
<td>-17.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipeline</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>-10.9</td>
<td>-10.0</td>
<td>-19.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

Data source: SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 55 and IPART analysis.

5.2.1 SDP’s submission to our Draft Report

In response to our Draft Report, SDP revised its proposed NRR for the plant and pipeline in water security mode to $869.9 million over the 5-year period. This is:

- $17.2 million more than SDP’s original proposal, reflecting higher proposed funding costs in line with our draft WACC of 4.9%. This is partially offset by reductions in forecast operating expenditure, such as the exclusion of the partial plant test SDP had originally proposed and a 0.25% efficiency factor applied to corporate and labour costs.
- $22.2 million more than the NRR allowed for under our draft decision, reflecting a higher opening RAB, higher plant forecast operating expenditure and higher depreciation from a shorter pipeline asset life.

Since our Draft Report, we have updated the WACC to reflect latest market data, which has caused it to decrease by 20 basis points to 4.7% from the 4.9% used by SDP in its revised proposal. This explains most of the difference between SDP’s revised revenue requirement and our final decision.

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166 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 33. The figure includes an additional $3.7 million to the NRR presented in SDP’s submission to the Draft Report, to account for additional insurance-related expenditure proposed by SDP in supplementary submissions that we received after April 2017.
In addition, we have maintained our draft decision on the asset life for new pipeline assets - ie, 120 years compared with SDP’s proposal of 100 years. Differences in our WACC and pipeline asset life also have flow through effects to the tax allowance and return on working capital. SDP, in its revised submission, accepted many of our draft expenditure decisions.

Figure 5.2 compares our draft and final decisions on NRR to SDP’s original and revised proposal.

Figure 5.2 Water security (shutdown) mode – SDP proposals versus IPART decision on notional revenue requirement over the 5-year determination period ($million, $2016-17)

Note: We have included the additional $3.7 million to the NRR presented in SDP’s submission to the Draft Report to account for additional expenditure relating to insurance items proposed by SDP in supplementary submissions.

Data source: SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 55; SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 33; and IPART analysis.

5.2.2 Compared to the 2012 determination period

When compared to the 2012 determination period, the NRR over the 2017 determination period is around 17.2% lower in water security (shutdown) mode. This is mainly due to calculating a better estimate of SDP’s tax liability by moving from a pre-tax to a post-tax framework and the lower WACC over the 2017 determination period.

In the 2012 Determination, we set a real pre-tax WACC of 6.7%. Moving to a post-tax WACC framework has reduced the return on assets, because a tax allowance is now separately calculated. Broadly, this change accounts for around $170 million of the $255.8 million reduction in return on assets between the two determination periods. The reduction in the return on assets is offset by the introduction of a tax allowance of $38.4 million. The remainder of the reduction in the return on capital is the result of a lower WACC (on comparable terms to the 2012 Determination), and a declining asset base.

Our decision on total operating costs (plant and pipeline including energy) over the 2017 determination period is $89.2 million, which is $10.9 million higher than the
$78.3 million allowed for in the 2012 determination period. This is because lower operating costs for the plant in the 2017 determination period are offset by an increase in corporate costs compared to our 2012 Determination.

Table 5.4 provides a comparison of NRR by each cost component over the two determination periods.

Table 5.4  Water security (shutdown) mode – IPART 2012 Determination and 2017 Determination (plant & pipeline) ($million, $2016-17)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Building block</th>
<th>2012 Determination</th>
<th>2017 Determination</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Difference (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Return on capital</td>
<td>686.4</td>
<td>430.7</td>
<td>-255.8</td>
<td>-37.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depreciation</td>
<td>230.3</td>
<td>244.8</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating costs</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>89.2</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax allowance</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return on working capital</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>-10.1</td>
<td>-89.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EnAM</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EfAM</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,006.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>833.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>-173.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>-17.2%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
Data source: IPART analysis.

5.3  Notional revenue requirement (plant and pipeline) in plant operation mode

In plant operation mode, SDP proposed a NRR of $1,212.1 million over the 2017 determination period (on average, $242.4 million per year).167

Our NRR in plant operation mode is $1,187.2 million, which is $24.8 million lower than SDP’s proposal over the five-year period. This is due to the combination of factors which partially offset each other, including:

- a higher WACC of 4.7% compared to SDP’s proposed WACC of 4.5%, due to updated market parameters
- higher energy costs due to higher benchmark unit prices, offset by lower benchmark volumes
- lower operating costs related mainly to chemicals and labour, and the removal of ongoing membrane replacement costs
- transferring prudent and efficient periodic maintenance from operating costs to capital costs to allow a review of these costs at the next price review, and
- correcting existing asset lives and the classification of certain asset categories, which in net terms has had a relatively minor impact.

Our NRR is shown below in Figure 5.3, compared to SDP’s initial proposed NRR.

167 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 55.

IPART  Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd
Figure 5.3 Plant operation mode - IPART decision on notional revenue requirement (plant & pipeline) versus SDP proposed over the 5-year determination period ($million, $2016-17)

Note: The ‘other adjustments’ referred to in the figure relate to modelling related differences between SDP’s proposal and IPART’s analysis. The main components of this are: differences in the EnAM proposal and IPART’s decision, updating working capital parameters, updating historical inflation for 2011-12 from 2.5% to 2.3%, and modelling discrepancies of around $4 million over the 2017 determination period.  

Data source: IPART analysis and SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 55.

In annual terms, our NRR is above SDP’s proposal in 2017-18, but below SDP’s in all other years of the 2017 determination period. The yearly differences between our NRR and SDP’s proposal is due mainly to our benchmark estimates of energy costs, and adjustments we made to other components of SDP’s proposed operating costs.

Notably, we removed operating costs relating to membrane replacement, capitalised prudent and efficient periodic maintenance costs, and reduced some operating costs line items such as chemicals and labour. These changes have a larger impact on SDP’s NRR in plant operation mode than water security (shutdown) mode.

The decisions we have made on energy costs (see Chapter 8) have also significantly impacted SDP’s NRR in plant operation mode, compared to water security (shutdown) mode. This is due to the energy intensive nature of the desalination process when the plant is producing potable water. Our use of benchmark unit prices has increased SDP’s NRR over the first two years of the determination period. This is offset though by lower benchmark volumes. Overall, 21.3% of the NRR in plant operation mode relates to energy costs, compared to under 0.5% in water security (shutdown) mode.
On an NPV basis, our NRR is $1,011.5 million compared to SDP’s proposal of $1,030.1 million (using a real pre-tax discount rate of 5.7%).

Table 5.5 provides a yearly comparison of our NRR to SDP’s proposed NRR.

| Plant operation mode – SDP proposed notional revenue requirement compared to IPART decision ($million, $2016-17) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **IPART Decision** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Plant | 218.9 | 217.9 | 205.2 | 198.3 | 193.5 | 191.5 | 1,006.5 |
| Pipeline | 51.5 | 36.2 | 36.2 | 36.2 | 36.1 | 36.1 | 180.7 |
| **Total** | **270.4** | **254.1** | **241.4** | **234.5** | **229.7** | **227.6** | **1,187.2** |
| **SDP Proposed** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Plant | 208.1 | 207.0 | 205.8 | 204.9 | 203.7 | 1,029.5 |
| Pipeline | 36.6 | 36.6 | 36.5 | 36.5 | 36.4 | 182.6 |
| **Total** | **244.7** | **243.6** | **242.3** | **241.4** | **240.1** | **1,212.1** |
| **Difference** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Plant | 9.8 | -1.8 | -7.5 | -11.4 | -12.1 | -23.0 |
| Pipeline | -0.4 | -0.4 | -0.4 | -0.3 | -0.3 | -1.8 |
| **Total** | **9.3** | **-2.2** | **-7.8** | **-11.7** | **-12.4** | **-24.8** |

**Note:** Numbers may not add due to rounding.

**Data source:** SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 55 and IPART analysis.

### 5.3.1 SDP’s submission to our Draft Report

In response to our Draft Report, SDP revised its proposed NRR for the plant and pipeline in plant operation mode to $1,187.4 million over the 5-year period.\(^{168}\) This is:

- $24.7 million less than SDP’s original proposal, reflecting lower proposed energy and operating costs, partially offset by higher proposed funding costs in line with our draft WACC of 4.9%.
- $3.3 million less than the NRR allowed for under our draft decision, reflecting lower forecast operating expenditure (primarily energy costs), but a higher opening RAB and higher depreciation due to shorter pipeline asset lives.

SDP’s revised NRR is similar to our final decision. This is because our lower cost of capital is largely offset by higher benchmark energy costs compared to SDP’s revised proposal. Since the Draft Report, we have updated the following to reflect latest market information:

- the cost of capital (WACC), and
- benchmark energy prices.

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\(^{168}\) SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 36. The figure includes an additional $2.8 million to the NRR presented in SDP’s submission to the Draft Report, to account for additional insurance-related expenditure proposed by SDP in supplementary submissions that we received after April 2017.

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We have also maintained our draft decision on the asset life for new pipeline assets - ie, 120 years compared with SDP’s proposal of 100 years. We have also made minor changes to operating and capital costs, based on our consultant’s review of SDP’s and the stakeholders’ submissions to our draft expenditure decisions.

Figure 5.4 compares our draft and final decisions on the NRR to SDP’s original and revised proposal.

**Figure 5.4** Plant operation mode – SDP proposals versus IPART decision on notional revenue requirement over the 5-year determination period ($million, $2016-17)

![Graph comparing NRR over 5 years](image)

**Note:** We have included an additional $2.8 million to the NRR presented in SDP’s submission to the Draft Report to account for additional expenditure relating to insurance items proposed by SDP in supplementary submissions.

**Data source:** SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 55; SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 36; and IPART analysis.

### 5.3.2 Compared to the 2012 determination period

When compared to the 2012 determination period, the NRR over the 2017 determination period is around 12.6% lower in plant operation mode. Again, this is mainly due to the lower WACC and a better estimate of SDP’s tax liability which arises from moving to a post-tax framework from a pre-tax framework.

Operating costs have increased under the 2017 determination period. This reflects market movements in input costs, particularly energy. The energy cost allowance has increased by $29.7 million (or 13.3%) over the two determination periods, due to higher benchmark prices (note, this comparison assumed SDP would be in plant operation mode over the 2012 and 2017 determination periods). The increase in benchmark prices is mainly due to increases in wholesale energy (up 49%), which has been partially offset by a 12% decline in the renewable energy component of the benchmark price. This is discussed in further detail in Chapter 8.
Holding energy costs constant, operating costs have decreased significantly over the two determination periods. This is mainly due to our decision to capitalise prudent and efficient periodic maintenance and membrane replacement costs (outlined in Chapter 7).

Table 5.6 provides a comparison of NRR by each cost component over the two determination periods.

Table 5.6 Plant operation mode – IPART 2012 determination and 2017 determination periods (plant & pipeline) ($million, $2016-17)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Building block</th>
<th>2012 Determination</th>
<th>2017 Determination</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Difference (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Return on capital</td>
<td>686.4</td>
<td>430.7</td>
<td>-255.8</td>
<td>-37.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depreciation</td>
<td>230.3</td>
<td>244.8</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating costs</td>
<td>430.7</td>
<td>443.9</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax allowance</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return on working capital</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-10.8</td>
<td>-95.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EnAM</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EfAM</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,358.7</td>
<td>1,187.2</td>
<td>-171.5</td>
<td>-12.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding. Data source: IPART analysis.

5.4 Revenue adjustments required by the Terms of Reference

The Terms of Reference requires us to treat demonstrated efficiency savings and energy gains or losses in accordance with our Methodology Paper for the EnAM and EfAM. In this section, we outline how we have calculated the adjustments for each mechanism and how these separate adjustments are to be passed through into prices from 1 July 2017.

The Terms of Reference allows us to update the Methodology Paper from time to time. Concurrently with the SDP price review, we have released a 2017 Methodology Paper.

5.4.1 Allowances for the energy adjustment mechanism

We have made a decision to:

20 Include an allowance in prices over the 2017 determination period for the losses made on the sale of SDP’s surplus energy while it was shutdown over the 2012 determination period of $28.8 million or $5.8 million per year (real $2016-17 and including financing costs). This is consistent with the Terms of Reference.

The purpose of the EnAM is to pass through to customers any gains and/or losses outside a core band from the sale of SDP’s surplus energy while it was shutdown (four year period from 2012-13 to 2015-16). Surplus energy includes electricity and Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs).

169 In April 2012, we released the Sydney Desalination Plant – Efficiency and Energy Adjustment Mechanisms - Methodology Paper, April 2012, following consultation.
The 2012 Methodology Paper sets a threshold for the core band at plus or minus 5% of the total value of SDP’s contracted energy. Gains (losses) on the sale of surplus energy when SDP is in shutdown or restart are shared on the following basis:

- SDP share: 100% within the threshold and 10% outside the threshold.
- Customer share: 90% outside the threshold.

**Following our analysis, we have accepted SDP’s proposed losses on the sale of its surplus energy**

We have allowed a total EnAM allowance of $29.0 million or $5.8 million per year (including financing costs) over the 2017 determination period. This is based on:

- The recommendation of our consultant, Marsden Jacob, on the gains and losses eligible for inclusion in the EnAM,\(^ {170} \) and
- Our application of financing costs.

This is equivalent to passing through $24.5 million (nominal and excluding financing costs) or 72% of SDP’s losses from the sale of surplus energy from 2012-13 to 2015-16. Our EnAM allowances are consistent with SDP’s proposed allocation of losses under the EnAM.\(^ {171} \)

The 2012 Methodology Paper states that we will include financing costs when calculating EnAM allowances to pass through into prices. Table 5.7 presents the customers’ share of losses on the sale of SDP’s surplus energy over the EnAM application period (ie, 2012-13 to 2015-16) before and after the application of 2012 financing costs. Table 5.8 presents our EnAM allowances for the 2017 determination period, including 2017 financing costs.

EnAM allowances represent about 3.6% (plant operation mode) of SDP’s NRR over the 2017 determination period. This adds about $15,791 to SDP’s daily fixed service charge.

**Table 5.7 Gains and losses over the EnAM application period ($million)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Customer share of losses excluding financing costs ($nominal)</td>
<td>Commercial in Confidence</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing costs (%nominal)(^ {a} )</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial in Confidence</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^ {a} \) This is the average based on the 12 months of data for each financial year. To apply half a year of financing costs (ie, to move a mid-year amount to an end-of-year amount), the financing cost rate for the relevant year (ie, i) is converted to a 6-month rate using the formula: \((1+i)^{0.5}-1\).

**Note:** We have redacted the annual information on customers’ share of gains or losses because this information could be used to derive SDP’s energy contract prices, which are commercial in confidence. Numbers may not add due to rounding.

**Data source:** RBA, Non-financial corporate BBB-rated bonds, Yield, 3 year target tenor. Series ID: FNFYBBB3M. IPART analysis.

\(^ {171} \) SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 47.
We have found no evidence of manifest imprudence in SDP’s management of surplus energy

According to our 2012 Methodology Paper, SDP must act to minimise its exposure to losses on the resale of surplus electricity and RECs. In the case of any ‘manifest imprudence’ that may arise on the part of SDP, we may exclude the affected transactions (in whole or in part) from the energy adjustment mechanism.\(^\text{172}\)

Over the review period 2012-13 to 2015-16, SDP has:
\(\checkmark\) taken the spot market price for its surplus electricity, and
\(\checkmark\) gradually released its surplus RECs into the market at the prevailing market price.

With the assistance of our energy consultants, Marsden Jacob, we reviewed SDP’s energy trading policy and activity and consider there is no evidence of manifest imprudence in SDP’s management of its surplus energy over the review period. We have therefore included all of SDP’s surplus energy transactions over the review period in the energy adjustment mechanism.

In response to our Issues Paper, Sydney Water suggested SDP could have more actively traded its surplus energy contracts, which would have reduced the losses passed on to Sydney Water’s customers under the EnAM.\(^\text{173}\) In our 2017 Methodology Paper, we have decided to enhance SDP’s incentives to prudently manage its surplus energy over the 2017 determination period. Specifically, we propose to:
\(\checkmark\) Increase SDP’s share of gains and losses outside the core band to provide SDP with a larger share of any gains it is able to achieve on the resale of its surplus energy.\(^\text{174}\)
\(\checkmark\) Modify the prudence test from a test of ‘no manifest imprudence’ to a general test of ‘the prudence of SDP’s energy trading policy and activity’.\(^\text{175}\)

Going forward, in applying this new test, IPART would need to assess whether SDP’s approach to managing energy is prudent. Box 6.1 in Chapter 6 outlines our general approach to efficiency and prudence tests for expenditure. We note that our approach to assessing the prudency of SDP’s surplus energy management will be tailored to the factors

\(^\text{173}\) Sydney Water submission to IPART Issues Paper, November 2016, pp 44-46.
\(^\text{175}\) IPART, 2017 Methodology Paper - SDP, June 2017, pp 41-42.
relevant to this activity. The 2017 Methodology Paper includes a discussion on how we intend to assess the prudency of SDP’s surplus energy management at the next review.\textsuperscript{176} We have accepted an amount equivalent to SDP’s proposed energy trading costs of $0.52 million over the 2017 determination period to allow SDP to meet the strengthened prudency test.\textsuperscript{177} This additional funding is not part of the EnAM allowance. Rather, we have included this additional funding in SDP’s general operating expenditure allowance.

We note that in providing this additional funding, we are not prescribing how SDP should manage its surplus energy nor are we endorsing the trading strategies outlined in SDP’s submission to our Draft Report (including its submission of a consultant report by Seed Advisory on energy trading). We will assess prudency at the next review and, as part of our prudency assessment, we will request that SDP demonstrate how it has prudently managed its surplus energy contracts. The 2017 Methodology Paper includes further discussion on our decision to provide additional funding to complement the strengthened prudency test.\textsuperscript{178}

Subject to some modifications, we have followed our Methodology Paper to calculate EnAM allowances

The 2012 Methodology Paper states that we will account for financing costs through the EnAM. However, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) corporate bond series identified in the 2012 Methodology Paper to undertake this process is no longer available.\textsuperscript{179}

To address this issue, we decided to use a substitute RBA 3-year corporate bond series to calculate a present value of losses incurred over 2012-13 to 2015-16 to be passed through by the EnAM. We then used the most recent 12 months of this substitute series (adjusted to remove forecast inflation) to calculate annual EnAM allowances for the 2017 determination period. Box 5.1 provides more detail on the approach we undertook.

Our energy consultant, Marsden Jacob, reviewed and confirmed the accuracy of SDP’s EnAM calculations and supporting information.\textsuperscript{180}

\textsuperscript{176} IPART, 2017 Methodology Paper - SDP, June 2017, pp 41-42.
\textsuperscript{178} IPART, 2017 Methodology Paper - SDP, June 2017, p 42.
\textsuperscript{179} The Methodology Paper goes on to say that we will use the average of the corporate bond yield (with 1 to 5 years to maturity; BBB bond credit rating) at the end of each quarter of the year as published by the Reserve Bank of Australia.” IPART, Efficiency and Energy Adjustment Mechanisms, Methodology Paper, April 2012, p 25.
\textsuperscript{180} Marsden Jacob, Energy Review – SDP, February 2017, pp 54-57.
Box 5.1 Steps in applying financing costs and calculating EnAM allowances

The following three steps show the process we adopted in arriving at our final EnAM allowances for the 2017 determination period (we provide illustrative examples under each step):

1. The customers’ share of gains and losses for each year of the application period (assumed to be mid-year values) are escalated to a present value in the review year (assumed to be an end of year value for the review year). For example, the customers’ share of gain or loss in 2012-13 (mid-year) will be escalated forward four and a half years to 2016-17 (end of year).

2. An annuity is calculated over the 2017 determination period. The cash flows of this annuity (calculated as end of year values) are set such that the present value of the annuity as of 2016-17 (end of year) is equal to the present value of the customers’ share of gains and losses as of 2016-17 (end of year).

3. The cash flows of the annuity (end of year values) are each discounted back six months to arrive at EAM allowances (mid-year values).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2012-13</th>
<th>2013-14</th>
<th>2014-15</th>
<th>2015-16</th>
<th>2016-17</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Customer share excl. financing costs (mid-year)</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual financing costs (nominal)</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 months of financing costs (nominal)</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customer share incl. financing costs (end-of-year)</td>
<td>$116</td>
<td>$115</td>
<td>$116</td>
<td>$106</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.4.2 Allowances for the efficiency adjustment mechanism

We have made a decision to:

21 Include an efficiency carryover of $51,100 per annum for the first three years of the 2017 determination period based on applying the 2012 EfAM methodology.

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181 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 76.

IPART  Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd
SDP proposed to include $50,000 in its annual revenue requirement for the first three years of the 2017 determination period under the EfAM.\footnote{SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 65 and information submitted to IPART (communication with SDP, 2 December 2016).} This efficiency gain reflects a reduction in insurance costs borne by SDP for its operator, Veolia.

We have decided to include this efficiency saving as part of the EfAM and apply it over the first three years of the 2017 determination period. The carryover period specified by the Terms of Reference for the EfAM is four years following the year in which the saving was achieved (ie, five consecutive years). The efficiency saving identified by SDP was achieved in 2015-16, which is the penultimate year of the 2012 determination period. By allowing SDP to retain this efficiency saving for the first three years of the 2017 determination period, SDP will have retained the saving for five consecutive years before the saving is passed on to customers through lower regulated prices from year four of the 2017 determination period.

While this efficiency saving relates to SDP uncovering a double counting of insurance costs, we consider this pass-through meets the objectives of the EfAM, by providing SDP with an incentive to identify and remove inefficiencies.

In response to our Draft Report, SDP accepted our EfAM allowance. Since the Draft Report we have inflated the $50,000 efficiency saving that was first achieved in 2015-16 from $2015-16 to $2016-17. This results in a small increase in the EfAM allowance from $50,000 per year to $51,100 per year.

Unlike the EnAM allowance, the EfAM allowance has a very minor impact on SDP’s NRR and prices over the first three years of the 2017 determination period.
6 Expenditure review

This chapter sets out our assessment of SDP’s efficient level of expenditure over the 2017 determination period.

In making our decisions, we engaged Atkins Cardno to review the efficiency of SDP’s proposed operating expenditure over the 2017 determination period. We asked Atkins Cardno to recommend any further efficiency savings that SDP should be able to achieve. In developing its recommendations, Atkins Cardno took into account international experience of desalination plants in shutdown modes and the effects of these long-term shutdowns on technical reliability of the plan and Good Industry Practice.\(^\text{183}\)

We also assessed prudent and efficient capital expenditure over the 2012 determination period, to include into the opening RAB for the 2017 determination period. As with operating expenditure, we engaged Atkins Cardno to review SDP’s historical and forecast capital expenditure and make recommendations on the amount of capital expenditure that should be included in the RAB.

Under the building block method, there is no explicit allowance for capital expenditure in the NRR. Instead, the prudent and efficient capital expenditure is added to the RAB and recovered through the allowances for a return on assets and regulatory depreciation.

All expenditures presented in this chapter include our decisions on efficient energy costs, which are presented separately in Chapter 8. Atkins Cardno reviewed SDP’s efficient energy volumes in all operating modes. Efficient energy prices were reviewed by our energy consultant, Marsden Jacob. Therefore, all expenditure recommended by Atkins Cardno in this chapter includes Marsden Jacob’s recommended benchmark energy prices.

6.1 Review of historical capital expenditure over the 2012 determination period

We have made a decision to:

22 Include in the RAB over the 2012 determination period prudent and efficient capital expenditure for the plant and pipeline as set out in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2. Our decision accepts SDP’s proposed costs.

Our decisions on capital expenditure reflect our assessment of the efficient and prudent expenditure on capital works that should be included in the RAB, and hence recovered through prices. To decide how much capital expenditure is added to the RAB, we applied a prudence and efficiency test to SDP’s actual capital expenditure over the 2012 determination period against the criteria in Box 6.1.

**Box 6.1 Efficiency test and prudence test**

**Efficiency test**

In reviewing expenditure, the efficiency test is used to set how much of SDP’s proposed expenditure (operating and capital) for the 2017 determination period will go into our determination of SDP’s revenue requirement. The efficiency test should examine whether SDP’s actual and proposed expenditure represents the best and most cost effective way of delivering the monopoly services.

The efficiency test examines whether the proposed capital expenditure represents the best way of meeting customers’ needs (over the life of the asset), subject to the utility’s regulatory requirements.

**Prudence test**

The prudence test assesses whether the decision to invest in an asset is one that SDP, acting prudently, would be expected to make in the circumstances existing at the time. The test assesses both:

- the prudence of how the decision was made to invest, and
- the prudence of how the investment was executed (i.e., the construction or delivery of the asset), having regard to information available at the time.

In making our decisions, we drew upon the findings of our expenditure consultant, Atkins Cardno. Atkins Cardno found SDP’s past capital expenditure over the 2012 determination period to be prudent and efficient. Most of the expenditure related to the replacement of the backup electricity supply, and was within the allowed capital expenditure of $1.7 million for the 2012 determination period. Atkins Cardno recommended including $1.2 million of prudent and efficient capital expenditure between 2012-13 and 2016-17 in the plant’s RAB.

Our decision on prudent and efficient capital expenditure over the 2012 determination period is presented in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2. Stakeholders did not comment on this issue.

**Table 6.1 Prudent and efficient past capital expenditure – plant and corporate ($million, $2016-17)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SDP actual</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPART decision</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Table 6.2 Prudent and efficient past capital expenditure - pipeline ($million, $2016-17)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SDP actual</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPART decision</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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6.2 Review of forecast expenditure over the 2017 determination period

Atkins Cardno assessed SDP’s proposed operating and capital expenditure for the plant and pipeline assets over the 2017 determination period. As noted above, we have updated Atkins Cardno’s recommended expenditure to include Marsden Jacob’s recommended final benchmark energy prices.

Over the five years of the 2017 determination period, Atkins Cardno\(^{185}\) recommended the following adjustments in plant operating costs:

- In *water security (shutdown) mode*, a reduction of $38 million or 31% (from SDP’s proposed $121.9 million to Atkins Cardno’s recommended $83.9 million).
- In *plant operation mode*, a reduction of $41.8 million or 9% (from SDP’s proposed $480.8 million to Atkins Cardno’s recommended $438.9 million).

Many of the reductions in operating costs are due to Atkins Cardno reclassifying these costs as capital expenditure (i.e., capitalising SDP’s proposed periodic maintenance costs and ongoing membrane replacement costs subject to a prudence and efficiency review). This means that Atkins Cardno’s recommended capital costs for the plant are higher than those proposed by SDP over the 2017 determination period.

Unlike the plant, pipeline expenditure does not vary by mode of operation. Atkins Cardno accepted SDP’s forecast capital and operating expenditure costs for the pipeline.

SDP also incurs one-off operating costs when the plant transitions to and from shutdown. For these costs, Atkins Cardno recommended:

- In *transition to restart*, a reduction of $26.9 million or 68% (from SDP’s proposed average restart charge of $39.3 million to Atkins Cardno’s recommended average charge of $12.4 million).
- In *transition to shutdown*, no adjustment (Atkins Cardno accepted SDP’s proposed $1.7 million one-off charge).

We have accepted Atkins Cardno’s recommendations in full. Further to Atkins Cardno’s recommendations, we have made additional allowances for SDP’s insurance-related costs. We have also allowed for energy trading costs related to the Energy Adjustment Mechanism (EAM) in the 2017 determination period. These costs were not reviewed by Atkins Cardno. Below we present our decisions compared to SDP’s proposed expenditure by mode. In the following chapter, we explain in detail the key expenditure adjustments and respond to SDP’s submission to our Draft Report.

\(^{185}\) All Atkins Cardno recommended expenditure in this chapter includes Marsden Jacob’s recommended benchmark energy prices. Therefore, the values reported in this chapter cannot be directly sourced from the public version of Atkins Cardno report.
6.3 Plant operating expenditure - water security (shutdown) mode

We have made a decision to:

23 Set the efficient level of SDP’s operating expenditure (plant and corporate) in water security (shutdown) mode as outlined in Table 6.3. Our decision is $34.3 million (or 28%) lower than SDP’s proposed costs.

SDP proposed $121.9 million in total operating costs in shutdown over the 2017 determination period.186 This includes energy costs, as well as $42.0 million in corporate costs.187

Atkins Cardno recommended $83.9 million in operating costs in water security shutdown (including energy costs). This is a reduction of $38 million (or 31%), from SDP’s proposal and includes the following adjustments:

- excluding SDP’s proposed plant testing costs
- efficiency adjustment to corporate costs
- capitalising periodic maintenance subject to a prudence and efficiency review
- efficiency adjustments for labour and other fixed costs, and
- efficiency adjustments to maintenance of the deferred new pump for the drinking water pumping station.188

We accepted our consultant’s recommendations. Further to Atkins Cardno’s recommendations, we have made additional allowances for SDP’s insurance-related costs. We have also allowed for energy trading costs in the 2017 determination period. Our decision on SDP’s efficient operating costs in water security (shutdown) mode is presented in Table 6.3 below.

Table 6.3 Efficient fixed operating costs in water security (shutdown) mode - including energy ($million, $2016-17)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2017-18</th>
<th>2018-19</th>
<th>2019-20</th>
<th>2020-21</th>
<th>2021-22</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SDP proposed</td>
<td>18.49</td>
<td>21.11</td>
<td>21.30</td>
<td>30.92</td>
<td>30.09</td>
<td>121.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPART draft decision</td>
<td>16.91</td>
<td>16.88</td>
<td>16.79</td>
<td>16.44</td>
<td>16.17</td>
<td>83.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP submission to Draft Reporta</td>
<td>17.85</td>
<td>18.09</td>
<td>18.07</td>
<td>18.50</td>
<td>18.04</td>
<td>90.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPART decision</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>17.82</td>
<td>17.73</td>
<td>17.15</td>
<td>16.91</td>
<td>87.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This includes an additional $3.7 million in insurance-related operating costs proposed by SDP in supplementary submissions that we received after SDP’s submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017.

Note: Operating costs include fixed and variable energy costs discussed in Chapter 8. They exclude pipeline costs.


186 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 57.
187 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 68.
In its submission to our Draft Report, SDP accepted many of Atkins Cardno’s recommendations, including disallowing the partial plant testing costs.\(^{189}\) Sydney Water supported our consultant’s recommendations in the Draft Report.\(^{190}\)

However, SDP did contest the efficiencies applied to its corporate costs and labour and other fixed plant O&M costs.\(^{191}\) Atkins Cardno reviewed SDP’s submission and maintained all its recommendations, except for corporate costs (base year adjustment and efficiency factor).\(^{192}\) Atkins Cardno recommended reinstating about $0.5 million in corporate costs over the 5-year determination period, compared to our draft decision.\(^{193}\)

Between our draft and final decisions, we have also allowed the following additional corporate costs:

- $0.5 million over the 5-year determination period for SDP to undertake energy trading to manage its surplus energy under the updated mechanisms in the 2017 Methodology Paper (outlined in Chapter 5), and
- $3.2 million over the 5-year determination period of additional insurance costs for SDP to manage our abatement mechanism.

We explain these adjustments in further detail in Chapter 7.

### 6.4 Plant operating expenditure - operation mode

We have made a decision to:

24 Set the efficient level of SDP’s operating expenditure (plant and corporate) in plant operation mode as outlined in Table 6.4. Our decision is $38.4 million (or 8%) lower than SDP’s proposed costs.

Over the 2017 determination period, SDP proposed $480.8 million in operating costs in plant operation mode (including energy costs).\(^{194}\) Compared to the 2012 Determination, this included an increase in plant O&M costs of $15.8 million, driven by:

- additional asset maintenance ($13.3 million), and
- changes in key input costs (eg, chemicals) ($3.2 million).\(^{195}\)

SDP’s proposed costs also include $46.2 million in corporate costs in plant operation mode over the 2017 determination period.\(^{196}\)

Atkins Cardno recommended $438.9 million in operating costs in plant operation mode over the 2017 determination period (including energy costs). This included reductions of $41.8 million (or 9%), from SDP’s proposed $480.8 million.\(^{197}\)

\(^{189}\) SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 39.
\(^{190}\) Sydney Water submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 6.
\(^{191}\) SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 39.
\(^{193}\) Atkins Cardno, Supplementary Expenditure Review – SDP, May 2017, p 15.
\(^{194}\) SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 57.
\(^{195}\) SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 75.
\(^{196}\) SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 69.
\(^{197}\) Atkins Cardno, Expenditure Review – SDP, February 2017, p 45 and Chapter 8.
The recommended adjustments include:

- capitalising periodic maintenance subject to a prudence and efficiency review
- removing ongoing membrane replacement costs
- a reduction in variable costs for chemicals
- an efficiency adjustment to corporate costs, and
- efficiency adjustments to maintenance of the deferred new pump for the drinking water pumping station.

We accepted our consultant’s recommendations. Further to Atkins Cardno’s recommendations, we have made additional allowances for SDP’s insurance-related costs. Our decision on SDP’s efficient operating costs in plant operation mode is presented in Table 6.4 below.

**Table 6.4 Efficient operating costs in plant operation mode - including energy**  
($million, $2016-17)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2017-18</th>
<th>2018-19</th>
<th>2019-20</th>
<th>2020-21</th>
<th>2021-22</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SDP proposed</td>
<td>95.92</td>
<td>95.90</td>
<td>95.94</td>
<td>96.38</td>
<td>96.63</td>
<td>480.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPART draft decision</td>
<td>87.13</td>
<td>85.91</td>
<td>84.62</td>
<td>83.84</td>
<td>83.95</td>
<td>425.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fixed operating costs</td>
<td>24.72</td>
<td>24.85</td>
<td>24.78</td>
<td>24.33</td>
<td>24.54</td>
<td>123.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>variable operating costs</td>
<td>62.41</td>
<td>61.07</td>
<td>59.84</td>
<td>59.51</td>
<td>59.41</td>
<td>302.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP submission to Draft Report</td>
<td>81.17</td>
<td>81.52</td>
<td>81.56</td>
<td>81.68</td>
<td>81.55</td>
<td>407.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPART decision</td>
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<td>85.50</td>
<td>82.00</td>
<td>81.26</td>
<td>442.34</td>
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<tr>
<td>fixed operating costs</td>
<td>25.80</td>
<td>25.76</td>
<td>25.67</td>
<td>24.96</td>
<td>25.19</td>
<td>127.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>variable operating costs</td>
<td>76.77</td>
<td>65.24</td>
<td>59.83</td>
<td>57.04</td>
<td>56.07</td>
<td>314.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This includes an additional $2.9 million in insurance-related operating costs proposed by SDP in supplementary submissions that we received after SDP’s submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017.


In its submission to our Draft Report, SDP accepted many of Atkins Cardno’s recommendations in plant operation mode, including:

- removing ongoing membrane replacement costs (due to our decision to allow capital expenditure for full replacement of membranes on restart)
- capitalising periodic maintenance costs
- a reduction in variable costs for chemicals, and
- deferral of the new pump for the drinking water pumping station.198

Sydney Water also supported our consultant’s recommendations in the Draft Report.199

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However, SDP again contested the efficiencies applied to its corporate costs and labour and other fixed plant O&M costs. As noted above, Atkins Cardno revised its efficiency target and recommended reinstating about $0.5 million to corporate costs.

We explain these adjustments in further detail in Chapter 7.

### 6.5 Plant capital costs - all modes of operation

We have made a decision to:

- Include in the RAB the forecast capital expenditure for the plant as outlined in Table 6.5 over the 2017 determination period. Our allowance is $12 million (or 484%) higher than SDP’s total proposed costs.

SDP proposed total capital expenditure of $2.5 million over the 2017 determination period. This is higher than the $1.7 million capital expenditure allowed in the 2012 Determination.

SDP’s proposed expenditure mainly related to the installation of an additional pump in the plant’s Drinking Water Pumping Station (DWPS). SDP was seeking some redundancy in delivery pump capacity to ensure water security and the ability to sustain supply in line with the plant’s design parameters of 266 ML per day at 94% availability.

Atkins Cardno recommended $14.5 million in capital costs over the 2017 determination period. This is $12 million (or 484%) higher than SDP’s total proposed costs. The recommended adjustments include:

- deferring the cost of installing the additional pump in the DWPS, and review it ex-post rather than build it into water security capital expenditure, and
- capitalising expenditure on periodic maintenance, excluding the costs associated with defective hoses that should be replaced by warranty.

These recommendations were supported by Sydney Water.

In its submission to our Draft Report, SDP agreed to capitalising expenditure on periodic maintenance and the deferral of expenditure on the additional drinking water pump. However, SDP disagreed with Atkins Cardno’s adjustment to remove $3 million associated with the replacement of permeate hoses. SDP argued that hoses needed to be replaced due to general wear and tear, which was not covered by warranty.

SDP also proposed additional capital expenditure for a membrane testing kit (a ‘skid test’ unit) to carry out high pressure testing of the membrane condition in situ. Its proposed

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202 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 104.
203 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 105.
206 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, pp 46, 60.
207 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 61.
capital expenditure of $1 million was accompanied by additional operating expenditure to maintain the membrane testing unit ($0.15 million per year).\textsuperscript{208}

Atkins Cardno reviewed SDP’s submission and maintained its recommendation on prudent and efficient capital costs.\textsuperscript{209} We accepted our consultant’s recommendation. A summary of Atkins Cardno’s recommendations and our decision on SDP’s prudent and efficient capital expenditure in shutdown and plant operation modes is presented in Table 6.5 below. The adjustments applied to capital costs are also discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.

Table 6.5 Plant and corporate capital expenditure over the 2017 determination period – all modes ($million, $2016-17)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2017-18</th>
<th>2018-19</th>
<th>2019-20</th>
<th>2020-21</th>
<th>2021-22</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>SDP proposed</td>
<td>0.32</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>2.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPART draft decision</td>
<td>1.53</td>
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<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>14.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP submission to Draft Report</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>18.47</td>
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<td>IPART decision</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>14.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


6.6 Pipeline operating and capital costs - all modes of operation

We have made a decision to:

26 Set forecast capital and operating expenditure over the 2017 determination period for the pipeline as outlined in Table 6.6. Our decision accepts SDP’s proposed costs.

Atkins Cardno made no adjustment to SDP’s proposed pipeline operating costs of $1.6 million over the 2017 determination period.\textsuperscript{210} SDP proposed no capital expenditure on pipeline, which Atkins Cardno accepted.\textsuperscript{211}

We accept our consultant’s recommendations and accordingly SDP’s proposed pipeline expenditure presented in Table 6.6 below.

Table 6.6 Pipeline expenditure over the 2017 determination period - all modes ($million, $2016-17)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2017-18</th>
<th>2018-19</th>
<th>2019-20</th>
<th>2020-21</th>
<th>2021-22</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SDP proposed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipeline operating costs</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipeline capital costs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPART decision</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipeline operating costs</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipeline capital costs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{208} SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, pp 56 and 81.
\textsuperscript{210} SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 58.
\textsuperscript{211} Atkins Cardno, Expenditure Review – SDP, February 2017, pp 9, 11-12.
6.7 Transition to restart one-off operating costs

We have made a decision to:

27 Set the efficient level of SDP’s one-off operating expenditure (including energy) to transition to restart as outlined in Table 6.7. Our decision is on average $26.9 million (or 68%) lower than SDP’s average proposed costs.

SDP proposed a six-fold increase in the one-off transition costs to restart the plant from water security (shutdown) mode, compared to the allowance of $6.1 million in the 2012 determination period. SDP’s proposed increase was mainly due to costs it considered were not accounted for over the 2012 determination period, such as:

- partial replacement of membranes (average $21.7 million)
- energy costs
- additional maintenance costs, and
- pipeline flushing costs ($0.6 million).

These one-off costs range between $37.3 to $41.0 million per event, depending on the year of the restart during the 2017 determination period.

Our decision, including energy costs, results in a reduction of $26.9 million (or 68%), from SDP’s proposed average transition to restart charge of $39.3 million. Some of this reduction is driven by Atkins Cardno’s recommendations to:

- capitalise full membrane replacement costs, and
- apply efficiency adjustments to chemical costs.

A significant proportion of the reduction, however, is due to what we have decided as appropriate ‘fixed’ energy costs to recover through the transition charge (ie, unrelated to production and supply of drinking water). In its submission to our Draft Report, SDP maintained that all the volume of energy it proposed in restart excludes any energy associated with the production of water. We discuss the energy component of the one-off operating costs incurred by SDP on restart in further detail in Chapter 8, including our adjustments to these volumes.

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212 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 70.
213 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 70.
214 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 40.
Our decision on SDP’s efficient one-off transition to restart costs is presented in Table 6.7 below.

### Table 6.7 One-off operating costs of transition to restart - including energy ($million, $2016-17)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2017-18</th>
<th>2018-19</th>
<th>2019-20</th>
<th>2020-21</th>
<th>2021-22</th>
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<td>39.37</td>
<td>40.23</td>
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<td>9.49</td>
<td>9.48</td>
<td>9.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP submission to Draft Report</td>
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<td>17.38</td>
<td>17.38</td>
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<td>12.65</td>
<td>12.03</td>
<td>11.74</td>
<td>11.62</td>
<td>12.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Total operating costs include energy costs discussed in Chapter 8.

### 6.8 Transition to shutdown one-off operating costs

We have made a decision to:

28 Set the efficient level of SDP’s one-off operating expenditure (including energy) to transition to shutdown as outlined in Table 6.8. Our decision accepts SDP’s proposed costs.

SDP proposed no increase to the current allowance for transitioning to shutdown of $1.7 million per event. 215

Atkins Cardno reviewed activities associated with shutting the plant down from plant operation mode into water security (shutdown) mode. It found that most of the costs are associated with flushing and cleaning of the reverse osmosis trains, feed pumps, post-treatment plant and pre-treatment plant, and capping the sea intake and outfall outlets. Atkins Cardno reviewed the input costs related to these activities, and found SDP’s proposed costs to be efficient, proposing no further adjustments.216

We accepted our consultant’s recommendations. The summary of Atkins Cardno’s recommendations and our decision on SDP’s efficient one-off transition to shutdown costs are presented in Table 6.8 below. There is no change from our draft decision on transition to shutdown costs.

### Table 6.8 One-off operating costs of transition to shutdown ($million, $2016-17)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>1.69</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPART decision</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>1.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


215 SDP pricing proposal to IPART - Appendices, October 2016, p 59.
7 Key expenditure adjustments over the 2017 determination period

In this chapter, we outline the key adjustments underpinning our expenditure decisions presented in Chapter 6. These adjustments are all based on the recommendations of our consultant, Atkins Cardno’s, and include:

- excluding SDP’s proposed plant testing costs
- capitalising a full membrane replacement on first restart
- capitalising periodic maintenance costs
- reducing SDP’s proposed chemical costs
- adjustments for labour and other fixed costs
- efficiency adjustment to corporate costs, and
- deferring expenditure on a new pump for the drinking water pumping station and skid unit test.217

In addition, we discuss our treatment of costs related to damage caused to the plant by the December 2015 storm event, and our decisions relating to SDP’s efficient insurance costs, particularly in relation to Industrial and Special Risks (ISR) policies. These costs were not reviewed by Atkins Cardno.

7.1 Exclusion of partial plant test in water security (shutdown) mode

SDP proposed a partial plant test to manage the operational risks associated with an extended period of water security (shutdown) mode. According to SDP, such a test would only be required once during the 2017 determination period.218

A key purpose of the partial plant test proposed in SDP’s submission is to assess the performance of the existing Reverse Osmosis (RO) membranes after many years under chemical preservation. If the restart occurs in the year 2019-20, SDP requested funding for the replacement of 62.8% of the existing membranes and replacement of the further 21.6% during the first two years of operation.219

Atkins Cardno recommended removal of costs of SDP’s proposed partial plant test ($17.5 million) from operating expenditure in water security mode.220 Atkins Cardno considered that an alternative and efficient option is to replace all the RO membranes on full restart.221

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218 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, pp 72-73.
Atkins Cardno viewed an ex-ante partial plant test to assess membrane condition as redundant because it would not remove the need to replace membranes at the next restart. The testing of the membranes against performance specification to ascertain performance does not need a partial plant test because all the RO membranes can be funded to be replaced for the full restart. According to Atkins Cardno, the replacement of all the RO membranes with new RO membranes should ensure that the plant meets its drinking water quality obligations.

Atkins Cardno noted that an 8-month period to restart the plant provides SDP with sufficient time to procure new membranes and address any residual vulnerability in the plant and equipment. An 8-month period to recommission the plant is similar to the time allowed for new plant commissioning and performance testing of newly constructed large desalination plants.

In its submission to our Draft Report, SDP agreed with Atkins Cardno’s rationale for disallowing expenditure on a partial plant test over the 2017 determination period. However, SDP maintained that the plant would nevertheless need testing in future price periods, because:

- the plant would be in full operation less frequently under the 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan rules, and
- financial penalties under the abatement mechanism would apply if SDP does not attain 100% output within eight months of entering a drought.

While our decision only affects the 2017 determination period, Atkins Cardno also noted that carrying out a partial plant test to provide SDP with confidence in the mechanical and electrical integrity of the plant is not justified. Atkins Cardno cited the following reasons:

- The plant was fully commissioned and operated for a two year proving period which should have identified and remedied the typical new plant equipment supplier and constructor defects.
- The plant pumps, and actuated valves and major drives are regularly turned by hand except for the high pressure pumps.
- All of the high pressure pumps have been fully refurbished by the supplier.

Further, Atkins Cardno noted that the operator ensures that the mechanical, electrical and civil, and safety assets all undergo regular inspection with routine and periodic maintenance which should enable the design lives to be achieved. Therefore, continuing to apply good asset management processes should reduce the risk of any major issues on restart. Atkins Cardno has recommended sufficient allowances to ensure that all plant equipment can be well maintained and regularly serviced.

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228 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 46.
Sydney Water also supported our decision to exclude costs associated with the partial plant test in the 2017 determination period. In principle, Sydney Water supported that testing costs should be borne by all customers, but it considered testing in the 2017 determination period would form part of the insurance claim.

### 7.2 Capitalising a full membrane replacement on first restart

We have made a decision to:

- Set SDP’s prudent and efficient capital expenditure at $30 million for a full membrane replacement on the first restart in the 2017 determination period. These costs would be payable at most once in the 2017 determination period. For clarity, this includes a restart:
  - triggered by drought response, or
  - discretionary use of the plant by third-party customers outside drought.

- Not provide any further allowances for the ongoing replacement of membranes in the 2017 determination period.

In its October 2016 submission, SDP proposed to include an average of $21.7 million covering partial replacement of membranes on a restart during the 2017 determination period. This amount was included in SDP’s proposed one-off transition to restart costs (ie, as an operating cost). SDP also proposed additional expenditure for ongoing membrane replacement costs if the plant operates. Atkins Cardno estimated that SDP’s proposed membrane replacement program would provide for replacement of 62.8% of membranes on restart and a further 21.6% over two years of operation. In total, SDP’s proposed costs would provide for replacement of about 84.4% of all membranes over the two years of operation following a restart in 2019-20.

Atkins Cardno reviewed SDP’s proposed membrane replacement program and found it inefficient. By the time of restart, the existing membranes would be past their guaranteed asset life and their performance would be uncertain. Atkins Cardno instead recommended providing for a full membrane replacement at first restart ($30 million).

Atkins Cardno also recommended that these costs be capitalised. It indicated that the Australian Accounting Standard AASB 116 definition of capital expenditure supports the capitalisation of periodic maintenance payments and membranes. This standard indicates that capital expenditure is that which is expected to generate benefits over more than a year. As membranes fall within this definition, Atkins Cardno recommended they be capitalised.

We recognise that membrane replacement costs are critical to the plant’s production and supply of any desalinated water. This is why we have accepted Atkins Cardno’s recommendation to include the prudent and efficient costs of full membrane replacement in

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232 Sydney Water submission to IPART Issues Paper, November 2016, p 35.
233 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 70.
the allowed capital expenditure on first restart in the 2017 determination period.\textsuperscript{237} Moreover, we note that if SDP experiences operational issues due to faulty membranes over the 2017 determination period, it should be covered by the manufacturer’s warranty.

We will review actual membrane replacement costs, if the plant is triggered to restart in the 2017 determination period, at the next price review. We discuss this expenditure in Chapter 12. Below we outline Atkins Cardno’s reasons for recommending a full membrane replacement at first restart in further detail.

7.2.1 Provision of full membrane replacement, given their existing age

No provision was made in our 2012 Determination for any membrane replacement costs in shutdown. The plant has been in water security (shutdown) mode since 1 July 2012. The membranes were installed before commissioning of the plant in 2010.

Early in the 2017 determination period, the stock of membranes will be reaching the end of its asset life (eight years). The manufacturer extends warranty on membrane conditions if membranes are preserved in shutdown using the agreed protocol. SDP has been following the agreed protocol for membrane storage.\textsuperscript{238} Atkins Cardno noted that even following the storage protocol, the condition of the membranes cannot be ascertained past the guaranteed eight years.\textsuperscript{239}

Atkins Cardno envisaged SDP’s first restart in its drought response role, triggered by dam levels falling below the threshold prescribed by the Metropolitan Water Plant (currently 60%). It considered that within a restart period SDP can procure membranes, carry out essential asset replacement, recruit and train additional operators and test the individual processes and the complete works. Atkins Cardno considered that the 8-month duration was sufficient to restart from a prolonged water security shutdown, including ordering membranes and full plant testing.\textsuperscript{240}

To calculate the efficient costs of a full membrane replacement, Atkins Cardno established a ‘supplied to SDP’s site’ benchmark unit cost for membranes, and applied a further allowance for installation, spares, and membrane disposal.\textsuperscript{241}

Providing the plant with full membrane replacement on first restart eliminates the need for the partial plant test in water security shutdown mode, ensuring operating cost savings in water security shutdown mode.

7.2.2 No provision for ongoing replacement of membranes during the 2017 determination period

A full membrane replacement on first restart allows further removal of costs associated with ongoing membrane replacement from SDP’s proposed operating costs in plant operation.

\textsuperscript{237} Atkins Cardno, Expenditure Review – SDP, February 2017, p 65.
\textsuperscript{238} Atkins Cardno, Expenditure Review – SDP, February 2017, p 64.
\textsuperscript{239} Atkins Cardno, Expenditure Review – SDP, February 2017, p 64.
\textsuperscript{240} Atkins Cardno, Expenditure Review – SDP, February 2017, p 23.
\textsuperscript{241} Atkins Cardno, Expenditure Review – SDP, February 2017, p 66.
mode, without any additional capital expenditure provision during the 2017 determination period.\(^{242}\)

Atkins Cardno’s proposed approach to membrane replacement in restart and plant operation modes results in cost savings over the 2017 determination period in all modes, irrespective of the year in restart.\(^{243}\)

### 7.2.3 Stakeholder views on membrane replacement costs

In its submission to our Draft Report, SDP accepted our draft decision to provide full membrane replacement on the first restart in the 2017 determination period, and capitalise these costs.\(^{244}\) It also accepted our draft decision not to provide additional capital expenditure for ongoing membrane replacement in plant operation mode.\(^{245}\)

However, SDP noted that capitalising membranes is not consistent with *Australian Accounting Standards*\(^{246}\). SDP also argued that a tax allowance should be included in the membrane service charge, given that these costs are capitalised and recovered independent of other service charges (discussed in detail in Chapter 12).

Atkins Cardno reviewed SDP’s submission to our Draft Report and maintained its recommendation to capitalise membranes. With warranted life of up to 8 years in full operation, Atkins Cardno considered that membranes clearly provide benefits over a number of years which is consistent with the definition of capital expenditure under accounting standards and should not be treated as operational consumables.\(^{247}\)

The draft decision to capitalise membranes was also supported by Sydney Water.\(^{248}\) Sydney Water queried, however, the likely process for on-going membrane replacement in future determination periods.\(^{249}\) In its submission to our Issues Paper, Sydney Water argued that a cost pass-through of the capitalisation of the efficient costs would be more appropriate.\(^{250}\)

We have maintained our draft decision to capitalise full membrane replacement on first restart as final. We agree with Atkins Cardno\(^{251}\) and consider that capitalisation of membrane replacement is preferable to a cost pass-through mechanism as this allows for additional scrutiny of the expenditure and provides a strong efficiency incentive to SDP. We outline the treatment of membrane replacement costs in Chapter 12 and the likely process for on-going membrane replacement in future determination periods.

\(^{244}\) SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 39.
\(^{245}\) SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 50.
\(^{246}\) SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 50.
\(^{248}\) Sydney Water submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 7.
\(^{249}\) Sydney Water submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 7.
\(^{250}\) Sydney Water submission to IPART Issues Paper, November 2016, p 37.
7.3 Capitalising periodic asset maintenance costs

SDP proposed to continue treating periodic asset maintenance costs as operating costs, as was the case under the 2012 Determination. Atkins Cardno, however, recommended the capitalisation of all periodic asset maintenance.

The recommended capital expenditure allowance for periodic maintenance over the 2017 determination period includes adjustments for defects under warranty. Much like membranes, Atkins Cardno considered these costs should be recognised as an asset consistent with *Australian Accounting Standards* because they generate benefits over more than one year. Prudent and efficient capital expenditure is the same in water security (shutdown) and plant operation modes.

Atkins Cardno found that unlike routine asset maintenance, periodic maintenance expenditure relates to significant expenditures involving replacement, renewal and/or refurbishment of items, which are proposed to take place on a cycle of multiple years. The inclusion of a ‘de-minimus’ threshold also reinforces the fact that it relates only to significant non-routine maintenance work and therefore the appropriateness of classifying periodic maintenance as capital expenditure.

In its submission to our Draft Report, SDP agreed with our draft decision to capitalise periodic maintenance. SDP also accepted setting the same level of efficient periodic maintenance costs in water security and plant operation modes, recognising that the new operating rules make it unlikely that SDP will be called into operation in the 2017 determination period. This draft decision was also supported by Sydney Water.

However, SDP again noted that capitalising periodic maintenance was not consistent with *Australian Accounting Standards*. SDP also disagreed with Atkins Cardno’s proposed adjustment to these costs to exclude $3 million for defective permeate hoses. SDP argued that hoses need to be replaced due to general wear and tear, which is not covered by warranty.

Atkins Cardno reviewed SDP’s submission to our Draft Report and maintained its recommendation on periodic maintenance as part of prudent and efficient capital costs. Atkins Cardno reviewed additional information provided by SDP and maintained its position that it is not normal to require such extensive replacement of permeate hoses so early in the life of the plant. Atkins Cardno maintained its recommendation that these items are material defects and should be covered by the plant operator’s warranties. Total recommended prudent and efficient capital expenditure is thus unchanged from our draft decision.

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252 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, pp 71 and 74.
256 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 60.
258 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 49.
259 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 81.
We have accepted our consultant’s recommendation and maintained our draft decision regarding periodic asset maintenance costs.

7.4 Lower chemical costs in plant operation mode and restart

Atkins Cardno recommended reductions in chemical costs in plant operation mode and in transition to restart, compared to SDP’s proposed costs.

Atkins Cardno used a bottom-up approach based on historical chemical usage data by the plant’s operator, and best practices in procurement to establish the efficient quantities and efficient unit cost of chemicals. A 5% procurement efficiency was applied to the cost of chemicals in plant operation mode and restart.²⁶²

In its submission to our Draft Report, SDP agreed with our draft decision on chemical costs.²⁶³ We have maintained this decision in setting final prices.

7.5 Adjustment to labour and other fixed costs

Atkins Cardno did not recommend efficiency adjustments to labour and other fixed costs in plant operation and restart modes, because:

- restart costs are associated with one-off activities which are not frequently repeated, so efficiencies are unlikely to be achieved within the same regulatory period, and
- in plant operation mode, there will need to be considerable time for the large number of new plant staff to be fully trained and experienced to ensure plant safety after a long period in water security mode.²⁶⁴

Atkins Cardno compared labour levels with desalination plants of similar design and output operating at full capacity. It concluded that SDP’s proposed level of labour levels and expenditure is reasonable given the need to have three shifts and standby maintenance because of the risk of reduced output.²⁶⁵

However, in water security (shutdown) mode, Atkins Cardno recommended a 2.5% per year cumulative efficiency adjustment to labour and other fixed costs from year 2 to 5 of the 2017 determination period, through improved productivity and innovation.²⁶⁶ This resulted in a reduction in SDP’s proposed costs.

In its submission to our Draft Report, SDP disagreed with the 2.5% per year efficiency target. Instead, SDP proposed a 0.25% per year cumulative adjustment to these costs.²⁶⁷ SDP argued that Atkins Cardno’s proposal:

- Was not supported with evidence that SDP base year costs were inefficient (scope for ‘catch-up’ efficiencies when compared to other comparable entities operating in similar environments).

²⁶³ SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 49.
²⁶⁴ Atkins Cardno, Expenditure Review – SDP, February 2017, pp 43 and 46.
Incorrectly assumed that “the likelihood of prolonged water security mode” would result in a negative change in labour costs despite the draft decision acknowledging the additional maintenance activity on site as the plant ages.\(^{268}\)

Atkins Cardno reviewed SDP’s submission to our Draft Report and maintained its recommendation on a 2.5% per year cumulative efficiency adjustment to labour and other fixed costs.\(^{269}\) Atkins Cardno stated that with the management resources SDP now has in place and the likelihood of a prolonged water security (shutdown) mode, there is an opportunity to set and achieve realistic efficiency targets through greater productivity and the application of innovation and new technology.

We agree with Atkins Cardno that the target is achievable due to the accumulated experience SDP (and its operator) has gained in water security (shutdown) mode and have accepted our consultant’s recommendation.

### 7.6 Efficiency targets applied to corporate costs in all modes

Our draft operating cost allowance included Atkins Cardno’s recommendation to apply a 0.75% per year cumulative efficiency adjustment to SDP’s proposed corporate expenditure in all modes. Atkins Cardno assessed that SDP should achieve and out-perform these efficiency targets through improved procurement, methods of working and innovation.\(^{270}\)

On that basis, Atkins Cardno recommended a $2.4 million reduction in corporate costs in water security (shutdown) and plant operation modes.\(^{271}\)

SDP was concerned the approach taken by Atkins Cardno to this aspect of its expenditure was related to future procurement savings which SDP had already obtained and factored into its forecast expenditure.\(^{272}\) In its submission to our Draft Report, SDP rejected the ‘catch-up’ component of the efficiency adjustment (0.5% per year), arguing that it was already on the frontier. SDP agreed, however, with the 0.25% per year ongoing efficiency factor applied to its corporate costs.\(^{273}\)

Atkins Cardno reviewed additional information provided by SDP on the components of corporate costs. Atkins Cardno concluded that there was a double counting of efficiencies by setting a lower base year cost and applying a catch-up efficiency. In its revised recommendation, Atkins Cardno:

- removed the 0.5% per year cumulative catch-up efficiency
- removed the one-off adjustment to cover SDP’s additional costs to prepare its pricing submission to the 2022 price review
- increased and smoothed the baseline corporate costs to allow SDP to manage the timing of this expenditure effectively, and

\(^{268}\) SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 39.


\(^{273}\) SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, pp 40-41.
removed corporate expenditure identified as related to energy trading, ancillary charges and forecasting.

In total, Atkins Cardno’s revised recommendation provided an additional $0.5 million for SDP’s efficient corporate costs over the 5-year determination period, in both water security (shutdown) and plant operation modes.\textsuperscript{274}

We have accepted our consultant’s recommendations. Further to Atkins Cardno’s recommendations, we have made additional allowances for SDP’s insurance-related costs. We have also allowed for energy trading costs in the 2017 determination period (an additional $0.5 million over the 5-year determination period). Corporate expenditure related to ancillary charges and forecasting, removed by Atkins Cardno from the recommended costs, were not included because:

- our benchmark energy price includes provisions for ancillary and market charges (see Chapter 8), and
- the provision we have made for energy trading renders forecasting expenditure redundant.

7.7 Ex-post efficiency review of drinking water pump and skid test unit

We have made a decision to:

31 Not include in the RAB the prudent and efficient capital costs of an extra drinking water pump ($2.1 million) and a skid test unit ($1 million) given the uncertainty in timing of this expenditure. Rather, these costs would be re-assessed for efficiency and included (with holding costs at WACC) at the next review of SDP prices.

SDP proposed capital expenditure for an additional drinking water pump. Atkins Cardno recognised the lack of standby capacity in SDP’s DWPS to deliver drinking water, presenting a risk to the reliability of supply. SDP proposed $2.1 million in capital expenditure to install an extra pump, to address this risk.\textsuperscript{275}

However, Atkins Cardno considered it prudent and efficient to defer the cost of installing the additional pump and review it ex-post rather than build it into water security (shutdown) mode capital expenditure for the 2017 determination period.\textsuperscript{276} It recommended removing $2.1 million capex from the prudent and efficient capital expenditure for the 2017 determination period. Due to the uncertainty of the need for and timing of any restart, it would be more appropriate to review the expenditure ex-post rather than to build it into water security capital costs for the 2017 determination period.

Atkins Cardno also recommended expenditure on portable skid test unit ($1 million) to carry out high pressure testing of the membrane conditions in situ. However, it considered it is only prudent to incur this cost in water security shutdown following the first restart for drought response in the 2017 determination period. A skid test unit is not required in the

\textsuperscript{275} SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 104.
current shutdown period, as a full replacement of membranes is recommended on the plant’s first restart in response to drought.\textsuperscript{277}

In our Draft Report, we agreed with Atkins Cardno and considered that these costs were not critical to the plant’s operations in its drought response role for the 2017 determination period, because:

\begin{itemize}
  \item There were two existing pumps with a guaranteed technical reliability parameter that were tested during plant technical proving period in 2010-2012, had been properly maintained during shutdown, and were highly unlikely to fail simultaneously.
  \item A skid test unit would only be prudent to procure in the next water security shutdown, as full membrane replacement recommended on first restart eliminated the need to test the condition of the existing membranes in the current shutdown.
\end{itemize}

In its submission to our Draft Report, SDP considered that capital expenditure for the 2017 determination period should include a provision for the membrane testing kit. It proposed capital expenditure of $1 million accompanied by additional operating expenditure in water security mode to maintain the skid test unit of about $0.15 million per year.\textsuperscript{278} SDP accepted, however, deferring the cost of installing the additional drinking water pump.\textsuperscript{279}

Atkins Cardno reviewed SDP’s submission and maintained that a portable skid test unit ($1 million) would be prudent to obtain when the plant shuts down following the first restart for drought response. A skid test unit is not required in the current shutdown period, as a full replacement of membranes is recommended on the plant’s first restart.\textsuperscript{280}

We accept our consultant’s recommendation not to include the prudent costs of a skid test unit and an extra pump in the allowed capital expenditure for the 2017 determination period.

We recognise the high degree of uncertainty associated with the timing of these costs if they eventuate, and the probability of these costs not eventuating at all during the 2017 determination period. Customers will save by not servicing the additional capital and operating costs until the benefits are likely to be realised.\textsuperscript{281} We have decided to include holding costs (based on our WACC decision) if any prudent capital expenditure on a skid test unit and an extra pump are incurred during the 2017 determination period, subject to the ex-post efficiency review, in the next price review.

\subsection*{7.8 Plant rebuild is fully insured}

The damage to the desalination plant as a result of the December 2015 storm event is fully covered by SDP’s insurance. Thus, there is no insurance ‘gap’. At the Public Hearing, SDP stated it was not intending to pass-through these costs to its customers, which updated the position it took in its pricing proposal.\textsuperscript{282}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{278} SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, pp 56 and 64.
\textsuperscript{279} SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 39.
\textsuperscript{280} Atkins Cardno, \textit{Supplementary Expenditure Review – SDP}, May 2017, p 22.
\textsuperscript{282} IPART, SDP public hearing transcript, 8 December 2016, p 43.
\end{flushright}
Our insurance consultants confirmed the view expressed by SDP at the Public Hearing. SDP has committed to having an operable plant by 13 December 2018, the date in the Agreed Reinstatement Plan that SDP has put in place with the NSW Government.

Because SDP’s insurance is covering the cost of repairs to the plant, there will be no change to the RAB or to asset lives. Our expenditure consultant has indicated that the insurance funded works for the December 2015 storm event will have a neutral effect on SDP’s RAB and asset lives. Much of the insurance funded capital expenditure is likely to be repair work (rather than asset replacement) or relate largely to civil assets which have less of an impact on future renewal requirements than replacement of shorter asset life items would have. This therefore limits the impact on future prudent and efficient expenditure.

We consider our expenditure consultant’s recommendation to be reasonable given that the purpose of the insurance cover (paid for through SDP’s prices) is largely to protect SDP and its customers from the effects of events such as this. Since the December 2015 storm event will not change the RAB or asset lives, it will not impact SDP’s prices (except to the extent that insurance premiums increase due to SDP having made a claim – see discussion below).

### 7.9 Efficient insurance costs

We have reviewed SDP’s Industrial and Special Risks (ISR) policies and premiums for the 2017 determination period. ISR insurance provides cover for physical loss or damage to SDP’s property as a result of, for example, fire, explosion, vandalism, weather perils, earthquake, or accidental damage. Typically, this policy covers the costs of replacement or reinstatement in the event of damage, and will also cover any resultant shortfall in revenue (ie, business interruption).

In our Draft Report, we questioned whether SDP’s insurance premiums should be based on the Maximum Foreseeable Loss (MFL) value for the plant or the total asset value of the plant. The MFL is the largest financial loss that SDP could experience when its property is harmed or destroyed by an adverse event such as a fire or earthquake.

Upon further research, we agree with SDP that the MFL is likely to be the total asset value of the plant for a single asset business. We infer the MFL in 2012 was reduced because SDP was owned at that time by Sydney Water.

SDP proposed an increase in its business interruption coverage from 36 to 60 months in response to our Draft Report. This increase is based on our changes to the abatement mechanism outlined in Chapter 3. Aon, SDP’s insurance broker, estimated the cost of this additional coverage to be approximately $1.1 million over the 2017 determination period.

We agree with SDP that changes to our abatement mechanism may require SDP to increase its insurance coverage. In the 2017 Determination, we have extended abatement to apply when SDP is required to operate the plant:

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283 IPART, SDP public hearing transcript, 8 December 2016, p 43.
284 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 15.
287 We note that the additional $1.1 million applies to water security mode and plant operation mode.
more uniformly during drought (ie, when the plant is unavailable), and
outside drought when SDP operates in an emergency response.

However, we do not consider SDP’s proposed coverage to be warranted. It is well above earlier benchmarks for business interruption loss established by its insurance broker, when it looked at water utility sector practices and organisations with a similar risk profile. Moreover the benchmarks were based on worst case scenarios similar to those underpinning SDP’s proposed 60 months coverage.

In addition, we do not consider the increase in coverage to 60 months to be proportionate to the changes that we have made in the abatement mechanism. If we were to accept SDP’s argument that its business interruption coverage is intended to apply only when it is abated, then we would need to consider the following when determining the maximum indemnity period for BI coverage:

a) the length of SDP’s plant operation period (ie, drought period, emergency response\(^\text{288}\)), and

b) the maximum period of reinstatement following a worst case scenario (ie, how long SDP would be inoperable for).

Abatement also results in a gradual reduction of fees over a year.

In other words, SDP would only need coverage when it is inoperable and it is required to produce water under the 60/70 rule or because of its emergency response role. This may be shorter than any overall period of inoperability.

Accordingly, we have based our allowance for insurance premiums on a level of business interruption coverage that reflects the earlier benchmarks submitted to us.

In total, our estimates increase insurance costs from our Draft Report by approximately $0.65 million ($2016-17) over the 2017 determination period. Our estimate of SDP’s insurance premiums is based on a reduction in its proposed premiums in proportion to the reduced business interruption coverage. We have added these insurance costs to both water security (shutdown) and plant operation modes in line with SDP’s proposal.\(^\text{289}\) This recognises that SDP would be unable to retrospectively obtain business interruption coverage should a drought response trigger be reached during the period the plant is being reinstated.

In a supplementary email, SDP indicated it had not included in its proposed insurance costs a provision for its annual insurance broking costs. Nor did it provide cost estimates of the recent Government decision to defer the removal of the Fire Services Levy charge from insurance premiums.

We have included adjustments for these additional costs. We have estimated a provision for the Fire Services Levy in line with SDP’s proposed methodology, however based on our efficient premiums. We included an amount equivalent to SDP’s proposed insurance broking costs after reviewing a range of industry estimates.

\(^{288}\) As the 14-month minimum run time is discretionary, SDP would only be abated if it chose to operate. In this sense, its exposure to BI coverage would arguably be more limited than in a drought.

\(^{289}\) SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 16.
In total, we allowed additional insurance-related costs over the 5-year determination period of:

- $3.2 million in water security (shutdown) mode, and
- $2.3 million in plant operation mode.
8 Energy costs

The cost of energy makes up a substantial proportion of SDP’s operating costs when the plant operates. This is because water desalination is an energy intensive process.

The four major elements of SDP’s energy costs are:

1. The cost of energy required by the plant (ie, the wholesale market cost of energy).
2. The cost of renewable energy certificates arising from:
   - the planning approval for the plant that required 100% renewable energy use, and
   - renewable energy schemes, which energy retailers in NSW are required to meet.
3. The cost of other energy components, including ancillary services and retail margins.
4. Network charges payable for the transmission of this energy over the network.

In this chapter, we outline our decisions on these cost allowances. We have set energy cost allowances to cover the first three of these components (wholesale energy, renewable energy, and other energy components). Our energy cost allowances reflect market-based benchmark prices and efficient benchmark volumes. We have maintained our approach to allow a cost pass-through mechanism for the fourth component (network charges).

8.1 Review of past energy use

Over the four years from 2012-13 to 2015-16, SDP used about 48% of the energy that had been forecast for shutdown mode in the 2012 Determination. As a result of this reduction in energy use, SDP made a saving of approximately $2.6 million. This is shown in Table 8.1.

While this saving was retained by SDP over the 2012 determination period, it has allowed us to reduce the efficient benchmark energy volume forecast for shutdown mode over the 2017 determination period, resulting in downward pressure on prices for customers (efficient benchmark energy volumes are outlined below).

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290 In operation mode, the plant requires about $50 million in energy costs per year (based on our benchmark energy prices and volumes over the 2017 determination period – see Appendix D) to supply Sydney with about 15% of its water needs (http://www.sydneydesal.com.au/faqs/ accessed on 23 June 2017).

291 The project approval for SDP was granted under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979. IPART, Review of water prices for Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Limited from 1 July 2012 - Final Report, December 2011, p 17.
### Table 8.1  Savings from reduced demand during 2012 determination period ($2016-17)

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<td>Forecast benchmark volumes (MWh)</td>
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<td>9,640</td>
<td>9,640</td>
<td>9,640</td>
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<td>38,560</td>
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<td>Forecast benchmark cost ($million)</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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<td>4.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Actual volumes (MWh)</td>
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<td>4,846</td>
<td>4,505</td>
<td>2,722</td>
<td></td>
<td>18,400</td>
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<tr>
<td>Actual benchmark cost ($million)*</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Savings (MWh)</td>
<td>3,313</td>
<td>4,794</td>
<td>5,135</td>
<td>6,918</td>
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<td>20,160</td>
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<tr>
<td>Savings ($million)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
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</table>

* Actual benchmark energy costs are calculated using actual energy volumes and 2012 benchmark energy prices.

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding. Actuals for the full year 2016-17 are not yet available.


### 8.2 Energy cost allowances

We have made a decision to:

32 Set energy cost allowances as outlined in Table 8.2.

The energy cost allowances reflected in SDP’s prices for the 2017 determination period are presented in Table 8.2.

These energy cost allowances reflect our decisions on energy prices and volumes and therefore reflect our market-based estimates of efficient energy costs over the 2017 determination period. Our benchmark unit energy prices have been developed by our energy consultant, Marsden Jacob. Our benchmark energy volumes are based on advice from our expenditure consultant, Atkins Cardno.

The energy cost allowances have been set by mode of operation, because SDP’s energy costs vary by mode (i.e., energy costs change as SDP transitions from shutdown, to restart, to plant operation). In addition, energy costs are also split into fixed and variable components so that they can be recovered through fixed or variable charges. For example, the variable energy cost in plant operation mode is recovered through SDP’s water usage charge, whereas the fixed component is independent of volumes supplied and is recovered through daily base and incremental service charges.

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Table 8.2 Energy cost allowances by mode of operation ($2016-17)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shutdown</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Fixed ($/day)</td>
<td>2,710.68</td>
<td>2,218.63</td>
<td>1,982.33</td>
<td>1,868.49</td>
<td>1,826.85</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transition to restart</td>
<td>7,066,572.80</td>
<td>5,779,200.00</td>
<td>5,160,960.00</td>
<td>4,863,129.60</td>
<td>4,754,176.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plant operation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Fixed ($/day)</td>
<td>4,140.36</td>
<td>3,386.04</td>
<td>3,023.79</td>
<td>2,849.28</td>
<td>2,785.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Variable ($/ML)</td>
<td>693.21</td>
<td>566.92</td>
<td>506.27</td>
<td>477.05</td>
<td>466.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 2019-20 will be a leap year with 366 days.

**Note:** There is no variable component in transition to restart. As soon as SDP supplies drinking water it moves to plant operation mode. Numbers may not add due to rounding.


Appendix D sets out how the energy cost allowances in Table 8.2 were calculated.

### 8.2.1 Compared to the 2012 Determination

Figure 8.1 and Figure 8.2 show our decisions on benchmark prices, volumes and allowed energy costs for the 2017 determination period compared to the 2012 determination period.

In plant operation mode, our energy cost allowances for the 2017 determination period have increased overall by $29.7 million or 13% compared to the 2012 determination period. This reflects:

- A 21% increase in benchmark prices compared to the 2012 determination period. This is driven by:
  - a 49% increase in the energy component of the benchmark price, and
  - a 12% decrease in the LGC component of the benchmark price.
- A 6% decrease in benchmark energy volumes compared to the 2012 determination period. This is driven by efficiencies identified by our expenditure review consultant.

In shutdown mode, our energy cost allowances for the 2017 determination period have decreased overall by $1.9 million or 33% compared to the 2012 determination period. This reflects:

- A 21% increase in benchmark prices compared to the 2012 determination period, for the reasons outlined above.
- A 44% reduction in benchmark energy volumes compared to the 2012 determination period.
Figure 8.1 Benchmark prices, volumes and costs in plant operation ($2016-17)

Note: 2012 benchmark prices include the carbon price in 2012-13 and 2013-14 and exclude the carbon price in 2014-15 to 2016-17 since the carbon tax was repealed effective 1 July 2014 (http://www.environment.gov.au/climate-change/repealing-carbon-tax). This comparison involves converting all figures into $2016-17 and comparing totals over each determination period.

Figure 8.2  Benchmark prices, volumes and costs in shutdown ($2016-17)

Note: 2012 benchmark prices include the carbon price in 2012-13 and 2013-14 and exclude the carbon price in 2014-15 to 2016-17 since the carbon tax was repealed effective 1 July 2014 (http://www.environment.gov.au/climate-change/repealing-carbon-tax). This comparison involves converting all figures into $2016-17 and comparing totals over each determination period.

8.3 Approach to setting energy cost allowances

We have made a decision to:

33 Continue to set energy cost allowances based on benchmark estimates of efficient energy costs.

We have decided to maintain our approach of setting energy cost allowances based on an efficient benchmark, as we consider this is best regulatory practice. By de-linking energy allowances from actual energy costs, this maintains appropriate incentives for SDP to prudently and efficiently manage its actual energy costs now and in the future. If we moved to passing through SDP’s actual energy costs, SDP would have little incentive to procure energy on a prudent and efficient basis and customers could be exposed to inefficient energy costs.

SDP proposed that we set energy cost allowances for the 2017 determination period based on SDP’s energy contract prices.294 The reasons presented by SDP are outlined in Box 8.1.

Box 8.1 SDP’s proposal to pass through actual energy costs

The following arguments were made by SDP in support of using its contracted energy costs for the purpose of setting prices over the 2017 determination period:

- SDP expressed its view that its contract price is both an efficient and prudent instrument through which to procure energy to provide the water supply and water security services as envisaged under the Metropolitan Water Plan, whilst complying with its planning conditions for 100% renewable energy.
- SDP argued that its use of long-term contracting is prudent and that the competitive tender process used to procure these contracts means that the prices in these contracts should be considered efficient.
- SDP noted that while IPART has a history of setting energy cost allowances based on an efficient benchmark (e.g., LRMC modelling) rather than actual energy costs in its 2010 and 2013 regulated retail electricity price determinations, the different operating contexts and regulatory objectives suggest that these approaches are not well suited to setting the energy cost allowance for SDP.
- SDP argued that using a ‘point in time’ market-based approach to set its energy cost allowance would negatively impact customers. SDP pointed to recent volatility in energy markets to support its argument that IPART’s approach would provide SDP with a windfall gain and potentially shift risk onto customers.
- SDP also expressed the view that basing energy cost allowances on its contracts would ensure Sydney Water and customers are not required to manage year-on-year volatility in SDP’s energy costs.

Data source: SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, pp 84-88.

294 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, pp 84-86. SDP redacted its energy contract prices (and the associated proposed energy cost allowances) from its public submission because this information is commercial in confidence. Therefore, we are not able to quote either SDP’s contract prices or its proposed energy cost allowances directly.
Sydney Water supported SDP’s position that because SDP’s energy contracts were secured following a competitive tender, and accordingly represent efficient energy costs, they should not be assessed at each price review.\(^{295}\)

In response to our Draft Report:

\(^{\blacktriangledown}\) SDP stated that it did not agree with our draft decision to use a market-based benchmark price per unit of energy because this exposes SDP and customers to price volatility between determinations. SDP maintained its position that we should set energy cost allowances for the 2017 determination period based on SDP’s energy contract prices which SDP characterises as its ‘market tested long-term contracting costs’.\(^{296}\)

\(^{\blacktriangle}\) Sydney Water noted that the efficient benchmark energy prices recommended by Marsden Jacob are above the contract prices secured by SDP under its competitively sourced long-term energy supply contracts. Sydney Water suggested that we consider sharing some of the benefits (and risks) of SDP’s energy contracts with customers.\(^{297}\)

We have considered SDP and Sydney Water’s proposals and submissions on this issue. We do not agree that passing through SDP’s actual energy costs (in part or in full) would achieve an efficient allocation of risk between SDP and customers and, as a result, our view is that setting energy cost allowances based on SDP’s energy contract prices is unlikely to be in the best long-term interests of SDP’s customers.

We have decided to maintain our approach of setting energy cost allowances based on an efficient market-based benchmark for the following reasons:

\(^{\blacktriangledown}\) Our market-based energy cost allowances will better reflect the market price of energy over time. With our approach, customers can expect to pay the efficient market price of energy required to efficiently run the plant over time rather than SDP’s contract costs which may or may not be efficient. While SDP’s contract prices are fixed and are therefore less volatile than market price, the more relevant consideration is whether SDP’s contracts are higher or lower than market prices, on average, over the long term.

\(^{\blacktriangle}\) Under our approach, which we maintain over the 2012 and 2017 determination periods, SDP has a strong incentive to meet or beat our estimate of the market price because it is able to keep any gains it is able to generate by doing this. Under SDP’s approach, SDP would no longer have a strong incentive to prudently manage its energy costs because these costs would be passed through to customers. We consider SDP’s approach would result in an inefficient allocation of risk between SDP and customers and could lead to SDP’s customers being exposed to inefficient costs.

We note that our approach to setting efficient benchmark energy costs is similar to our approach to setting an efficient benchmark cost of capital. A business will typically have a portfolio of debt at different prices and different maturities. When we consider the cost of debt for pricing purposes over the regulatory period, we do not pass through the actual costs of debt entered into by the regulated business in the past because this might result in:

\(^{\blacktriangledown}\) prices that do not necessarily reflect efficient market prices in the short term

\(^{\blacktriangledown}\) an inefficient allocation of risk between the regulated business and its customers, and

\(^{295}\) Sydney Water submission to IPART Issues Paper, November 2016, p 41.

\(^{296}\) SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 54.

\(^{297}\) Sydney Water submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 21.
the potential for inefficient costs to be passed through to customers over the longer term.

8.4 Methodology used to estimate benchmark unit energy prices

Our benchmark unit energy prices have been recommended by our energy consultant, Marsden Jacob. They include electricity, Large-scale Generation Certificates (LGCs), and all other components of energy costs (excluding network costs for which we are proposing to maintain the cost pass-through mechanism).

Marsden Jacob’s benchmarks are based on current electricity and LGC forward market data (robust for the first three years of the 2017 determination period) and long-run marginal cost (LRMC) modelling to extrapolate these forecasts to the end of the 2017 determination period.

LRMC modelling was undertaken to establish the cost of providing energy, capacity and LGCs in each year of the 2017 determination period. This was in the context of pricing contracts that could be purchased for NSW over the 2017 determination period. Critical input variables in this modelling included demand, fuel costs, and capital cost assumptions.

Marsden Jacob employed two approaches to estimating the LRMC:

- An incremental approach (assuming existing supply capacity is able to meet SDP’s load).
- A standalone approach (assuming new supply capacity is required to meet SDP’s load).

These approaches generated a LRMC range which Marsden Jacob then used to extend or extrapolate market-based estimates out to the end of the 2017 determination period.

Marsden Jacob’s approach to developing benchmark prices was based on meeting SDP’s load profiles under shutdown, transition, and operation modes.

Following our Draft Report, we re-engaged Marsden Jacob to re-estimate their benchmark prices based on:

- the same methodology used in their February 2017 report, and
- up-to-date market and LRMC parameters.

We consider Marsden Jacob’s updated benchmark prices are the best available forecast of energy market prices over the 2017 determination period.

8.5 Our benchmark energy unit prices

We have made a decision to:

34 Set efficient benchmark energy unit prices as outlined in Table 8.3.

Marsden Jacob recommended benchmark energy prices for three modes of operation:

298 Additional information on Marsden Jacob’s LRMC modelling is contained in: Marsden Jacob, Energy Review – SDP, February 2017, Chapter 7 and Appendix 4.
Shutdown, which assumes a flat load of 0.57 MW.

Transition, which assumes a linear increase from 0.57 MW to 37.5 MW.

Plant operation, which assumes a flat load of 37.5 MW.

Marsden Jacob developed two cases of benchmark prices. One case that includes the cost of over-contracting and another that excludes the cost of over-contracting. We have decided to base our benchmark prices on the case that excludes the cost of over-contracting. The case that excludes the cost of over-contracting is less prescriptive in that it does not assume SDP meets its load by entering forward contracts. This uses the forward market curve as the market’s best estimate of spot market prices going forward. We therefore consider the case excluding the cost of over-contracting provides the best forecast of spot market prices over the forecast period.

Table 8.3 sets out our benchmark energy unit costs for the 2017 determination period.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shutdown</td>
<td>197.88</td>
<td>161.96</td>
<td>144.71</td>
<td>136.40</td>
<td>133.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>197.17</td>
<td>161.25</td>
<td>144.00</td>
<td>135.69</td>
<td>132.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>197.16</td>
<td>161.24</td>
<td>143.99</td>
<td>135.68</td>
<td>132.64</td>
</tr>
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</table>


8.5.1 We are using up-to-date benchmark prices

In response to our Draft Report, SDP proposed that if we were to maintain our benchmark approach for the Final Report, we should update our benchmark prices to reflect up-to-date market information.

While we agree with SDP that we should use the most up to date market information when setting regulated prices, we note that the revised benchmark prices proposed in SDP’s submission to our Draft Report were based on updating only one of several components of the benchmark price (i.e., energy component).

Figure 8.3 shows how the benchmark price has changed since the Draft Report.

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301 Forward contracts are traded in whole megawatt (MW) units. In order to meet a load of 0.5 MW, a market participant would need to purchase a forward contract for 1 MW (i.e., 100% over-contracted). In order to meet a load of 49.5 MW, a market participant would need to purchase a forward contract for 50 MW (i.e., 1% over-contracted). The degree (and potential cost) of over-contracting diminishes as the load increases.

302 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 54.
Relative to the benchmark prices used in our Draft Report, the updated benchmark prices used in our Final Report are:

- **Higher** in the first two years of the 2017 determination period. This change is due largely to high gas forward market prices that are driving high electricity forward market prices in the early years of the 2017 determination period.

- **Lower** in the last two years of the 2017 determination period. This change is due largely to a sharp reduction in the large-scale generation certificate (LGC) forward prices in the latter years of the 2017 determination period.

Marsden Jacob’s supplementary report includes a discussion of factors that, in Marsden Jacob’s view, have affected the benchmark price since it was originally estimated in November 2016 to when it was updated in May 2017. The following points summarise the discussion provided in Marsden Jacob’s supplementary report:

- **Energy swap contract prices** have increased in the early years of the 2017 determination period because:
  - NSW had a very hot 2016/17 summer that resulted in many days of extreme demand and associated high spot prices.
  - The availability of gas was lower and prices higher than previously projected.
  - The bidding behaviour of a number of generators in the NEM has changed.
  - The closure of Hazelwood Power Station has impacted spot prices.

- **The downward sloping energy swap contract outlook** was due to:
  - The outlook of renewable generation development is higher than previously assessed.

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- The expectation of increasing gas availability over the period.

- The fall in the LGC forward curve has been due to:
  - The outlook of renewable generation development is higher than previously assessed.
  - Some parties with LGC liabilities electing to pay the penalty price rather than purchase LGCs.
  - Higher energy prices which have the effect of lowering the LGC price required for renewable energy projects to be economic.

In response to our Draft Report, SDP claimed that Marsden Jacob’s recommended benchmark prices were in $2015-16 and that we had mistakenly reported them to be in $2016-17. We confirm that Marsden Jacob’s recommended benchmark prices were and continue to be in $2016-17. Marsden Jacob has confirmed and clarified this in its supplementary report.

8.5.2 Components of benchmark unit energy prices

Table 8.4 shows the components of the benchmark price for plant operation mode. A full description of these cost components can be found in Marsden Jacob’s report. In broad terms:

- Energy costs ($114.62/MWh) make up 58% of the total benchmark price in 2017-18. This represents a large increase from the (LRMC based) benchmark in 2016-17. Marsden Jacob cited high gas market prices and the closure of Hazelwood Power Station as issues that have affected energy market prices over the outlook period.

- Renewable energy costs ($75.21/MWh) consisting of LGCs, small scale generation certificates (STCs), and energy savings certificates (ESS), make up 38% of the total benchmark price in 2017-18. The main component of renewable energy costs in 2017-18 (ie, LGCs) is 8% lower than the (LRMC based) LGC benchmark in 2016-17.

- Other components ($7.33/MWh) consisting of retail margin, market fees, metering and data fees, ancillary services, and losses make up the remaining 4% of the total benchmark price in 2017-18. Together, these components are slightly higher in dollar terms than the benchmarks in 2016-17.

In developing these benchmark prices, Marsden Jacob assumed that the benchmark price included 100% renewable energy and that this was made up of 90% LGCs and 10% STCs.
Table 8.4 Components of Marsden Jacob’s benchmark price ($/MWh, $2016-17)

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<td>Energy (ex. losses)</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ancillary services</td>
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<td>0.25</td>
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<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losses</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total a</strong></td>
<td><strong>130.99</strong></td>
<td><strong>197.16</strong></td>
<td><strong>161.24</strong></td>
<td><strong>143.99</strong></td>
<td><strong>135.68</strong></td>
<td><strong>132.64</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a* Refers to Marsden Jacob’s benchmark unit energy price for plant operation mode. Numbers may not add due to rounding.


8.5.3 Compared to the 2012 Determination

Table 8.5 compares our efficient benchmark energy unit prices to the components of various alternative unit energy price estimates. Specifically:

- **IPART 2012 benchmark price**: this is the IPART allowed unit energy cost from the 2012 Determination for 2016-17, moved into $2016-17 based on actual inflation.

- **SDP original / updated market price**: SDP reported market-based estimates for the first three years of the 2017 determination period as part of its pricing submission. In response to our Draft Report, SDP presented a revision of our draft 2017 benchmark price with an updated energy component.

- **IPART draft / final 2017 benchmark price**: this is the estimate we have used in our draft and final reports to set energy allowances. These estimates were developed and recommended by our energy consultant, Marsden Jacob.

The benchmark is designed to reflect market prices. We note that Marsden Jacob’s estimates are close to the market prices quoted and updated by SDP in its pricing proposal and submission to our Draft Report. Our final 2017 benchmark price is lower than SDP’s updated market price because Marsden Jacob incorporated up-to-date information on LGC’s in its update to the benchmark price.
Table 8.5 Comparing energy cost components ($/MWh, $2016-17)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IPART 2012 benchmark</th>
<th>SDP original market price a</th>
<th>IPART draft 2017 benchmark price b</th>
<th>SDP updated market price a</th>
<th>IPART final 2017 benchmark price b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Energy</strong></td>
<td>48.90</td>
<td>55.50</td>
<td>63.51</td>
<td>112.57</td>
<td>114.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LGCs</strong></td>
<td>76.16</td>
<td>82.63</td>
<td>77.06</td>
<td>77.06</td>
<td>69.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td>5.93</td>
<td>11.50</td>
<td>11.86</td>
<td>11.86</td>
<td>12.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>130.99</td>
<td>149.62</td>
<td>152.43</td>
<td>201.49</td>
<td>197.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a While SDP provided these market prices in its pricing proposal and submission to our Draft Report, SDP has maintained throughout this review that we should not set a benchmark price and should instead pass-through its energy contract price.

b Refers to Marsden Jacob’s original and updated benchmark unit energy prices for plant operation mode.

Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.


Figure 8.4 illustrates Marsden Jacob’s updated modelling of the energy component of the benchmark price, which is based on the forward market curve for the first three years of the 2017 determination period and then extrapolated over the remainder of the period based on incremental and stand-alone LRMC modelling.

Figure 8.4 Marsden Jacob’s modelling of the energy component ($/MWh, $2016-17)

Note: The first three years of Marsden Jacob’s estimate (2017-18 to 2019-20) are equal to the forward curve. We note that this figure is presented in $2016-17 while the figure presented in Marsden Jacob’s supplementary report is in nominal dollars.


Figure 8.5 illustrates Marsden Jacob’s modelling of the LGC component of the benchmark price, which is based on a combination of forward market and LRMC modelling.

Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd  IPART  109
8.6 Benchmark volumes

We have made a decision to:

35 Set benchmark energy volumes as outlined in Table 8.6.

Our benchmark energy volumes are based on our expenditure consultant, Atkins Cardno’s, review and recommendations of SDP’s energy requirements in each mode of operation.\textsuperscript{307}

Atkins Cardno based its analysis of SDP’s energy requirements in plant operation mode on the plant’s proving period after construction.\textsuperscript{308} The plant’s proving period was the two years to June 2012. Atkins Cardno also made specific assumptions around technical aspects of plant operation and sea water quality.\textsuperscript{309}

In shutdown, Atkins Cardno formed its estimate of SDP’s energy requirements on the plant’s actual energy use over the 2012 determination period.

We have accepted Atkins Cardno’s benchmark energy volumes over the 2017 determination period, but for an adjustment to energy volumes in transition to restart.

Atkins Cardno’s estimate of efficient energy consumption is 71,000 MWh for the complete transition to restart, which includes energy for the drinking water pumping station,
assumed an 8-month restart period. In its February 2017 report, Atkins Cardno considered restart would include production and supply of 15,000 ML of drinking water.

Once SDP supplies drinking water, it moves to plant operation mode and begins receiving an incremental daily service charge and a water usage charge for the water it supplies. Therefore, it is important the transition to restart charge only include energy costs that are unrelated to the production and supply of drinking water to not double count these costs.

In our Draft Report, of the total volume of 71,000 MWh estimated for restart, we estimated that 52,740 MWh related to the production and supply of 15,000 ML of desalinated water. The remaining 18,260 MWh are considered ‘fixed’ (ie, unrelated to production and supply of drinking water) and what we have decided as appropriate costs to recover through the transition charge.

In response to our Draft Report, SDP accepted our draft decisions on energy volumes during water security and full operation mode but challenged our decision on the energy volume during transition to restart. SDP’s position is that by removing an estimate of the ‘variable’ component of energy used during restart risks the 2017 Determination understating the energy requirements during restart. SDP maintained its position that the efficient volume of energy required in restart is 79,652 MWh.

Following our Draft Report, we re-engaged Atkins Cardno to consider SDP’s response. In its supplementary report, Atkins Cardno revised its estimate of the volume of drinking water that could be produced and supplied during an 8-month transition to restart from 15,000 ML to 10,000 ML.

Atkins Cardno noted that the actual delivery of 10,000 ML is not certain, as the membranes arrival to site could be delayed or other issues could delay water production meeting the export specification during the eight month start up. Atkins Cardno concluded that the variable energy requirements for 10,000 ML should not be deducted from the 71,000 MWh restart allowance and that an alternative approach would be to undertake an ex-post adjustment based on the actual volume of water delivered.

We have decided to accept Atkins Cardno’s recommendation on the efficient energy requirement for transition to restart of 71,000 MWh, but we have decided to maintain our approach of deducting from this total amount the variable component associated with the production and delivery of 10,000 ML of desalinated water. That is, our decision is to deduct 35,160 MWh from the total 71,000 MWh resulting in an allowance of 35,840 MWh. Our reasons for maintaining this approach are:

310 Atkins Cardno, Expenditure Review – SDP, February 2017, p 43.
311 Atkins Cardno, Expenditure Review – SDP, February 2017, p 42.
312 This estimate is derived by applying the MWh / ML in full production mode (ie, 320,835MWh / 91,250ML = 3.516MWh / ML) to 15,000ML (ie, 3.516MWh x 15,000ML = 52,740MWh).
313 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 55.
314 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, pp 52 and 55.
317 That is, 3,516 MWh x 10,000 ML = 35,160 MWh.
Our aim is to set cost-reflective charges for transition to restart (before drinking water is supplied) and plant operation (when drinking water is being supplied). Once the supply of drinking water commences, the plant moves to the ‘plant operation’ pricing schedule, where SDP receives an incremental service charge and a water usage charge per ML of water supplied. The water usage charge covers chemicals and energy to produce and supply drinking water. The 8-month grace period from abatement introduced in our 2017 Determination allows the plant to supply at less than full capacity without abatement when ramping up to full production.

We do not want to over-compensate SDP through the one-off transition to restart charge by including variable energy costs in the transition charge. We also do not want to fund SDP to produce 10,000 ML of non-drinking water.

We consider our approach provides SDP the energy required to get ready to supply drinking water and also provides a strong incentive for SDP to maximise the production of drinking water during the 8-month restart period.

Our benchmark energy volumes for the 2017 determination period are set out in Table 8.6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8.6 Benchmark energy volumes (MWh)</th>
<th>2016-17</th>
<th>2017-18</th>
<th>2018-19</th>
<th>2019-20</th>
<th>2020-21</th>
<th>2021-22</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shutdown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Total (fixed)</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,014</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition to restart</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant operation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Fixed</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,665</td>
<td>7,665</td>
<td>7,686</td>
<td>7,665</td>
<td>7,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Variable</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>320,835</td>
<td>320,835</td>
<td>321,714</td>
<td>320,835</td>
<td>320,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Total</td>
<td>360,000</td>
<td>328,500</td>
<td>328,500</td>
<td>329,400</td>
<td>328,500</td>
<td>328,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*2019-20 will be a leap year with 366 days.

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.


8.7 Pass through of energy network charges

We have made a decision to:

- Maintain the cost pass-through mechanism used in the 2012 Determination for SDP’s energy network costs. However, we have:
  - Updated the benchmark volumes used in the calculation of the Variable Network Charge.
  - Capped the maximum demand used to calculate the capacity charge/s that feed into the Fixed Network Charge, from 1 July 2017 until SDP is first called into operation, to the lesser of:
    - actual maximum demand used to calculate SDP’s actual capacity charge/s, and
    - benchmark maximum demand of 1,090 kilovolt-amps (kVA).
Under the 2012 Determination we established a methodology to pass-through variable and fixed network charges determined by the AER to SDP’s customers. SDP passes through energy network costs via two pass-through mechanisms: a Variable Network Charge (VNC) and a Fixed Network Charge (FNC).

- The VNC is based on regulated network prices and benchmark energy volumes.
- The FNC is based on regulated network prices and actual maximum demand (ie, maximum demand recorded over the 12 months leading up to each billing month).

We decided to use a cost pass-through in the 2012 Determination because there was considerable uncertainty about potential changes in network prices over the 2012 determination period (as the AER’s determination in place at that time was due to end in 2013-14).

We consider the cost pass-through mechanism has operated as intended over the 2012 determination period and we have decided to continue to use this method to pass-through SDP’s network charges over the 2017 determination period. Similar to the 2012 determination period, SDP’s network costs will become uncertain in the 2017 determination period. The AER sets network charges on a two-year basis, and its next determination will come into effect on 1 July 2017.

SDP supported the use of a pass-through mechanism given the significant uncertainty with electricity network prices over the medium term. SDP also argued that retaining the pass-through mechanism would maintain regulatory consistency in addressing the same issue across determinations.318

Sydney Water also supported the use of a pass-through mechanism, noting that any forecast of network charges during the previous price review for SDP would have been significantly higher than actual billed charges.319 Further, Sydney Water stated that the unpredictability of network charges means that no forecast would be more efficient than a pass-through of actual charges.320

8.7.1 Benchmark volumes used in the pass through mechanism

We have updated the energy volumes used in the calculation of the VNC consistent with our decisions on SDP’s efficient energy requirements by mode of operation over the 2017 determination period (outlined above).

In response to our Draft Report, Sydney Water discussed that, as part of the December 2015 storm related reinstatement works, it is likely that SDP’s demand on the energy network will increase, resulting in higher capacity charges and FNC for a period of time following the re-instatement works. Sydney Water considers that the FNC in water security mode should not include additional demand charges related to storm-related reinstatement works and

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318 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, pp 37-38.
319 Sydney Water submission to IPART Issues Paper, November 2016, p 42.
320 Sydney Water submission to IPART Issues Paper, November 2016, p 42.
suggested a potential solution to this could be to base the FNC on a benchmark volume of energy rather than actuals during the relevant period.321

We have explored this issue and consider there is a case to temporarily cap the FNC. The reason for this is that unlike the VNC, we do not currently set a benchmark volume for the FNC. Therefore, if SDP increases its energy use while in shutdown (eg, by running a plant test):

▼ The VNC (based on benchmark energy volume) would not increase.

▼ The FNC (based on actual maximum demand) could increase.

SDP currently pays capacity charges on two network connections: a primary connection; and a secondary connection. We have analysed SDP’s maximum demand over the period July 2014 to June 2016 and note maximum demand used to calculate capacity charges over that period is 1,090 kilovolt-amps (kVA). We have decided to use this maximum recorded maximum demand for the temporary FNC cap. We note the 1,090 kVA cap applies separately to each of SDP’s capacity charges.

The capacity charges that feed into FNC are based on maximum demand occurring in a peak period recorded over a maximum period of the previous 12 months.322 Therefore, a temporary increase in maximum demand in one month can result in higher capacity charges (and therefore higher FNC) for a period up to 12 months following the temporary increase in maximum demand. The impact on FNC of a temporary spike in maximum demand is illustrated in Figure 8.6.

Figure 8.6  A spike in demand leads to higher capacity charges for following 12 months

Note: This example is for illustration only. The actual increase in maximum demand associated with a potential rebuild related plant test may be greater or less than what we have assumed in this illustrative example.

Data source: IPART analysis.

If we were to set a firm end date for the FNC cap and that rebuild-related spikes in maximum demand occur within the 12 months leading up to this firm end date, there is a risk that rebuild-related FNC costs could be passed-through to customers. Given the uncertainty about the timing of plant re-instatement works, we have decided to apply the FNC cap from 1 July 2017 until SDP is first called into operation mode. This will ensure SDP’s FNC is capped at a level consistent with shutdown until it is next called into operation.

We have consulted with SDP on this issue and confirm that SDP:\footnote{Email correspondence between IPART and SDP, 25 May 2017 and 31 May 2017.}

- Agrees with Sydney Water’s proposal to temporarily cap the FNC.
- Accepts our proposal to set the FNC cap to maximum demand of 1,090 kVA.
- Accepts our proposal to cap FNC from 1 July 2017 until SDP is called into operation.
9 Other building block components

To calculate the allowances for a return on assets and regulatory depreciation\textsuperscript{324} in the revenue requirement, we need to determine three key inputs:

\begin{itemize}
  \item the value of SDP's RAB, which represents the economic value of the assets used to deliver the monopoly services
  \item the appropriate asset lives and depreciation method for SDP's RAB, and
  \item the appropriate rate of return (ie, the WACC) on SDP's RAB.
\end{itemize}

In this chapter, we provide an overview of our decisions on these issues and their impact on SDP's NRR.

We also discuss our decisions on factors affecting the regulatory tax allowance and set out our findings on that tax allowance over the 2017 determination period.

9.1 The value of the Regulatory Asset Base

The RAB represents the value of SDP's assets on which we consider it should earn a return on capital and an allowance for regulatory depreciation. In determining the value of the RAB over the 2017 determination period, we have calculated:

\begin{itemize}
  \item the opening RAB at 1 July 2017, by rolling the historical RAB forward from 2011-12 to 2016-17, and
  \item the value of the RAB from 1 July in each year of the 2017 determination period.
\end{itemize}

9.1.1 Calculating the opening RAB at 1 July 2017

We have made a decision to:

\textbf{37} Set the opening RAB at 1 July 2017 by rolling the historical RAB forward from 2011-12 to 2016-17 as outlined in Table 9.1.

In calculating the opening RAB, we rolled forward the RAB over the 2012 determination period. This involved using the determined RAB at 1 July 2011\textsuperscript{325} and making the following adjustments:

\begin{itemize}
  \item adding prudent and efficient capital expenditure (see Chapter 6)
  \item deducting the regulatory depreciation we allowed in the 2012 Determination, and
  \item adding the annual indexation of the RAB.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{324} Regulatory depreciation is also known as 'return of assets', as the regulatory depreciation allowance returns the value of assets over their lives.

\textsuperscript{325} When we set the RAB at our 2012 determination, the figures we used for 2011-12 were forecasts. Therefore, we need to adjust the 2011-12 figures for our actual figures including our decisions on capital expenditure for 2011-12.
We also made corrections to the asset lives and category values used to establish the RAB in the 2012 Determination (discussed further below).

The historical RAB roll forward is presented in Table 9.1. Our opening RAB of $1,969.0 million (plant and pipeline) for the 2017 determination period is around $4.6 million below SDP’s proposed opening RAB of $1,973.6 million.326

Table 9.1  RAB roll forward – 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2017 ($million, $nominal)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opening RAB</td>
<td>1,344.7</td>
<td>1,337.7</td>
<td>1,331.0</td>
<td>1,330.4</td>
<td>1,309.6</td>
<td>1,281.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plus Capex</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>less Depreciation</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plus Indexation</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closing RAB</td>
<td>1,337.7</td>
<td>1,331.0</td>
<td>1,330.4</td>
<td>1,309.6</td>
<td>1,281.5</td>
<td>1,267.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipeline</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opening RAB</td>
<td>632.3</td>
<td>658.6</td>
<td>669.6</td>
<td>684.7</td>
<td>689.9</td>
<td>691.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plus Capex</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>less Depreciation</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plus Indexation</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closing RAB</td>
<td>658.6</td>
<td>669.6</td>
<td>684.7</td>
<td>689.9</td>
<td>691.7</td>
<td>701.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 2011-12 is the final year of the 2008 determination period for Sydney Water, the original owner of SDP. Forecasts were used to roll forward the RAB in this year during the 2012 Determination of SDP’s prices.

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

Data source: IPART analysis.

RAB roll forward for 2011-12

We have made a decision to:

38 Roll forward the RAB from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 by taking account of actual CPI, but not updating for actual capital expenditure.

Our standard regulatory practice is to roll forward the RAB from the beginning of the final year of the previous regulatory period to the end of the current regulatory period updating for actuals where they are available. In SDP’s case, this requires rolling the RAB forward from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2016, taking actuals into account.

However, the roll forward of the RAB from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 is outside the current determination period and traverses the sale of the plant from Sydney Water to Government and then to the current owners.327

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326 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 60.
Consequently, SDP has not updated the 2011-12 RAB for actuals. The prices in SDP’s submission are based on a 1 July 2012 opening RAB of $2,000.2 million ($2012-13), consistent with the RAB we set in the 2012 Determination. SDP reconfirmed in its submission to our Draft Report that it considers that neither the CPI nor capital expenditure should be updated for outcomes in 2011-12.\textsuperscript{328}

We have maintained our decision to update the 2011-12 RAB for CPI outcomes only and not actual capital expenditure. SDP considers the reasons for our decision on capital expenditure apply equally to the CPI. However, we maintain the position that sophisticated bidders would reasonably expect CPI forecasts to be updated with outcomes. That is, it would be reasonable to expect the RAB to be indexed using actual CPI, but that the opening value of the RAB not be adjusted for actual capital expenditure in acknowledgment that bids for SDP were based on forecast capital expenditure. The intention is to reflect the real value of the RAB at time of sale (lease).

We also note that the difference between forecast and actual capital expenditure for 2011-12 would have a minor impact on prices over the 2017 determination period. The impact of the lower actual CPI (2.3% for 2011-12 compared to the 2.5% forecast used to set prices under the 2012 Determination) is to reduce the opening RAB as at 1 July 2012 by around $4 million compared to SDP’s submission to our Draft Report.

\textbf{2012 Determination - correcting asset category values}

We have made a decision to:

39 Correct asset category values used in the 2012 Determination to roll the RAB forward from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2017.

In the 2012 Determination, the asset values for some plant asset categories were inadvertently swapped. This happened in two instances:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Project development costs and Pre-operations payments.
  \item Seawater intake and Seawater outlet.
\end{itemize}

The net impact is that SDP’s depreciation profile was overstated by around $3 million ($2011-12) each year in the 2012 determination period. As shown in Table 9.2 below, this is because the larger asset value for project development costs of $115.9 million was assigned the much shorter pre-operations payments asset life of 20 years, instead of 44 years.

\textsuperscript{327} Sydney Water was the original owner of SDP. On 9 May 2012, Sydney Water created two trusts: SDP Assets Trust and SDP Pipeline Trust (the Trusts). The assets associated with SDP (desalination plant, site and pipeline) were transferred to the Trusts on 31 May 2012, with SDP owning the units in the Trusts. Later on the same day, Sydney Water entered into a sale and leaseback arrangement with the Ministerial Holding Corporation for $1.9 billion. The units in the Trusts were then transferred to the Ministerial Holding Corporation. On 1 June 2012, the units in the Trust were then sold for $2.3 billion to a consortium of Hastings Funds Management Ltd (now the Infrastructure Fund) and Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan Board, the successful bidder in the private sector, for a 50-year term. Sydney Water Corporation, Annual Report, 30 June 2012, pp 50, 151 and 176.

\textsuperscript{328} SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 70.
Table 9.2  Asset categories, values and economic lives ($million, $2012-13)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Value$</th>
<th>Economic Life (new assets)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As per SDP’s (then owned by Sydney Water) 2011 submission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project development costs</td>
<td>$115.9</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-operations payments</td>
<td>$10.0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seawater intake</td>
<td>$205.0</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seawater outlet</td>
<td>$62.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As per IPART 2012 Determination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project development costs</td>
<td>$10.0</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-operations payments</td>
<td>$115.9</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seawater intake</td>
<td>$62.3</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seawater outlet</td>
<td>$205.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$ The values presented are opening asset values as at 1 July 2012, based on IPART’s analysis and are consistent with the other decisions presented in this report.

Data source: IPART analysis.

SDP did not raise this issue in its pricing proposal, but agreed with the draft decision to make this correction to asset category values in its submission to our Draft Report. SDP therefore, we have corrected for this error by:

- placing the relevant depreciated values (as at 1 July 2017) into the correct asset categories from 1 July 2017, and
- making no retrospective adjustments in correcting for this issue.

This approach ensures that all asset categories, values and remaining lives align at the commencement of the 2017 determination period, resulting in an appropriate depreciation profile being calculated going forward.

SDP is financially indifferent on a present value basis as a result of this issue, as it would still fully recover the cost of its investment, although over a different timeframe. The lower RAB as at 1 July 2017 due to the higher depreciation profile would be offset by the quicker recovery of the assets. That said, SDP would better off on a cash flow basis as it would receive a faster payback for a higher valued asset than it otherwise should (eg, 24 years earlier).

Nonetheless, correcting for this modelling error results in a more appropriate depreciation profile over the 2017 determination period. It ensures that cash flows more closely align with the appropriate level of depreciation of the assets, and importantly prices that are more cost reflective.

329 SDP submission to IPART’s Draft Report, April 2017, p 74.
2012 Determination - correcting asset lives

We have made a decision to:

40 Correct asset lives used in the 2012 Determination to roll the RAB forward from 1 July 2017.

In the 2012 Determination, new asset lives were applied to existing assets for all depreciating plant asset categories. Overall, this understated depreciation by about $4 million in each year over the 2012 determination period. If uncorrected, customers would continue to be better off up to the point where the assets should have expired.\(^{330}\)

Although SDP’s depreciation profile (and therefore allowance) has been understated over the 2012 determination period, it would be financially indifferent on a present value basis over the life of the asset because it would still fully recover its initial investment (ie, via the higher relative RAB as at 1 July 2017 and onwards).

In its submission to our Draft Report, SDP agreed with the decision to correct for this issue.\(^{331}\) Therefore, again, we have corrected for this error to ensure that cash flows more closely align with the appropriate level of depreciation of the assets, and that resulting prices are cost reflective. Our correction is prospective in nature and will only affect the RAB roll forward from 1 July 2017 onwards. But to make this correction we need to recast the RAB from 1 July 2012 to establish correct asset lives over the 2017 determination period. This involves:

- establishing what the remaining economic lives were for existing assets as at 1 July 2012, and
- rolling forward the RAB from 1 July 2012 with the correct remaining economic lives to establish the remaining lives for existing assets as at 1 July 2017.

Our decision on asset lives compared to SDP’s proposal is presented in Table 9.3.

**Table 9.3 Remaining asset lives to apply to affected asset categories from 1 July 2017 (years)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>SDP Proposed</th>
<th>IPART Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plant</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seawater intake</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>82.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seawater outlet</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>92.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pumping station</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-operations payments</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project development costs</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Table 9.3 also reflects the asset category swap addressed in Table 9.2 above.

**Data source:** SDP submission to IPART’s Draft Report, April 2017, p 74.

\(^{330}\) The magnitude of the impact depends on the economic life of the asset class. For example, at 1 July 2012, depreciation for the pumping station using the new life of 20 years instead of the remaining life of 17 years leads to around a 15% understatement in depreciation paid over the 2012 determination period. At the other end of the spectrum, the outlet infrastructure has a new life of 100 years and a remaining life of 97 years, which equates to a 3% understatement.

\(^{331}\) SDP submission to IPART’s Draft Report, April 2017, p 69.
Maintaining our standard practice of using allowed depreciation

We have made a decision to:

41 Maintain our standard practice of using allowed depreciation to roll forward the historical RAB.

In its original pricing proposal, SDP proposed to recalculate depreciation over the period 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2017 based on actual prudent and efficient capital expenditure when rolling forward the RAB over this period.

Actual prudent and efficient capital expenditure over this period was lower than forecast during the 2012 Determination, albeit marginally (see Table 9.4). Therefore, SDP’s proposal would result in the RAB being marginally higher at 1 July 2017 than if allowed depreciation was used.

| Table 9.4 Historical capital expenditure ($million, $nominal) |
|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| 2012 Determination | 0.5     | 1.1     | 0.0     | 0.0     | 0.0     | 1.6    |
| Actual          | 0.4     | 0.0     | 0.3     | 0.4     | 0.0     | 1.1    |

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

Data source: SDP pricing proposal to IPART (Information Return), October 2016 and IPART analysis.

It is our standard practice to roll forward the historical RAB using allowed depreciation. This is an important feature of our regulatory framework as it provides regulated entities with the incentive to not overestimate their forecast capital expenditure at a price review. Therefore, irrespective of the size of the impact on the RAB, we have used allowed depreciation to roll forward SDP’s historical RAB given the incentives this approach provides.

In its submission to our Draft Report, SDP used allowed depreciation to roll forward its historical RAB. SDP also noted an issue with the way allowed depreciation had been indexed from $2011-12 to $nominal in our Draft Report. This issue resulted in our $nominal estimate of allowed depreciation being overstated, and therefore the opening RAB as at 1 July 2017 being understated. This indexing issue has been addressed, and is reflected in the historical RAB roll forward presented in Table 9.1.

9.1.2 Calculating the RAB over the 2017 determination period

We have made a decision to:

42 Adopt the value of the RAB in each year of the 2017 determination period as set out in Table 9.5.

To calculate the RAB in each year of the 2017 determination period, we rolled forward the RAB to 2021-22 by:

332 SDP pricing proposal to IPART (Information return), October 2016.
333 SDP submission to IPART’s Draft Report, April 2017, p 71.
334 SDP submission to IPART’s Draft Report, April 2017, p 69.
adding $14.5 million of prudent and efficient forecast capital expenditure over the period, which is all plant related (discussed in Chapter 6), and
deducting $250.4 million for regulatory depreciation (of which $220.6 million is plant related, and the remaining $29.9 million is for the pipeline).

This gives the forecast RAB for each year of the 2017 determination period, which we use to set SDP’s return on capital and allowance for depreciation.

The RAB roll forward over the 2017 determination period is shown in Table 9.5 below.

Table 9.5  RAB roll forward – 2017 determination period ($million, $2016-17)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Plant</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opening RAB</td>
<td>1,267.3</td>
<td>1,224.8</td>
<td>1,183.4</td>
<td>1,142.2</td>
<td>1,101.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plus Capex</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>less Depreciation</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closing RAB</td>
<td>1,224.8</td>
<td>1,183.4</td>
<td>1,142.2</td>
<td>1,101.8</td>
<td>1,061.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pipeline</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opening RAB</td>
<td>701.8</td>
<td>695.8</td>
<td>689.8</td>
<td>683.8</td>
<td>677.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plus Capex</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>less Depreciation</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closing RAB</td>
<td>695.8</td>
<td>689.8</td>
<td>683.8</td>
<td>677.9</td>
<td>671.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
Data source: IPART analysis.

Our RAB is $1.4 million lower at the end of the 2017 determination period than that proposed by SDP in its submission to our Draft Report. The differences leading to a lower RAB than SDP proposed are:

- The difference in the opening RAB as at 1 July 2017 resulting from updating the CPI for the outcome in rolling forward the RAB in 2011-12.
- Retaining the decision to set the pipeline remaining life at 115 years, compared with SDP’s proposal of 95 years.
- Accepting Atkins Cardno’s recommended capital expenditure profile, which was around $4 million lower over the 2017 determination period than SDP’s revised proposal. 

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335  SDP submission appendices to IPART’s Draft Report - Appendices, April 2017, p 32.
336  SDP submission to IPART’s Draft Report, April 2017, p 61.

IPART  Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd
9.2 Return on capital

We have made a decision to:

43 Apply a real post-tax WACC of 4.7% for the purposes of calculating an appropriate rate of return on SDP’s assets.

44 Set an allowance for return on capital as outlined in Table 9.7.

We include an allowance for a return on assets in the revenue requirement. This represents our assessment of the opportunity cost of the capital invested to provide the regulated services. Our approach ensures that the business can continue to make efficient capital investments in the future.

To calculate this allowance, we multiply the value of the RAB in each year of the determination period by an appropriate rate of return. As for previous reviews, we have determined the return on capital using the WACC.

9.2.1 Rate of return

We have developed our current approach to setting the WACC in consultation with stakeholders in a number of reviews. Our decision is to use our standard methodology for all parameters. We have selected the midpoint post-tax real WACC value of 4.7%.

The WACC is based on market data sampled to and including:

- 12 May 2017 for the risk free rate
- End April 2017 for the debt margin, market risk premium and inputs to uncertainty index, and
- May 2017 for the short-term inflation estimate.

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Our decisions on parameters and the post-tax real WACC are shown in Table 9.6.

Table 9.6  WACC parameters and WACC estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Current Market Data</th>
<th>Long-term averages</th>
<th>Final WACC range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Market data</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nominal risk free rate</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt margin</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market risk premium</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WACC parameters</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt funding</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity funding</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gamma</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate tax rate</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity beta</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cost of equity and debt</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of equity (nominal post-tax)</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of equity (real post-tax)</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of debt (nominal pre-tax)</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of debt (real pre-tax)</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WACC estimates</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nominal Vanilla (post-tax nominal) WACC</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-tax real WACC</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-tax nominal WACC</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-tax real WACC</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data source: IPART analysis.

As market uncertainty is currently within one standard deviation of the long-term average, we have selected the midpoint WACC value (Figure 9.1). We measure market uncertainty using our financial market uncertainty index. This is consistent with our decision rule for selecting a point within our range of WACC values, which was established as part of our 2013 review of the WACC.338

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Compared to the 2012 Determination, the post-tax real WACC has decreased by 90 basis points, reflecting the greater weight given under our present WACC methodology to current market data. Current data is now given equal weight to long-term average data. Since 2012 there has been a significant reduction in the risk-free rate. This has driven a reduction in the current cost of debt, despite a slight upward movement in the debt margin. It has also driven a reduction in the current cost of equity, despite an increase in the current market risk premium.

SDP originally proposed a WACC of around 4.5% based on our biannual WACC update from August 2016. In its submission to our Draft Report, SDP adopted the 4.9% WACC that we used to set draft prices.

Since then, several key WACC parameters have decreased to reflect current market conditions. SDP noted that it expects IPART to update the allowed rate of return using its current methodology, and the latest data available, in its final decision.

9.2.2 Return on assets

Based on the RAB values set out in Table 9.5 and our decision to apply a WACC of 4.7%, the resulting return on capital is shown in Table 9.7 below. Our allowance for the return on capital is higher than proposed by SDP as a result of the higher WACC and higher capital expenditure (due to our decision to capitalise period maintenance costs – see Chapters 6 and 7).

---

339 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, pp 61-62.
341 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 68.
### Table 9.7 Allowance for return on capital - all modes ($million, $2016-17)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2017-18</th>
<th>2018-19</th>
<th>2019-20</th>
<th>2020-21</th>
<th>2021-22</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Plant</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPART decision</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>272.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP proposed</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>262.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference %</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pipeline</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPART decision</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>158.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP proposed</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>152.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference %</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.*

*Data source: SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, pp 57-58, and IPART analysis.*

### 9.3 Regulatory depreciation

We have made a decision to:

1. Accept SDP’s infrastructure based asset categories, with minor adjustments, as set out in Table 9.8 and
2. Adjust SDP’s proposed new and existing asset lives as set out in Table 9.9, and
3. Set an allowance for regulatory depreciation as set out in Table 9.10.

An allowance for regulatory depreciation is included in the revenue requirement (and used in calculating the value of the RAB, as discussed above). This is intended to ensure that the capital invested in the regulatory assets is returned over the useful life of each asset.

To calculate this allowance, we determine the appropriate asset categories and lives for SDP’s RAB, and the appropriate depreciation method to use.

### 9.3.1 Asset categories on an infrastructure basis

We have accepted SDP’s proposal to revert back to an infrastructure based asset classification, given that it aligns with SDP’s accounting and reporting systems. A CEMLND\(^\text{342}\) asset categorisation was adopted in the 2012 price review only because it was consistent with how Sydney Water reported capital expenditure for regulatory purposes (i.e., the then owner of the plant and pipeline).

However, we consider the pipeline RAB should be allocated across two asset categories - pipeline and non-depreciating. The non-depreciating assets consist of land and easements, and make up around $13 million of the $660 million of total pipeline capital expenditure.

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\(^\text{342}\) CEMLND asset categorisation divides assets into the following: civil, electrical, mechanical, electronic, non-depreciating assets.
Our 2012 modelling aggregated the pipeline and non-depreciating assets into one category, despite SDP’s 2012 submission identifying these two asset categories. We consider including a non-depreciating asset category to be consistent with SDP’s proposed asset classes for the plant infrastructure.

Reverting to asset categories on an infrastructure basis has a negligible impact on SDP’s NRR given that total capital expenditure over the 2012 determination period was $1.1 million in nominal terms. In its submission to our Draft Report, SDP accepted the reclassification of asset values that were transposed in the 2012 determination period.\(^{343}\)

### Table 9.8 Asset categories for the RAB roll forward from 1 July 2012

#### Desalination Plant Infrastructure – Existing Assets (as at 1 July 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IPART 2012 Determination</th>
<th>SDP 2017 proposal</th>
<th>IPART 2017 decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plant</td>
<td>Plant</td>
<td>Plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intake infrastructure</td>
<td>Intake infrastructure</td>
<td>Intake infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outlet infrastructure</td>
<td>Outlet infrastructure</td>
<td>Outlet infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pumping station</td>
<td>Pumping station</td>
<td>Pumping station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-operations payments</td>
<td>Pre-operations payments</td>
<td>Pre-operations payments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project development</td>
<td>Project development</td>
<td>Project development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-depreciating</td>
<td>Non-depreciating</td>
<td>Non-depreciating</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Desalination Plant Infrastructure – New Assets (post 1 July 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IPART 2012 Determination</th>
<th>SDP 2017 proposal</th>
<th>IPART 2017 decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil</td>
<td>Plant</td>
<td>Plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical</td>
<td>Intake infrastructure</td>
<td>Intake infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanical</td>
<td>Outlet infrastructure</td>
<td>Outlet infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic</td>
<td>Pumping station</td>
<td>Pumping station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-depreciating</td>
<td>Pre-operations payments</td>
<td>Pre-operations payments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project development</td>
<td>Project development</td>
<td>Project development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-depreciating</td>
<td>Non-depreciating</td>
<td>Non-depreciating</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Pipeline Infrastructure – Existing & New Assets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IPART 2012 Determination</th>
<th>SDP 2017 proposal</th>
<th>IPART 2017 decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil</td>
<td>Pipeline</td>
<td>Pipeline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical</td>
<td>Non-depreciating</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-depreciating</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Corporate – New Assets (post 1 July 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IPART 2012 Determination</th>
<th>SDP 2017 proposal</th>
<th>IPART 2017 decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Short lived assets</td>
<td>Short lived assets</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{343}\) SDP submission to IPART’s Draft Report, April 2017, p 69.
9.3.2 Asset lives

We have accepted SDP’s proposed new asset lives for the plant infrastructure, following their review by our expenditure consultant, Atkins Cardno. However, we have not accepted SDP’s proposal to adjust the asset life for the pipeline from 140 years (2012 Determination) to 100 years based on its design life.

SDP reiterated its position on the pipeline asset life in its submission to our Draft Report. SDP maintains that the pipeline design life is 100 years for both the land-based and below-sea parts of the pipeline. It considered that the land-based asset life of 140 years recommended by Atkins Cardno is purely assumption-driven.

We requested that Atkins Cardno reassess the appropriate asset life for the pipeline. In doing so, it noted that:

- The current assumption of 140 years is consistent with asset lives applied to Sydney Water’s water mains of a similar diameter in similar locations and environments within the Sydney Area.
- The under-sea section of pipeline is in a more aggressive environment than the land-based sections.
- Under the current plant operation mode, the design flow is 250 ML/d with a lower pumping head. This means that the pipeline is not under full design flows and pressures until the second stage of the desalination plant is operational. There is no indication that this will be needed in the short run.

We are satisfied with Atkins Cardno’s assessment and have decided to adopt its recommendation to set the asset life for new pipeline infrastructure at 120 years. This reflects that half the length of the pipeline is land-based (140 years) and the other half is in a more aggressive environment under Botany Bay (100 years). We set asset lives on the principle of economic life (i.e., over what period should the asset provide a service), and not on its design life. This is consistent with Atkins Cardno’s rationale.

Also based on Atkins Cardno’s recommendation, we have decided to set a 5-year asset life for new short-lived corporate assets. SDP proposed a shorter 3-year life for corporate assets. This decision increased the existing life for short-lived assets as at 1 July 2017 to 1.8 years from SDP’s proposed 1.3 years.

We have made a number of adjustments to SDP’s proposed existing asset lives. These are largely a result of the corrections made to modelling errors detected as part of the 2012 Determination (Outlined earlier in this chapter).

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344 Atkins Cardno, Expenditure Review – SDP, February 2017, p 68.
345 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 62.
346 SDP submission to IPART’s Draft Report, April 2017, p 75.
351 SDP pricing proposal to IPART (Information Return), October 2016.
Our decision on asset lives for existing and new assets is presented in Table 9.9.

### Table 9.9  Asset lives for existing and new assets (years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Existing Assets</th>
<th>New Assets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SDP Proposed</td>
<td>IPART Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Plant Infrastructure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intake infrastructure</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>82.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outlet infrastructure</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>92.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pumping station</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-operations paymentsa</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project development costsa</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membranesb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pipeline Infrastructure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipeline</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>115.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corporate Assets</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short lived assets</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Pre-operations payments and Project development costs are pre-commissioning costs. No future capital expenditure will occur for these asset categories for the existing assets.
b The membranes asset category was not considered in the IPART, Review of water prices for Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Limited from 1 July 2017 – Issues Paper, August 2016, and therefore SDP has not made a proposal in relation to the appropriate economic life.

Data source: SDP pricing proposal to IPART (Information Return), October 2016. IPART analysis.

#### 9.3.3 Return of assets (regulatory depreciation)

We have accepted SDP’s straight-line approach to regulatory depreciation. This is consistent with our approach in previous reviews. We consider this method is superior to alternatives in terms of simplicity, consistency and transparency.

The difference between our allowances for regulatory depreciation and SDP’s proposed values is due to a number of decisions we have made on asset lives and asset categories outlined above. In its submission to our Draft Report, SDP generally accepted our approach to calculating depreciation, with the exception of the economic life assumed for pipeline assets.352

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352 SDP submission to IPART’s Draft Report, April 2017, pp 74, 75.
Table 9.10 presents our draft decision on SDP’s allowance for regulatory depreciation over the 2017 determination period.

Table 9.10  Allowance for regulatory depreciation - all modes ($million, $2016-17)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2017-18</th>
<th>2018-19</th>
<th>2019-20</th>
<th>2020-21</th>
<th>2021-22</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPART decision</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>215.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP proposed</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>207.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference %</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipeline</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPART decision</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP proposed</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference %</td>
<td>-19.3%</td>
<td>-19.4%</td>
<td>-19.4%</td>
<td>-19.3%</td>
<td>-19.3%</td>
<td>-19.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

Note: The allowance for regulatory depreciation differs from that used to roll forward the RAB. The difference is the depreciation used to roll forward the RAB is discounted to the mid-year point using the pre-tax WACC. This ensures that the cash flows received by SDP via prices over a year align in principle with the dollar basis of the NRR.

Data source: SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, pp 57-58, and IPART analysis.

9.4 Regulatory tax allowance

We have made a decision to:

46 Adopt the regulatory tax allowance as set out in Table 9.11.

We include an explicit allowance for tax, because we use a post-tax WACC to estimate the allowance for a return on assets in the revenue requirement. This tax allowance reflects the regulated business’s forecast tax liabilities.

We calculate the tax allowance for each year by applying a 30% statutory corporate tax rate adjusted for franking credits to the business’s (nominal) taxable income. For this purpose, taxable income is the notional revenue requirement (excluding tax allowance) less operating cost allowances, tax depreciation, and interest expenses. As part of calculating the appropriate tax allowance, the business is required to provide forecast tax depreciation for the determination period. Other items such as interest expenses are based on the parameters we use for the WACC, and the value of the RAB.

The tax allowance is one of the last building block items we calculate, due to its dependence on other items such as operating cost allowances and WACC parameters.

The difference between our tax allowance and that proposed by SDP is mainly due to our higher WACC, which results in more taxable income (for plant and pipeline). In a supplementary submission to our Draft Report, SDP raised a technical issue around interest...
expenses used to calculate the tax allowance.\textsuperscript{353} We have calculated SDP’s tax allowance consistently with our published method.\textsuperscript{354}

Table 9.11 presents our decision on SDP’s tax allowance for the 2017 determination period.

Table 9.11  Allowance for tax - all modes ($million, $2016-17)
\begin{tabular}{lcccccc}
\hline
\hline
Plant & & & & & &  \\
IPART decision & 8.3 & 9.0 & 9.5 & 10.0 & 10.5 & 47.3  \\
SDP proposed & 7.1 & 7.8 & 8.3 & 8.9 & 9.3 & 41.4  \\
Difference & -1.2 & -1.2 & -1.2 & -1.2 & -1.2 & 5.9  \\
Difference % & 12.2\% & 15.4\% & 13.8\% & 13.0\% & 12.8\% & 14.3\%  \\
Pipeline & & & & & &  \\
IPART decision & -2.3 & -2.0 & -1.8 & -1.5 & -1.3 & -8.8  \\
SDP proposed & -2.2 & -1.9 & -1.7 & -1.4 & -1.2 & -8.4  \\
Difference & -0.1 & -0.1 & -0.1 & -0.1 & -0.1 & -0.4  \\
Difference % & -3.0\% & -4.0\% & -5.5\% & -7.0\% & -8.8\% & -5.2\%  \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

Data source: SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, pp 57-58, and IPART analysis.

9.4.1 Maintaining the current statutory corporate tax rate of 30%

We have made a decision to:

47 Maintain the current statutory corporate tax rate of 30% to calculate SDP’s taxation allowance for the purposes of setting prices over the 2017 determination period.

We have decided to calculate SDP’s tax allowance over the 5-year determination period using the current legislated corporate tax rate of 30%. As part of the Commonwealth Government’s 2016-17 Budget, a schedule for progressively decreasing the corporate tax rates from 30% to 25% by 2026-27 was announced.\textsuperscript{355} The 2016-17 Budget measure passed both houses of Parliament on 9 May 2017, however with amendments.\textsuperscript{356} The amendments set the threshold for receiving the lower tax rate at turnover of $50 million annually. SDP’s revenue in both modes will exceed this threshold over the 2017 determination period, and therefore the lower tax rate does not need to be taken into consideration at this point.

\textsuperscript{353} Email correspondence with SDP, 9 May 2017.
\textsuperscript{354} The incorporation of company tax in pricing determinations, Other Industries – Final Decision, December 2011.

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9.4.2 Treatment of tax loss carryovers

We have made a decision to:

48 Adopt SDP’s proposed approach to the treatment of tax loss carryovers for the distribution pipeline.

We have accepted SDP’s proposal to remove the provision for the carryover of tax losses for the pipeline. That is, we have not set a zero tax allowance where a negative tax allowance is calculated.

We set separate NRRs (ie, building blocks) for SDP’s plant and pipeline. Due to this separation, these assets are independently subject to carryover of tax losses in our model. SDP calculates its tax depreciation on an accelerated basis and provided its estimates for the purpose of calculating the tax allowance over the next regulatory period (ie, 2017 determination period). The tax depreciation estimates provided for the plant result in a positive tax allowance. However, the tax depreciation estimates provided for the pipeline result in a tax loss.

SDP has proposed that while separate tax allowances continue for the two broad asset classes, the treatment of accumulated tax losses be changed to recognise that ‘SDP Pty Ltd’ is taxed as a single entity. This allows tax losses for the pipeline to offset tax payable for the plant.

We agree with SDP’s proposal as it will result in an aggregate tax allowance that is more reflective of SDP’s tax position as a single entity. If we did not adopt SDP’s proposal, we would be overcompensating SDP for tax and the pipeline prices would be too high.

9.5 Return on working capital

We have made a decision to:

49 Adopt 15 days for ‘receivable days’ to calculate SDP’s working capital allowance.

IPART’s default working capital parameters were used in setting prices for the Draft Determination.

For the Final Determination, we have set working capital parameters that reflect SDP’s operating environment. This decision accepts SDP’s proposed parameters with the exception of ‘receivable days’. Given that SDP’s billing cycle is 30 days, we have set the ‘receivable days’ to 15 days.

In line with our approach to calculating receivable days, the billing cycle (30 days in SDP’s case) should be divided by two. This represents how long, on average, the regulated entity has to carry the revenue owing over repeated or consecutive billing periods.
10 Refining price structures

The Terms of Reference require us to determine prices for SDP’s two monopoly services:

a) the supply of non-rainfall dependent drinking water to purchasers, and

b) the making available of the desalination plant to supply non-rainfall dependent drinking water.

In the 2012 Determination, we met the Terms of Reference by setting the following separate maximum prices for SDP’s declared monopoly services:

\[ \text{water usage charge} \ (\$/ML) \text{ for supplying non-rainfall dependent drinking water, which reflects SDP’s variable operating costs and applies only when the plant supplies water, and} \]

\[ \text{water service charges} \ (\$/day) \text{ for making the desalination plant available, which reflect SDP’s fixed operating and capital costs and apply whether or not the plant supplies water.} \]

Separate water service charges were set for a range of defined operation modes. In addition to water service charges, we set separate one-off payments to reflect the costs of transitioning between some modes of operation.

In this chapter, we discuss what charges we have set over the 2017 determination period, when they apply and what costs are recovered by each charge.

10.1 Overview of our price structures

For the 2017 Determination, we have decided to maintain our broad pricing approach adopted in the 2012 Determination and, where possible, improve the transparency of charging arrangements. We continue to set mode-dependent prices, but have simplified the modes on the advice of our expenditure consultant by removing the intermittent shutdown periods.

We have also decided to split the water service charge into a ‘base service charge’ and an ‘incremental service charge’. We have further refined transition charges, distinguishing between restarts within and outside drought and in some circumstances, first and subsequent restarts.

SDP accepted our price structures and, in particular, our approach to splitting the existing water service charges into a base service charge and an incremental service charge.\textsuperscript{357} Sydney Water was also supportive of the refinements we have made to the price structures for SDP’s services. It considered these refinements should improve transparency and assist in setting appropriate cost sharing rules amongst water users.\textsuperscript{358}

\textsuperscript{357} SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 77.

\textsuperscript{358} Sydney Water submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 22.
An overview of our price structure by mode of operation is presented in Table 10.1. The sections below discuss each in turn.

### Table 10.1 Price structures for the 2017 determination period by mode of operation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Water usage charge</th>
<th>Base service charge</th>
<th>Incremental service charge</th>
<th>Pipeline charge</th>
<th>Transition charge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shutdown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Transition to shutdown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Only applies to water in storage*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restart</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Transition to restart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Only applies to water in storage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant operation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Applies to water produced and supplied to customers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Although the plant will not produce water during shutdown, we have decided to continue to enable SDP to supply water out of storage (ie, out of its storage tanks) after production has stopped. The 2012 Determination also allowed this provision.

### 10.2 Pricing for making the plant available (fixed charges)

We have made a decision to:

- Split water service charges into:
  - a base service charge ($/day), reflecting SDP’s efficient fixed costs when in water security (shutdown) mode, and
  - an incremental service charge ($/day), reflecting the difference in SDP’s efficient fixed costs between water security (shutdown) and plant operation modes.

We have decided to retain water service charges for making the desalination plant available in accordance with our Terms of Reference. These charges recover allowances for a full return on capital, depreciation and return on working capital, plus the efficient fixed operating costs of each mode.359

But we have decided to split water service charges into a **base service charge** and an **incremental service charge** to increase transparency in SDP’s fixed costs. This is a departure from the 2012 Determination.

### 10.2.1 Base service charge – water security (shutdown) mode

The base service charge reflects the fixed costs SDP incurs when the plant is in water security (shutdown) mode. These are the minimum costs of maintaining the plant so that it can reliably produce drinking water in a timely manner when required under the 60/70 rule.

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359 Water service charges also include allowances for the Energy Adjustment Mechanism (EnAM) and the Efficiency Adjustment Mechanism (EfAM), as required by the Terms of Reference.
The base service charge is a fixed daily charge calculated by adding the annual fixed operating costs, return on capital, depreciation and return on working capital, and dividing by the number of days in a financial year.\footnote{We note that a tax allowance is included as a component of the fixed charge to reflect our move to a post-tax WACC framework. More details on this are provided in Chapter 6.}

In its response to our Issues Paper, Sydney Water expressed support for this change but questioned whether the allocation of costs between the base and incremental service charges was appropriate.\footnote{Sydney Water submission to Issues Paper, November 2016, p 18.} Sydney Water clarified in its submission to our Draft Report that it was seeking to ensure that the base service charge includes all the costs needed to maintain the desalination plant in a state of readiness to be able to fulfil its drought response obligations – but no more.\footnote{Sydney Water submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 22.}

Based on the recommendations of our expenditure consultants, we are satisfied that we have set the base service charge to recover the efficient costs only during shutdown period and no more. This includes the minimum level of operating costs that are required for maintenance activities during water security shutdown.

Sydney Water is also seeking to ensure that the cost sharing rules for these charges send the appropriate price signals to all water users.\footnote{Sydney Water submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 24.} Our view is these costs are appropriately paid by impactors (including Sydney Water) when the plant responds to drought and other water security emergencies. Cost sharing is discussed in more detail in Chapter 11.

### 10.2.2 Incremental service charge – plant operation mode

The incremental service charge reflects the difference in SDP’s fixed costs between water security (shutdown) and plant operation modes. In plant operation mode, SDP would receive the base service charge plus the incremental service charge.

The incremental service charge includes the following fixed operating costs:

- Corporate fixed costs – additional staff to manage relations with customers due to increased business activity.
- Plant fixed costs – extra labour (shifts) to carry out additional routine and periodic maintenance of the plant when it operates.

There is also a slight amount of fixed energy costs in the incremental service charges related to periodic and routine maintenance during operations. Most energy costs, however, are variable and are recovered through the water usage charge which is discussed below. Appendix D provides a breakdown of our energy allowances into fixed and variable components for each mode of operation.

In its submission to our Draft Report, SDP proposed we amend the sharing equation in the Determination so that an incremental service charge can be levied when a customer chooses not to take water after contracting with SDP to take water outside of drought.\footnote{SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 79.} We agree...
with SDP that the incremental service charge is not avoidable when water is not taken in or outside drought and address this in further detail in Chapter 11.

10.3 Pricing for the supply of drinking water (usage charges)

We have made a decision to:

51 Retain a water usage charge ($/ML) for supplying non-rainfall dependent drinking water.

This charge reflects SDP’s efficient variable operating costs and applies only when the plant produces and supplies water (i.e., plant operation period). It mainly includes the costs of energy required for the production of desalinated water.

Although the plant will not produce water during shutdown, we have decided to continue to enable SDP to charge for water supplied out of storage (i.e., out of its storage tanks) after production has stopped. The 2012 Determination also allowed this provision.

Similarly, we have enabled SDP to supply water out of storage during restart, consistent with the 2012 Determination. SDP considered that the ability to charge for water supplied out of storage under any mode during a drought should be retained to provide maximum flexibility.365

10.4 One-off transition charges (for restart and shutdown)

We have made a decision to:

52 Continue transition charges, which reflect the efficient one-off operating costs of moving from shutdown into plant operation mode and vice versa.

In the 2012 Determination, we set one-off charges to reflect the fixed operating costs SDP incurs when the plant is moving between modes – i.e., moving into shutdown from plant operation or conversely moving out of shutdown into restart (on the way to plant operation mode).

The one-off restart and shutdown costs are additional to the NRR presented in Chapter 5 and are passed through only when the plant is required to restart or shutdown. These one-off costs have been calculated based on the advice of our expenditure and energy consultants (Chapter 6 and 8).

The one-off costs for a restart are significant and include additional operational staff labour, marine intake and outfall opening, chemicals, waste disposal, as well as a fixed energy component. Shutdown charges recover costs associated with flushing and cleaning of the reverse osmosis trains, feed pumps, post-treatment plant and pre-treatment plant, and capping the sea intake and outfall outlets, which are about six times less than those incurred when restarting the plant.366

Specifically, these charges do not recover variable energy costs for the production and supply of drinking water and therefore do not substitute for water usage charges. This

365 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 81.
reflects our decision to allow SDP an 8-month grace period from abatement while ramping up production during a restart. That is, SDP can enter a plant operation mode and not be subject to financial penalty for up to 8 months if production is less than 250 ML per day. This allows it to recover its variable energy costs through the water usage charge as soon as the plant is ready to produce drinking water.

In its submission to our Draft Report, SDP accepted the continuation of one-off transition charges. However, SDP considered the level of the transition to restart charge is too low as it substantially under-estimates the volume of energy required in restart.\textsuperscript{367} We disagree with SDP on this issue and outline our position in Chapters 6 and 8.

Membrane replacement costs are also excluded from these charges. Although triggered by a restart, we have made a decision to capitalise these costs and recover them through a separate daily service charge, discussed further in Chapter 12.

10.4.1 Transition charges are payable only once during drought or on notice by a customer outside drought

We have made a decision to:

53 Ensure transition charges (for restart and shutdown) are payable only once. Either:
   – when triggered by dam storage levels when the plant is responding to drought, or
   – upon notice by a customer to start or cease supply outside drought.

The transition charges are payable at most once upon request to restart or shutdown by a customer outside drought. We also distinguish between first and subsequent restarts within drought episodes.

When the plant is required to operate in response to drought, SDP will receive a restart payment on first restart when dam storage levels fall below the 60% trigger. Restart charges are not payable on subsequent restarts during the same drought episode when dam levels have not yet reached the 70% trigger. Therefore, during an unbroken drought episode, SDP would receive only one restart payment.

Transition to shutdown charges are also only payable once, when a drought ends. That is, these charges are payable on first shutdown when the dam storage levels exceed the 70% trigger. They are not payable if the plant shuts down when dam storage levels are still below 70% since the first restart.

We have decided that SDP should not receive subsequent transition payments for restarting and shutting the plant down during a drought because this is inconsistent with the plant’s primary role to maximise production during drought. This aligns with our decision to strengthen the abatement mechanism so that SDP’s charges are abated when shutting down within drought. Under the 2012 Determination, transition to restart and shutdown charges were payable for each shutdown or restart irrespective of dam levels.

\textsuperscript{367} SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 82.
SDP accepted that only one transition to restart and transition to shutdown charge is levied during an unbroken drought period.368

Outside drought, the use of the plant is discretionary and the transition charges are paid once on request by a customer to restart and shutdown. If a customer requests the plant to restart outside drought, and the plant enters a shutdown for any reason during the term of the contract, no transition to restart (or shutdown) charges are payable in relation to this temporary shutdown.

10.5 Separate mode-independent pipeline charge

We have made a decision to:

54 Continue to set a mode-independent pipeline charge.

As in the 2012 Determination, we have decided to retain a separate charge for the pipeline, as this facilitates component pricing. The pipeline charge does not vary according to operating mode. The pipeline charge recovers allowances for a full return on capital, depreciation and return on working capital, plus the efficient fixed operating costs of the pipeline (ie, the NRR presented in Chapter 5).

SDP has consistently supported retaining a separate pipeline charge that does not vary by mode over the 2017 determination period.369
11 Refining cost sharing rules

In the previous chapter, we discussed what charges we have set over the 2017 determination period, when they apply and what costs are recovered by each charge. In this chapter we outline the decisions we have made on how these charges are to be shared.

The 2012 Determination shared all costs based on each customer’s proportionate use of SDP – ie, how much desalinated water each customer purchases relative to the total volumes supplied. In practice, this is likely to deter third-party customers, as the costs of SDP supplying water are high.

For the 2017 Determination, we have decided to use a principles based approach to sharing SDP’s costs. We employ the impactor and beneficiary pays principles in a hierarchy to create an efficient allocation of costs. This approach recognises the purpose for which the plant was built and is continued to be funded, namely the provision of an additional supply of water when dam storage levels are low. It also recognises that third parties may want to call the plant into operation commercially outside of drought.

We outline our decisions on rules for sharing membrane costs in Chapter 12. Our decisions on membrane sharing rules are consistent with our overarching principles and sharing rules in this chapter, but have regard to the complex timing of membrane replacement.

11.1 Cost sharing rules align with the plant’s primary role to respond to drought

We have made a decision to:

55 Change the cost sharing rules to reflect the desalination plant’s primary role as a drought response measure, such that:
   - Base service charges (and pipeline service charges) are always paid for by impactors
   - Water usage charges are always paid for by beneficiaries, and
   - Incremental service charges and transition charges are paid by impactors when the plant operates as a drought measure (including any portion of the minimum run time that falls outside drought) and beneficiaries when it operates outside of drought.

We have changed cost sharing rules to align with the plant’s primary role, which is to respond to drought and therefore the purpose for which it was built. Under our funding hierarchy, those who:

▼ cause the need for the desalination plant to exist always pay the base (and pipeline) service charge (impactors)

370 We have based our analysis of cost sharing on the Local Land Services framework which uses a hierarchy to determine who should pay. See IPART, Review of funding framework for Local Land Services NSW – Draft Report, September 2013.
directly benefit from the plant’s operation always pay the variable charges (beneficiaries), and
call the plant into operation (or require it to stop operating) pay the transition and incremental service charges. This will change according to whether the plant operates as a drought measure (impactors) or commercially outside of drought (beneficiaries).

Our decision represents a significant change to the current cost sharing rules, but we note that currently Sydney Water is SDP’s only customer and in practice would still pay most fixed costs for the foreseeable future. Under the 2012 Determination, fixed charges (both plant and pipeline) were allocated under the ‘beneficiary’ (or user) pays principle in proportion to the share of the plant’s output.

Table 11.1 presents our cost sharing arrangements for SDP charges. The precise cost shares paid by different parties would vary depending on the charge in question and whether it was at a time of drought or not. In the sections that follow we outline our sharing rules in detail.

We address SDP’s and Sydney Water’s submissions on our cost sharing rules at the end of this chapter. No other stakeholder commented on our approach to sharing SDP’s costs.

### Table 11.1 Our cost sharing rules – who should pay for what?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Charge/cost</th>
<th>Inside drought - allocate to</th>
<th>Outside drought - allocate to</th>
<th>Sharing rule - impactors</th>
<th>Sharing rule - beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Base service charge (and pipeline charge)</td>
<td>Impactor pays</td>
<td>Impactor pays</td>
<td>Based on proportion of total system draw(^b) “on the day”</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incremental service charge</td>
<td>Impactor pays</td>
<td>Beneficiary pays</td>
<td>Based on proportion of total system draw “on the day”</td>
<td>Based on proportion of draw from SDP “on the day”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition to restart charge</td>
<td>Impactor pays</td>
<td>Beneficiary pays</td>
<td>Once off charge – proportion of total system draw over the previous 12 months</td>
<td>Once off charge – the customer that calls SDP into operation (outside drought)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition to shutdown charge</td>
<td>Impactor pays</td>
<td>Beneficiary pays</td>
<td>Once off charge – proportion of total system draw over drought period</td>
<td>Once off charge – the customer that requires SDP to stop producing (outside drought)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water usage charge</td>
<td>Beneficiary pays</td>
<td>Beneficiary pays</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Charge per ML of water supplied by SDP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Impactor pays principle also extends to any portion of the minimum run time that falls outside drought.
\(^b\) Total system draw is any water sourced from WaterNSW Greater Sydney area dams and/or SDP.

### 11.2 Base service (and pipeline service) charges are always charged to impactors

The desalination plant exists as a non-rainfall dependant water source for Sydney during times when dams are low (the 60/70 rule). The plant’s primary role is to act as insurance and augment Greater Sydney’s water supply in the event of water scarcity. Therefore, SDP’s base costs (and pipeline costs) are a form of drought insurance premium or water security...
payment that should be paid by impactors who contribute to water scarcity in Greater Sydney.

Accordingly, we have decided that SDP’s base service charge (fixed capital and operating costs when shutdown) should be recovered from anyone who draws water from both or either WaterNSW and SDP (ie, in proportion to their draw on the total water supply system).\(^{371}\) This is consistent with the impactor pays principle, where those that create the need for a cost (ie, the desalination plant as a drought insurance/response measure) should pay for the cost.

11.2.1 What is an impactor?

We have made a decision to:

56 Define impactors so as to capture bulk water users who directly affect Greater Sydney’s water storage levels and cause the need for SDP to exist. Specifically, impactors source water from dams supplying Greater Sydney (WaterNSW) and from the desalination plant (SDP) when it operates.

We define impactors so as to capture bulk water users who directly affect Greater Sydney’s water storage levels.\(^{372}\) Total system draw is comprised of bulk water sourced from dams supplying Greater Sydney (WaterNSW) and from the desalination plant (SDP) when it operates.\(^{373}\)

Our definition means that:

▼ Outside drought (outside the 60/70 rule) - when the desalination plant’s default position is ‘off’ - total system draw would include only bulk water sourced from WaterNSW’s dams supplying Greater Sydney.

▼ In drought (under the 60/70 rule) - when the desalination plant is ‘on’ - total water system draw would also include water sourced from SDP, given that the plant is contributing to Greater Sydney’s water security needs. This also applies when the desalination plant is ‘on’ outside of drought.

Both in and out of drought, total water draw excludes water sourced from recycling schemes or any other source that adds to water security. These water users are not impactors because they are not drawing on dam storage levels and therefore do not create the need for the desalination plant.

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\(^{372}\) In full, our definition of “Impactor” is:

(a) Sydney Water Corporation; and

(b) any holder of a Retail Supplier’s Licence:

(i) who is supplied water by Water NSW or SDP; and

(ii) whose Retail Supplier’s Licence is subject to a condition requiring its holder to contribute to the costs of the Plant.

\(^{373}\) Outside the 60/70 rule, the desalination plant’s default position is ‘off’ and total water system demand would relate only to bulk water sourced from dams. When the desalination plant is ‘on’ under the 60/70 rule it is contributing to Greater Sydney’s water security needs and therefore part of “total water system supply”. For the purposes of asportioning SDP’s costs, ‘total water system demand’ should exclude water supplied from recycling schemes and any other sources that add to Sydney’s water security.
We note that Sydney Water would not be disadvantaged under our definition of an impactor if a third-party customer decides to request supply from SDP outside drought. The third-party customer would be likely to become an impactor as soon as it starts drawing water from SDP, and therefore contribute to base service charges. This also means that any utility with a WICA licence and direct supply agreement with WaterNSW that bypasses Sydney Water could also be considered an impactor when they take water.

11.2.2 Compelling impactors to pay

Our sharing rules require SDP to be able to levy charges on impactors, which need not have water supply agreements with SDP. That is, an impactor could be a utility that draws only from WaterNSW’s dams and therefore only has a supply arrangement with WaterNSW.

However, the Minister has an explicit power to add conditions to drinking water retailers’ WICA licences, so as to compel them to pay SDP for the making available of the plant. This is the case even where the WICA licensee is not a direct customer of SDP. This power was introduced in 2011, in contemplation of the privatisation of the plant.

In its submission to our Draft Report, SDP raised concerns about the practical implementation of being able to levy charges on impactors. Specifically, SDP noted that it may not be able to:

- levy charges from impactors without a commercial relationship (contracted as customers)
- compel WaterNSW to provide usage information on a monthly basis to allow SDP to recover charges from impactors in a timely manner, and
- check or control for the creditworthiness of an impactor that has not contracted with SDP, unlike its direct customers.

We agree with SDP that IPART does not have the power to compel WICA licensees to pay SDP as impactors. However, as noted above, there is scope for the Minister to give effect to our cost sharing rules by way of WICA licence conditions.

While SDP would like more certainty it is the Minister not IPART who is ultimately responsible for executing the WIC Act. For example, the Minister’s licence condition compelling the WICA license holder to make reasonable endeavours to contract with SDP could include requirements to negotiate:

- payment terms, including default of payment, and
- provision of information to calculate charges.

The Minister has discretion over how the requirements of the WIC Act are executed. The implementation of our cost sharing rules is contingent on the Minister’s decision. This means that Sydney Water will remain the default impactor if the Minister decides not to identify any other impactors through the addition of licence conditions.

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374 WIC Act, section 13(2)(c)(ii).
375 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 85.
376 The Minister is able to require holders of retail supplier’s licences to contribute to the costs of SDP’s infrastructure under WIC Act. The Minister has express power to do so under s 12(2)(c)(ii) of WICA, which was introduced specifically with the privatisation of the desalination plant in mind.
While SDP will not have the power to undertake effective credit checks on impactors, we consider that this is mitigated by the statutory mechanism for impactors to be compelled to contribute to drought security costs and pay SDP as an impactor through a licence condition. We have therefore maintained our decision to share SDP’s base service charges from WIC Act licence holders who draw water from both or either WaterNSW and SDP (ie, impactors).

11.2.3 Sydney Water would still pay most fixed costs in practice

Currently, Sydney Water is SDP’s only customer and pays all of SDP’s fixed costs. In practice, this is likely to continue for the foreseeable future, even with the proposed introduction of the impactor pays principle, because of Sydney Water’s large share of the market.

This is the case even with the increased competition from WICA licensees for retail water. WICA licensees can either source water from Sydney Water, using its distribution network, or source water directly from WaterNSW. Both ultimately supply water in competition with Sydney Water. Currently, these WICA licensees are primarily ‘wholesale’ customers of Sydney Water, purchasing potable water from Sydney Water to on-sell to their end-use customers. Accordingly, they pay SDP’s costs indirectly, including the drought insurance premium, indirectly through Sydney Water’s wholesale prices without the need to identify them as impactors through their licenses.

11.2.4 ‘On the day’ sharing rule

We have made a decision to:

57 Share base service (and pipeline service) charges between impactors based on their proportion of total system draw that day.

We consider our new sharing rules to be an improvement on those in the 2012 Determination. Under the 2012 Determination, the methodology for allocating fixed costs may have had unintended consequences for third-party customers because:

- fixed charges during shutdown and restart were allocated to each customer as a proportion of total desalinated water purchased in the 12 months preceding that shutdown, and

- if a third-party customer bought any amount of water from SDP on a day when dam levels were high (ie, outside drought), and there are no other customers, it would have become liable for the full daily fixed charge on this day.377

In practice, these sharing rules may not create financial incentives to seek supply from SDP, particularly when dam levels are high. For example, the ‘historical’ sharing rule effectively requires customers to pay a proportion or all of SDP’s fixed costs for years to come after their actual use of the plant.378

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377 See clause 6 of Schedule 2 under the 2012 Determination as an example. IPART, Prices for Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Limited’s Water Supply Services - Determination No. 2, December 2011, pp 24-25.
378 For example, assume SDP supplied water in 2012 to a third-party customer whilst operating in its drought response role. In 2013, dam storage levels returned to 80% and SDP ceased to operate. SDP remained shutdown for five years, until dam levels reached 60% in 2018, calling the plant into operation. The third-party customer in this example would pay a proportionate share of SDP’s fixed costs for the entire duration that SDP is shutdown (ie, from 2013 to 2018) based on their consumption back in 2012.
Under our 2017 sharing rule, an impactor’s share of the daily base service charge is proportionate to their daily share of total system draw. This ‘on the day’ sharing rule avoids some of the complications and unintended perverse outcomes created by the cost sharing rules under the 2012 Determination.

11.3 Water usage charges always paid for by beneficiaries

Under our sharing rules, those who take water directly from the desalination plant always pay the water usage charges associated with the plant’s operation.

In principle, there is a case to extend the ‘impactor pays’ principle to SDP’s variable charges when the plant is operating in drought. This is because the plant is called into operation under drought conditions to augment Sydney’s water supply. However, doing this would create a perverse incentive for third parties to source water from SDP during drought. This is why our sharing rules allocate water usage charges to beneficiaries (direct users of SDP) at all times.

If impactors were targeted to pay water usage charges, Sydney Water could contribute to the variable costs of desalinated water supplied that it does not receive. In addition, Sydney Water could pay higher prices for dam water from WaterNSW because SDP’s operation offsets (decreases) demand for WaterNSW water. This would raise the per unit cost of dam water paid by Sydney Water to WaterNSW (ie, total cost per ML) and lower the per unit cost of desalinated water paid by a third party to SDP, creating a perverse incentive for the third-party to source water from SDP.

Sydney Water was concerned that it would cross-subsidise water taken by third parties, and ultimately make desalinated water sourced from SDP cheaper than dam water from WaterNSW. A worked example of how this perverse incentive would arise if SDP’s usage charge was levied on an impactor pays basis is shown in Appendix E.

11.4 Ongoing and one-off fixed operating costs paid by impactors during drought and beneficiaries outside drought

Transition and incremental service charges are allocated to those who call the plant into operation. That is, in drought impactors pay and outside of drought beneficiaries pay.

While impactors do not directly request the plant to operate in a drought, operation is triggered under the 60/70 rule to augment Greater Sydney’s water supply. This is part of the plant’s purpose for existing, as previously discussed. Therefore, the 60/70 operating rule calls the plant into operation on behalf of the impactors, requiring them to pay the transition and incremental service charges (ie, additional one-off and ongoing fixed operating costs when the plant is called into production).

379 WaterNSW’s current determination contains an equation that adjusts (proportionately increases) WaterNSW’s variable price to large customers (currently only Sydney Water) for every ML taken from SDP. This equation assumes that forecast demand for that year remains constant and any water taken from SDP must reduce water taken from WaterNSW by an equivalent amount. This ensures that WaterNSW’s revenue requirement is unaffected by SDP operation.

Outside of drought the plant provides a discretionary service which can be called on by third-parties for commercial use or Sydney Water for emergency response. Therefore, the plant is not responding to water scarcity, operating for the purpose of augmenting Sydney’s water supply due to drought. Accordingly, beneficiaries pay SDP’s transition and incremental service charges.

Our decision on who should pay incremental service charges is different from our preliminary position presented in our Issues Paper. We initially proposed levying charges to recover incremental service costs on a user (beneficiary) pays basis during drought. Sydney Water agreed with our preliminary position to allocate incremental service charges to beneficiaries. However, we did not address the sharing of transition charges in our Issues Paper. Sydney Water raised the issue of transition charges and made a case that these charges should be allocated to beneficiaries outside drought (outside the 60/70 rule) and allocated to impactors inside drought (inside the 60/70 rule). Sydney Water argued that allocating transition charges to beneficiaries outside drought was to prevent its customers from subsidising the discretionary use of the plant by third-party customers.

We agree with Sydney Water that transition charges should be allocated to impactors when the plant is responding to drought and to beneficiaries outside of drought (as outlined above). Based on Sydney Water’s logic and consistent with our principles, it follows that incremental service charges should be allocated to impactors in drought, given that both transition and incremental service charges relate to calling the plant into operation.

11.4.1 Sharing ongoing incremental service charges – calculated ‘on the day’

We have made a decision to:

- Share incremental service charges ‘on the day’ between:
  - impactors during drought based on their proportion of total system draw that day
  - impactors during any portion of the minimum run time that falls outside drought based on their proportion of total system draw that day, and
  - beneficiaries outside drought based on their proportion of desalinated water sold that day.

Like base service charges, incremental service charges are levied daily recovering the ongoing fixed operating costs to run the plant.

During drought, these charges would be shared between impactors based on their share of total system draw ‘on the day’. That is, each impactor will be charged an amount equal to the proportion of water it draws from WaterNSW and SDP (compared to total water supplied by WaterNSW and SDP) for each day SDP operates.
We also note that during any portion of the minimum run time that falls outside drought charges would be shared between impactors as well because this discretionary period of production is an extension of the plant being called into operation because of drought.

Outside drought, these charges will be shared between beneficiaries based on their total proportion of draw from SDP ‘on the day’. That is, each beneficiary will be charged an amount equal to the proportion of water it draws from SDP (only) compared to total water supplied by SDP (only) for each day SDP operates.

In response to our Draft Report, SDP noted that our Draft Determination limited its ability to recover its costs outside of drought when water is not supplied (not due to SDP). SDP argued that its incremental service costs are not avoidable when water is not supplied during a period of operation (ie, as opposed to shutdown).385

We agree with SDP that its incremental service costs are not avoidable when water is not taken. We have amended the 2017 Determination so that when water is not supplied the sharing ratio for the incremental service charge is set equal to the most recent day water was supplied.

11.4.2 Sharing one-off transition charges

We have made a decision to:

59 Share one-off transition charges (to restart and shutdown):

– between existing impactors based on their total system draw over the 12 months prior to a restart for drought and the entire drought episode prior to the first shutdown after the end of drought, and

– equally by the beneficiaries that request the restart or shutdown outside drought (ie, issue a notice for SDP to start or cease supply).

Transition charges are one-off payments made to SDP to recover fixed operating costs of either recommencing or terminating supply (ie, for the plant transitioning to and from shutdown). Because they are not on-going payments, like incremental service charges, an ‘on the day’ sharing rule is inappropriate.

Allocating a significant one-off payment (transition charge) according to draw on a particular day could lead to a perverse outcome. This would occur when an impactor’s/beneficiary’s draw on the water supply network on that day is significantly different from its average/typical draw. This means that its contribution to these costs would not represent that customer’s impact on the system.

How we apportion transition charges between impactors in drought and beneficiaries outside of drought is summarised below:

▼ Transition to restart charges:

– Commencement of drought response, allocate on impactor pays principle using the total customer impact over the preceding 12 months.

385 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 79.
Outside drought, allocate on beneficiary pays principle in equal shares to customer(s) who request the restart.

Transition to shutdown charges:
- Completion of drought response, allocate on impactor pays principle using the total customer impact over the period of drought.
- Outside drought, allocate on beneficiary pays principle in equal shares to customer(s) who request the shutdown.

We have moved away from only using historical use of the plant to allocate these one-off charges (ie, as per the 2012 Determination) because it creates some uncertainty for SDP’s cost recovery. Charging based on historical use of the plant would be based on previous users, not necessarily those that call plant into operation, which is inconsistent with efficient allocation of costs under the impactor and beneficiary pays framework.

Inside drought, SDP’s transition to restart charges are shared between existing impactors based on their total system draw (from WaterNSW and SDP) over the 12 months preceding SDP commencing its transition to operation. This is a reasonable reflection of the impact each water user has had on the total system. Transition to shutdown charges are shared between existing impactors based on their draw over the entire drought episode. This is to reflect that total system draw can be greatly impacted by drought conditions, especially if restrictions are in place.

We also note that if any portion of the minimum run time falls outside drought the transition to shutdown charge would be shared between impactors as well because this discretionary period of production is an extension of the plant being called into operation because of drought.

Outside of drought, transition charges are shared equally between the beneficiaries (direct users of SDP) that request the restart or shutdown (ie, issue a notice for SDP to start or cease supply). This is appropriate because transition charges recover costs that are independent of volumes supplied to individual customers. As noted in Chapter 10, transition charges can be charged at most once to a requesting customer outside drought.

In response to our Draft Report, SDP considered that sharing the transition to restart charge equally between beneficiaries creates a disincentive for small users to source water from SDP alongside a large user. SDP also noted that while it is true that transition charges recover costs that are independent of volumes supplied to individual customers, it does not follow that these joint costs should therefore be shared equally between such customers.

While this may be the case theoretically, we consider that outside of drought SDP’s general costs represent a greater disincentive to sourcing water from SDP compared to WaterNSW. We have therefore decided to maintain the current sharing rule for the transition to restart charge. Introducing an alternative rule based on volumes as proposed by SDP would also present practical challenges because it would need to be based on contracted amounts before water is supplied. We consider this would increase the complexity of the 2017 Determination with very little gain.

SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, pp 85-86.
SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 86.
11.5 Stakeholder views on cost sharing rules

Below we outline stakeholder views on cost sharing rules, and our response to their views.

11.5.1 SDP

SDP was not in favour of changing the cost sharing rules to an impactor pays basis in its initial pricing proposal.388 However, at our Public Hearing it revised its view and agreed that sharing costs on an impactor pays principle is logical and better aligns with the plant’s primary role to respond to drought.389

In its response to our Draft Report, SDP accepted our cost sharing rules. However, this acceptance is premised on the low likelihood of the emergence of any new customers (or impactors) during the 2017 determination period. In light of this, SDP provided feedback on practical concerns regarding the implementation of our cost sharing rules, requesting additional consultation and consideration at future reviews.390

Generally speaking, SDP believes that our cost sharing rules are too prescriptive outside of drought, undermining the emergence of new customers.391

We note SDP’s view that our cost sharing rules outside of drought are prescriptive. As noted in Chapter 2, our preference is for unregulated pricing outside of drought. However, we are required to regulate SDP’s prices in and outside of drought under the Terms of Reference.

11.5.2 Sydney Water

In response to our Issues Paper, Sydney Water supported the proposal to move away from recovering SDP’s water security charge on a user pays basis toward an impactor pays basis.392 Further, Sydney Water agreed more broadly with the possibility of third-party customers sharing the burden of SDP’s costs.

However, Sydney Water and WaterNSW emphasised that SDP’s sharing rules should not result in desalinated water becoming cheaper to buy than dam water, nor the cross subsidisation of desalinated water by Sydney Water for third-party customers.393

In response to our Draft Report, Sydney Water questioned whether our cost sharing rules would result in desalinated water becoming cheaper than dam water. Specifically, Sydney Water raised the following issues:394

\[\text{In our Draft Report, we did not account for treatment costs when comparing the costs between organisations in our examples (Appendix E), and}\]

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388 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, pp 124-126.
389 SDP, SDP public hearing transcript, 8 December 2016, p 18.
390 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, pp 85-86.
391 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, pp 85-86.
392 Sydney Water submission to IPART Issues Paper, November 2016, p 27.

IPART Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd
as a result, the incremental service charge should be shared between beneficiaries during drought because not doing so could create a perverse incentive for third parties to source water from SDP during drought.

Sydney Water argues that our analysis of the cost sharing rules did not compare water from difference sources on a like-for-like basis. That is, we did not include treatment costs associated with water sourced from WaterNSW.

We agree that it is not possible to make a proper comparison between the costs of water businesses unless we account for the cost of producing a comparable product. Based on available information, we estimate that average treatment costs would be approximately $375/ML or $0.38/kL. We have incorporated these treatment costs into our examples in Appendix E.

In light of this, Sydney Water views possible scenarios where desalinated water could be cheaper than dam water (dollars per ML basis). Sydney Water concludes that this may lead to perverse outcomes (eg, an opportunistic water user switching to SDP during drought). Therefore, Sydney Water does not support sharing SDP’s incremental service charges on an impactor pays basis during drought. Further, Sydney Water argues that since the costs needed to maintain and trigger the water security benefits of SDP have already been fully recovered from impactors (ie, through the base service charge), beneficiaries should pay for the cost of producing drinking water (ie, the incremental service and water usage charges).

We do not agree with Sydney Water that our cost sharing rules create a perverse outcome. We have designed SDP’s cost sharing rules so that the business drawing the most water from total system supply will pay the majority of SDP’s fixed costs as the greatest impactor. This includes the incremental service charge, which should also be shared on an impactor pays basis during drought given that the plant is called into operation because of impactors. In addition, SDP’s incremental service costs should not be shared on a beneficiary pays basis because it is not avoidable if water is not taken.

Accordingly, the average costs of water to a business ($/ML) do not allow for a direct comparison of the relative cost of desalinated water against dam water, because costs are shared based on SDP’s purpose not on a commercial basis. If desalinated water were to have a lower marginal cost than dam water during drought this is not a perverse incentive as long as all businesses face similar incentives to take water from SDP during drought, reflecting SDP’s purpose (offsetting demand for dam water during drought).

Therefore, we have not changed our decision to share incremental costs on impactor pays basis during drought. We have updated our examples in Appendix E with our final decisions on costs and cost sharing rules. Our examples demonstrate how costs will be shared between two customers (Sydney Water and Retailer A) in hypothetical situations.

396 IPART analysis.
12 Treatment of membrane replacement costs

In Chapter 6, we decided to allow for the prudent and efficient cost of a full membrane replacement only once at the time of a first restart in the 2017 determination period. This is the cornerstone of our consultant’s (Atkins Cardno) recommendations, reflecting that:

- the plant has been in a prolonged period of shutdown (since July 2012), and the membrane stock is near the end of its guaranteed life, and
- providing a full membrane replacement on first restart eliminates the need for a partial plant test in water security (shutdown) mode.\(^{398}\)

We also decided not to provide any further allowances for the ongoing replacement of membranes in the 2017 determination period (ie, in the event of subsequent restarts).

In this chapter, we outline our treatment of these costs over the 2017 determination period, should the plant restart and be called into operation. In particular, we have decided to capitalise the costs of a full membrane replacement on first restart in accordance with Atkins Cardno’s recommendation,\(^{399}\) and to introduce a separate daily membrane service charge to recover the capital costs of membranes over their asset life.

We consider a separate charge recovering membrane costs increases transparency of the membrane replacement program. Specifically, the charge is designed to accommodate the uncertainty of their timing, and ensure customers only pay for membranes when they are needed.

We apply different cost sharing rules for membrane service charges depending on whether the plant is called into operation for drought or commercially, outside drought. These cost sharing rules are consistent with those applied to SDP’s other charges in Chapter 11.

Finally, we have decided not to make a provision for membranes needed in the event that the first restart over the 2017 determination period is in response to an emergency (ie, exceptional circumstances specified in the Water Supply Agreement). Rather, we would review these prudent and efficient costs ex-post at the next price review. We consider this to be in keeping with SDP using ‘reasonable endeavours’ in an emergency response.

12.1 Capitalising the costs of membrane replacement

We have made a decision to:

60 Establish a separate membrane asset base (membrane RAB) as set out in Table 12.1:

- with an opening value of $30 million in the year of first restart
- adopting an asset life for membranes of 8 years

\(^{399}\) Atkins Cardno, Expenditure Review – SDP, February 2017, p 12.
– not adding any further capital expenditure for the ongoing replacement of membranes, and
– rolling forward the membrane RAB until the membranes fully depreciate.

We have decided to capitalise the costs of a full membrane replacement on first restart in accordance with Atkins Cardno’s recommendation, and to introduce a separate daily membrane service charge to recover the capital costs of membranes over their asset life.

To capitalise membrane costs, we establish a separate asset base, a ‘membrane RAB’. The membrane RAB has an opening value of $30 million in accordance with our decision on the prudent and efficient costs of a full set of membranes (see Chapter 6). Opening and closing values of the membrane RAB are calculated over an 8-year asset life, until the membranes are fully depreciated.

The RAB represents the value of SDP’s stock of membrane assets on which we consider it should earn a return on capital and an allowance for regulatory depreciation. It assumes that a full membrane replacement occurs in 2017-18 and is calculated beyond the 2017 determination period, over the full life of the membranes (from 2017-18 to 2024-25).

SDP’s annual required revenue for membrane costs is then calculated in each year as the sum of the:

- return on membrane assets, using our WACC of 4.7%
- return of membrane assets, using straight line depreciation over the 8-year asset life, and
- tax allowance for membrane assets.

Finally, the annual required revenue is converted to a daily service charge. Our decision on membrane RAB is presented in Table 12.1.

**Table 12.1 Membrane RAB, revenue requirement and daily charges assuming a restart in 2017-18 ($’000, $2016-17)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opening RAB</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>26,250</td>
<td>22,500</td>
<td>18,750</td>
<td>15,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Depreciation</td>
<td>3,750</td>
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<td>3,750</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closing RAB</td>
<td>26,250</td>
<td>22,500</td>
<td>18,750</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>11,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return on capital</td>
<td>1,378</td>
<td>1,206</td>
<td>1,033</td>
<td>861</td>
<td>689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax allowance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total capital costs or required revenue</td>
<td>5,043</td>
<td>4,871</td>
<td>4,698</td>
<td>4,526</td>
<td>4,354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Daily charge ($/day)</strong></td>
<td>13,816</td>
<td>13,344</td>
<td>12,837</td>
<td>12,400</td>
<td>11,928</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Numbers may not add due to rounding.

**Data source:** IPART analysis.

In its submission to our Draft Report, SDP accepted our decision to establish a membrane asset base, noting that this approach:

facilitates capitalising membranes, and
\n\nensures that customers only pay membrane replacement costs when they are required.\(^{401}\)

However, SDP noted that an allowance for tax also needed to be included in the membrane service charge.\(^{402}\) SDP proposed adopting a pre-tax framework to simplify the process by removing the need to estimate a tax depreciation profile for the membranes.\(^{403}\)

We agree with SDP and have included a tax allowance as part of the membrane service charge. To calculate the tax allowance, we have applied accelerated depreciation, consistent with the tax depreciation estimates provided by SDP for the plant and pipeline. This results in a zero tax allowance in all years of the 2017 determination period. This is because income for the first two years after membranes are purchased is entirely offset by the sum of accelerated depreciation and the benchmark interest expense, resulting in a tax loss. The accumulated tax loss for the first two years is not exhausted by the income earned later in the 2017 determination period.

### 12.2 Establishing membrane service charges

We have made a decision to:

61 Set separate charges to recover the capitalised costs of a full membrane replacement over the 2017 determination period, which includes the:

- schedule of membrane service charges as outlined in Table 12.2, and
- one-off charges for residual membrane costs as outlined in Table 12.3.

We have set a schedule of daily charges for membranes given that a restart could in principle occur in any year of the determination period. In practice, the restart is unlikely to occur during the first year of the 2017 determination period (2017-18) while the plant is inoperable following the December 2015 storm event. Atkins Cardno also assessed it unlikely that a dam level driven restart would happen before 2019-20.\(^{404}\)

The schedule of daily membrane service charges over the 5-year 2017 determination period is presented in Table 12.2. These service charges are derived from Table 12.1. We note that the one-off transition to restart charge (average $12.4 million including energy costs, see Chapter 6) is payable on each restart in response to drought and excludes membrane costs. Therefore there is no double counting of membrane costs to customers.

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\(^{401}\) SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 73.

\(^{402}\) SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 50.

\(^{403}\) SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 65.

To allow SDP to recoup the full cost of the membrane replacement required at a restart, we have also decided to set a separate charge for any residual capital costs of membranes. This would be a one-off charge payable by the user (or users) on transition to shutdown following a period of operation outside drought (we explain the charging and cost sharing rules for membrane service charges below).

The residual costs payable at shutdown vary depending on which year the restart occurs during the 2017 determination period. Our decision on the residual membrane charge is presented in Table 12.3. These costs are also derived from Table 12.1.

### Table 12.3 One-off residual membrane charge payable on shutdown over the 2017 determination period contingent on restart year ($’000, $2016-17)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017-18</td>
<td>26,250</td>
<td>22,500</td>
<td>18,750</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>11,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018-19</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>26,250</td>
<td>22,500</td>
<td>18,750</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019-20</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>26,250</td>
<td>22,500</td>
<td>18,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020-21</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>26,250</td>
<td>22,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021-22</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>26,250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data source: IPART analysis.

### 12.3 Sharing rules for membrane replacement costs

We have made a decision to:

62. Apply the following charging rules for membrane costs:
   - membranes paid for in full by impactors when the plant is triggered by drought
   - membranes paid for in full by beneficiaries when the plant operates outside drought, and
   - membrane costs revert to impactors if drought occurs before they are paid in full by beneficiaries.

Similar to SDP’s other charges (Chapter 11), we employ the impactor and beneficiary pays principles in a hierarchy to create an efficient allocation of membrane costs. This approach recognises the purpose for which the plant is used (ie, in response to drought or for discretionary use outside drought).
Accordingly, we have decided that membrane service charges are paid in full on an impactor pays basis during drought (including any portion of the minimum run time that falls outside drought) and beneficiary pays basis outside drought. This is consistent with our decision on cost sharing rules for other charges.

12.3.1 Membranes for drought response are funded in full by impactors

A full replacement of membranes on first restart in response to drought is intrinsic to SDP’s primary drought response role. Therefore, when the costs are triggered by a restart, we consider that they should be treated in the same way as the base service charge. That is, the daily membrane service charges are:

- shared on the impactor pays principle, and
- continue into plant operation period and a subsequent shutdown until the membranes are fully paid (i.e., over the 8-year asset life).

Effectively, the membrane service charge becomes an add-on to the base service charge.

Should the plant restart during the 2017 determination period in response to drought, any actual membrane costs incurred by SDP would be treated like any other capital cost in the base service charge and subject to a prudence and efficiency test at the next determination period when rolling forward the historical RAB and its membrane component.

Sydney Water noted the possibility that some membranes may be replaced in 2017 or 2018 as part of storm-related reinstatement works. Sydney Water considered that membranes funded by SDP’s insurers should be excluded from the starting membrane RAB in the 2017 determination period.

In addition, Sydney Water commented that if SDP restarted (accompanied with full membrane replacement) and then continued to operate in the 2017 determination period, some further replacement of the membranes might be required, affecting the membrane RAB.

Sydney Water also raised the likely treatment of membrane replacement costs if the desalination plant were to operate for more than four years at some time in the future.

As noted above, our decision to capitalise a full set of membranes on first restart includes a standard prudence and efficiency assessment at the next price review, similar to other capital expenditure items. Only prudent and efficient expenditure on membrane replacement will be accepted in the opening membrane RAB for the next price determination period. We would therefore adjust the membrane RAB ex-post for any membrane replacement funded by SDP’s insurers during plant reinstatement work following the December 2015 storm event, and any holding costs using the relevant WACC.

12.3.2 Membranes paid for in full by beneficiaries outside drought

Much like incremental service charges, membrane service charges should be paid on a user or beneficiary pays principle for discretionary use of the plant outside drought. Moreover,
because a restart outside drought is not intrinsic to SDP’s water security role, we consider that all associated membrane costs should be borne by the beneficiary. That is, regardless of how long the plant is requested to operate, the full set of membranes should be paid for over their economic life.

This means that a third-party customer would pay a one-off charge on transition to shutdown (ie, by issuing a notice to cease supply) to recover the residual costs of membranes, as set out in Table 12.3.

The proposal to recoup all membrane costs from third-party customers for use of the plant outside drought is similar to SDP’s proposal. SDP proposed that membrane costs be paid in full by third-party customers, however as a one-off payment at restart. However, by capitalising membrane costs and paying for them over their useful life, our treatment of membranes allows the potential sharing of these costs in the event there are multiple customers using the plant simultaneously (although not sequentially) outside drought.

Our treatment of membranes would see a third-party customer pay out the residual membrane costs regardless of the terms of the supply (ie, duration and capacity). In its response to our Draft Report, SDP expressed concern the cost sharing rules for direct users outside of drought are excessively prescriptive. Specifically, SDP noted that the residual membrane service charge paid by beneficiaries would be a significant disincentive to new entrants, and potentially provide windfall benefits to impactors, should the membranes still be in service when the next drought commenced.

SDP proposed unregulated pricing agreements with customers outside drought to accommodate supply at varying levels of output. As discussed in Chapter 2, we are unable to implement such agreements given our Terms of Reference. The prices we set reflect the efficient cost for the provision of SDP’s services at full capacity, both in and outside drought.

We note that alternative sources of water are available outside drought, and the customer’s decision to source water from SDP is a commercial decision. Also, we set the maximum charges that SDP can levy. SDP has an option outside drought to replace less than the full set of membranes where production is less than full capacity, and charge less than the maximum membrane service and residual charges outlined above.

12.3.3 No additional membrane costs payable at a subsequent restart

Membrane replacement costs are allowed only once in the 2017 determination period, on first restart of the plant in or outside of drought.

Membranes funded by a third-party customer on first restart outside drought could have a significant useful life left in them. Sydney Water customers (and other impactors) would therefore receive a windfall gain for the residual life of the membranes over the 2017 determination period. This is because the membranes could be used by SDP during drought but would have been paid outside of drought (ie, by a third-party customer, not by Sydney Water).

408 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 70.
409 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 31.
Equally, third-party customers would receive a windfall gain if they were to use the plant subsequent to a drought period of less than eight years (the life of the membranes). This is because membranes for drought response are funded in full by impactors.

Avoiding membrane costs under these circumstances does not reduce the unit cost of desalinated water below dam water and therefore incentivise inefficient use of the plant. As noted above, it is appropriate for impactors to pay for a full set of membranes on first restart in response to drought because it is difficult for SDP to predict the duration of a drought. SDP is required by its Network Operator’s Licence to maximise production in response to drought.

At any subsequent restart of the plant, SDP would not be over-compensated for the fully funded membranes.

**12.3.4 Membrane costs revert to impactors if drought occurs before they are paid in full**

If drought occurs before membranes are paid in full by a third-party customer, the cost sharing rule would switch from beneficiary to impactor pays. The remaining costs of the membranes therefore would be paid in full by all impactors, as per Table 12.2.

Effectively, the stock of membranes paid by the third-party customer on a beneficiary pays basis outside drought ‘changes hands’ when the drought starts, now becoming intrinsic to drought response and thus shared using the impactor pays principle. The daily membrane service charges in this instance would be paid by impactors and continue throughout the drought period and beyond into a subsequent shutdown until the membranes are fully paid (ie, over the 8-year asset life).

**12.4 Ex-post review of membrane costs for emergency response**

We have made a decision to:

63 Review the prudent and efficient capital costs of membranes associated with supply for emergency response to Sydney Water (ie, exceptional circumstances specified in the Water Supply Agreement) ex-post at the next determination period.

- Where appropriate, these costs would be rolled into the historical RAB, including holding costs using the relevant WACC.
- These membranes costs would be paid for in full by Sydney Water.

If Sydney Water requests SDP to restart in emergency, SDP must use its reasonable endeavours to supply any amount of desalinated water within the shortest period of time.

Notwithstanding their age, the existing membranes might still be fit to produce some quantity of desalinated water that can be treated to drinking water quality standard. This is

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410 We note that in this circumstance if the third-party customer continues to draw supply from SDP, they are no longer classed as a beneficiary. They would therefore no longer pay for membrane costs based on their total proportion of draw from SDP ‘on the day’. Instead, they would be classed as an impactor and be charged an amount for membranes equal to the proportion of water they draw from WaterNSW and SDP. Therefore, they do not avoid membrane costs.
particularly so if the emergency period is short. However, if the emergency is expected to be prolonged, it would be reasonable to expect some replacement of membranes on restart.

Due to uncertainties associated with the timing and nature of any emergency response, we recommend reviewing membrane replacement costs in this instance ex-post. At the next price review, we would assess the prudent and efficient capital costs of membranes associated with emergency response. This is consistent with our treatment of other capital cost items with uncertain timing (eg, skid test unit and an extra pump for the drinking water pumping station, see Chapter 7).

To ensure SDP is not underfunded for the membranes it might need for an emergency response, we would also reimburse any holding costs using the relevant WACC. The resulting membrane costs would be subsequently paid for by Sydney Water.

In its submission to our Draft Report, SDP accepted our decision to conduct an ex-post review of membrane replacement costs at the next price review in the event of an emergency response during the 2017 determination period.\(^{411}\) This was also supported by Sydney Water, which commented that neither the occurrence of emergency events nor the specific costs needed for SDP to provide an emergency response can be known in advance.\(^{412}\)

\(^{411}\) SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 60.
\(^{412}\) Sydney Water submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 12.
13 Prices and impacts

This chapter outlines our prices and the impact of our pricing decisions on Sydney Water’s customers. It also discusses the implication of our pricing decision on other matters we must consider under section 15 of the IPART Act (see Appendix B). These include:

- SDP’s financial viability and shareholders
- general inflation
- the environment, and
- SDP’s service standards.

We are satisfied that our 2017 Determination achieves an appropriate balance between these matters.

13.1 Prices over the 2017 determination period

We have made a decision to:

64 Set prices for the 2017 determination period as outlined in Table 13.1.

Our prices comprise the following charges:

- **Base service charge** ($/day) reflecting SDP’s fixed costs for the plant when in water security (shutdown) mode. On an annual basis, this is equivalent to the NRR in water security (shutdown) mode.

- **Incremental service charge** ($/day) reflecting SDP’s additional fixed costs when in plant operation mode. On an annual basis, this is equivalent to the NRR in plant operation mode (with all variable costs removed) less the NRR in water security (shutdown) mode.

- **Water usage charge** ($/ML) for supplying non-rainfall dependent drinking water. This charge reflects SDP’s efficient variable operating costs when the plant is operating.

- **Pipeline service charge** ($/day) reflecting SDP’s fixed costs for the pipeline, which are the same in water security (shutdown) and plant operation modes. On an annual basis, this is equivalent to the NRR for the pipeline.

- **Membrane service charge** ($/day) reflecting the capitalised costs of a full membrane replacement at restart.

- **Transition charges** ($/per event) reflecting the efficient fixed one-off operating costs incurred when the plant moves from water security (shutdown) into plant operation mode and vice versa.

SDP’s prices are presented in Table 13.1 below. Our prices recover costs in the year they occur. As a result, there is no smoothing of the NRR or prices. We note that the prices are in ‘real’ $2016-17 – ie, they exclude the effects of inflation over 2017-18 to 2021-22 (in contrast, bill impacts include forecast inflation over 2017-18 to 2021-22). Prices in the accompanying
Determination are in $2017-18 – ie, the prices outlined in this chapter adjusted for one year of inflation.

Table 13.1 Prices for the 2017 determination period ($2016-17)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% change</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Plant service charges</td>
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<tr>
<td>($/day)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base service charge</td>
<td>391,257</td>
<td>365,748</td>
<td>362,064</td>
<td>357,033</td>
<td>352,906</td>
<td>348,783</td>
<td>-10.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incremental service</td>
<td>37,034</td>
<td>20,948</td>
<td>21,383</td>
<td>21,345</td>
<td>21,081</td>
<td>22,377</td>
<td>-39.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>charge ($/day)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipeline service charge</td>
<td>140,610</td>
<td>99,071</td>
<td>99,086</td>
<td>98,793</td>
<td>99,011</td>
<td>98,899</td>
<td>-29.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membrane service charge ($/day)*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13,816</td>
<td>13,344</td>
<td>12,837</td>
<td>12,400</td>
<td>11,928</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition to restart</td>
<td>6,053</td>
<td>13,933</td>
<td>12,652</td>
<td>12,031</td>
<td>11,735</td>
<td>11,622</td>
<td>92.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>($'000 per event)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition to shutdown</td>
<td>1,588</td>
<td>1,686</td>
<td>1,686</td>
<td>1,686</td>
<td>1,686</td>
<td>1,686</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>($'000 per event)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water usage charge</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>-10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>($/ML)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* No membrane service charge applies if there is no restart in the 2017 determination period. The membrane service charge in this table assumes a first restart in 2017-18. Table 12.2 presents the complete schedule of membrane service charges by year of restart.

**Note:** The first year of the 2017 Determination is 2017-18. Results for 2016-17 are provided for comparative purposes.

13.1.1 Compared to the 2012 Determination

Plant and pipeline service charges decrease because of a lower WACC and better estimate of tax allowance

Under our decisions, SDP’s base and pipeline service charges decrease in 2017-18 compared to 2016-17. The base service charge decreases by 6.5% from 2016-17 to 2017-18, while the pipeline service charge decreases by 29.5%.

Over the 2017 determination period the base service charge continues to decrease, reflecting the fact that the return on capital is decreasing over this period.

The pipeline charge also reflects our decision to allow tax losses for the pipeline to offset tax payable on the plant. The impact of this change is a reduction in the overall required revenue via a negative tax allowance for the pipeline.

Incremental service charges decrease because of the capitalisation of periodic maintenance costs

The incremental service charge decreases by 43.4% from 2016-17 to 2017-18. This is almost entirely due to our decision to capitalise periodic maintenance costs. These costs are now recovered through the base service charge.
Membrane service charges would be introduced for the first time in the 2017 determination period

Membrane replacement costs were not included in the 2012 Determination, given the age of these assets at the time. If SDP restarts during the 2017 determination period, it is likely to need a full set of membranes which would add on average around $12,865 to SDP’s daily service charges. The membrane replacement costs start at the time of the first transition to restart and then continue until they are paid in full. No membrane replacement costs are payable if SDP remains in shutdown for the duration of the 2017 determination period.

Water usage charges decrease over time

Water usage charges increase in 2017-18 by 22.5%, but then decrease over time. This largely reflects the movements in benchmark energy costs. Over the 2017 determination period, the benchmark energy cost declines, which results in a reduction in the water usage charge of 10.5% from 2016-17 to 2021-22.

The usage charge also decreases over time because of reductions in energy volumes recommended by our consultants. Our analysis indicates energy costs decline from approximately $693 per ML in 2017-18 to $466 per ML in 2021-22, or about 82% to 76% of the water usage charge in those years respectively.

Additional costs have been included in transition to restart charges

Additional costs have been included in transition to restart charges. In 2017-18, the transition to restart charge increases by 130.2% compared to 2016-17 under our final decisions. This reflects costs related to energy and pipeline flushing that were not included in the 2012 Determination, and changes in key input costs (eg, chemicals).

The energy costs in the transition to restart charges reflect the fixed energy costs associated with restarting the plant, and not the variable energy costs that depend directly on the volume of water produced in restart. These latter energy costs are captured by the water usage charge.

13.1.2 Compared to the Draft Report

Since the Draft Report, we have updated the following to reflect latest market information:

- the cost of capital (WACC), and
- benchmark energy prices.

We have also made minor changes to operating and capital costs, based on our consultant’s review of SDP’s and stakeholder submissions to our draft expenditure decisions. The charges mostly affected by these changes include:

1. Base and pipeline service charges – being fixed charges, both have reduced because of a decrease in the WACC to 4.7% compared to 4.9% in our Draft Report.
2. Water usage charge - is higher in the first two years but lower in the subsequent three years of the determination period. This is due to the updated benchmark energy prices.
3. Transition to restart charge - has increased significantly due to additional fixed energy requirements allocated to the restart period after considering SDP’s submission and the recommendations of our consultant, Atkins Cardno.

13.1.3 Compared to SDP’s proposed prices

SDP’s proposed prices are presented in Table 13.2. Differences between SDP’s prices and our prices derive from our decisions on SDP’s efficient costs, which are identified in the NRR analysis in Chapter 5. This includes:

- Capitalising prudent and efficient periodic maintenance costs so that customers do not need to pay for these capital-related costs upfront.
- Disallowing a partial plant test in water security (shutdown) mode.
- Deciding to review ex-post capital expenditure contingent on uncertain future restart of the plant so that customers only pay for this if needed.

Factors that have increased our prices include a higher WACC than proposed by SDP and higher benchmark energy costs.

Our transition to restart charges are lower than SDP’s because we have excluded energy costs for the production and supply of drinking water (these costs are recovered via the usage charge) and we have capitalised membrane costs and introduced a membrane service charge (see Chapter 12).

Since our Draft Report SDP revised its cost estimates and proposed prices. Its proposed prices increased from those originally proposed in Table 13.2, reflecting higher proposed funding costs in line with our draft WACC of 4.9%. This was partially offset, however, by reductions in forecast operating expenditure, such as accepting our decisions to exclude costs related to the partial plant test SDP had originally proposed and to apply a 0.25% efficiency factor to its corporate and labour costs.
Table 13.2  SDP’s proposed prices for the 2017 determination period ($2016-17)

<table>
<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Plant Service Charges ($/day)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base service charge</td>
<td>391,257</td>
<td>357,809</td>
<td>361,921</td>
<td>358,074</td>
<td>381,872</td>
<td>375,375</td>
<td>-4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incremental service charge</td>
<td>37,034</td>
<td>40,424</td>
<td>33,195</td>
<td>32,197</td>
<td>7,576</td>
<td>10,666</td>
<td>-71.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pipeline service charge ($/day)</strong></td>
<td>140,610</td>
<td>100,332</td>
<td>100,237</td>
<td>99,811</td>
<td>99,900</td>
<td>99,659</td>
<td>-29.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition to restart ($’000 per event)</td>
<td>6,053</td>
<td>37,272</td>
<td>38,402</td>
<td>39,372</td>
<td>40,232</td>
<td>40,982</td>
<td>577.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition to shutdown ($’000 per event)</td>
<td>1,588</td>
<td>1,686</td>
<td>1,686</td>
<td>1,686</td>
<td>1,686</td>
<td>1,686</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Water usage charge ($/ML)</strong></td>
<td>687</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note**: The prices in this table are based on SDP’s proposal with the following modifications: the base charge is equivalent to SDP’s proposed water security charge, and incremental charge is equivalent to SDP’s proposed plant operation charge less SDP’s proposed water security charge.

**Data source**: SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, pp 127-130.

13.1.4 The prices for the 2017 determination period meet the requirements of the Terms of Reference

In determining SDP’s prices, we must comply with a range of pricing principles set out in the Terms of Reference (Appendix A). These principles require us to adopt a price structure that includes at least two components:

- a variable charge for the drinking water supplied to SDP’s customers, and
- a fixed charge for making the plant available that applies whether or not drinking water is supplied to customers.

The pricing principles also set out very specific requirements on the type of costs to be recovered through these price components. Notably, fixed costs are recovered through service charges and variable costs recovered through usage charges.

Our prices in Table 13.1 meet these requirements.

13.2 Implications for retail customers

We note that in presenting customer bill impacts in this chapter, we present nominal dollar impacts – ie, bill impacts including forecast inflation. In calculating bill impacts for the 2017 determination period, we apply an inflation rate of 2.1% per annum (to $2016-17) for the first year of the determination period, and an inflation rate of 2.5% per annum for each year thereafter.

Sydney Water is SDP’s only customer at present. As a result, we are considering the impact of our prices on Sydney Water’s customers.
Our decisions result in reductions to the prices paid by Sydney Water’s customers. Notably, the cost of SDP goes down in 2017-18 in a typical Sydney Water customer’s annual bill.\(^{413}\)

\(^{\downarrow}\) When the plant is shutdown, the yearly cost of SDP per customer falls 12% from $96.78 in 2016-17 to $85.51 in 2017-18.

\(^{\downarrow}\) When the plant operates, the yearly cost of SDP per customer falls 3% from $134.75 in 2016-17 to $130.42 in 2017-18.

In 2017-18, the plant is expected to be shutdown. From 2018-19 onwards, if drought occurs and the plant is called into operation customers would pay on average an additional $37.49 in their annual water bill. This recovers SDP’s costs of producing and supplying water, as well as the additional fixed operating and membrane costs needed to run the plant.

If the plant were to operate over the entire 5-year period, SDP’s costs would decrease on average by 1.4% each year. This is because our estimates of benchmark energy prices decrease over the period. If the plant remains shutdown it uses little energy. SDP’s costs during shutdown would increase on average by 0.4% each year over the 5-year determination period, which is less than our 2.5% estimate of the rate of inflation.

Figure 13.1 shows how the costs of SDP for a typical Sydney Water customer are expected to fall as a result of our draft decisions.

**Figure 13.1** Annual cost of SDP for a typical Sydney Water customer ($/year, $nominal) – with inflation

\[\text{Note: The full operation customer impacts assume that membranes are replaced on 1 July 2017.}
\]

\[\text{Data source: IPART analysis.}\]

Customers also pay one-off transition costs if the plant is called into operation at some point over the 2017 determination period. The timing of transitions to restart and shutdown is uncertain and will depend on when future droughts occur and how long those droughts last. The impacts of these one-off transition costs are:

\[^{413}\text{ Customers would pay the 2017-18 costs at a one year lag, given the cost pass-through mechanism under the Sydney Water 2016 Determination. These costs are expressed in $2017-18 for simplicity.}\]
When SDP transitions to restart, a typical customer will pay on average an additional $6.25 in their annual water bill.\textsuperscript{414}

When SDP transitions to shutdown, a typical customer will pay on average an additional $0.88 their annual water bill.\textsuperscript{415}

Table 13.3 shows how each component of SDP’s charges are expected to flow through to a typical Sydney Water customer’s bill. We have separated these impacts into:

- base charges, which apply in all modes of operation
- incremental charges, which apply in plant operation mode only, and
- transition charges, which apply when the plant transitions to restart or shutdown.

Table 13.3  
\textbf{Annual cost of SDP for a typical Sydney Water customer ($/year, $\text{nominal}) – with inflation}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Base charges</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Base service charge</td>
<td>71.19</td>
<td>67.28</td>
<td>67.61</td>
<td>67.31</td>
<td>67.44</td>
<td>67.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Pipeline service charge</td>
<td>25.59</td>
<td>18.23</td>
<td>18.50</td>
<td>18.63</td>
<td>18.92</td>
<td>19.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Plant operation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Incremental service charge</td>
<td>6.74</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>4.02</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>4.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Membrane service charge\textsuperscript{a}</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>2.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Water usage charge</td>
<td>31.23</td>
<td>38.69</td>
<td>33.29</td>
<td>30.90</td>
<td>29.87</td>
<td>29.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transition charges</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Transition to restart</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>7.02</td>
<td>6.46</td>
<td>6.21</td>
<td>6.14</td>
<td>6.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Transition to shutdown</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cost in shutdown</strong></td>
<td>96.78</td>
<td>85.51</td>
<td>86.12</td>
<td>85.94</td>
<td>86.36</td>
<td>86.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cost in plant operation</strong></td>
<td>134.75</td>
<td>130.42</td>
<td>125.79</td>
<td>123.29</td>
<td>122.72</td>
<td>123.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a} The customer impact of membrane costs has been calculated by averaging the $/day membrane service charges in Table 2, multiplying this by the number of days in the relevant year, and dividing the result by the number of Sydney Water customers.

\textbf{Note:} Numbers, may not add due to rounding. Further, the forecast number of 20mm equivalent meters used to calculate the customer impacts in this table are consistent with Sydney Water’s 2016 Determination. The CPI forecasts used to convert $2016-17 prices and customer impacts into $\text{nominal}$ are: the ABS published March to March All Capitals CPI of 2.1\% for moving from $2016-17 to $2017-18, and the mid-point of the RBA target band of 2.5\% for all remaining years.

\textbf{Data source:} IPART analysis.

13.3  
Implications for SDP’s financial viability and shareholders

We are satisfied our determination will not adversely affect the ability of SDP to operate, and maintain the assets required to deliver its regulated services over the 2017 determination period. Further, we are satisfied that this determination will enable SDP to earn a reasonable rate of return on its assets.

\textsuperscript{414} This represents the average bill impact from 2018-19 to 2021-22. 2017-18 is excluded from the average because the plant is expected to be shutdown.

\textsuperscript{415} Again, this represents the average bill impact from 2018-19 to 2021-22. 2017-18 is excluded from the average because the plant is expected to be shutdown.
13.3.1 SDP is priced to be financially indifferent

Consistent with the Terms of Reference, our prices encourage SDP to be financially indifferent as to whether or not SDP supplies water to customers, including Sydney Water.

Notably, our water usage charge for the supply of non-rainfall dependent drinking water reflects all efficient costs that vary with output, including variable labour, energy and maintenance costs. The fixed charges for making the plant available to supply non-rainfall dependent drinking water are periodic payments. These reflect fixed costs, including the fixed component of operating costs, a return of assets and a return on assets.

Our base service charge applies to all modes of operation, which means SDP is entitled to charge for making the plant available to supply non-rainfall dependent drinking water irrespective of the levels of water in dam storages servicing Sydney or the availability of water from other sources.

13.3.2 Rate of return

Our pricing decisions mean that SDP is able to achieve the total NRR we have set for the 2017 determination period. Therefore, we expect that SDP will earn a real post-tax rate of return on its RAB of at least the benchmark rate of 4.7% over the 2017 determination period (see Chapter 9). This calculation is based on the assumptions we used in our modelling of the financial impacts of our pricing decisions, and depends on SDP achieving the efficiency targets we have set.

13.3.3 Financeability

Since the 2012 Determination, we have established a financeability test that we use to consider the effect of our regulated prices on the utility’s financial sustainability. We assess whether our decisions would enable the utility to raise finance consistent with an investment grade rated firm, over the regulatory period.

In our financeability assessment, we check whether a utility would achieve at least a Baa2 rating, based on our own financeability test. We have reviewed our approach to calculating the credit ratios we use in our financeability test, including Funds From Operations (FFO) Interest Cover, Debt Gearing, and FFO over debt.

Table 13.4 shows SDP’s financial ratios based on our prices. Our financeability test has been done on the basis of a revenue forecast that assumes no abatement events occur during the regulatory period. Table 13.5 shows our benchmark financial ratios.

---

416 The objective of our financeability test is to assess the short-term financial sustainability of the utility. Our financeability test requires us to construct financial statements for the regulated utility, use the utility’s actual cost of debt and gearing levels to compute the financial ratios, compare the financial ratios against our Baa2 benchmark levels, make an overall assessment taking into account the financial ratios, financial statements and other relevant information which could affect financial sustainability. IPART, Financeability tests in price regulation – Final Decision, December 2013.

417 IPART, Financeability ratios – Final Decision, April 2015.
### Table 13.4 SDP’s financial ratios (based on RAB values)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. FFO Interest Cover</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Debt / RAB</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. FFO / Debt</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** For the Final Report, we are calculating the 2016-17 financeability metrics based on historical data. For the Draft Report, the 2016-17 metrics were calculated using inputs generated within the regulatory model. The Draft Report metrics were: FFO interest cover – 1.9, Debt/RAB – 90%, and FFO/Debt – 4.9%.

### Table 13.5 Financial Ratio Benchmarks (for water utilities)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Credit Ratio</th>
<th>A3</th>
<th>Baa1</th>
<th>Baa2</th>
<th>Baa3</th>
<th>Ba1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. FFO Interest Cover</td>
<td>&gt;2.9</td>
<td>2.3 - 2.9</td>
<td>1.7 - 2.5</td>
<td>1.4/1.5 - 1.7</td>
<td>&lt;1.4 / 1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Debt / RAB</td>
<td>&lt;60%</td>
<td>80-85%</td>
<td>60-91%</td>
<td>90-100%</td>
<td>&gt;100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. FFO / Debt</td>
<td>&gt;10%</td>
<td>&gt;10%</td>
<td>6-10%</td>
<td>5-8%</td>
<td>&lt;4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Data source:** Kanangra Ratings Advisory Services advice to IPART, see IPART, Financeability tests in price regulation — Final Decision, December 2013, p10.

Based on our analysis of SDP’s credit metrics, and the improvement of these credit metrics over the 2017 determination period, we consider SDP to be financially sustainable:

- The first two metrics, FFO interest cover and Debt/RAB, are consistent with Baa2 (investment) grade in all years of the determination.
- The third metric, FFO/debt, is below investment grade for the first four years of the determination, but consistent with investment grade in the final year. This increasing trend arises because debt is forecast to be paid off during the period.

We do not expect a regulated entity will meet every benchmark in every year of a determination period. SDP’s own financeability assessment produces ratios that are very similar to those in Table 13.4 above. SDP indicates that the FFO/Interest and Debt/RAB ratios meet the Baa2 benchmark for all years of the determination, but that FFO/Debt does not meet it for any of the years. SDP did not change its position on its financeability between its original proposal and the revised submission.

Based on its proposed revenue requirements, SDP expects its financial position to remain sustainable over the 2017 determination period. Our NRR is marginally lower than proposed by SDP in both water security (shutdown) and plant operation modes (see Chapter 5).

### 13.4 Implications for general inflation

Under section 15 of the IPART Act, we are required to consider the effect of our determinations on general price inflation. SDP costs contribute to general water costs in Greater Sydney as they are included in Sydney Water prices as a cost pass-through.
In our 2016 Determination of Sydney Water’s prices, we included SDP’s fixed costs based on the 2016-17 prices set in our 2012 Determination of SDPs’ prices. The resulting Sydney Water prices contributed to the annual impact on general price inflation of -0.006% points (above the change in the CPI).\textsuperscript{420}  

Our decisions result in a $79.7 million reduction in SDP’s fixed costs already included in Sydney Water prices.\textsuperscript{421} This would reduce Sydney Water’s target NRR and prices; however, the additional impact on general inflation would be very small.\textsuperscript{422}

13.5 Implications for ecologically sustainable development

The NSW Government is responsible for determining any negative environmental impacts associated with SDP’s activities, and for imposing standards or requirements on SDP to address these impacts.

In setting our prices, we have provided SDP with sufficient funding to meet its environmental and other obligations and to conduct its operations in accordance with Good Industry Practice.

The project approval for SDP was premised on ecologically sustainable development

SDP was constructed by Sydney Water from 2007-2010 as part of the NSW Government’s Metropolitan Water Plan. It was constructed in response to the worst drought in 100 years, when Sydney’s dam levels fell to 34%.\textsuperscript{423} The desalination plant was intended to reduce the likelihood of end-use customers (ie, retail customers) facing water restrictions and to increase Sydney’s water security during droughts.\textsuperscript{424}

The project approval for SDP\textsuperscript{425} included a requirement that the plant use 100% renewable energy.\textsuperscript{426} SDP has entered into long-term 20-year contracts with Infigen to acquire fixed volumes of electricity and RECs at fixed real prices. SDP has contracted annual volumes of electricity sufficient to run the plant at full capacity. It has the ability to sell load back to the market if the plant’s electricity demand is less than full capacity.\textsuperscript{427}

\textsuperscript{421} From $194.9 million in 2016-17 to $169.7 million in 2017-18, $168.4 million in 2018-19 and $166.9 million in 2019-20, a cumulative reduction of $22.2m+26.5m+$28 = $79.7 million over 2017-18 to 2019-20, see Chapter 4. Sydney Water prices already included passing through $194.9 million per year x 4 years = $779.6 million of SDP’s fixed charges over 2016-17 to 2019-20. Our draft decision results in removing $79.7 million from Sydney Water prices.
\textsuperscript{422} The impact on general price inflation of -0.006% points above resulted from $418 million (in $2016-17) reduction in Sydney Water’s NRR over its 2016 determination period. The $80.8 million reduction due to SDP’s lower fixed costs would contribute to an additional 80.8/418 = 19% impact, or -0.001% point reduction in general inflation (above the change in CPI).
\textsuperscript{424} We also note that Sydney Water is required to maintain and comply with an agreed roles and responsibility protocol regarding the development and implementation of the Metropolitan Water Plan under its Operating Licence. IPART, Sydney Water Corporation Operating Licence – Report to the Minister, May 2015, p 6.
\textsuperscript{425} The project approval for SDP was granted under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979.
\textsuperscript{426} IPART, Review of water prices for Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Limited from 1 July 2012 - Final Report, December 2011, p 17.
\textsuperscript{427} SDP submission to IPART: Review of prices for SDP, 8 July, 2011, p 3.
SDP holds an environment protection licence

The NSW Environment Protection Authority (EPA) is the environmental regulator of SDP. It has issued an environment protection licence that requires Veolia, in its management of SDP, to meet certain requirements such as water quality criteria for the outfall.428 This licence is scheduled to be reviewed in October 2018.

SDP has undertaken a marine monitoring program

SDP conducted a six year Marine and Estuarine Monitoring Program to determine the impacts upon seawater quality and aquatic ecology as a result of its operation. The program’s methodology was independently reviewed by experts from the CSIRO, UNSW and UTS and endorsed as robust. The program was designed to detect a change of 10% in the marine environment with 80% confidence.429

The Marine and Estuarine Monitoring Program concluded in 2014. The research has shown that, once discharged to the ocean, the seawater concentrate returns to normal temperature and salinity within 50-75 metres from the outlet. This is called the near field mixing zone. It has been found that there are no significant impacts on seawater quality or aquatic ecology from the seawater concentrate beyond the near field mixing zone and minimal impact within near field mixing zone during operation.430

13.6 Implications for SDP’s service standards

Under our Determination, we expect SDP to achieve operating efficiency savings. We are satisfied that SDP can achieve these efficiency savings and thus can generate sufficient revenue to achieve service standards at or above those expected by customers and required under its licences.

SDP holds a Network Operator’s Licence and Retail Supplier’s Licence under the WIC Act. IPART administers and reviews these licences.

Our expenditure consultant, Atkins Cardno, concluded the main licence obligation is for the plant to be maintained consistent with Good Industry Practice.431 Accordingly, in water security (shutdown) mode, Atkins Cardno considered this to be the main cost driver and undertook its expenditure review on this basis.432 Our consultant confirmed that SDP has and is continuing to maintain the plant.433 This is consistent with the findings of the WIC Act audit.434

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432 See condition A2(a)(i) of SDP’s Network Operator’s Licence.
A Terms of Reference

The Hon. Greg Pearce MLC
Minister for Finance and Services
Minister for the Illawarra

Dr Peter J Boxall AO
Chairman
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal
PO Box 0250
QVB Post Office NSW 1230

Dear Dr Boxall,

I write regarding the Terms of Reference for Referral of Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd (SDP) to IPART under Section 62 of the Water Industry Competition Act 2006.

I note your previous request that the Terms of Reference be amended to provide for IPART to establish an efficiency gains and losses carryover mechanism for SDP. I understand that implementation of this mechanism would involve the preparation of a methodology paper, which would be subject to public consultation prior to finalisation and publication.

I am pleased to support this proposal subject to the methodology paper also including a mechanism to adjust SDP’s revenue to accommodate significant gains and losses associated with the sale of surplus electricity and Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs).

Amended Terms of Reference, which refer to this mechanism as well as IPART’s proposed efficiency carryover mechanism, are attached to this letter. For clarity, the intention of the proposed energy adjustment mechanism is that:

1. It would only apply to electricity and RECs that are not required by SDP when the desalination plant is not in full operation mode when complying with the plant's operating rules, as established by the Metropolitan Water Plan and subsequently included in SDP’s Network Operator Licence under the Water Industry Competition Act.

2. It would ensure that SDP customers for water (in Sydney Water’s Area of Operations) receive the benefit of significant gains and bear significant losses incurred as a result of the difference between the cost of electricity and RECs under SDP’s contracts with Infegin and the market price for electricity and RECs arising from the sale of SDP’s surplus electricity and RECs (in the circumstances described in point 1).

Level 38, Governor Macquarie Tower, 1 Farrer Place, Sydney NSW 2000
Phone (02) 9228 5027 Fax (02) 9228 5494 Email: office@parliament.nsw.gov.au
3. For electricity, the mechanism would mirror the ‘Calculation of Shortfall Adjustment’ in SDP’s Electricity Supply Agreement with Illigen, with the ‘market price’ defined as the half-hourly spot price and/or the price of a contracted ‘available block’.

4. For RECs, the ‘market price’ would be the price shown in the Nextgen Greenroom Report, or another equivalent report.

I understand that IPART’s intention is to publish its draft methodology paper in the near future, with the final paper due to be published by May 2012.

Yours sincerely,

Greg Pearce MLC
Minister for Finance and Services
Minister for the Illawarra

16 Feb 2011
Terms of Reference for Referral of Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Limited to IPART under Section 52 of the Water Industry Competition Act

Background

On 29 June 2010 Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Limited (SDP) was granted a network operator licence in relation to the desalination plant. The Minister for Finance and Services has, under section 51 of the Water Industry Competition Act 2006, declared that SDP is a monopoly supplier in relation to the water supply services it provides under its network operator licence.

SDP is the only supplier of non-rainfall dependent drinking water in New South Wales. Currently, the primary purchaser of drinking water supplied from the desalination plant is Sydney Water Corporation. Sydney Water Corporation purchases bulk water from two main sources, the Sydney Catchment Authority and, since its commissioning, the desalination plant.

The desalination plant is a key element in Sydney’s water security plan. Under its network operator licence, the desalination plant is required to maximise water production when dam storage levels in Sydney are below a prescribed threshold. Prices set by the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) should therefore reflect the water supply services provided by SDP set out below:

(a) the supply of non-rainfall dependent drinking water to purchasers, and
(b) the making available of the desalination plant to supply non-rainfall dependent drinking water.

Matters for consideration - pricing principles

Unless indicated otherwise each price determination is to be consistent with the following pricing principles:

1. Maximum prices should be set so that expected revenue generated will recover the efficient costs of providing the services described at (a) and (b) above over the life of the assets. Costs include operating costs, a return on the assets and return of assets (depreciation).

2. In calculating the return on invested assets:

   I. The rate of return (or Weighted Average Cost of Capital) should reflect the commercial risks faced by the asset owner in providing the services.

   II. IPART should determine an appropriate opening asset value.

3. Return of assets (depreciation) is to reflect the economic lives of the assets.

4. The structure of prices should encourage SDP to be financially indifferent as to whether it provides water. As such the structure of prices should comprise separate charges for the different water supply services described at (a) and (b) above.

5. The amount of any adjustments under the mechanisms in principle 8 should each be separately quantified and published by IPART.
6. The charges for water supply services in (b) above should be a periodic payment and should reflect fixed costs including, return on assets, return of assets, and the fixed component of operating costs. SDP is to be entitled to charge for providing the water supply services in (a) above irrespective of levels of water in storages serving Sydney or availability of water from other sources.

7. The charges for water supply services in (c) above should reflect all efficient costs that vary with outputs, including variable energy, labour costs, and maintenance costs.

8. For each price determination other than the first price determination:

i. SDP should be allowed to carryover demonstrated efficiency savings, net of efficiency losses, in operating expenditure in providing the water supply services specified at (a) and (b) above for a period of 4 years following the year in which the efficiency saving was achieved.

ii. In calculating the notional revenue requirement, IPART should determine the demonstrated efficiency savings and treatment of energy gains or losses in accordance with the Methodology Paper; and

iii. A mechanism(s) is required to allocate the costs or benefits to SDP customers (in Sydney Waters area of operation) of actual gains or losses beyond a core band that result from the difference between SDP's costs of electricity and RECs under its contracts with Infragen and revenues from the sale of surplus electricity and RECs. The mechanism would only operate at times when:

- the desalination is in Shutdown or in a Restart Period; and
- SDP complies with its requirements to maintain and operate the desalination plant under clause 82 of its Watermark operator licence.

9. Any other matters that IPART may consider relevant.

**Methodology Paper**

IPART must publish on its website a methodology paper setting out its approach to implementing pricing principles 8 above. IPART may update the Methodology Paper from time to time.

**Timing**

The determination period is to cover the period to 30 June 2017. For each successive price determination period, IPART is to resolve the price determination before the expiry of the current determination period.
B Legal requirements for this review

In conducting this review of SDP’s prices, we must comply with:

- relevant sections of the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal Act 1992 (IPART Act) which sets out matters that we must have regard to, and
- clause 24J of the Water Industry Competition (General) Regulation 2008 (WIC Regulation) which sets out requirements that we must meet before issuing our Final Report.

B.1 How we complied with the IPART Act

B.1.1 Section 15(1) – Matters to be considered by Tribunal under this Act

In making determinations, IPART is required under section 15(1) of the IPART Act to have regard to the following matters (in addition to any other matters IPART considers relevant):

- the cost of providing the services concerned
- the protection of consumers from abuses of monopoly power in terms of prices, pricing policies and standard of services
- the appropriate rate of return on public sector assets, including appropriate payment of dividends to the Government for the benefit of the people of New South Wales
- the effect on general price inflation over the medium term
- the need for greater efficiency in the supply of services so as to reduce costs for the benefit of consumers and taxpayers
- the need to maintain ecologically sustainable development (within the meaning of section 6 of the Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991) by appropriate pricing policies that take account of all the feasible options available to protect the environment
- the impact on pricing policies of borrowing, capital and dividend requirements of the government agency concerned and, in particular, the impact of any need to renew or increase relevant assets
- the impact on pricing policies of any arrangements that the government agency concerned has entered into for the exercise of its functions by some other person or body
- the need to promote competition in the supply of the services concerned
- considerations of demand management (including levels of demand) and least cost planning
- the social impact of the determinations and recommendations, and
- standards of quality, reliability and safety of the services concerned (whether those standards are specified by legislation, agreement or otherwise).
Section 15(1) of the IPART Act applies to IPART’s determination of SDP’s prices in the same way as it applies to prices for government monopoly services referred for determination under section 12 of the IPART Act (see WIC Act, section 52(3)). Table B.1 outlines the sections of the report that address each matter.

IPART has also had regard to certain matters listed in section 14A(2) of the IPART Act. Where IPART has had regard to those matters, they are also matters covered by section 15(1) of the IPART Act, and the relevant sections of the report are listed below.

Table B.1 Consideration of section 15(1) matters by IPART

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Matters under section 15(1)</th>
<th>Final Report reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) the cost of providing the services</td>
<td>Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) the protection of consumers from abuses of monopoly power</td>
<td>Sections 2.5, 3.1, and chapters 6, 7, 8, and 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) the appropriate rate of return and dividends</td>
<td>Sections 3.1.5, 9.2, and 13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) the effect on general price inflation</td>
<td>Section 13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) the need for greater efficiency in the supply of services</td>
<td>Section 2.2 and chapters 5, 6, and 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) ecologically sustainable development</td>
<td>Sections 2.2 and 13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) the impact on borrowing, capital and dividend requirements</td>
<td>Sections 3.1.5, 9.2, and 13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h) impact on pricing policies of any arrangements that the</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government agency concerned has entered into for the exercise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of its functions by some other person or body</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) need to promote competition</td>
<td>Chapter 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j) considerations of demand management and least cost planning</td>
<td>Section 2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k) the social impact</td>
<td>Sections 2.2 and 13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l) standards of quality, reliability and safety</td>
<td>Section 2.2, chapters 5, 6, 7, and section 13.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B.1.2 Section 16 – Report on financial impact if maximum price not charged

Section 16 of the IPART Act states:

If the Tribunal determines to increase the maximum price for a government monopoly service or determines a methodology that would or might increase the maximum price for a government monopoly service, the Tribunal is required to assess and report on the likely annual cost to the Consolidated Fund if the price were not increased to the maximum permitted and the government agency concerned were to be compensated for the revenue foregone by an appropriation from the Consolidated Fund.

We have considered this requirement and, notwithstanding the reference to ‘government monopoly service’ which we note SDP does not provide, have formed a view that if SDP’s maximum prices in its 2017 Determination were to increase and if SDP did not raise its prices to the maximum permitted, SDP would not be compensated for any revenue foregone by an appropriation from the Consolidated Fund and therefore there would be no cost to the Consolidated Fund.
B.2 How we complied with the WIC Regulation

Clause 24J of the WIC Regulation specifies that we must meet the following requirements prior to issuing our Final Report.

1. Before IPART issues its final report for a significant pricing investigation, IPART must:
   a) consider all submissions made to it on the draft report for the investigation that it considers material, and
   b) ensure that the matters referred to in subclause (2) are included in the report.

2. The final report must include the following matters:
   a) the pricing methodology applied for the determination of pricing that IPART has made,
   b) any significant methodological changes and the reasons for those changes,
   c) the assumptions that IPART has made for the determination and the reasons for those assumptions,
   d) IPART’s response to submissions it has received on the draft report that IPART considers material, including the reasons for accepting or not accepting (whether wholly or in part) material submissions made by the investigated monopoly supplier.

3. The final report may include such other matters as IPART considers appropriate.
In issuing our Final Report, we have met all the requirements specified in clause 24J of the WIC Regulation.

Table B.2 Meeting of clause 24J matters by IPART

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement of clause 24J</th>
<th>How requirement has been met</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Before IPART issues its final report for a significant pricing investigation, IPART must:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) consider all submissions made to it on the draft report for the investigation that it considers material</td>
<td>We have carefully and fully considered all submissions made to our Issues Paper, at the Public Hearing, and in response to our Draft Report. We also carefully and fully considered supplementary information provided by stakeholders that was provided to us (and to our expert consultants) on a commercial in confidence basis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) ensure that the matters referred to in subclause (2) are included in the report.</td>
<td>We have ensured that each of the matters referred to in subclause (2) are included and fully considered in the Final Report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The final report must include the following matters:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) the pricing methodology applied for the determination of pricing that IPART has made</td>
<td>Our Final Report sets out our pricing methodology. Relevant chapters are: 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) any significant methodological changes and the reasons for those changes</td>
<td>Our Final Report details and explains the reasons for changes to our methodology. Relevant chapters are: 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, and 12.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) the assumptions that IPART has made for the determination and the reasons for those assumptions</td>
<td>All assumptions made in our Determination are clearly stated and reasons for these assumptions are provided.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) IPART’s response to submissions it has received on the draft report that IPART considers material, including the reasons for accepting or not accepting (whether wholly or in part) material submissions made by the investigated monopoly supplier.</td>
<td>We accepted all submissions to our Issues Paper, at the Public Hearing and to our Draft Report. We have considered all submissions. Our Final Report acknowledges and responds to all material issues raised in submissions to our Draft Report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The final report may include such other matters as IPART considers appropriate.</td>
<td>In addition to these clause 24J requirements, we have considered all matters that we are required to consider under section 15(1) (see Table B.1).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C  Our building block approach to setting the revenue requirement

In this appendix, we provide information about our building block methodology for setting SDP’s revenue requirement. This is our standard approach, which we used in the 2012 Determination and continue to use in the 2017 Determination.

C.1 Components of the building block

The NRR represents our view of the total efficient costs of SDP providing its regulated services in each year of the determination period. In general, we set prices to recover this amount of revenue.

This method to calculate SDP’s revenue requirement involves determining, for each year of the 2017 determination period, an allowance for:

▶ Operating expenditure, which represents our estimate of the efficient level of SDP’s forecast operating, maintenance and administration costs.

▶ A return on the assets SDP uses to provide its services. This amount represents our assessment of the opportunity cost of the capital invested in SDP, and ensures that it can continue to make efficient capital investments in the future. To calculate this amount, we need to decide on the efficient and prudent levels of SDP’s past and forecast capital expenditure, the value of SDP’s regulatory asset base (RAB), and the appropriate weighted average cost of capital (WACC).

▶ A return of those assets (regulatory depreciation). This allowance recognises that through the provision of services to customers, SDP’s capital infrastructure will wear out over time, and therefore regulatory depreciation allows the cost of the RAB to be recovered throughout its expected life. To calculate this allowance, we need to decide on the appropriate asset lives and depreciation method.

▶ An allowance for meeting tax obligations. In the 2017 Determination, we use a real post-tax WACC to calculate the allowances for return on assets, and calculate the allowance for tax as a separate cost block. We consider this method accurately estimates the tax liability for a comparable commercial business. This represents a departure from the 2012 Determination, where we used a pre-tax WACC.

▶ An allowance for working capital, which represents the holding cost of net current assets.
D Calculation of energy cost allowances

Table D.1 shows how the energy cost allowances set out in Chapter 8 were calculated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shutdown</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Benchmark price ($/MWh)</td>
<td>197.88</td>
<td>161.96</td>
<td>144.71</td>
<td>136.40</td>
<td>133.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Benchmark volume (MWh)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,014</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cost per year ($)</td>
<td>989,400</td>
<td>809,800</td>
<td>725,532</td>
<td>682,000</td>
<td>666,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Frequency (days)</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Allowance ($/day)</td>
<td>2,710.68</td>
<td>2,218.63</td>
<td>1,982.33</td>
<td>1,868.49</td>
<td>1,826.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transition to restart</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Benchmark price ($/MWh)</td>
<td>197.17</td>
<td>161.25</td>
<td>144.00</td>
<td>135.69</td>
<td>132.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cost per transition ($)</td>
<td>7,066,573</td>
<td>5,779,200</td>
<td>5,160,960</td>
<td>4,863,130</td>
<td>4,754,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Allowance ($/transition)</td>
<td>7,066,572.80</td>
<td>5,779,200.00</td>
<td>5,160,960.00</td>
<td>4,863,129.60</td>
<td>4,754,176.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Plant operation - fixed</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Benchmark price ($/MWh)</td>
<td>197.16</td>
<td>161.24</td>
<td>143.99</td>
<td>135.68</td>
<td>132.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Benchmark volume (MWh)</td>
<td>7,665</td>
<td>7,665</td>
<td>7,686</td>
<td>7,665</td>
<td>7,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cost per year ($)</td>
<td>1,511,231</td>
<td>1,235,905</td>
<td>1,106,707</td>
<td>1,039,987</td>
<td>1,016,686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Frequency (days)</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Fixed allowance ($/day)</td>
<td>4,140.36</td>
<td>3,386.04</td>
<td>3,023.79</td>
<td>2,849.28</td>
<td>2,785.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Plant operation - variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Benchmark price ($/MWh)</td>
<td>197.16</td>
<td>161.24</td>
<td>143.99</td>
<td>135.68</td>
<td>132.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Benchmark volume (MWh)</td>
<td>320,835</td>
<td>320,835</td>
<td>321,714</td>
<td>320,835</td>
<td>320,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cost per year ($)</td>
<td>63,255,829</td>
<td>51,731,435</td>
<td>46,323,599</td>
<td>43,530,893</td>
<td>42,555,554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Frequency (ML)</td>
<td>91,250</td>
<td>91,250</td>
<td>91,500</td>
<td>91,250</td>
<td>91,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Variable allowance ($/ML)</td>
<td>693.21</td>
<td>566.92</td>
<td>506.27</td>
<td>477.05</td>
<td>466.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a 2019-20 will be a leap year with 366 days.

Note: There is no variable component in transition because as soon as SDP supplies a ML of drinking water it is deemed to be in operation mode. Of Atkins Cardno’s estimate of efficient energy required to restart of 71,000 MWh (which Atkins Cardno advises includes the production and supply of 10,000 ML of desalinated water), we have subtracted 35,160 MWh related to the production and supply of 10,000 ML of desalinated water (ie, assuming 3.516 MWh per ML consistent with full production mode). The remaining 35,840 MWh is assumed fixed and is recovered through the transition to restart charge.

Data source: IPART analysis.
E Examples of cost sharing rules

In this section we provide examples showing how our cost sharing rules work when SDP is in different modes in and outside of drought:

1. SDP not operating (shutdown) outside of drought.
2. SDP operating inside of drought, Retailer A takes all of SDP’s water.
3. SDP operating inside of drought, Sydney Water takes all of SDP’s water.
4. SDP operating outside of drought.
5. SDP operating inside of drought, where impactors share SDP’s variable costs.

Our five hypothetical examples include two large water retailers in Sydney: the incumbent, Sydney Water; and a new entrant called Retailer A. All numbers are sourced from this report, and the current determinations for Sydney Water and WaterNSW.

We have included Example 5 to show what would happen if SDP’s variable costs were to be shared between impactors (instead of beneficiaries in our rules) during a drought. Example 5 provides part of our justification for why variable costs are always paid by beneficiaries under our cost sharing rules.

The examples also show how WaterNSW’s charges to Sydney Water are affected by the operation of SDP under WaterNSW’s current determination.435

We responded to Sydney Water’s concern about comparing costs on a like-for-like basis by including treatment costs in the examples below. We have provided a more detailed response to all of Sydney Water’s concerns in our discussion in Chapter 11.

E.1 Example 1 – Cost sharing, SDP not operating (shutdown) outside drought

The purpose of this example is to show how our cost sharing rules work when SDP is not operating (in shutdown) outside of drought as discussed in Chapter 9.

In this example, SDP’s base water security and pipeline costs are shared between Sydney Water and Retailer A in proportion to each organisation’s relative share of total system demand. In this example total system demand is represented by demand for dam water from WaterNSW only, because SDP is in shutdown. Example 1 is summarised in Table E.1.

435 IPART, Water NSW Maximum prices for water supply services from 1 July 2016 in relation to Sydney Catchment Functions — Determination No. 3, pp 5-6.
### Table E.1 Example 1 – SDP not operating (shutdown) outside of drought ($million, $2016-17)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2017-18</th>
<th>Sydney Water</th>
<th>Retailer A</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demand (ML)</td>
<td>448,183</td>
<td>91,250</td>
<td>539,433a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand share total (%)</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition to restart costs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incremental service costs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipeline service costs</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membrane service costs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable costs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base water security costs</td>
<td>110.9</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>133.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total SDP costs (A)</strong></td>
<td>141.0</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>169.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WaterNSW fixed costs</td>
<td>133.4</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>160.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WaterNSW variable costs</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total WaterNSW costs (B)</strong></td>
<td>166.7</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>200.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment Costs (C)</td>
<td>168.1</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>202.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Costs (A)+(B)+(C)</strong></td>
<td>475.7</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>572.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of total costs</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$/ML</td>
<td>1061.5</td>
<td>1061.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Total system demand is based on forecast demand for 2017-18 provided as part of the Sydney Water pricing review.

**Note:** Numbers may not add due to rounding.

Total water demand in 2017-18 is 539,433 ML, comprised of:

- Sydney Water total demand: 448,183 ML (83%) from WaterNSW, and
- Retailer A total demand: 91,250 ML (17%) from WaterNSW.

Under our cost sharing rules, SDP’s base water security costs and pipeline costs would be recovered from impactors. SDP has no other costs during shutdown. Both retailers would be apportioned their share of the costs based on their relative share of system demand on the day the costs are accrued.

SDP’s base water service and pipeline costs in 2017-18 are $169.7 million. We would apportion costs to impactors as follows:

- Sydney Water: $169.7 million × 83% = $141.0 million, and
- Retailer A: $169.7 million × 17% = $28.7 million.

Both Sydney Water and Retailer A source all water from WaterNSW. Under WaterNSW’s determination, Sydney Water and Retailer A share WaterNSW’s fixed charges ($160.5 million) for large customers based on the relative proportion of water supplied to each customer for 2017-18.

WaterNSW’s variable price to large customers in 2017-18, when SDP is shutdown, is $74.39/ML.436 Sydney Water pays $33.3 million through the variable price for 448,183 ML.

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436 IPART, Water NSW Maximum prices for water supply services from 1 July 2016 in relation to Sydney Catchment Functions — Determination No. 3, pp 5-8 and IPART analysis.
of water from WaterNSW. Retailer A pays $6.8 million through the variable price for 91,250 ML of water from Water NSW.

We have included treatment costs in our scenarios to allow for a direct comparison of costs between businesses purchasing water from different sources. We use an average treatment cost of $375/ML for both Sydney Water and Retailer A. While in reality treatment costs will vary based on location and company, our examples are designed to demonstrate how SDP’s costs are shared between users.

Our sharing rules outside of drought when SDP is shutdown result in a cost to each party of:

- Sydney Water: $1,061.5/ML, and
- Retailer A: $1,061.5/ML.

E.2 Example 2 – SDP operating inside drought, Retailer A takes all of SDP’s water

The purpose of this example is to show how our cost sharing rules work when SDP is operating inside drought.

In this example, we assume that SDP is operating in drought for the entire year. We also assume that Retailer A has entered into an access agreement with SDP to purchase 100% of its water produced.

SDP’s base water security, transition and incremental service costs are shared between impactors Sydney Water and Retailer A in proportion to the relative share of total system demand. SDP’s variable costs are paid by Retailer A. Example 2 is summarised in Table E.2.
### Table E.2  Example 2 – Cost sharing, SDP operating in drought, Retailer A takes all of SDP’s water ($million, 2016-17)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2017-18</th>
<th>Sydney Water</th>
<th>Retailer A</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demand (ML)</td>
<td>448,183</td>
<td>91,250</td>
<td>539,433$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand share total (%)</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition to restart costs</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incremental service costs</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipeline service costs</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membrane service costs</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable costs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>76.8$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base water security costs</td>
<td>110.9</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>133.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total SDP costs (A)</td>
<td>163.1</td>
<td>110.0</td>
<td>273.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WaterNSW fixed costs</td>
<td>160.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>160.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WaterNSW variable costs</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total WaterNSW costs (B)</td>
<td>200.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>200.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment costs (C)</td>
<td>168.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>168.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total costs (A)+(B)+(C)</td>
<td>531.7</td>
<td>110.0</td>
<td>641.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of total costs</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$/ML</td>
<td>1,186.3</td>
<td>1,205.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Total system demand is based on forecast demand for 2017-18 provided as part of the Sydney Water pricing review.

* Variable costs are highest in the first year and decrease over the determination period, to $65.4 million in 2018-19 and $56.1 million in 2021-22. Using subsequent years of the determination period would result in a lower $/ML for Retailer A compared with 2016-17.

**Note:** Numbers may not add due to rounding.

Total water demand for 2017-18 is 539,433 ML, comprised of:

- Sydney Water total demand: 448,183 ML (83%) from WaterNSW, and
- Retailer A total demand: 91,250 ML (17%) from SDP.

Under our cost sharing rules, SDP’s base water security, pipeline, membrane, incremental service, and transition to restart charges would be recovered from impactors. This would be apportioned to each based on their relative share of draw on the water supply in the Greater Sydney area (ie, defined as bulk water sourced from dams supplying Greater Sydney (WaterNSW) and from the desalination plant (SDP) when it operates).

In total SDP’s base water security, pipeline, membrane, incremental service, and transition to restart charges amount to $196.3 million in 2017-18 and would be apportioned to impactors as follows:  

- Sydney Water: $196.3 million × 83% = $163.1 million, and
- Retailer A: $196.3 million × 17% = $33.2 million.

Retailer A sources 100% of its water from SDP and pays an additional $76.8 million for the 91,250 ML of desalinated water from SDP.

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437 These numbers do not include transition charges, however these would be apportioned on an 83/17 split under the impactor pays sharing rule. This would not impact the price per ML differential between Sydney Water and Retailer A.
Variable costs are highest in the first year and decrease over the determination period, to $65.4 million in 2018-19 and $56.1 million in 2021-22. We note that SDP’s total variable costs represent a significant proportion of SDP’s cost. Therefore, if we used costs from subsequent years of the determination Retailer A would have a lower $/ML than shown above.

While the average cost of sourcing water from SDP falls over the determination period, we do not consider that this creates a perverse incentive. Both Sydney Water and Retailer A face the same cost sharing rules and incentive to source water from SDP. We illustrate this in Example 3 below.

In Example 2, Sydney Water sources 100% of its water from WaterNSW. Under WaterNSW’s determination, Sydney Water would therefore pay all of WaterNSW’s fixed charges for large customers for 2017-18 ($160.5 million). It would also pay WaterNSW’s $89.29/ML variable price to large customers, when SDP is in full production. This amounts to $40 million in total for the 448,183 ML water sourced from WaterNSW (which is $6.7 million more than when SDP is off).

Under our example Sydney Water would also pay approximately $168.1 million in treatment costs for water sourced from WaterNSW. This allows for a direct like-for-like comparison of Sydney Water and Retailer A’s costs.

Our sharing rules result in a cost to each party of:
- Sydney Water: $1,186.3/ML, and
- Retailer A: $1,205.1/ML.

E.3 Example 3 – SDP operating inside drought, Sydney Water take all of SDP’s water ($million, $2016-17)

The purpose of this example is to show how SDP’s costs are shared between Sydney Water and Retailer A during drought when Sydney Water purchases all of SDP’s water. This is in contrast to Example 2 where Retailer A purchases all of SDP’s water.

In this example, we assume that SDP is operating in drought for the entire year. We also assume that Sydney Water purchases all of SDP’s water.

SDP’s base water security, transition and incremental service costs are shared between impactors Sydney Water and Retailer A in proportion to the relative share of total system demand. SDP’s variable costs are paid by Sydney Water. Example 3 is summarised in Table 5.1.
Table E.3  Example 3 – SDP operating inside drought, Sydney Water takes all of SDP’s water ($million, $2016-17)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2017-18</th>
<th>Sydney Water</th>
<th>Retailer A</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demand (ML)</td>
<td>448,183</td>
<td>91,250</td>
<td>539,433a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand share total (%)</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition to restart costs</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incremental service costs</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipeline service costs</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membrane service costs</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable costs</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>76.8b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base water security costs</td>
<td>110.9</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>133.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total SDP costs (A)</td>
<td>239.8</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>273.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand share WaterNSW (%)</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WaterNSW fixed costs</td>
<td>127.8</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>160.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WaterNSW variable costs</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total WaterNSW costs (B)</td>
<td>159.7</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>200.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment costs (C)</td>
<td>133.8</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>163.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total costs (A)+(B)+(C)</td>
<td>533.4</td>
<td>108.3</td>
<td>641.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of total costs</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$/ML</td>
<td>1,190.1</td>
<td>1,186.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a  Total system demand is based on forecast demand for 2017-18 provided as part of the Sydney Water pricing review.

b  Variable costs are highest in the first year and decrease over the determination period, to $65.4 million in 2018-19 and $56.1 million in 2021-22. Using subsequent years of the determination period would result in a lower $/ML for Sydney Water compared with 2016-17.

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

Total water demand for 2017-18 is 539,433 ML, comprised of:

- Sydney Water total demand: 448,183 ML (83%) from WaterNSW and SDP, and
- Retailer A total demand: 91,250 ML (17%) from WaterNSW.

Under our cost sharing rules, SDP’s base water security, pipeline, membrane, incremental service, and transition to restart charges would be recovered from impactors. This would be apportioned to each based on their relative share of total draw on Greater Sydney’s water supply (ie, defined as bulk water sourced from dams supplying Greater Sydney WaterNSW and from the desalination plant (SDP) when it operates).

In total SDP’s base water security, pipeline, membrane, incremental service, and transition to restart charges amount to $196.3 million in 2017-18. These charges would be apportioned to impactors as follows:438

- Sydney Water: $196.3 million × 83% = $163.1 million, and
- Retailer A: $196.3 million × 17% = $33.2 million.

438  These numbers do not include transition charges, however these would be apportioned on an 83/17 split under the impactor pays sharing rule. This would not impact the price per ML differential between Sydney Water and Retailer A.
Sydney Water takes 100% of SDP’s water (91,250 ML) for 2017-18. Sydney Water pays an additional $76.8 million for this water.

Variable costs are highest in the first year and decrease over the determination period, to $65.4 million in 2018-19 and $56.1 million in 2021-22.

In this example, Retailer A sources 100% of its water from WaterNSW. Under WaterNSW’s determination, Sydney Water and Retailer A would share WaterNSW’s fixed charges ($160.5 million) for large customers based on the relative proportion of total water purchased from WaterNSW (80% and 20% respectively).

Both customers would also pay WaterNSW’s $89.29 /ML variable price to large customers, when SDP is in full production. Sydney Water would pay $31.9 million in total for the 356,933 ML sourced from WaterNSW. Retailer A would pay $8.1 million for the 91,250 ML sourced from WaterNSW.

Under our example Sydney Water would pay approximately $133.8 million to treat 356,933 ML and Retailer A would pay $34.2 million to treat 91,250 ML of water from WaterNSW. Including treatment costs allows for a direct like-for-like comparison of Sydney Water and Retailer A’s costs (when SDP is operating).

Our sharing rules result in a cost to each party of:
- Sydney Water: $1,190.1/ML, and
- Retailer A: $1,186.3/ML.

E.4 Example 4 – SDP operating outside of drought

The purpose of this example is to show how our cost sharing rules work when a third-party calls SDP into operation outside of drought.

In this example, we assume that SDP is operating outside of drought for the entire year. We also assume that Retailer A has entered into an access agreement with SDP to purchase 100% of the water it produces.

Only SDP’s base water security and pipeline costs are shared between Sydney Water and Retailer A, in proportion to the relative share of total system demand. All incremental service charges, membrane charges, transition to restart and variable costs are paid by Retailer A. Example 4 is summarised in Table E.4.
### Table E.4 Example 4 – SDP operating outside drought ($million, $2016-17)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost Category</th>
<th>Sydney Water</th>
<th>Retailer A</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demand (ML)</td>
<td>448,183</td>
<td>91,250</td>
<td>539,433*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand share total (%)</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition to restart costs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incremental fixed costs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipeline service costs</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membrane service costs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable costs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>76.8b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base water security costs</td>
<td>110.9</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>133.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total SDP costs (A)</strong></td>
<td><strong>141.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>132.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>273.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WaterNSW fixed costs</td>
<td>160.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>160.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WaterNSW variable costs</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total WaterNSW costs (B)</strong></td>
<td><strong>200.5</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td><strong>200.5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment costs (C)</td>
<td>168.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>168.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total costs (A) + (B) + (C)</strong></td>
<td><strong>509.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>132.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>641.7</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of total costs</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>$/ML</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,137.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,447.5</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Total system demand is based on forecast demand for 2017-18 provided as part of the Sydney Water pricing review.

b Variable costs are highest in the first year and decrease over the determination period, to $65.4 million in 2018-19 and $56.1 million in 2021-22. Using subsequent years of the determination period would result in a lower $/ML for Retailer A compared with 2016-17.

**Note:** Numbers may not add due to rounding.

As previously, Sydney Water sources 100% of its water from WaterNSW and Retailer A sources 100% of its water from SDP.

Total water demand for 2017-18 is 539,433 ML, comprised of:

- Sydney Water’s total demand: 448,183 ML (83%) from WaterNSW, and
- Retailer A’s total demand: 91,250 ML (17%) from SDP.

Under our cost sharing rules, SDP’s base service and pipeline costs are recovered from impactors. This would be apportioned to each based on their relative share of draw on the water supply in the Greater Sydney area (ie, defined as bulk water sourced from dams supplying Greater Sydney (WaterNSW) and from the desalination plant (SDP) when it operates).

When operating outside drought, all other costs are recovered from beneficiaries, including transition to restart, incremental service charges, membrane charges, and variable costs. Transition costs would be apportioned to each beneficiary on an equal share basis. Incremental service costs would be apportioned on each beneficiary based on proportional of draw from SDP on the day. Given that Retailer A is the only beneficiary it will pay 100% of transition to restart, incremental service and variable charges. Retailer A will also pay all variable costs per ML of water supplied by SDP.
SDP’s base water security and pipeline costs for 2017-18 are $169.7 million. Therefore, we would share costs between the impactors as follows:439

- Sydney Water: $169.7 million × 83% = $141.0 million, and
- Retailer A: $169.7 million × 17% = $28.7 million.

In addition, Retailer A pays $13.9 million in transition to restart costs, $7.8 million in incremental service costs, $5.0 million in membrane service costs and $76.8 million in variable costs for 91,250 ML of water from SDP ($103.4 million).

Sydney Water sources 100% of its water from WaterNSW. Like Example 2, Sydney Water would pay all of WaterNSW’s fixed charges for large customers in 2017-18 ($160.5 million). This means that Sydney Water would pay $40 million in variable costs for the 448,183 ML water sourced from WaterNSW, based on the $89.29 /ML variable price to large customers, when SDP is in full production.

Sydney Water would also pay $168.1 million to treat 448,183 ML sourced from WaterNSW not allocated under SDP’s cost sharing rules.

Our sharing rules result in a cost to each party of:

- Sydney Water: $1,137.0/ML, and
- Retailer A: $1,447.5/ML.

**E.5 Example 5 – SDP operating inside drought, where impactors share SDP’s variable costs**

The purpose of this example is to show what would happen if we were to recover SDP’s variable costs on an impactor pays basis while SDP is in full production in a period of drought.

In this example, we assume that SDP is operating in drought for the entire year. We also assume that Retailer A has entered into an access agreement with SDP to purchase 100% of its water production. All SDP costs are shared between Sydney Water and Retailer A in proportion to the relative share of total system demand. Example 5 is summarised in Table E.5.

---

439 These numbers do not include transition charges, however these would be apportioned on an 83/17 split under the impactor pays sharing rule. This would not impact the price per ML differential between Sydney Water and Retailer A.
### Table E.5  Example 5–SDP operating inside of drought, where impactors share SDP’s variable costs ($million, $2016-17)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2017-18</th>
<th>Sydney Water</th>
<th>Retailer A</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demand (ML)</td>
<td>448,183</td>
<td>91,250</td>
<td>539,433a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand share total (%)</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition to restart costs</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incremental fixed costs</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipeline service costs</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membrane service costs</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable costs</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>76.8b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP base water security costs</td>
<td>110.9</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>133.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total SDP costs (A)</strong></td>
<td><strong>226.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>46.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>273.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WaterNSW fixed costs</td>
<td>160.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>160.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WaterNSW variable costs</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total WaterNSW costs (B)</strong></td>
<td><strong>200.5</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td><strong>200.5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment costs (C)</td>
<td>168.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>168.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total costs (A) + (B) + (C)</strong></td>
<td><strong>595.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>46.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>641.7</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of total costs</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$/ML</td>
<td>1,328.6</td>
<td>506.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Total system demand is based on forecast demand for 2017-18 provided as part of the Sydney Water pricing review.

* Variable costs are highest in the first year and decrease over the determination period, to $65.4 million in 2018-19 and $66.1 million in 2021-22.

**Note:** Numbers may not add due to rounding.

As previously, Sydney Water sources 100% of its water from WaterNSW and Retailer A sources 100% of its water from SDP.

If SDP’s variable costs were shared on an impactor pays principle, then Sydney Water would contribute to these costs, in proportion to its system draw. Therefore, Retailer A pays $13.0 million for 91,250 ML of water from SDP. Sydney Water pays $63.8 million for water produced by SDP that is supplied to Retailer A.

Under WaterNSW’s determination, Sydney Water would continue to pay all of WaterNSW’s fixed charges for large customers for 2017-18 ($160.5 million). Sydney Water also continues paying the additional $40 million for the 448,183 ML of water it sources from WaterNSW.

Sharing SDP’s costs during drought on an impactor pays basis alone results in a cost to each party of:

- Sydney Water: $1,328.6/ML, and
- Retailer A: $506.2/ML.

This represents a significant cross subsidy from Sydney Water to Retailer A. Retailer A’s total costs are only 7% of total system costs while Sydney Water pays 93% of total system costs when it only demands 83% of water supplied. This could allow Retailer A to on-sell desalinated water to its retail or end-use customers at the prevailing market price and realise super normal profits.
We think that this creates a powerful perverse incentive for Retailer A to source water from SDP during drought for the purpose of realising super normal profits. Therefore, sharing variable costs on an impactor pays basis is inefficient and as discussed we have reverted to allocating SDP’s variable costs to beneficiaries in and out of drought.
Glossary


2017 Determination  Determination of SDP’s maximum prices from 1 July 2017, made in this review.

2017 Draft Determination  Draft Determination of SDP’s maximum prices from March 2017, superseded by the 2017 Determination.


Sydney Water 2016 Determination  IPART, *Sydney Water Corporation, Maximum prices for water, sewerage, stormwater drainage and other services from 1 July 2016 – Determination, June 2016*.

2012 determination period  The period from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2017.

2017 determination period  The period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2022.

The 60/70 rule (under the 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan)  New rules under the 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan, replacing the ‘70/80 rule’. Until and unless SDP’s Network Operator’s Licence is changed, our Determination will give effect to the 70/80 rule, despite what the 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan says.
The 70/80 rule (under the 2010 Metropolitan Water Plan)

Condition A2(b) of SDP’s Network Operator’s Licence (No.10_010) requires SDP to operate and maintain the desalination plant with the objective of maximising the production of drinking water for the exclusive supply into the Sydney Water Corporation area of operation beginning when the available storage in Sydney’s water supply reservoirs falls below 70%, until the available storage rises to 80%.

‘Under the 70/80 rule’ refers to when SDP is operating in its drought response role. In this role, SDP must operate to maximise its production and supply of drinking water in Sydney Water’s area of operations.

‘Outside the 70/80 rule’ refers to when SDP is not operating in its drought response role.

Abatement mechanism

A pricing mechanism intended to create a financial incentive for SDP to maximise its production of drinking water when required under its operating rules.

AER

Australian Energy Regulator.

Base service charge (water security)

Daily fixed charge to reflect the costs of making plant available in water security (shutdown) mode.

Building block approach

IPART’s standard methodology to establish notional revenue requirement.

Dam storage levels

Available storage in Sydney’s water supply reservoirs as published on a weekly basis on the website of the WaterNSW (former Sydney Catchment Authority). If for any reason WaterNSW is unable to calculate or publish the available storage, the available storage is the amount of water as calculated and notified from time to time by such other authority as is nominated by the Minister.

EfAM

Efficiency Adjustment Mechanism in the 2012 Determination.
Efficiency Adjustment Mechanism

As per the Terms of Reference, SDP should be allowed to carryover demonstrated efficiency savings, net of efficiency losses, in operating expenditure in providing its water supply services for a period of four years following the year in which the efficiency saving was achieved. EfAM should be applied in accordance with the 2012 Methodology Paper.

EAM

Energy adjustment mechanism in the 2017 Methodology Paper.

ECM

Efficiency carryover mechanism in the 2017 Methodology Paper.

EnAM

Energy Adjustment Mechanism in the 2012 Determination.

Energy Adjustment Mechanism

As per Terms of Reference, energy adjustment mechanism is to provide for the carryover and pass-through to SDP’s customers of gains or losses, outside a core band, associated with the sale of surplus electricity and RECs when the plant is in shutdown and restart modes only. EnAM should be applied in accordance with the 2012 Methodology Paper.

EPA

NSW Environment Protection Authority.

ESCOSA

Essential Services Commission of South Australia.

Financial indifference principle

Pricing principle under Terms of Reference, requiring that “the structure of prices should encourage SDP to be financially indifferent as to whether or not it supplies water. As such the structure of prices should comprise separate charges for the different water supply services.”

FNC

Fixed Network Charge.

Force majeure event

As defined in the 2017 Determination.

GWh

Gigawatt-hour.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good Industry Practice</td>
<td>As per SDP’s Network Operator’s Licence granted on 9 August 2010, as varied on 10 May 2013, means the exercise of that degree of skill, diligence, prudence and foresight that reasonably would be expected from a prudent desalination plant operator acting in accordance with good industry practice and applicable Australian and internationally recognised standards having regard to the Capacity of the Water Infrastructure, its duty, age and technological status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPART</td>
<td>Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of NSW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impactor pays principle</td>
<td>The impactor pays principle allocates costs according to which of the parties created the cost, or the need to incur the cost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incremental service charges</td>
<td>For the 2017 Determination, daily fixed charges in plant operating mode over and above the base service charge in water security shutdown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infigen</td>
<td>Infgen Energy Limited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infigen contracts</td>
<td>Electricity Supply Agreement and RECs Supply Agreement between Infgen and SDP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGCs</td>
<td>Large-scale generation certificates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term shutdown mode (2012 Determination)</td>
<td>Term for the operational mode where the plant is not producing water for between 91 days and two years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRET</td>
<td>Large-scale Renewable Energy Target.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRMC</td>
<td>Long-run marginal cost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFL</td>
<td>Maximum Foreseeable Loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-term shutdown mode (2012 Determination)</td>
<td>Term for the operational mode where the plant is not producing water for between 11 and 90 days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membrane service charge</td>
<td>For the 2017 Determination, daily fixed charges to recover capital costs of membrane replacement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ML</td>
<td>Megalitre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWh</td>
<td>Megawatt-hour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Operator’s licence</td>
<td>SDP’s Network Operator’s Licence (No.10_010) granted under the WIC Act on 9 August 2010, as varied on 10 May 2013.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nil water usage charge</td>
<td>Applies when SDP supplies drinking water to Sydney Water outside the 60/70 rule, minimum runtime, and emergency response.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRR</td>
<td>Notional revenue requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notional revenue requirement</td>
<td>Revenue requirement set by IPART that represents the efficient costs of providing SDP’s declared monopoly services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O&amp;M contract</td>
<td>Operating and maintenance contracts between SDP and Veolia (the plant operator).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside the 70/80 rule</td>
<td>See ‘the 70/80 rule’ above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipeline charge</td>
<td>Separate daily fixed charge for SDP’s pipeline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant operation mode</td>
<td>Mode of operation when SDP supplies desalinated water to customers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAB</td>
<td>Regulatory Asset Base.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBA</td>
<td>Reserve Bank of Australia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECs</td>
<td>Renewable Energy Certificates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restart mode(s)</td>
<td>In the 2012 Determination, the modes to transition from a corresponding shutdown mode into plant operation mode.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>For the 2017 Determination, the mode to transition from water security (shutdown) mode to plant operation mode.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RET</td>
<td>Renewable Energy Target.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCA</td>
<td>Former Sydney Catchment Authority, now WaterNSW (Greater Sydney).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP’s water supply services</td>
<td>Services declared by the Minister under section 51 of the WIC Act, 2 May 2011.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| SDP’s monopoly services | SDP’s declared services referred to IPART under Terms of Reference are:  
(a) the supply of non-rainfall dependent water to purchasers, and  
(b) the making available of the desalination plant to supply non-rainfall dependent drinking water. |
| Short-term shutdown mode (2012 Determination) | Term for the operational mode where the plant is not producing water for between 2 and 10 days. |
| Shutdown modes | In the 2012 Determination, shutdown includes short-term, medium-term, long-term and water security shutdowns. No water is supplied to customers (except for water from storage) under the 2012 Determination.  
For the 2017 Determination, we accepted only one shutdown mode or period. In this Report, we refer to this mode or period as ‘shutdown, ‘Shutdown period,’ ‘Water security (shutdown) mode’ or ‘Water security mode.’ |
<p>| Storm event | On 16 December 2015, SDP sustained significant damage from a storm event that occurred in areas across Sydney. |
| Sydney Water | Sydney Water Corporation. |
| Sydney Water’s area of operation | Sydney Water Corporation’s area of operation as defined in Sydney Water’s Operating Licence, <em>Sydney Water Corporation Operating Licence, 2015-2020</em>. |
| Terms of Reference | Terms of Reference for Referral of Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Limited to IPART under section 52 of the <em>Water Industry Competition Act 2006</em>, 16 February 2012. |
| Third-party customer | SDP’s customers other than Sydney Water. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transition charges</td>
<td>One-off charges for SDP to transition from Plant operation mode to a shutdown mode, or from a shutdown mode to a corresponding restart mode.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under the 70/80 rule</td>
<td>See ‘the 70/80 rule’ above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veolia</td>
<td>Veolia Water Australia Pty Ltd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WACC</td>
<td>Weighted average cost of capital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WaterNSW</td>
<td>WaterNSW is the organisation responsible for managing raw water supply across NSW by bringing together the Sydney Catchment Authority (SCA) and State Water Corporation (State Water) (at 1 January 2015).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water security (shutdown) mode</td>
<td>Term for the operational mode where the plant is not producing water for longer than 11 days (under the 2017 Determination).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water service charge</td>
<td>Fixed daily charge for making the desalination plant available (under the 2012 Determination).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Supply Agreement</td>
<td>Agreement between Sydney Water and SDP, June 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water usage charge</td>
<td>Variable water charge per ML of water supplied to SDP’s customers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIC Regulation</td>
<td>Water Industry Competition (General) Regulation 2008 (NSW).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd

Energy Adjustment and Efficiency Carryover Mechanisms

Methodology Paper
Water

June 2017
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1 Introduction

We determine Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd’s (SDP’s) prices in accordance with a standing Ministerial reference under section 52 of the Water Industry Competition Act 2006 (WIC Act). Under the Terms of Reference (see Appendix A), we are required to apply the following two revenue adjustment mechanisms at each SDP price review:†

- **Energy Adjustment Mechanism (EAM)** - a mechanism to transfer a portion of gains and losses, outside a core band, that result from the sale of SDP’s surplus energy (electricity and Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs)) when SDP is in shutdown or restart mode.

- **Efficiency Carryover Mechanism (ECM)** – a mechanism to allow SDP to carryover demonstrated efficiency savings, net of efficiency losses, in operating expenditure for a period of four years following the year in which the efficiency saving was achieved.

In 2012, we published a Methodology Paper² setting out our approach to implementing the EAM and ECM. The Terms of Reference allows us to update the Methodology Paper from time to time.

We reviewed and updated the Methodology Paper concurrent to our review of SDP’s maximum prices to apply from 1 July 2017. The updated EAM and ECM methodologies are set out in the 2017 Methodology Paper. These updated methodologies will be applied at the 2022 price review and factored into prices over the 2022 determination period. We note the updated methodologies will influence SDP’s incentives to manage its surplus energy and deliver efficiency savings over the 2017 determination period. This is why we reviewed the Methodology Paper at the same time as our review of SDP’s maximum prices from 1 July 2017.

1.1 Our Methodology Paper

Our Issues Paper³ identified key issues relating to how the existing energy adjustment and efficiency carryover mechanisms operate and asked what changes, if any, should be made to these mechanisms. Key issues identified for stakeholder consultation included:

- the scope and design of the mechanisms
- the calculation methods used, and
- the external data sources to be used.

The purpose of this review was to update, improve, and clarify how these mechanisms operate and how we intend to apply them at the next price review.

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1 We received the initial Terms of Reference on 4 May 2011. The initial reference was replaced by the current reference on 16 February 2012.


The **EAM** re-allocates some of the risk relating to SDP’s surplus energy from SDP to customers. Re-allocating risk from SDP to customers changes SDP’s incentive to manage these risks prudently and efficiently. Given that SDP (rather than customers) is best placed to manage the market price risk of its surplus energy, we consider it important that SDP retain sufficient incentive to manage this risk prudently and efficiently. We are supporting this objective by:

- increasing SDP’s share of gains or losses outside the core band
- setting the core band relative to the contract value of surplus energy sold in the year, and
- signalling that we will undertake a prudence review of SDP’s trading policy and trading activity at the next price review and may decide to exclude trades from the EAM if there is evidence of imprudence in the management of SDP’s surplus energy.

We have also refined and clarified how we intend to calculate gains and losses on the sale of surplus energy.

The purpose of the **ECM** is to allow SDP to retain permanent efficiency savings for a period of time before these savings are passed on to customers through lower prices. We have refined the ECM to:

- clarify the purpose of the ECM, which is to focus on identifying, delivering, and passing through permanent efficiency savings to SDP’s customers
- clarify the scope of costs that are subject to the mechanism, and
- ensure efficiency savings are retained by SDP for a maximum of five years.

We are maintaining our approach in relation to mode-specific efficiency savings which are to be retained for up to five years, while SDP is in that specific mode, over a five consecutive year period, beginning when the efficiency saving is first achieved.

In March 2017 we released a draft 2017 Methodology Paper, which set out our draft decisions on the EAM and ECM. The draft 2017 Methodology Paper also presented stakeholder views, analysis and findings to support our draft decisions. Stakeholder feedback was generally positive and accepting of our draft decisions. SDP questioned some aspects of the draft decisions and requested further clarification on some issues. We have responded to these questions and requests for clarification in this final 2017 Methodology Paper.

### 1.2 Our review process

In developing our 2017 Methodology Paper, we have carefully considered and taken into account all feedback received from stakeholders through the review. We have also complied with our Terms of Reference (see Appendix A).

As part of our review process, we have undertaken extensive investigation, public consultation, and analysis including:

- releasing an Issues Paper in August 2016 to assist stakeholders to identify and understand the key issues for review
inviting SDP to make a pricing proposal in October 2016 detailing its proposed services, costs, and prices for the period 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2022 (which reflected SDP’s view of the revenue required to operate and maintain the plant and respond to regulatory demands throughout the 2017 determination period)

inviting stakeholders to make submissions on the Issues Paper and SDP’s pricing proposal by 11 November 2016

holding a Public Hearing in December 2016 to discuss a wide range of issues raised by SDP and other stakeholders

engaging an independent consultant (Marsden Jacob Associates) to review SDP’s proposed allowances for energy costs and the energy adjustment mechanism, and

releasing a draft 2017 Methodology Paper in March 2017 that invited stakeholders to make submissions in response to the draft by April 2017.

Our reports, stakeholder submissions, the transcript from the public hearing, and consultants’ reports are available on our website (www.ipart.nsw.gov.au).

SDP submitted its pricing proposal to IPART on 27 October 2016. SDP redacted certain information from the public version of its pricing proposal on the grounds of commercial confidentiality.

At the Public Hearing, SDP disclosed some of the information that had been redacted from the public version of its pricing proposal. Accordingly, SDP resubmitted its pricing proposal to include some information that was originally redacted. No other changes were made to SDP’s revised pricing proposal.

We have referred to SDP’s revised pricing proposal throughout this 2017 Methodology Paper. SDP’s revised pricing proposal is available on our website. To avoid potential confusion, we have marked SDP’s original pricing proposal on our website as ‘superseded’.

The 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan was released on 19 March 2017. Under the new Plan, the ‘on’ and ‘off’ triggers for the desalination plant have been lowered to run the water supply system more cost effectively, taking account of changes in demand over the medium term. SDP is to operate in drought response when the total dam storage level is below 60% (previously 70%) and continue to do so until the total dam storage level reaches 70% (previously 80%).

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4 A total of six written submissions were received from interested stakeholders.
5 Marsden Jacob Associates’ final report was received in February 2017 and published on our website in March 2017.
6 The Hon. Don Harwin MLC, Minister for Resources, Minister for Energy and Utilities, Minister for the Arts, New Water Plan to save Greater Sydney, Media release Sunday 19 March 2017.
8 The Metropolitan Water Plan does not define ‘drought’ according to the desalination plant’s trigger levels. However, the desalination plant, along with other water sources, is accessed as the water levels in dams reduce. Therefore, the plant is a drought response measure, aimed at securing supply of water. We refer to SDP’s operating rules to distinguish between when the plant is operating in its drought response role and when it is not.
1.3 Structure of this Methodology Paper

We have separated the 2017 EAM and ECM methodologies (covered in chapters 2 to 5) from our review of the 2012 Methodology Paper (covered in appendices B and C).

The remainder of this Methodology Paper is structured as follows:

- Chapter 2 sets out our methodology for the EAM.
- Chapter 3 provides worked examples of the EAM.
- Chapter 4 sets out our methodology for the ECM.
- Chapter 5 provides worked examples of the ECM.

Appendices:
- Appendix A contains the Terms of Reference.
- Appendix B provides analysis and discussion on the issues we considered in our review of the 2012 Energy Adjustment Mechanism methodology.
- Appendix C provides analysis and discussion on the issues we considered in our review of the 2012 Efficiency Adjustment Mechanism methodology.

- Glossary of terms used in this Methodology Paper.
1.4 Our final decisions

Our final decisions are outlined in the chapters of this Methodology Paper. For convenience, they are also listed below.

Energy Adjustment Mechanism (EAM)

We made the following decisions:

1. Increase SDP’s share of gains and losses that occur outside the core band from 10% to 20%. This change takes effect from 2017-18. SDP’s current share of gains and losses that occur outside the core band (ie, 10%) still applies for 2016-17. 36

2. Modify our prudence test of SDP’s energy trading policy and activity from a test of “no manifest imprudence” to a test of “the prudence of SDP’s energy trading policy and activity”. 41

3. Allow SDP’s request for additional funding of $0.52 million over the 2017 determination period to allow SDP to meet the strengthened prudency test. 42

4. Amend how gains and losses on RECs are calculated so that gains/losses are recognised in the year the RECs are sold (not accrued). 43

5. Clarify the method used to apply financing costs to EAM allowances. 44

6. Not extend the EAM to partial production. This is consistent with the Terms of Reference. 45

Efficiency Carryover Mechanism (ECM)

We made the following decisions:

7. Maintain the current approach of including efficiency savings, net of efficiency losses, for four years following the year they are achieved (ie, five years total). 46

8. Maintain the current treatment of mode specific efficiency savings (ie, held for up to five years, within a five consecutive year period, while SDP is in that specific mode). 47

9. Adopt aspects of the ECM we applied to other IPART regulated water businesses, including:
   – Removing the requirement that in order to be carried over, efficiency savings must be the result of a ‘management initiative’. 55
   – Shifting the ECM application period to use the five most recent years of actual data. 55
   – Adding a clawback to ensure savings are held by SDP for a maximum of five years. 55
2 Energy Adjustment Mechanism Methodology

2.1 Terms of Reference

The Terms of Reference state:\textsuperscript{10}

A mechanism(s) is required to allocate the costs or benefits to SDP customers (in Sydney Water’s area of operation) of actual gains or losses beyond a core band that result from the difference between SDP’s costs of electricity and RECs under its contracts with Infigen and revenues from the sale of surplus electricity and RECs. The mechanism would only operate at times when:

- The desalination plant is in Shutdown or in a Restart Period; and
- SDP complied with its requirements to maintain and operate the desalination plant under clause A2 of its network operator licence.

The Minister further advised that:\textsuperscript{11}

For clarity, the intention of the proposed energy adjustment mechanism is that:

1. It would only apply to electricity and RECs that are not required by SDP when the desalination plant is not in full operation mode when complying with the plant’s operating rules, as established by the Metropolitan Water Plan and subsequently included in SDP’s Network Operator’s Licence under the Water Industry Competition Act.

2. It would ensure that SDP customers for water (in Sydney Water’s Area of Operations) receive the benefit of significant gains and bear significant losses incurred as a result of the difference between the cost of electricity and RECs under SDP’s contracts with Infigen and the market price for electricity and RECs arising from the sale of SDP’s surplus electricity and RECs (in the circumstances described in point 1).

3. For electricity, the mechanism would mirror the ‘Calculation of Shortfall Adjustment’ in SDP’s Electricity Supply Agreement with Infigen, with the ‘market price’ defined as the half-hourly spot price and/or the price of a contracted ‘available block’.

4. For RECs, the ‘market price’ would be the price shown in the Nextgen Greenroom Report, or another equivalent report.

2.2 Purpose of the EAM

SDP manages a large scale reverse osmosis desalination plant located on the coast of Kurnell, 25 kilometres from Sydney’s CBD. The plant can produce on average 250 ML of drinking water per day, which is equivalent to about 15% of Sydney’s total drinking water supplies.\textsuperscript{12} SDP produces drinking water by forcing sea water through membranes at high pressure to remove the salt. This process requires a considerable amount of energy.

\textsuperscript{10} SDP Terms of Reference, February 2012, page 2.
\textsuperscript{11} Letter to IPART, 16 February 2012.
SDP has entered into long-term contracts to acquire fixed minimum volumes of electricity and RECs at fixed prices.\(^\text{13}\) However, when the plant is not operating, the minimum quantity of electricity under the contract applies and SDP is exposed to the risk of reselling electricity that is not needed at an uncertain price. Notably, when the market price is below its contract price, SDP incurs a loss on the resale of surplus energy in shutdown or restart modes. On the other hand, in the event that the market price exceeds the contract price, SDP makes a gain on the resale of surplus energy.

SDP incurs these gains and losses, not as the result of our price structures, but because of the avenues available to SDP to deal with surplus electricity and RECs within the constraints of its Infingen (energy) contract arrangements (outlined below). The Government decided that not all of SDP’s gains and losses on surplus energy should remain with SDP. In February 2012, the Government amended the Terms of Reference and required IPART to develop a methodology for calculating gains and losses on the resale of SDP’s surplus energy outside a core band and passing them through to customers through water prices.

2.3 Scope of the EAM

The EAM passes through gains or losses, outside a core band, from the sale of surplus electricity and RECs when the plant is in shutdown or restart mode to SDP’s customers.

The EAM applies to gains and losses on the sale of SDP’s surplus energy contracts when SDP is in shutdown or restart mode and when SDP is in compliance with the relevant provisions of its network operator licence.\(^\text{14}\) The EAM only applies to SDP’s current energy (electricity and RECs) contracts with Infingen.

2.3.1 SDP’s current energy contracts with Infingen

Electricity for the desalination plant is provided under a contract between SDP and Infingen Energy Markets Pty Ltd, which is a subsidiary of Infingen Energy Limited. In its submission to the 2012 price review, SDP described the conditions of the Electricity Supply Agreement:

- a 20-year term
- fixed real prices
- no pass-through of any future tax, levy, impost or charge relating to greenhouse gas or carbon emissions
- no pass-through of any cost arising from the introduction or operation of any emissions trading scheme
- a contracted annual volume sufficient to support full operations at the desalination plant, and
- the ability to sell load back to the market if electricity demand is lower than forecast.\(^\text{15}\)


\(^{14}\) SDP is required to maintain and operate the desalination plant under clause A2 of its network operator licence granted under the *WIC Act* on 9 August 2010 and varied on 10 May 2013.

\(^{15}\) SDP (Sydney Water) submission to IPART’s review of prices, 8 July 2011, p 3.
SDP also has agreements with Renewable Power Ventures Pty Ltd, another subsidiary of Infigen Energy Limited, for the supply of RECs to offset the power used by the desalination plant.16

SDP reports that the RECs are sold to SDP under a 20-year Renewable Energy Certificate Agreement, which provides for the supply of RECs at fixed real prices.17 The agreement includes a minimum annual number of RECs that SDP must purchase. SDP may sell any surplus RECs in the market.

2.3.2 Changes to SDP’s energy contracts

The EAM is premised on the continued operation of SDP’s Electricity Supply Agreement with Infigen Energy Limited dated 28 July 2008 (as amended and restated on 31 March 2010) and its RECs Supply Agreement with Renewable Power Ventures Pty Limited dated 28 July 2008 (as amended and restated on 31 March 2010). These are collectively known as the Infigen Contracts.

We will exclude from the EAM any amendments to the contracts that increase the duration, risk, or cost of these contracts. We will include in the EAM any amendments to the contracts that decrease the duration, risk, or cost of these contracts. This approach is consistent with the standard regulatory principle that customers should be able to share in efficient gains while not being exposed to inefficient losses incurred by the regulated business.

The EAM will cease to apply from the date of the termination, assignment or novation (as the case may be) in the event that:

▼ the term of the contract expires

▼ either party terminates the Infigen Contracts, or

▼ SDP assigns or novates the Infigen Contracts to a third party (other than to a person who purchases SDP’s entire interest in the Desalination Plant).

Notwithstanding the above, any loss or gain accruing to SDP as a result of assignment, termination or novation will be subject to the EAM.

Any net loss or gain accruing to SDP as a result of the assignment or termination of one of the Infigen Contracts — including any payment received or made by SDP — will be subject to the EAM. We will allow for financing costs on any such amount subject to the EAM at the financing interest rate specified in this 2017 Methodology Paper.

In the event that SDP makes or receives a payment as a result of the assignment or termination of a contract, IPART may, at its discretion and having regard to the materiality of the payment, apportion the loss or gain over the remaining term of the current contract for purposes of the EAM.

16 SDP (Sydney Water) submission to IPART’s review of prices, 8 July 2011, p 3.
17 SDP (Sydney Water) submission to IPART’s review of prices, 8 July 2011, p 3.
2.3.3 Changes to renewable energy schemes

If there is a Change in Scheme and SDP is required to purchase another type of Environmental Credit, the EAM will apply to the other type of Environmental Credit in the same way it had previously applied to RECs.

‘Change in Scheme’ and ‘Environmental Credit’ have the meaning given to each of those terms in the RECs Supply Agreement with Renewable Power Ventures Pty Limited dated 28 July 2008 (in place as of 1 July 2012).

2.4 EAM timeframes

The EAM is structured around the following three periods:

- **Application period**: the five years immediately preceding the review year. The EAM will apply to actual realised gains and losses over the application period.
- **Review year**: the year the EAM is applied.
- **Adjustment period**: the determination period immediately following the review year. EAM allowances will apply.

Table 2.1 illustrates these time periods for the next EAM application in 2021-22.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.1 EAM application period, review year, and adjustment period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017 determination period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** This example assumes a five-year 2022 determination period.

**Source:** IPART analysis.

2.5 EAM calculation of gains and losses

2.5.1 Gains and losses are evaluated within a financial year

We will calculate gains and losses on a financial year basis. If SDP is not in shutdown or restart mode or is deemed to not be in compliance with the relevant terms of its Network Operator’s Licence for part of a financial year during the application period, any energy relating to that period will be excluded from the EAM.

The EAM will apply to gains and losses that are realised in each financial year.

For electricity, the EAM gain or loss calculation applies to surplus electricity contracted and sold in that particular financial year. If electricity for next year is forward sold this year, any gain or loss on that electricity will be included in next year’s EAM gain or loss calculation. In this case, although the price is locked in this year, the electricity is traded next year and the gain or loss is not realised until next year.
For RECs, the EAM gain or loss calculation applies to surplus RECs sold in that particular financial year. If RECs accrued this year are banked and sold next year, any gain or loss on those RECs will be included in next year’s EAM gain or loss calculation. In this case, although the RECs are accrued this year, they are not sold until next year and the gain or loss is not realised until next year.

2.5.2 Calculating gains and losses on surplus electricity contracts

For transparency and to inform our prudency review, we will calculate both an actual gain or loss (based on actual sale price which may be the spot market or a forward market price) and a hypothetical gain or loss (based on the spot market price).

The actual gain or loss calculation will be used to calculate EAM allowances (subject to the prudency review). The difference between hypothetical and actual gain or loss illustrates the value gained or lost if SDP decides to forward sell some portion of its surplus electricity.

The most meaningful comparison of actual and hypothetical gains and losses will be over the longer term (eg, over a determination period). While we do not intend to use this information (ie, the comparison between hypothetical and actual gains or losses over a determination period) to explicitly adjust EAM allowances, we do intend to use this information to inform our understanding of SDP’s surplus energy management and our prudency review. For example, if actual gains are consistently lower than hypothetical gains over a determination period, we would investigate this to understand why this occurred and how SDP had responded to this over the determination period.

The two measures will be calculated as follows:

- Actual gain or loss = (volume of surplus electricity) x (actual sale price less contract price)
- Hypothetical gain or loss = (volume of surplus electricity) x (spot market price less contract price)

In the event SDP sells all surplus electricity into the spot market, the actual gain or loss would equal the hypothetical gain or loss.

The process of calculating gains and losses on electricity

The following outlines how each of the formulas above would be calculated.

1. Calculate the contract value of surplus electricity:
   - Determine the volume of surplus electricity within scope of the EAM for each month of the application period. This volume will depend on how many days there are in each month.
   - Calculate the value of surplus electricity on a monthly basis (ie, volume of surplus electricity in a month multiplied by the contract price relevant to that month).
   - Sum the monthly values to generate totals for each financial year over the application period.
2. Calculate the actual gain or loss:
   - Calculate the actual revenue for each month (ie, volume of surplus electricity in each month multiplied by the volume weighted average sale price for that month provided by SDP).
   - Sum the monthly revenues to generate totals for each financial year over the application period.
   - Calculate the actual gain or loss (ie, total actual revenues less contract value for surplus electricity in each financial year over the application period).

3. Calculate the hypothetical gain or loss:
   - Calculate the hypothetical revenue for each month (ie, volume of surplus electricity in month multiplied by monthly average spot price published on the AEMO website).
   - Sum the hypothetical monthly revenues to generate totals for each financial year over the application period.
   - Calculate the hypothetical gain or loss (ie, total hypothetical revenues less contract value for surplus electricity in each financial year over the application period).

2.5.3 Calculating gains and losses on surplus REC contracts

For transparency and to inform our prudency review, we will calculate both an actual gain or loss (based on the actual sale price when surplus RECs are sold) and a hypothetical gain or loss (based on the average spot market price in the quarter the surplus RECs are accrued).

The actual gain or loss calculation will be used to calculate EAM allowances (subject to our prudency review). The difference between hypothetical and actual gain or loss illustrates the value gained or lost as the RECs are received at the end of the quarter in which they are accrued and then banked to be sold in subsequent quarter/s.

The most meaningful comparison of actual and hypothetical gains and losses will be over the longer term (eg, over a determination period). While we do not intend to use this information (ie, the comparison between hypothetical and actual gains or losses over a determination period) to explicitly adjust EAM allowances, we do intend to use this information to inform our understanding of SDP’s surplus energy management and our prudency review. For example, if actual gains are consistently lower than hypothetical gains over a determination period, we would investigate this to understand why this occurred and how SDP had responded to this over the determination period.

The two measures will be calculated as follows:

\[
\text{Actual gain or loss} = (\text{volume of surplus RECs sold in quarter}) \times (\text{actual sale price less contract price})
\]

\[
\text{Hypothetical gain or loss} = (\text{volume of surplus RECs sold in quarter}) \times (\text{spot market price relevant to the quarter in which RECs are accrued less contract price})
\]

18 Consistent with the calculation of shortfall adjustment in SDP’s Electricity Supply Agreement with Infigen.
The process of calculating gains and losses on RECs

The following outlines how each of the formulas above would be calculated.

1. Calculate the contract value of surplus RECs sold:
   - Identify the transactions of surplus RECs sold in each quarter over the application period.
   - Identify the contract cost of surplus RECs sold in each quarter over the application period.
   - Calculate the sum of the cost of REC contracts sold in each financial year of the application period.

2. Calculate the actual gain or loss:
   - Calculate the actual revenue for each quarter. For each surplus REC sold in a quarter, identify the actual revenue generated from these sales.
   - Calculate the actual gain or loss for each quarter. This is actual revenue minus contract value for each quarter.
   - Calculate the actual gain or loss for each financial year. This is the sum of the quarterly actual gains or losses over each financial year of the application period.

3. Calculate the hypothetical gain or loss:
   - Calculate the hypothetical revenue for each quarter. For each surplus REC sold in a quarter, identify the quarter in which that REC was accrued. Assume each REC was sold for the average spot price for the quarter in which it was accrued. The quarterly spot market price is the simple average of daily REC spot market prices over each quarter based on data provided through subscription with TFS Green Australia (or an alternative data source if this is not available).
   - Calculate the hypothetical gain or loss for each quarter. This is hypothetical revenue minus contract value for each quarter.
   - Calculate the hypothetical gain or loss for each financial year. This is the sum of the quarterly hypothetical gains or losses over each financial year of the application period.

An example of how gains and losses are calculated for RECs is presented in Box 2.1.

---

Information on REC trades, including when RECs are accrued, received, and sold, is maintained by SDP.

19 Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd
Box 2.1 Clarifying the calculation of actual gains and losses on RECs

For this example, assume a REC is accrued in the second quarter of 2017-18 and is received following that quarter on 1 January 2018. The REC is banked and sold by SDP one year later on 1 January 2019.

Under this 2017 EAM methodology, the actual gain or loss would be recorded as occurring in 2018-19 and would be based on the difference between SDP’s contract price and the actual sale price on 1 January 2019.

This is different to the approach we took when applying the 2012 EAM methodology. Under that approach, the actual gain or loss would be recorded as occurring in 2017-18 and would be based on the difference between SDP’s contract price and the actual sale price on 1 January 2019.

The only difference in approaches is that we are now recognising and recording gains and losses in the year they are actually realised (which can be, but is not necessarily, the year in which the REC is accrued).

The new approach means customers will not pay (receive) holding costs for unrealised losses (gains) and we remove the potential complication of what to do when RECs are banked across application periods. That is, if a REC is accrued in year 5 of an application period and is not sold early enough during the review year, we would be unable to attribute the realised gain or loss to year 5 of the application period and we would need to add an adjustment factor to the next application of the EAM.

2.5.4 Combining gains and losses on electricity and RECs

For each financial year over the application period, we will sum the actual gains and losses on electricity and RECs to a single combined actual gain or loss on energy before we apply the core band (discussed below). By combining electricity and RECs into a single energy gain or loss, gains in one component will be able to offset losses in the other component. This means that customers will be exposed to gains and losses outside a core band on the resale of SDP’s surplus energy (rather than being exposed to separate risks for electricity and RECs depending on where each component is trading relative to separate core bands).

2.5.5 Relationship to Shortfall Adjustment in SDP’s electricity contract

In calculating the gain or loss on surplus electricity, we will follow the definitions and procedures specified in the ‘Calculation of Shortfall Adjustment’ in SDP’s Electricity Supply Agreement with Infigen Energy Limited to the extent consistent with the methodology specified in this paper.

However, the combined actual gain or loss on energy may differ from the Shortfall Adjustment on the SDP contract as a result of any/all of the following factors:

- the inclusion of RECs
- the restriction of the EAM’s coverage to shutdown and restart modes of operation as specified by the Terms of Reference
- the allowance for financing costs (see below), and
any timing differences (financial year vs. calendar year and the treatment of the final year of each determination period).

2.6  How the EAM shares gains and losses between SDP and its customers

As required by the Terms of Reference, actual gains or losses beyond a core band are shared between SDP and its customers.

2.6.1  Defining the core band

We have defined a core band of plus or minus 5% of the contract value of SDP’s surplus energy sold (ie, electricity and RECs combined) for which gains and losses are realised in that financial year.

Therefore, instead of total volume of energy contracted in the year, the core band is now based on the same volume of energy that is used in the calculation of gains and losses (ie, the volume of energy sold within the year). This means that the core band is no longer necessarily a fixed value in each year of the application period, but will vary to reflect the volume of energy sold that year. Basing the core band on surplus energy sold in the financial year accommodates the potential ‘banking’ of RECs and ensures that gains and losses are treated symmetrically in the event that RECs are accrued and sold in different years.

An example of how the core band threshold is calculated is provided in Box 2.2.
Box 2.2 Clarifying the calculation of the core band threshold

We have changed the definition of the core band as a result of our change to how the gains and losses on RECs are calculated. That is, because we are recognising and recording gains or losses on the sale of RECs in the year the gains or losses are realised (rather than in the year the RECs are accrued), it is important the core band for a particular year also reflects the RECs sold in that year (rather than accrued in that year).

The following table illustrates the difference between how the core band is defined in this 2017 Methodology Paper compared to how it is defined in the 2012 Methodology Paper.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of application period</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012 core band – contract value</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Total contracted electricity ($)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Total contracted RECs ($)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Total contracted energy ($)</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Core band (5% of total contract) ($)</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 core band – contract value</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Surplus contracted electricity ($)</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Surplus contracted RECs ($)</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Surplus sold electricity ($)</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Surplus sold RECs ($)</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Total surplus sold energy ($)</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Core band (5% of surplus sold) ($)</td>
<td>9.45</td>
<td>9.70</td>
<td>9.90</td>
<td>10.05</td>
<td>10.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures used in this example are for illustration only.
Source: IPART analysis.

2.6.2 Defining the sharing ratio’s outside the core band

Consistent with the Terms of Reference, SDP retains 100% of gains and losses within the plus or minus 5% core band. Relative to this core band:

- SDP retains 20% of incremental gains and losses outside the plus or minus 5% core band.
- The remaining 80% of incremental gains and losses outside the plus or minus 5% core band are passed through to customers.

We note the exception to these sharing rules is that in 2016-17, SDP will retain 10% of any incremental gain or loss outside the plus or minus 5% core band and the EAM will pass
through the remaining 90% of any incremental gain or loss outside the plus or minus 5% core band to customers. This is because we have released the final 2017 Methodology Paper at the close of 2016-17 and we are of the view that this change to SDP’s incentives should apply prospectively (ie, from 2017-18) and not retrospectively (ie, it should not apply to 2016-17). All other aspects of the 2017 Methodology Paper will apply to 2016-17.

Figure 2.1 illustrates the key design elements of the EAM.

**Figure 2.1 EAM sharing of gains and losses on resale of surplus energy**

![Figure 2.1 EAM sharing of gains and losses on resale of surplus energy](image)

Source: IPART analysis.

2.7 **We will review the prudence of SDP’s energy trading policy and activity**

At each review year when we apply the EAM, we intend to review the prudence of SDP’s energy trading policy and its energy trading activity over the application period. Any evidence of imprudence may result in us excluding part of a trade, a trade, or multiple trades from the EAM.

2.8 **We will calculate EAM allowances that include financing costs**

The EAM includes financing costs to compensate SDP for the delay in passing on losses and/or to compensate customers for the delay in receiving gains through the EAM.

EAM allowances are generated by calculating a five-year annual annuity over the adjustment period, with a present value equal to the present value of the gains and losses over the application period to be passed on to customers under the EAM. There are three steps to this process:

1. The gains and losses for each year of the application period (assumed to be mid-year values) are escalated to a present value in the review year (assumed to be an end of year value for the review year). For example, a gain or loss in 2016-17 (mid-year) will be escalated forward five and a half years to 2021-22 (end of year).
2. An annuity is calculated over the application period (five years). The cash flows of this annuity (calculated as end of year values) are set such that the present value of the annuity as of 2021-22 (end of year) is equal to the present value of gains and losses as of 2021-22 (end of year).

3. The cash flows of the annuity (end of year values) are each discounted back six months to arrive at EAM allowances (mid-year values).

We intend to use the 3-year BBB Corporate Bond Rate series currently published by the RBA. If this series is discontinued in the future, we will use a suitable alternative series. The RBA series is a monthly nominal series. If the RBA series is available, the EAM will use:

- For the application period: simple averages of 12 monthly observations for the relevant years of the application period. For partial years, the simple average of six monthly observations will be converted to a six month interest rate.

- For the review year: the simple average of the available months for the review year.

- For the adjustment period: the simple average of the available months for the review year, converted to real using the RBA’s latest inflation forecast and the Fisher equation.

- To discount the annuity values from end of year to mid-year values: the simple average of the available months of the review year, converted to real values using the RBA’s latest inflation forecast and the Fisher equation, converted to a six month interest rate.

Table 2.2 illustrates how EAM allowances are calculated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2017 determination period</th>
<th>2022 determination period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Application period ($nominal)</td>
<td>Review year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$CS $CS $CS $CS</td>
<td>%n %n %n %n</td>
<td>%n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>%n %n %n %n</td>
<td>Present value</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: $CS is the customers’ share. $EAM is the annual annuity for the Energy Adjustment Mechanism (EAM). %n is the nominal interest rate. %real is the real interest rate. Assumes a five-year 2022 determination period.

Source: IPART analysis.

2.9 EAM process

The following points step through how we intend to apply the EAM at future price reviews:

- Calculate hypothetical and actual gains and losses for electricity and RECs in each financial year of the application period.

---


21 We note that this process assumes all the qualifications set out in this paper have been met and therefore that gains and losses over the application period are subject to the EAM.

Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd IPART 17
- Sum the actual gains and losses for electricity and RECs into combined energy gains and losses for each year of the application period. This gives the total energy gain or loss in each year of the application period to potentially be shared between SDP and customers.

- Undertake a prudence review to ensure that any losses are not the result of imprudence in terms of SDP’s energy management policy and/or its energy management activity.

- Calculate the core band for each year of the application period as plus or minus 5% of the combined contract value of surplus electricity and RECs sold in each year of the application period (using the same volumes used to calculate the gains and losses above).

- Apply the plus or minus 5% core bands and sharing ratios to combined energy gains and losses for each year of the application period. This gives the allocation of gains and losses between SDP and customers for each year of the application period.

- Use the RBA corporate bond series (or a substitute series if the RBA series is discontinued) and the latest available RBA 1-year inflation forecast to generate:
  a) a nominal financing rate series using monthly observations over the relevant years of the application period
  b) a nominal interest rate using available months of data for the review year
  c) a real interest rate based on the nominal rate used for the review year, the RBA’s most recent 1-year inflation forecast, and the Fisher equation, to be used to calculate an annuity over the adjustment period, and
  d) a real interest rate based on the nominal rate used for the review year, the RBA’s most recent 1-year inflation forecast, and the Fisher equation, converted to a six month interest rate to discount the annuity values (end of year values) to EAM allowances (mid-year values).

- Combine these nominal and real annual rates into a series, calculate an annual annuity over the adjustment period (ie, five equal annual payments in constant real dollars) with a present value equal to the present value of customers’ share of gains and losses on an annual basis over the application period.

- Use the six month interest rate to discount the annuity values (end of year values) to EAM allowances (mid-year values).

### 2.10 Information requirements

We will collect information to implement the EAM at future price reviews. IPART will develop an appropriate framework to collect this information and include it in our written advice to SDP prior to future reviews.

We already have an annual reporting framework in place with SDP. Under the Water Industry Competition Act 2006 (NSW), licence holders are required to provide information requested by IPART.
3  Worked examples of the Energy Adjustment Mechanism

The following examples illustrate how we intend to implement the Energy Adjustment Mechanism (EAM) at future price reviews.

3.1  Example 1 – gains and losses within the core band

Table 3.1 shows how the EAM allocates gains and losses when they are within the core band. Because the gains and losses are within the core band in each of the financial years, SDP retains 100% of the gains and losses. The EAM passes 0% of the gains and losses on to customers.

Table 3.1  Gains and losses within the core band

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial year</th>
<th>2017 determination period</th>
<th>2022 determination period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year of period</td>
<td>Application period ($nominal)</td>
<td>Review year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cost - surplus energy sold</td>
<td>Review year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Electricity</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- RECs</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Total</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revenue - surplus energy sold</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Electricity</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- RECs</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Total</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gain or loss</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Total gain (loss)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- EAM core band</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EAM shares</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- SDP within band</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- SDP outside band</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Customer share</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- PV customer share</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EAM</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- EAM allowance</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- PV EAM allowance</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The figures used in this example are for illustration only.

Source: IPART analysis.
3.2 Example 2 – gains and losses outside the core band

Table 3.2 shows how the EAM allocates gains and losses when they are outside the core band.

SDP retains 100% of the gain or loss up to the core band and 20% of the gain or loss outside the core band. The EAM adds financing costs to the Customer share (ie, 80% of gains and losses outside the core band) and passes this through to customers over the adjustment period.

In this example, the present value of the Customer share of gains and losses over the application period is ($10.4). This is equal to the present value of an annual annuity of ($2.2) over the adjustment period.

Table 3.2 Gains and losses outside the core band

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial year</th>
<th>2017 determination period</th>
<th>2022 determination period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Application period ($nominal)</td>
<td>Review year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year of period</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost - surplus energy sold</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Electricity</td>
<td>100 100 100 100 100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- RECs</td>
<td>100 100 100 100 100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Total</td>
<td>200 200 200 200 200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue - surplus energy sold</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Electricity</td>
<td>80 90 100 110 120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- RECs</td>
<td>80 90 100 110 120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Total</td>
<td>160 180 200 220 240</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gain or loss</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Total gain (loss)</td>
<td>(40) (20) - 20 40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- EAM core band</td>
<td>(10) (10) 10 10 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAM shares</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- SDP within band</td>
<td>(10) (10) - 10 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- SDP outside band</td>
<td>(3) (2) - 2 6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Customer share</td>
<td>(27) (8) - 8 24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- PV customer share</td>
<td></td>
<td>(10.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- EAM annuity (end of year)</td>
<td>(2.2) (2.2) (2.2) (2.2) (2.2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- PV of EAM annuity</td>
<td>(10.4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- EAM allowances (mid-year)</td>
<td>(2.2) (2.2) (2.2) (2.2) (2.2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sharing outside the core band in 2016-17 is based on the 2012 EAM methodology of 10% SDP and 90% customers. Sharing outside the core band in all other years is based on the 2017 EAM methodology of 20% SDP and 80% customers.

Note: the figures used in this example are for illustration only and may not add due to rounding. This analysis assumes a nominal financing rate of 5% and an inflation forecast of 2.5%. The nominal interest rate of 5% is used over the application period and the forecast real interest rate (ie, (1.05 / 1.025) – 1) is used over the adjustment period.

Source: IPART analysis.
### 3.3 Example 3 – banking of RECs between years

This example illustrates how the core band adjusts when RECs are banked between years. For example, in year 1, SDP sells $190 of surplus energy (5% core band = $9.50) and in year 5 SDP sells $210 of surplus energy (5% core band = $10.50).

#### Table 3.3 Banking of RECs between years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial year</th>
<th>2017 determination period</th>
<th>2022 determination period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year of period</td>
<td>1  2  3  4  5</td>
<td>1  2  3  4  5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost - surplus energy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Electricity</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- RECs</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Total</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost - surplus energy sold</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Electricity</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- RECs</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Total</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue - surplus energy sold</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Electricity</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- RECs</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Total</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gain or loss</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Total gain (loss)</td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>(25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- EAM core band</td>
<td>(9.5)</td>
<td>(9.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAM shares</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- SDP within band</td>
<td>(9.5)</td>
<td>(9.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- SDP outside band</td>
<td>(3.1)</td>
<td>(3.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Customer share</td>
<td>(27.4)</td>
<td>(12.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- PV customer share</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- EAM annuity (end of year)</td>
<td>(2.6)</td>
<td>(2.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- PV of EAM annuity</td>
<td>(12.3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- EAM allowances (mid-year)</td>
<td>(2.6)</td>
<td>(2.6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Sharing outside the core band in 2016-17 is based on the 2012 EAM methodology of 10% SDP and 90% customers. Sharing outside the core band in all other years is based on the 2017 EAM methodology of 20% SDP and 80% customers.

**Note:** the figures used in this example are for illustration only and may not add due to rounding. This analysis assumes a nominal financing rate of 5% and an inflation forecast of 2.5%. The nominal interest rate of 5% is used over the application period and the forecast real interest rate (ie, (1.05 / 1.025) – 1) is used over the adjustment period.

**Source:** IPART analysis.
4  Efficiency Carryover Mechanism Methodology

4.1 Terms of Reference

The Terms of Reference state:\textsuperscript{23}

SDP should be allowed to carryover demonstrated efficiency savings, net of efficiency losses, in operating expenditure in providing the water supply services specified at (a) and (b) above for a period of 4 years following the year in which the efficiency saving was achieved.

4.2 Purpose of the Efficiency Carryover Mechanism

Our approach to regulating prices for monopoly services, which is referred to as our ‘form of regulation’, provides:

\begin{itemize}
  \item incentives for the businesses we regulate to manage their costs prudently and efficiently, and
  \item incentives for the businesses we regulate to search for and deliver permanent cost savings that can benefit customers through lower prices.
\end{itemize}

Without an efficiency carryover mechanism (ECM), if the business makes a permanent efficiency saving in the first year of a five-year determination period, it is able to retain the saving for five years. However, if it makes a permanent efficiency saving in the fourth year of a five-year determination period, it is able to retain the saving for just two years. Therefore, businesses can have an incentive to delay permanent efficiency savings from the end of one determination period to the beginning of the next determination period. Although the saving is still made, its benefit to customers is delayed.

Our form of regulation includes an efficiency sharing mechanism to explicitly allow businesses to retain efficiency savings for a specified period in order to provide an incentive to achieve savings, on the condition that customers will benefit through lower prices in subsequent determination periods.

The ECM removes the incentive to delay efficiency savings, by allowing the business to retain a permanent savings for the same number of years regardless of when the saving is achieved within a determination period, while maintaining all other aspects of the form of regulation. One way to think of the ECM is that it takes the incentives for permanent efficiency savings that apply in the first year of the determination period, and applies these incentives consistently across the remaining years of the determination period. With an ECM in place:

\begin{itemize}
  \item The business has an incentive to achieve efficiency savings as soon as they are identified.
  \item The business retains the efficiency saving for a fixed number of years, regardless of when during the determination period the efficiency saving is made.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{23} SDP Terms of Reference, February 2012, page 2.
In the case of savings that might otherwise be delayed until the next determination period, customers will benefit through lower prices sooner if the business responds to the incentive to achieve efficiency savings as soon as they are identified.

4.3 What costs are included in the ECM

The scope of the ECM is limited to operating costs (ie, capital expenditure is excluded, as it is beyond the scope of the Terms of Reference).

The ECM applies to operating costs across all modes of operation. Unlike other water utilities, SDP’s costs, and thus its prices, vary depending on what mode of operation it is in. As a result, we need to calculate its annual notional revenue requirement for each mode of operation.

There are some elements of SDP’s operating costs, however, that are not relevant when it comes to setting regulated prices and are therefore excluded from the ECM. Specifically:

- SDP’s actual energy prices are excluded from the ECM because we set prices based on benchmark energy prices that may be different to SDP’s actual energy prices.
  - If SDP were to negotiate lower actual energy prices, this would not affect SDP’s regulated prices because we would continue to set energy prices relative to a benchmark energy price (not SDP’s actual price). Therefore, SDP’s actual energy prices are excluded from the ECM.
  - Energy volumes are included in the ECM. If SDP is able to achieve efficiency savings that reduce its demand for energy, we will take this into account when setting prices and customers will benefit through lower prices in the future. Therefore, energy volumes are included in the ECM.

- Any operating costs that are outside the scope of SDP’s regulated prices are excluded from the ECM. For example:
  - If SDP engaged in any unregulated activities, any costs associated with these activities would be excluded from the ECM.
  - In the absence of the EAM, any gains or losses from the sale of SDP’s surplus energy contracts would be fully retained by SDP and would be outside the scope of SDP’s regulated prices. Therefore, gains and losses on the sale of SDP’s surplus energy are excluded from the ECM.

4.4 ECM timeframes

The ECM is structured around the following three periods:

- **Application period:** the five years immediately preceding the review year.\(^{24}\) The ECM will apply to permanent net efficiency savings over the application period.

- **Review year:** the year the ECM is applied.

\(^{24}\) Because we do not have actual data for final year of the determination period when we apply the ECM, this year is included in the application period at the next application of the ECM. That is, the application period is lagged one year behind the determination period.
Carryover period: the first three years of the determination period immediately following the review year. If an efficiency saving is made in year five of the application period, the ECM will allow the saving to carry over for the first three years of the next determination period (ie, allowing the saving to be retained for five years).

Table 4.1 illustrates these time periods for the next EAM application in 2022.

Table 4.1  EAM application period, review year, and adjustment period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2017 determination period</th>
<th>2022 determination period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Application period</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review year</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carryover period</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This example assumes a five-year 2022 determination period.
Source: IPART analysis.

The ECM applies to efficiency savings made in any of the five years immediately preceding the final year of the determination period (this five year period is called the application period). At the 2021-22 review year, the ECM application period will be the five consecutive year period 2016-17 to 2020-21 immediately preceding the review year (2021-22). This means that:

- The ECM will make use of actual expenditure data in every year (ie, there is no need to rely on forecasts for the review year).
- We can ensure savings are held by SDP for a maximum of five years, consistent with the Terms of Reference.
- The ECM application period is consistent with the EAM application period.

4.5  Identifying and carrying over efficiency savings

4.5.1  Definition of efficiency savings

The ECM applies to permanent net reductions in operating costs. If the identified cost reduction is the result of cost shifting or if the saving has been re-absorbed into the business with the effect of there being no surplus to share with customers, the identified cost reduction would not qualify as an efficiency saving for the ECM.

The ECM does not depend on what caused the net reduction in operating cost. What is important is that SDP identifies and commits to maintain the permanent reduction in operating costs. The purpose of the ECM is to allow SDP to retain permanent savings for a period of time before they are passed on to customers through lower prices. The ultimate test is whether an identified efficiency saving will lead to a permanent reduction in prices for customers.

25 The terms of reference requires us to apply a 5-year carryover period that includes the year in which the efficiency saving was achieved. Given the review year is the final year of a determination period, the last year that SDP can reveal an efficiency saving is in the penultimate year of a determination period. Therefore, the 5-year carryover period consists of the final two years of the current determination period plus the first three years of the next determination period.
4.5.2 Carrying over general and mode-specific efficiency savings

The Terms of Reference state that SDP should be allowed to carry over efficiency savings for four years following the year they are achieved (i.e., five years total).

General efficiency savings occur every year regardless of what mode SDP is in. Therefore, the ECM allows these general efficiency savings to carry over for five years. Following this five consecutive year period, customers benefit each year into perpetuity from lower prices as a result of the permanent efficiency saving.

Mode-specific efficiency savings, on the other hand, occur only when SDP is in that specific mode. If SDP is in a specific mode for, on average, two years out of every five, it follows that an efficiency saving achieved in this mode will only generate benefits two years out of every five. Therefore, by definition, a $1 mode-specific saving is less valuable than a $1 general saving. To ensure mode-specific savings are not over-incentivised relative to general savings, the ECM allows mode-specific savings to be held for up to five years, while SDP is in that specific mode, over a five consecutive year period beginning in the year the saving was first achieved.

4.5.3 Ensuring savings are held for a maximum of five years

We set prices for the next determination period during the last year of the current determination period before actual costs are known for this year.

Therefore, it is possible for SDP to make a permanent efficiency saving in the last year of a determination period and for us to not know about the saving when we set prices for the next determination period. The result is that SDP is able to retain this saving for a total of six years before we are able to pass it on to customers through lower prices.

The ECM needs to address this situation for two reasons:

- To be consistent with the Terms of Reference which stipulate SDP should be able to retain savings for four years following the year they are made.
- To remove the incentive for SDP to delay savings until the last year of a determination period. Removing the incentive for SDP to delay savings is the sole purpose of the ECM.

If a permanent efficiency saving is made in the first year of the ECM application period (i.e., the last year of the previous determination period), SDP will retain the saving for six years. To correct for this, the ECM applies a negative carryover amount in the first year of the next determination period (ECM adjustment). The ECM adjustment is equal to the efficiency saving retained in the sixth year plus one year of financing costs. This effectively returns the sixth year of benefit retained by SDP in the last year of the current determination period to customers in the first year of the next determination period. Including financing costs is necessary to fully remove any incentive SDP might still have to delay savings until the last year of the determination period.

The financing cost assumption used by the ECM to return the sixth year of the efficiency saving from SDP to customers will be consistent with the financing cost assumption used by the EAM.
The ECM adjustment applies to both general and mode-specific efficiency savings. Because the ECM adjustment is about returning the sixth year of benefit retained by SDP to customers in the first year of the next determination period, the ECM adjustment will be applied to the base service charge, which applies regardless of the mode of operation.

### 4.6 ECM allowances

Table 4.2 summarises how ECM allowances will be applied to SDP’s charges in future price reviews.

General efficiencies relate to operating costs recovered through SDP’s base service charge. Mode-specific efficiency savings relate to costs recovered through transition, incremental service, and water usage charges (ie, charges that only apply in those specific modes). However, note the ECM adjustment is made to the base service charge to ensure that savings held for more than five years can be returned to customers immediately, regardless of the mode of operation.

#### Table 4.2 How ECM carryovers apply to SDP charges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Shutdown mode</th>
<th>Restart mode</th>
<th>Operation Mode</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General efficiency carryovers</td>
<td>Applies to Base Service Charge (WSC)</td>
<td>Applies to Base Service Charge (WSC)</td>
<td>Applies to Base Service Charge (WSC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode-specific efficiency carryovers</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>Applies to Transition Charge (TC)</td>
<td>Applies to Incremental Service Charge (ISC) and Water Usage Charge (WUC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECM adjustment</td>
<td>Applies to Base Service Charge (WSC)</td>
<td>Applies to Base Service Charge (WSC)</td>
<td>Applies to Base Service Charge (WSC)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IPART analysis.

SDP’s pricing proposal should clearly state whether an identified efficiency saving has been inflated from the dollars of the year the saving was achieved to dollars of the review year. IPART’s CPI index should be used for any such inflation indexation.

### 4.7 ECM process

The following points step through the ECM calculation process:

- Identify whether SDP permanently reduced total in-scope operating costs below the regulatory allowance used by IPART in setting maximum prices. If so, quantify the size of the incremental efficiency saving ($X$).

- Identify the financial year of the application period in which the saving was achieved (n).

- Ensure SDP retains the efficiency saving for five years and its expenditure allowance in subsequent determination periods is reduced by the amount of the incremental efficiency saving ($X$).

---

26 Note that since we have capitalised membranes to be recovered through a separate membrane service charge, these costs are outside the scope of the ECM (which relates to operating costs only).
If an efficiency saving is achieved in year 2 of the application period (i.e., the first year of the determination period), SDP will retain the saving for up to five years and, as intended, the ECM will have no effect.

If an efficiency saving is achieved in years 3 to 5 of the application period, apply a positive ECM allowance of $X per year for the first n-2 years of the next determination period. Ensure general ECM allowances are applied to the Water Security Charge and mode-specific ECM allowances are applied to the mode-specific charge they correspond to.

If the saving was achieved in year 1 of the application period and it is clear that without adjustment SDP will retain the savings in the sixth year after it was first achieved, apply a negative ECM adjustment of $X+$F (where $F$ represents one year of financing costs) for the first year of the next determination period. ECM adjustments are applied to the base service charge.

4.8 Information requirements

We will need to collect additional information to implement the ECM at future price reviews. IPART will develop an appropriate framework to collect this information and include it in our written advice to SDP prior to future price reviews.

We already have an annual reporting framework in place with SDP. We will work with SDP over the 2017 determination period to ensure this reporting framework continues to meet our requirements.
5 Worked examples of the Efficiency Carryover Mechanism

The following examples illustrate how we intend to implement the ECM at future price reviews. For simplicity, we have not included the effects of inflation indexation in these examples. In each example, the ECM application period, which spans from year 5 of determination period 1 to year 4 of determination period 2, is shaded grey.

5.1 Example 1 – General efficiency saving

The ECM allows permanent net efficiency savings to be retained for five years. The following example shows how the ECM allows a general efficiency saving achieved in the third year of determination period 2 to carryover for the first two years of determination period 3. This ensures general efficiency savings are retained by SDP for five years before being passed on to customers through lower prices.

Table 5.1 General efficiency saving

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>D</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECM Application Period</td>
<td>Allowance</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECM allowance</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net allowance</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP gain</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The figures used in this example are for illustration only. Source: IPART analysis.

5.2 Example 2 – Mode-specific efficiency saving

The ECM allows mode-specific efficiency savings to be retained for up to five years, while SDP is in that specific mode, over a five consecutive year period, beginning when the efficiency saving is first achieved. The following example shows how the ECM allows a mode-specific saving to be held for up to five years, while SDP is in that specific mode, over a five consecutive year period, beginning when the efficiency saving is first achieved. In year 3 of determination period 2, SDP moves from mode 1 into mode 2 and makes an efficiency saving that is specific to mode 2. SDP remains in mode 2 for a total of four years before moving back to mode 1 in year 2 of determination period 3. In this example, SDP

27 The figures used in these examples are for illustration only.

28 IPART Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd
remains in mode 2 for four years out of the five consecutive year period following achievement of the mode-specific efficiency saving and retains this saving for four years.

Table 5.2  Mode-specific efficiency saving

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Determination period 1</th>
<th>Determination period 2</th>
<th>Determination period 3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECM Application Period</td>
<td>M1 M1 M1 M1 M1</td>
<td>M1 M1 M2 M2 M2</td>
<td>M2 M1 M1 M1 M1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M1 allowance</td>
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<td>100 100 100 100 100</td>
<td>100 100 100 100 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M2 allowance</td>
<td>200 200 200 200 200</td>
<td>200 200 200 200 200</td>
<td>190 190 190 190 190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>100 100 100 100 100</td>
<td>100 100 190 190 190</td>
<td>190 100 100 100 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>- - - - -</td>
<td>- - 10 - -</td>
<td>- - - - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M1 ECM</td>
<td>- - - - -</td>
<td>- - - - -</td>
<td>- - - - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M2 ECM</td>
<td>- - - - -</td>
<td>- - - - -</td>
<td>- - 10 - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net allowance</td>
<td>100 100 100 100 100</td>
<td>100 100 200 200 200</td>
<td>200 100 100 100 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP gain</td>
<td>- - - - -</td>
<td>- - 10 10 10</td>
<td>- - - - -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: M1 = mode 1; M2 = mode 2. The figures used in this example are for illustration only.

Source: IPART analysis.

5.3  Example 3 – Efficiency savings retained for a maximum of five years

The ECM now ensures that efficiency savings are held for a maximum of five year consistent with the Terms of Reference. If a permanent efficiency saving is achieved in the first year of the application period (ie, year 5 of determination period 1) and we are not aware of it when we set prices, SDP will retain this saving for six years. The ECM inflates the sixth year of the retained saving (ie, the $10 retained by SDP in year 5 of determination period 2) by financing costs (in this case assumed to be 5%) and passes this back to customers in year 1 of determination period 3.

Table 5.3  Ensuring savings are held for a maximum of five years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financing cost of 5%</th>
<th>Determination period 1</th>
<th>Determination period 2</th>
<th>Determination period 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECM Application Period</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowance</td>
<td>100 100 100 100 100</td>
<td>100 100 100 100 100</td>
<td>90 90 90 90 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>100 100 100 100 90</td>
<td>90 90 90 90 90</td>
<td>90 90 90 90 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>- - - - -</td>
<td>- - - - -</td>
<td>- - - - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECM allowance</td>
<td>- - - - -</td>
<td>- - - - -</td>
<td>-(10.5) - - - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net allowance</td>
<td>100 100 100 100 100</td>
<td>100 100 100 100 100</td>
<td>79.5 90 90 90 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP gain</td>
<td>- - - - -</td>
<td>- - - - -</td>
<td>-(10.5) - - - -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The figures used in this example are for illustration only.

Source: IPART analysis.
5.4 Example 4 – Temporary underspends and overspends

The regulatory framework allows the flexibility of temporary underspends in one year to be offset by temporary overspends in another year. The following example shows how the ECM does not affect temporary underspends and overspends, which are both retained by SDP. In this example, SDP underspends $10 in year 1 of determination period 2 and overspends $10 in year 2 of determination period 2. These amounts offset each other. Because the underspend in year 1 of determination period 2 is temporary, it is outside the scope of the ECM.

Table 5.4 Temporary underspends and overspends are outside the scope of the ECM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Determination period 1</th>
<th>Determination period 2</th>
<th>Determination period 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1  2  3  4  5</td>
<td>1  2  3  4  5</td>
<td>1  2  3  4  5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ECM Application Period</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowance</td>
<td>100 100 100 100 100</td>
<td>100 100 100 100 100</td>
<td>100 100 100 100 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>100 100 100 100 100</td>
<td>100 110 100 100 100</td>
<td>100 100 100 100 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>- - - - -</td>
<td>- - - - -</td>
<td>- - - - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECM allowance</td>
<td>- - - - -</td>
<td>- - - - -</td>
<td>- - - - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net allowance</td>
<td>100 100 100 100 100</td>
<td>100 100 100 100 100</td>
<td>100 100 100 100 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP gain</td>
<td>- - - - -</td>
<td>10 (10) - - -</td>
<td>- - - - -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* The figures used in this example are for illustration only.

*Source:* IPART analysis.
A Terms of Reference

The Hon. Greg Pearce MLC
Minister for Finance and Services
Minister for the Illawarra

Dr Peter J Boxall AO
Chairman
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal
PO Box Q290
QVB Post Office NSW 1230

Dear Dr Boxall

I write regarding the Terms of Reference for Referral of Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd (SDP) to IPART under Section 52 of the Water Industry Competition Act 2006.

I note your previous request that the Terms of Reference be amended to provide for IPART to establish an efficiency gains and losses carryover mechanism for SDP. I understand that implementation of this mechanism would involve the preparation of a methodology paper, which would be subject to public consultation prior to finalisation and publication.

I am pleased to support this proposal subject to the methodology paper also including a mechanism to adjust SDP’s revenue to accommodate significant gains and losses associated with the sale of surplus electricity and Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs).

Amended Terms of Reference, which refer to this mechanism as well as IPART’s proposed efficiency carryover mechanism, are attached to this letter. For clarity, the intention of the proposed energy adjustment mechanism is that:

1. It would only apply to electricity and RECs that are not required by SDP when the desalination plant is not in full operation mode when complying with the plant’s operating rules, as established by the Metropolitan Water Plan and subsequently included in SDP’s Network Operator Licence under the Water Industry Competition Act.

2. It would ensure that SDP customers for water (in Sydney Water’s Area of Operations) receive the benefit of significant gains and bear significant losses incurred as a result of the difference between the cost of electricity and RECs under SDP’s contracts with Inflegen and the market price for electricity and RECs arising from the sale of SDP’s surplus electricity and RECs (in the circumstances described in point 1).
3. For electricity, the mechanism would mirror the ‘Calculation of Shortfall Adjustment’ in SDP’s Electricity Supply Agreement with Infigen, with the ‘market price’ defined as the half-hourly spot price and/or the price of a contracted ‘available block’.

4. For RECs, the ‘market price’ would be the price shown in the Nextgen Greenroom Report, or another equivalent report.

I understand that IPART’s intention is to publish its draft methodology paper in the near future, with the final paper due to be published by May 2012.

Yours sincerely

Greg Pearce MLC
Minister for Finance and Services
Minister for the Illawarra

16 Feb 2015
Terms of Reference for Referral of Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Limited to IPART under Section 52 of the Water Industry Competition Act

Background

On 29 June 2016 Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Limited (SDP) was granted a network operator licence in relation to the desalination plant. The Minister for Finance and Services has, under section 51 of the Water Industry Competition Act 2006, decided that SDP is a monopoly supplier in relation to the water supply services it provides under its network operator licence.

SDP is the only supplier of non-rainfall dependent drinking water in New South Wales. Currently, the primary purchaser of drinking water supplied from the desalination plant is Sydney Water Corporation. Sydney Water Corporation purchases bulk water from two main sources, the Sydney Catchment Authority and, since its commissioning, the desalination plant.

The desalination plant is a key element in Sydney’s water security plan. Under its network operator licence, the desalination plant is required to maximise water production when dam storage levels in Sydney are below a prescribed threshold. Prices set by the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) should therefore reflect the water supply services provided by SDP set out below:

(a) the supply of non-rainfall dependent drinking water to purchasers; and

(b) the making available of the desalination plant to supply non-rainfall dependent drinking water.

Matters for consideration - pricing principles

Unless indicated otherwise, each price determination is to be consistent with the following pricing principles:

1. Maximum prices should be set so that expected revenues generated will recover the efficient costs of providing the services described at (a) and (b) above over the life of the assets. Costs include operating costs, a return on the assets and return of assets (depreciation).

2. In calculating the return on invested assets:
   i. The rate of return (or Weighted Average Cost of Capital) should reflect the commercial risks faced by the asset owner in providing the services.
   ii. IPART should determine an appropriate opening asset value.

3. Return of assets (depreciation) is to reflect the economic lives of the assets.

4. The structure of prices should encourage SDP to be financially indifferent as to whether or not it supplies water. As such the structure of prices should comprise separate charges for the different water supply services described at (a) and (b) above.

5. The amount of any adjustments under the mechanisms in principle 8 should each be separately quantified and published by IPART.
6. The charges for water supply services in (b) above should be a periodic payment and should reflect fixed costs including, return on assets, return of assets, and the fixed component of operating costs. SDP is to be entitled to charge for providing the water supply services in (b) above irrespective of levels of water in dam storages servicing Sydney or availability of water from other sources.

7. The charges for water supply services in (a) above should reflect all efficient costs that vary with output, including variable energy, labour costs, and maintenance costs.

8. For each price determination other than the first price determination:

   i. SDP should be allowed to carryover demonstrated efficiency savings, net of efficiency losses, in operating expenditure in providing the water supply services specified at (a) and (b) above for a period of 4 years following the year in which the efficiency saving was achieved.

   ii. In calculating the notional revenue requirement, IPART should determine the demonstrated efficiency savings and treatment of energy gains or losses in accordance with the Methodology Paper; and

   iii. A mechanism(s) is required to allocate the costs or benefits to SDP customers (in Sydney Waters area of operation) of actual gains or losses beyond a core band that result from the difference between SDP's costs of electricity and RECs under its contracts with Infugen and revenues from the sale of surplus electricity and RECs. The mechanism would only operate at times when:

       - the desalination is in Shutdown or in a Restart Period; and

       - SDP complied with its requirements to maintain and operate the desalination plant under clause A2 of its network operator licence.

9. Any other matters that IPART may consider relevant

**Methodology Paper**

IPART must publish on its website a methodology paper setting out its approach to implementing pricing principle 8 above (Methodology Paper) IPART may update the Methodology Paper from time to time.

**Timing**

The determination period is to cover the period to 30 June 2017.

For each successive price determination period, IPART is to make the price determination before the expiry of the current determination period.
B  Review of 2012 Energy Adjustment Mechanism

This appendix outlines the how we have updated, improved, and clarified the design of the Energy Adjustment Mechanism (EAM). It discusses the issues we considered in making these changes and responds to stakeholder views on these issues.

B.1  Incentive to prudently manage surplus energy contracts

We have made a decision to:

1  Increase SDP’s share of gains and losses that occur outside the core band from 10% to 20%. This change takes effect from 2017-18. SDP’s current share of gains and losses that occur outside the core band (ie, 10%) still applies for 2016-17.

B.1.1  The 2012 EAM aims to provide an incentive for prudent management of surplus energy

When SDP is not in full operation mode, it has surplus energy (electricity and RECs) contracts that it sells into the market. Depending on market prices at the time of each trade, SDP can incur gains and losses on the sale of these surplus energy contracts.

Without an EAM in place, these gains and losses would be retained by SDP in full. With an EAM in place, these gains and losses incurred during shutdown and restart are shared with customers. Because the gains and losses are shared with customers, it is important that SDP retains sufficient incentive to prudently and efficiently manage its surplus energy contracts.

The EAM set out in the 2012 Methodology Paper shares gains or losses on the sale of SDP’s surplus energy on the following basis:28

- A materiality threshold is set based on 5% of the value of SDP’s minimum energy contract cost (note this includes both energy used as well as surplus energy). This materiality threshold is used to create a core band of gains or losses of plus or minus 5% of the value of SDP’s minimum energy contract cost.
- SDP retains 100% of gains or losses within the plus or minus 5% core band.
- SDP retains 10% of gains or losses outside the plus or minus 5% core band.
- The remaining 90% of gains and losses outside the plus or minus 5% core band are passed on to SDP’s customers (in Sydney Water’s area of operations) by the EAM.

The 2012 Methodology Paper also states that in the case of any manifest imprudence that may arise on the part of SDP, IPART may exclude the affected transactions (in whole or in part) from the EAM.29

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B.1.2 Stakeholders disagree on whether SDP should forward sell surplus electricity

In its pricing proposal, SDP said that it considers the 2012 specification of the EAM, as it applies during shutdown and restart modes, remains broadly appropriate. SDP’s proposal was to retain the EAM as it applies to shutdown and restart modes as set out in the 2012 Methodology Paper. SDP engaged Seed Advisory to undertake a review of SDP’s Large Scale Generation Certificates (LGCs) and electricity trading. Seed Advisory found that SDP’s LGC and electricity trading activities:

- were broadly consistent with SDP’s policy requirements
- were prudent and reasonable for a company not actively engaged in the energy market, and
- within this context, have achieved value for money.

In response to our Issues Paper, Sydney Water made the following observations in relation to SDP’s management of its surplus energy:

- Sydney Water questioned SDP’s view that the risks and costs of actively managing resales of its excess electricity would outweigh the potential benefits.
- If SDP actively manages the resale of its electricity, it is clear that the benefits to customers significantly outweigh any risks or additional cost incurred by SDP.
- IPART’s ‘manifest imprudence’ measure is a particularly high test and it would be imprudent of SDP to not actively manage the resale of surplus electricity.
- The EAM should incentivise active trading by calculating the pass through amount on the difference between the contract price and the average peak price for electricity contracts traded on the ASX each quarter. The implication of this being:
  - that customers would receive the gains and losses associated with an active management style
  - if SDP remained passive it would retain the difference between a passive and active style, and
  - if SDP matched the active style it would not retain any of the gains or losses.

At the Public Hearing, there was further discussion around SDP’s management of its surplus energy contracts. SDP responded to Sydney Water’s proposal for SDP to actively manage the resale of its surplus electricity by arguing that it is not a merchant energy business and not equipped, nor financed, to take on these risky functions. SDP also noted that one of the biggest barriers to trading electricity forward, even just one quarter ahead, is the risk that it might get called into action at relatively short notice, for example in response to a health issue, and if they had sold that quarter ahead, they would be “left high and dry for energy”.

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30 SDP, Pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 47.
33 Sydney Water submission to IPART Issues Paper, November 2016, p 44.
34 Sydney Water submission to IPART Issues Paper, November 2016, p 46.
35 Sydney Water submission to IPART Issues Paper, November 2016, p 46.
36 IPART, SDP public hearing transcript, 8 December 2016, p 13.
37 IPART, SDP public hearing transcript, 8 December 2016, pp 59-60.
Sydney Water maintained its view that its customers would likely be better off if SDP undertook a more active approach to the resale of its surplus energy under the EAM and that although it accepted there would be more risk and cost associated with active management, it said the relevant question was whether the benefits are likely to outweigh the associated costs.38

B.1.3 Our energy consultant sees a role for some level of forward selling

As part of our determination of SDP’s prices and review of the Methodology Paper, we engaged Marsden Jacob Associates (Marsden Jacob) to review SDP’s energy costs. The public version of Marsden Jacob’s report is available on our website.39

Marsden Jacob made the following observations in relation to SDP’s energy trading policy:

▼ SDP’s management of surplus RECs is sensible and prudent. However, SDP could improve its surplus electricity position by forward selling some portion of its contracted surplus one quarter ahead.40

▼ A ‘less passive’ strategy of forward selling electricity could be accomplished under the existing contractual arrangements with little, if any, increase in the risk of being short against contracted maximum capacity.41 This is because high dam levels indicate a very low risk of drought in the next quarter. If drought breaks, SDP requires time to restart and it is unlikely it will reach full load within the next quarter. Last, the probability of being called on to respond to an emergency is extremely remote.42

The potential benefits of what Marsden Jacob term ‘less passive position management’ is estimated to be approximately $0.5 million to $1 million per annum on average when in shutdown, depending what proportion of SDP’s surplus energy is forward sold.43

Asymmetry of EAM outcomes

Marsden Jacob formed a view that the 2012 EAM is likely to result in a disproportionate sharing of gains and losses between SDP and customers – with SDP retaining the majority of gains on the sale of SDP’s surplus energy and customers receiving the majority of losses on the sale of SDP’s surplus energy. This is because Marsden Jacob considers there is limited scope for market prices to exceed SDP’s energy contract price while there is larger scope for market prices to be less than SDP’s energy contract price.44

Marsden Jacob noted the reason for this is that SDP’s surplus contracts, along with electricity and LGCs, also include other services (eg, retail margin and ancillary services) that SDP is not able to sell.45 Because a portion of the value of SDP’s surplus energy contracts cannot be sold in a secondary market, this will tend to limit the size of gains and amplify the size of losses on the sale of SDP’s surplus energy contracts. Marsden Jacob also noted SDP’s energy

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38 IPART, SDP public hearing transcript, 8 December 2016, pp 58-59.
contract prices are near new entry levels, which indicates the potential for losses on the sale of SDP’s surplus energy is likely to exceed the potential for gains.\textsuperscript{46}

**SDP’s incentives under the EAM**

Marsden Jacob considered the 2012 EAM design shields SDP from the vast majority of the potential gains and also the vast majority of prudent losses. Marsden Jacob commented that the limited upside available would potentially act as a deterrent to any rational business to invest in less passive management of the surplus electricity (especially) and LGC sales.\textsuperscript{47}

**Recommended changes to the EAM sharing ratios to improve incentives**

Marsden Jacob identified and analysed a number of alternative sharing arrangements to provide increased incentives for a less passive management of SDP’s surplus energy. Some of the potential modifications that Marsden Jacob reviewed include:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Modifying the core band to share some of the gains and losses within the threshold with customers.
  \item Increasing SDP’s share of gains and losses outside the threshold.
  \item Introducing a different sharing profile for gains as opposed to losses.
\end{itemize}

The options identified by Marsden Jacob were as follows:

\begin{itemize}
  \item **Option 1**: SDP retain 50\% of the first $2 million gain or loss per year. SDP retain 15\% of the incremental gain or loss in excess of $2 million.
  \item **Option 2**: SDP retain 50\% of the first $3 million gain or loss per year. SDP retain 20\% of the incremental gain or loss in excess of $3 million.
  \item **Option 3**: SDP retains 25\% of the total gain or loss regardless of its size.
\end{itemize}

Marsden Jacob also expressed the view that if there are material changes made to the EAM, they should take effect from 1 July 2017, given that we are now half way through the 2016-17 financial year (ie, the 2012 EAM should apply to financial year 2016-17).\textsuperscript{48}

**B.1.4 The EAM should provide an effective incentive for SDP to prudently manage its surplus energy**

We agree with Marsden Jacob’s view that the EAM should be amended to provide SDP a stronger incentive to prudently manage its surplus energy contracts (particularly its surplus electricity contracts). We have decided to:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Maintain our approach of summing gains and losses on surplus electricity and RECs into a single gain or loss on surplus energy so that only net gains or losses on energy are shared with customers.
  \item Maintain a core band of plus or minus 5\%. We have slightly modified this to be based off the value of surplus energy sold in a financial year (not the total value of contracted energy in a financial year). This will have two effects:
\end{itemize}

the core band will narrow slightly because the value of surplus energy is slightly less than the value of total energy when SDP is in shutdown, and

the core band will better match the contract value of surplus energy sold in each year. This will remove any potential incentive for SDP to time the sale of RECs in such a way as to retain a larger share of gains and smaller share of losses.49

Maintain that SDP retain 100% of gains and losses within the core band. Our reasons for this are:

- it is consistent with the Terms of Reference, and
- it provides SDP the appropriate and efficient incentive to prudently manage surplus energy contracts when those contracts are trading in the market within 5% of their contract value.

Increase SDP’s share of gains and losses outside the core band from 10% to 20%. Our reasons for this are:

- Marsden Jacob advised that a conservative approach to forward selling some of SDP’s surplus electricity could be expected to generate gains of approximately $0.5 million per year on average. Marsden Jacob also advised this activity is likely to involve additional administrative costs of up to $75,000 a year.50

- Under the 2012 EAM where SDP retains 10% of gains and losses outside the core band, SDP would retain $50,000 of the estimated gains of forward selling surplus energy (assuming its contracts are trading outside the core band). This is less than the estimated cost of $75,000 per year and explains why, under the 10% sharing arrangement, SDP may not have sufficient financial incentive to forward sell surplus electricity.

- Under the 2017 EAM where SDP retains 20% of gains and losses outside the core band, assuming its contracts are trading outside the core band, SDP would retain $100,000 of the estimated gains of forward selling its surplus energy. This is more than the estimated cost of $75,000 per year. By increasing SDP’s share of gains or losses outside the core band from 10% to 20%, we are removing the potential disincentive to forward sell surplus energy.

We note that this change is symmetric in design in that SDP will bear a slightly larger share of both gains and losses outside the plus or minus 5% core band.

We agree with Marsden Jacob that this change in the share of gains and losses outside the threshold should take effect from 1 July 2017 (ie, the 10% SDP and 90% customer sharing ratio should apply in 2016-17). The reason for this is that by the time the Methodology Paper is finalised, 2016-17 will be almost over. In this case there is little value in applying the stronger incentive retrospectively.

49 For example, under the previous fixed core band, if two years’ worth of deeply in the money RECs are sold in one financial year, SDP will be able to retain a larger share of the resulting gains than if these RECs were sold over two financial years (assuming the sale price is the same in both years).

B.2 We will review the prudence of SDP’s energy trading policy and activity

We have made a decision to:

2 Modify our prudence test of SDP’s energy trading policy and activity from a test of “no manifest imprudence” to a test of “the prudence of SDP’s energy trading policy and activity”.

We agree with Sydney Water’s submission that the 2012 Methodology Paper test of “no manifest imprudence” sets a standard that does not provide adequate incentives.

In our draft 2017 Methodology Paper, we said the approach we would take in assessing the prudence of SDP’s energy would be similar to that in assessing the prudence of capital expenditure. In this case, we would engage consultants to review:

- the prudence of SDP’s energy policy, and
- the prudence of how this policy was executed (ie, the sale of surplus energy), given information available at the time.

In response to our draft 2017 Methodology Paper, SDP expressed support for our position that we would assess prudence based on the information available at the time decisions were made. SDP further stated that it accepted many of the proposed principles behind the strengthening of the prudency test.

However, SDP requested further guidance on:

- how IPART will assess the efficiency and prudence of SDP’s energy trading, given the inherent differences between assessing the prudence of capital expenditure and the prudency of energy decision-making
- how IPART intended to use the calculation of ‘hypothetical gains and losses’ in determining the EAM pass-through amounts, and
- what information IPART will require from SDP as part of the reporting framework.

When assessing the prudence of SDP’s management of its surplus energy contracts at the next review, with the assistance of an expert energy consultant, we intend to review SDP’s policies, procedures, trading records, and other related documentation to understand how SDP has managed its surplus energy contracts over the review period. The over-arching question we will seek to answer is whether SDP’s management of surplus energy is in line with what would be reasonably expected as prudent management of surplus energy if there was no EAM in place (ie, if SDP was fully exposed to the risk of its surplus energy contracts).

The purpose of calculating a ‘hypothetical gain or loss’ is to quantify the difference between a passive strategy (ie, the hypothetical gain or loss) and SDP’s actual strategy (ie, the actual gain or loss) if this differs from the passive strategy. Over time, this would provide an indication of how successful SDP’s actual strategy has been. However, as clearly stated in the Methodology Paper, the actual gain or loss calculation will be used for the EAM. We do

53 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 23.
not intend to use the 'hypothetical gain or loss' information to retrospectively assess whether individual trading decisions in isolation were or were not prudent.

We intend to work with SDP to incorporate new information relating to SDP's energy trading function into the existing information reporting framework.

B.3 We are providing additional funding to allow SDP to meet the strengthened prudency test

We have made a decision to:

3 Allow SDP's request for additional funding of $0.52 million over the 2017 determination period to allow SDP to meet the strengthened prudency test.

We have strengthened the prudency test of SDP's management of its surplus energy. Therefore, we have decided to allow an amount equivalent to SDP's proposed costs of $0.52 million over the 2017 determination period to allow SDP to meet the strengthened prudency test. We note that we are not prescribing how SDP should manage its surplus energy nor are we endorsing the strategies outlined in the Seed Advisory report and SDP's submission to our Draft Report. We will assess prudency at the next review and as part of our prudency test we will request that SDP demonstrate how it has prudently managed its surplus energy contracts.

SDP submitted a consultant report from Seed Advisory, which detailed and costed a range of energy trading strategies from 'low risk' to 'higher risk'. SDP indicates that it intends to pursue the upper end of a 'low-risk' approach (and will consider adopting one aspect of the moderate risk approach) to trading a portion of its surplus energy contracts. According to SDP, this balanced strategy will be underpinned by principles that seek to “provide SDP (and customers) with access to gains from forward selling excess energy, while limiting SDP’s risk exposure from purchasing energy at volatile and highly asymmetric spot prices”. SDP stated that it intends to further investigate and consider several aspects of its energy trading strategy and noted that any energy trading strategy should be dynamic in response to changes in market conditions and drivers.

SDP proposed that we allow it to recover the costs of its energy trading function through regulated prices "consistent with the ‘base, step, trend’ approach to forecasting operating expenditure." SDP’s proposed trading costs are based on Seed Advisory estimates and include one-off set-up costs as well as ongoing operating costs. We note that SDP’s proposed ongoing operating costs are similar to those estimated by our energy consultant Marsden Jacob which estimated ongoing operating costs of $75,000 per year. We also note that while Marsden Jacob did not estimate one-off set up costs, we consider SDP’s proposal is reasonable given the set-up requirements identified in the Seed Advisory report.

55 Seed Advisory, Costs and Risks of Energy Trading, April 2017, Chapter 4.
56 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 25.
57 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 25.
58 SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 25.
60 Seed Advisory, Costs and Risks of Energy Trading, April 2017, pp 15-17, 21.
B.4 We are amending the calculation of gains and losses for RECs

We have made a decision to:

4 Amend how gains and losses on RECs are calculated so that gains/losses are recognised in the year the RECs are sold (not accrued).

Our Issues Paper discussed how the ability to ‘bank’ RECs complicates the calculation of gains or losses because there is a delay between when RECs are accrued and when they are subsequently sold.\(^{61}\)

Through the 2017 SDP price review it became apparent that the 2012 Methodology Paper was not clear about when to record realised gains and losses on RECs. That is, if a REC is accrued in one financial year and is then sold in the next financial year, should the EAM recognise the realised gain or loss in the first financial year (ie, the year it was accrued) or the second financial year (ie, the year it was sold)?

In our application of the 2012 Methodology Paper, we decided to recognise gains and losses in the year the REC was accrued (ie, not necessarily the year the gains or losses were realised). Our reasons for this include:

\(^\text{\textbullet} \) This approach is consistent with the way the core band is calculated in the 2012 Methodology Paper (ie, 5% of the value of total contracted electricity and RECs).

\(^\text{\textbullet} \) None of the RECs accrued over the application period were unsold by the time we applied the 2012 EAM as part of the 2017 SDP price review.

For the 2017 Methodology Paper, we have decided to recognise gains and losses on the sale of RECs in the year they are realised (ie, not necessarily the year they were accrued). Our reasons for this are:

\(^\text{\textbullet} \) Under the 2012 approach, there is a risk that some RECs accrued during the application period will be unsold and remain in SDP’s bank in the review year when we apply the EAM. This would create a complicated situation to adjust for at the next price review (ie, we would have to effectively re-open the previous application period, recalculate allowances, and make corresponding adjustments to future EAM allowances to take account of these RECs).

\(^\text{\textbullet} \) Recognising gains and losses before they are actually realised means that customers will be paying financing costs for eventual losses (and receiving financing costs for eventual gains) before these losses (and gains) have materialised. We consider it more appropriate that gains and losses are recognised in the year they are realised and that financing costs apply from this point in time.

In its response to our draft 2017 Methodology Paper, SDP accepted this amendment to the calculation of gains and losses for RECs.\(^{62}\)


B.5 We are clarifying our approach to financing costs

We have made a decision to:

5 Clarify the method used to apply financing costs to EAM allowances.

The 2012 Methodology Paper states that we will allow for the time value of money by applying an interest rate to increase the amounts eligible for pass-through at the end of each year. The interest rate we referred to was the average of the corporate bond yield (with one to five years to maturity; BBB bond credit rating) at the end of each quarter of the year as published by the Reserve Bank of Australia.63

In our Issues Paper, we noted that the RBA had discontinued this data series. As a substitute for the discontinued series, and to account for financing costs, we proposed to use either the RBA’s:

▼ “non-financial corporate BBB-rated bonds – yield – 3 year target tenor”, or
▼ “non-financial corporate BBB-rated bonds – yield – 5 year target tenor”.64

We considered the 3-year series appeared to provide a better match for the original (discontinued) series, and provided an indicative average of the timeframe over which holding costs need to be calculated.65

SDP stated that, conceptually, what is required is an interest rate that matches the time between the incurrence of the cost and the end of the determination period.66 Thus, a different rate would be applied, depending on when the cost was incurred. Nonetheless, SDP expressed support for our proposal that the 3-year series should be adopted as the financing rate for calculating cost pass-through amounts under the EAM, given the:

▼ relatively small time periods involved over a determination lend itself practically to using a single rate for all costs (and benefits), and
▼ 3-year rate would best match the average time period – assuming that the relevant costs are incurred uniformly throughout the determination period.

We have decided to maintain the application of financing costs. However, financing costs will now apply from the year a gain or loss is realised (not necessarily the year in which RECs are accrued).

We have also decided to refer to the RBA’s series “non-financial corporate BBB-rated bonds – yield – 3 year target tenor” as the reference rate. This aligns with SDP’s view and our preference in the Issues Paper. If this series is discontinued before a future application of the EAM, we will identify a similar substitute series as the reference rate.

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66 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 48.
67 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 48.
In its response to our draft 2017 Methodology Paper, SDP accepted this approach to the application of financing costs. We note that we have provided further clarification of the application of financing costs in this final 2017 Methodology Paper.

**B.6 We have decided not to extend the EAM to partial production**

We have made a decision to:

6. Not extend the EAM to partial production. This is consistent with the Terms of Reference.

In our Issues Paper, we noted that there may be a need to consider how the EAM interacts with SDP’s incentives to operate given the 2012 EAM applies only in shutdown and restart modes. In particular, we noted that if the EAM does not apply when the plant is producing desalinated water outside the Metropolitan Water Plan drought rule, SDP may at times have an incentive to remain in shutdown mode.

SDP noted that this is the most significant issue with the EAM and proposed that we extend the EAM to partial modes of production so that it does not face the potential perverse incentive of remaining in shutdown (ie, to continue to enjoy the benefits of the EAM), rather than entering partial production (ie, giving up the benefits of the EAM when it moves into production mode).

Under the Terms of Reference, the scope of EAM does not extend to a plant production mode. Therefore, our decision not to extend the EAM to partial production is by reference to the Terms of Reference.

In its response to our draft 2017 Methodology Paper, SDP stated that while it accepts our decision to not extend the EAM to partial production during the 2017 determination period, it intends to revisit this issue at the next price review.

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70 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, pp 48-49.
C  Review of 2012 Efficiency Carryover Mechanism

This appendix outlines how we have updated, improved, and clarified the design of the Efficiency Carryover Mechanism (ECM). It discusses the issues we considered in making these changes (and are still open to considering) and responds to stakeholder views on these issues.

C.1  The ECM should continue to focus on permanent efficiency savings

We have made a decision to:

7 Maintain the current approach of including efficiency savings, net of efficiency losses, for four years following the year they are achieved (i.e., five years total).

In its pricing proposal, SDP proposed that we allow both over and underspends (both temporary and permanent) to carryover and be shared with customers. 72

We do not support SDP’s proposal for the following reasons:

▼  We consider the proposal is inconsistent with our understanding of the Terms of Reference, which requires efficiency savings, net of efficiency losses, to be carried over by SDP for a period of time before being passed on to customers. We do not accept that this includes negative efficiency savings (i.e., efficiency losses).

▼  There is a risk under a symmetric carryover mechanism that the role of the expenditure review is weakened and that inefficient costs are shared with customers. This risk was highlighted in Sydney Water’s response to our Issues Paper where it said “Sydney Water agrees that efficiency losses should never be passed through to customers”. 73

In response to our draft 2017 Methodology Paper, SDP repeated a view it expressed in its pricing proposal that the continuing distinction between temporary and permanent savings adds considerable complexity (particularly in the context of SDP’s already more complex mode-based operating regime), given the practical difficulty in distinguishing between ‘temporary’ and ‘permanent’ savings, for little apparent benefit. 74

While operating costs are typically recurrent in nature, there can be a range of reasons why costs are delayed or brought forward between years. When costs are delayed or brought forward between years, this can result in temporary over and underspends relative to the regulatory allowance. Our regulatory framework allows flexibility for costs to be shifted between years within the regulatory period. This means SDP is able to offset overspends in one year with underspends in another year. If the ECM did not distinguish between temporary and permanent savings (that is, if SDP shared both temporary and permanent savings with customers), there is a risk that temporary underspends would be shared with customers.

72  SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 33.
74  SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 18.  SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 33.
customers while temporary overspends would be fully retained by SDP. This would effectively penalise SDP whenever costs are either delayed or brought forward between years within the regulatory period. We consider this would work against the flexibility of our regulatory framework.

If the issue is that it may be difficult to distinguish permanent efficiency savings from temporary savings in practice, it is important to note that a condition of allowing efficiency savings to carryover between regulatory periods is that there must be a corresponding permanent reduction in the regulatory allowance following the carryover period. If a permanent efficiency saving has not been made, there would be no case to permanently reduce the regulatory allowance and there would be no case to provide an efficiency carryover benefit. We note that any proposal to carryover efficiency savings under the ECM will be considered as part of our expenditure review. This will include establishing whether the identified saving is permanent and therefore justifies a permanent reduction in the regulatory allowance.

We do not share SDP’s view that the ECM adds considerable complexity. The potential role of the ECM is limited to the following three scenarios:

1. If a permanent saving is made in year 1 of a determination period, the saving is retained by SDP for five years and the ECM has no effect.

2. If a permanent saving is made in years 2, 3, or 4 of a determination period, SDP can propose to carry over the saving for the first 1, 2, or 3 years of the next determination period.

3. If a permanent saving is made in year 5 of a determination period, we will identify it at the next price review and ensure the saving is only retained by SDP for five years consistent with the Terms of Reference.

C.2 Treatment of mode-specific savings

We have made a decision to:

8 Maintain the current treatment of mode specific efficiency savings (ie, held for up to five years, within a five consecutive year period, while SDP is in that specific mode).

C.2.1 SDP should retain mode-specific savings for up to five years, while in that mode, within a five consecutive year period

We have decided to retain the 2012 Methodology Paper approach of allowing mode specific savings to be retained by SDP for up to five years, while SDP is in that mode, during a five consecutive year period. Our reasons for this are:

- It is consistent with the Terms of Reference.
- It means that savings are not carried over for an indefinite period until SDP re-enters a specific mode.
- It means the relative incentive strength for general and mode-specific savings are proportional to the relative value of general and mode-specific savings.
It therefore provides appropriate strength incentives for both mode-specific and general savings.

This is important given that in the long term, there appears to be greater scope for general efficiency savings than for mode-specific savings.

Our approach should encourage SDP to efficiently allocate resources between the search for both general and mode-specific efficiency savings.

The following sections outline SDP and Sydney Water’s proposed amendments to the treatment of mode-specific savings under the EAM and steps through the analysis supporting our decision.

C.2.2 Proposed amendments to the treatment of mode-specific savings

In its pricing proposal, SDP proposed that we amend the efficiency mechanism to allow mode specific savings to be held for five years, while SDP is in that specific mode, whether or not these five years are consecutive. SDP considers that its proposal:

- would acknowledge that it does not know *ex ante* (ie, before the fact), and cannot control, the duration of a mode
- would help to narrow the range of sharing ratios which apply in practice, which would strengthen the incentive properties of the mechanism, and
- would be more consistent with the intent of the Terms of Reference.

At the Public Hearing, SDP said that it supports the continuation of the ECM as it represents something very close to best practice regulation. SDP said that the ECM is complicated by its mode-dependent pricing structure and, as a result, the incentives under the 2012 ECM are weaker than perhaps IPART had initially intended.

SDP also reiterated the argument presented in its proposal that it be allowed to hold over mode-specific savings until it re-enters that specific mode so that it can retain the saving for the full five years.

In response to our Issues Paper and SDP’s proposal, Sydney Water noted that SDP’s proposed approach is not unreasonable in theory, however in practice it could result in holding periods spanning over decades which could reduce SDP’s incentive to look for efficiency savings and would potentially bind future Tribunals.

To overcome these issues, Sydney Water proposed a more generous amendment to the ECM that would allow mode specific savings to be retained for five consecutive years even if SDP is not in that specific mode.

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75 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 33.
76 That is, unlike the 2012 approach where SDP is able to retain mode-specific savings for somewhere between one and five years depending on how long it remains in that specific mode, under SDP’s proposal, it would be guaranteed to retain the mode-specific saving for five years whether or not they are consecutive.
77 IPART, SDP public hearing transcript, 8 December 2016, p 66.
78 IPART, SDP public hearing transcript, 8 December 2016, pp 66-67.
79 Sydney Water submission to IPART Issues Paper, November 2016, p 32.
80 Sydney Water submission to IPART Issues Paper, November 2016, p 32.
C.2.3 SDP’s proposal could result in savings being carried forward for an indefinite period until SDP re-enters the relevant mode

As an extreme example, consider the case of mode specific efficiency savings related to transition to plant operation mode. If these efficiency savings were retained for five non-consecutive years (ie, five separate transitions to restart), it could be a very long time before customers experience any benefit from these savings.

In response to our draft 2017 Methodology Paper, SDP recognises that with the reduction in drought triggers in the 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan, SDP is likely to experience extended periods of time in shutdown, which weakens the case to carryover savings from one period of operation to the next. On this basis, SDP accepted our decision to not carryover efficiency savings for an indefinite period.\(^{81}\)

C.2.4 There is greater scope for general savings than mode-specific savings

In response to our draft 2017 Methodology Paper, SDP maintains there is greater scope for efficiency savings in operation (ie, mode specific savings) than in shutdown (ie, general savings). This is because there are more activities involved in operation than in shutdown. As such, SDP maintains there should be a stronger incentive in place for mode-specific savings than is currently provided by the ECM.\(^{82}\)

We accept there are more activities in operation than in shutdown and thus greater scope for efficiency savings when the plant is in operation than when it is in shutdown. However, when general and mode-specific operating costs are scaled by the proportion of time that SDP is likely to be in shutdown and operation respectively, it becomes clear that there is greater scope for general efficiency savings than there is for mode specific efficiency savings.

The relative scope for general and mode-specific savings is illustrated in Figure C.1.

The key findings in Figure C.1 are:
- the scope for general efficiency savings covers about 11% (general operating costs excluding energy) of SDP’s total costs over the long run, and
- the scope for mode-specific efficiency savings covers about 3.5% (mode-specific operating costs excluding energy) of SDP’s total costs over the long run.

We excluded energy costs from this analysis because energy prices (but not energy volumes) are excluded from the scope of the ECM. These findings demonstrate why it is important that we do not over-incentivise mode-specific savings relative to general savings.

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\(^{81}\) SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 18.
\(^{82}\) SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, pp 17-18.
Figure C.1  Estimated components of SDP’s total costs over the long term based on IPART charges for 2017-18

Note: This analysis excludes capital costs relating to pipeline, membranes, additional pump, and skid test unit.

Data source: IPART analysis using IPART charges for 2017-18 (in $2016-17). Dam level analysis is based on Figure 2.4 from SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 9.

- Applying the 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan 60/70 rule to the last 56 years of dam level data (ie, from 1960 to 2016) shows there were six droughts over this period. SDP would have been in shutdown for approximately 44 years (79% of the time), transitioned to restart/shutdown six times each, and been in operation for approximately 12 years (21% of the time).

- Over the long term, capital and other non-operating costs make up about 76% of SDP’s total costs. General operating costs (excluding energy) make up about 11% of SDPs total costs while mode-specific operating costs (excluding energy) make up about 3.5% of SDP’s total costs.
C.2.5 General savings are more valuable than mode-specific savings

General savings (which occur all the time) are more valuable than mode-specific savings (which occur only some of the time).

Mode-specific savings only occur when SDP is in that specific mode. Most of the mode-specific costs are associated with operation mode. Operation mode is only expected to occur about 21% of the time (based on the 60/70 rule and historical dam level data).

Therefore, as a general rule of thumb, a $1 mode-specific saving achieved in operation mode (which occurs around 21% of the time) is only worth about 21% of the value of a $1 general saving (which occurs 100% of the time).

C.2.6 The 2012 ECM provides an incentive strength that is proportionate to the value of the efficiency saving

For general savings, assuming a 5% discount rate, the 2012 ECM allows SDP to retain 22% of the general saving (years one to five) and customers receive the remaining 78% of the general saving through lower prices (from year six into perpetuity).

For mode-specific savings, assuming SDP is in that specific mode for the first year of every five year determination period (ie, 20% of the time) and using a 5% discount rate, the 2012 ECM allows SDP to retain 22% of the mode specific saving (retained by SDP in year one) and customers receive the remaining 78% of the general saving through lower prices (prices are lower when SDP is in that specific mode in years six, 11, 16, and so on into perpetuity). If SDP remains in the specific-mode for more than one year after it achieves a mode-specific saving, it will receive more than 22% of the mode specific saving. At the extreme case, if SDP retains a mode-specific saving for five consecutive years and customers receive the benefit for one out of every five years thereafter, SDP will have retained 56% of the mode-specific saving and customers under the 2012 ECM.

While there is uncertainty about how long SDP will remain in a specific mode after it has achieved a mode-specific efficiency saving, SDP can expect to retain a share of mode-specific savings that is at least as large as its share of general efficiency savings (ie, 22%).

C.2.7 SDP’s proposed approach would over incentivise mode-specific savings relative to general savings

SDP’s proposal would guarantee it retains mode-specific savings for five years whether or not these years are consecutive. For example, assuming SDP is in operation for the first year of every five year determination period (ie, 20% of the time) and assuming a 5% discount rate, under SDP’s proposal:

- SDP would retain 22% of general savings and 70% of mode-specific savings.

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83 SDP pricing proposal to IPART, October 2016, p 9 (based on Figure 2.4).
84 This assumption is based on the finding that SDP would have been in operation approximately 21% of the time based on historical dam level data presented in Figure C.1.
Customers would not begin to benefit from mode-specific efficiency saving until 25 years after the mode-specific saving is achieved.

Assuming the same hypothetical situation outlined above, Sydney Water’s proposal would guarantee SDP retain mode-specific savings for five years whether or not it remains in that specific mode. Under Sydney Water’s proposal and our hypothetical example of SDP being in operation for the first year of every five year determination period (ie, 20% of the time), SDP would retain 22% of general savings and 98% of mode-specific savings.

Table C.1 shows how general and mode-specific efficiency savings are shared between SDP and customers under the 2012 ECM and how they would be shared under SDP’s and Sydney Water’s ECM proposals.
Table C.1 How efficiency savings are shared under the 2012 ECM, SDP’s ECM proposal, and Sydney Water’s ECM proposal

| Determination | Year | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 |
| **2012 ECM**  |      |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| General efficiency savings |      |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| SDP (22%)     | 1    | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Customers (78%)| -    | - | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Mode-specific efficiency savings |      |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| SDP (22%)     | 1    | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Customers (78%)| -    | - | - | - | - | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| **SDP’s ECM proposal** |      |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| General efficiency savings |      |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| SDP (22%)     | 1    | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Customers (78%)| -    | - | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Mode-specific efficiency savings |      |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| SDP (70%)     | 1    | - | - | - | - | 1 | - | - | - | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Customers (30%)| -    | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| **Sydney Water’s ECM proposal** |      |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| General efficiency savings |      |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| SDP (22%)     | 1    | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Customers (78%)| -    | - | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Mode-specific efficiency savings |      |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| SDP (98%)     | 1    | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Customers (2%) | -   | (1) | (1) | (1) | 1 | - | - | - | - | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |

**Note:** Analysis based on 5% discount rate. For mode-specific savings, SDP is assumed to be in the specific mode in the first year of each determination period and customers are assumed to continue to benefit from the mode specific saving in years 36, 41, 46, and so on into perpetuity.

**Source:** IPART analysis.
C.2.8 It is important that we do not over-incentivise mode-specific efficiency saving at the expense of general efficiency savings

If mode-specific savings are over-incentivised relative to general savings (as is the case under SDP and Sydney Water’s proposals), and if there is a budget constraint (whether this is a funding constraint, management time constraint, consulting budget constraint, etc), so that not every potential efficiency saving can be pursued, SDP could have an incentive to over-invest in mode specific savings relative to general savings. Ultimately, over-incentivising mode-specific savings relative to general savings could result in welfare losses for SDP’s customers.

C.2.9 Uncertainty about how long mode-specific savings can be retained

In response to our draft 2017 Methodology Paper, SDP contends that the ECM has not addressed the underlying uncertainty in relation to how long SDP is able to retain mode-specific savings. That is, SDP’s retention of mode-specific savings is more likely to be determined by the length of the drought than it is to be determined by the length of the regulatory period or ECM carryover period.  

We accept that the duration of droughts is uncertain and this creates uncertainty over how long SDP is able to retain mode-specific savings. While the ECM addresses uncertainty relating to the treatment of savings between regulatory periods, we agree the ECM does not address the underlying uncertainty relating to the length of a drought. This uncertainty is inherent to the purpose of the plant and it is not clear that it should be addressed through a regulatory instrument.

To illustrate this point, consider a situation where SDP operated in a competitive market for its drought response services. In this example, SDP is able to achieve a mode-specific saving during a drought period. Before the saving makes its way into lower prices as a result of competitive pressures, the drought breaks and there is no longer demand for SDP’s drought response services. In this case, SDP would no longer be able to sell its drought response services and it would no longer retain this saving. In addition to this, we note there is an additional source of uncertainty in a competitive market that the ECM does not reflect. That is the additional source of uncertainty regarding SDP being pressured to pass through savings to customers within a short period of time following a saving being achieved because of competitive market pressure.

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SDP submission to IPART Draft Report, April 2017, p 17.

IPART Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd
C.3 Adopting aspects of the ECM we applied to other IPART regulated water businesses

We have made a decision to:

9 Adopt aspects of the ECM we applied to other IPART regulated water businesses, including:
   – Removing the requirement that in order to be carried over, efficiency savings must be the result of a ‘management initiative’.
   – Shifting the ECM application period to use the five most recent years of actual data.
   – Adding a clawback to ensure savings are held by SDP for a maximum of five years.

In our Issues Paper, we asked whether we should move to adopt the ECM that we developed during our 2015-16 water pricing reviews (ie, Sydney Water, Hunter Water and WaterNSW). Our Final Report for the 2016 Sydney Water Price Review provides a detailed overview and analysis of the ECM we developed during our 2015-16 water pricing reviews.86

C.3.1 We have modified the definition of ‘efficiency saving’

The 2012 Methodology Paper includes a requirement that efficiency savings must be the result of ‘management initiative’. This requirement is subjective and unlikely to have much benefit in practice.

Consistent with the ECMS put in place for the other water utilities we regulate, SDP’s ECM should include any permanent cost reductions that SDP commits to. We consider the real benefit of the ECM is to challenge the business to identify cost savings (regardless of their source) and commit to making these savings permanent for the long term benefit of customers. That is, under our 2017 methodology, the business would apply for a carryover if it is confident that the efficiency saving is in fact permanent. The business would not need to demonstrate whether the efficiency savings it is as a result of management initiative.

C.3.2 We have lagged the application period by one year

Currently, the 2012 ECM applies to each five-year determination period. However, when the methodology is applied at a price review, we do not have actual data for the last year of the determination period. Under the 2012 ECM methodology, estimates for the final year of the determination period are therefore required.88

Again, to be consistent with the ECMS put in place for the other water utilities we regulate, we have decided to lag the 2017 ECM application period by one year. In SDP’s case it would apply to the last five years of actual data (ie, the last year of the previous determination period and the first four years of the current determination period).

This means at the next price review, the ECM would apply to the last year of the 2012 determination (2016-17). In principle, new incentives should not be applied retrospectively. However, in this instance we consider there is a strong case to include 2016-17 in the ECM to ensure SDP retains efficiency savings for a maximum of five years consistent with the Terms of Reference (discussed in the next section).

For clarity, we are lagging the application period by one year. We are not proposing to change the number of years that savings can be retained by SDP as specified by the Terms of Reference (this is still five years).

C.3.3 We have added a clawback feature to ensure savings are retained by SDP for a maximum of five years

The 2012 ECM methodology effectively allows for efficiency savings to be held for up to six years. That is, if SDP makes an efficiency saving in the last year of the current determination period (2016-17) and we set prices for the 2017 determination period without this information, SDP could retain the saving for six years (ie, 2016-17 plus the full five years of the 2017 determination period). This outcome would not be consistent with the Terms of Reference which state that SDP should be able to retain efficiency savings for four years following the year the saving is achieved (ie, five years).

We are correcting for this by adding a clawback feature to the 2017 ECM. In the example above, the sixth year of benefit retained by SDP in the last year of the 2017 determination period would be inflated by the time value of money (consistent with our application of financing costs under the EAM) and returned to customers (through the base service charge) in the first year of the 2022 determination period.

This feature is consistent with the clawback feature we included in the ECM established for the other water utilities we regulate.
## Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012 determination period</td>
<td>The period 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 ECM</td>
<td>The Efficiency Adjustment Mechanism outlined in the 2012 Methodology Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012 EAM</td>
<td>The Energy Adjustment Mechanism outlined in the 2012 Methodology Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Methodology Paper</td>
<td>The Methodology Paper published by IPART in April 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 Determination</td>
<td>Determination of SDP’s maximum prices from 1 July 2017, made in this review.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 determination period</td>
<td>The period 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 ECM</td>
<td>The Efficiency Carryover Mechanism outlined in the 2017 Methodology Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 EAM</td>
<td>The Energy Adjustment Mechanism outlined in the 2017 Methodology Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 Methodology Paper</td>
<td>The Methodology Paper published by IPART in June 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjustment period</td>
<td>The determination period immediately following the review year</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEMO</td>
<td>Australian Energy Market Operator</td>
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<tr>
<td>Application period</td>
<td>The five year period immediately preceding the review year</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carryover period</td>
<td>The first three years of a determination period immediately following the review year</td>
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<tr>
<td>Determination period</td>
<td>The period over which IPART sets maximum prices</td>
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<tr>
<td>General saving</td>
<td>Efficiency savings that apply in all modes of operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hunter Water</td>
<td>Hunter Water Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infigen</td>
<td>Infigen Energy Limited</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGC</td>
<td>Large scale generation certificates</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRMC</td>
<td>Long run marginal cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Metropolitan Water Plan</td>
<td>Under the 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan, when total dam storage levels fall below 60% (‘on’ trigger) SDP must operate to maximise its supply of drinking water to Sydney Water’s area of operation. Outside the ‘minimum run time’, these arrangements will continue to apply until total dam storages reach 70% (‘off’ trigger).</td>
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<tr>
<td>60/70 rule</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mode-specific saving</td>
<td>Efficiency savings that only apply in a specific mode of operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review year</td>
<td>The year in which IPART reviews and sets prices for the next determination period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBA</td>
<td>The Reserve Bank of Australia</td>
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<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Renewable energy certificate</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sydney Water</td>
<td>Sydney Water Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>WIC Act</td>
<td>Water Industry Competition Act 2006 (NSW)</td>
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